• KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00209 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10523 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00209 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10523 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00209 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10523 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00209 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10523 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00209 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10523 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00209 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10523 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00209 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10523 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00209 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10523 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 -0.14%

Ashgabat Police Reportedly Crack Down on Non-Resident Workers

In Turkmenistan, police raids targeting non-resident laborers seeking short-term work in the capital are intensifying, according to Turkmen.News, placing additional pressure on citizens from regions that face chronic unemployment at home.

Day Laborers Targeted

Police in Ashgabat have reportedly been extorting money from non-resident day laborers, threatening them with detention and forced removal from the city. These raids are concentrated near the newly opened transport hub in the Gurtly district, which recently replaced the former central interchange near the Tekin Bazaar, a long-established site for informal employment.

For many from Turkmenistan’s regions, Ashgabat offers the only opportunity to earn a daily wage of $2.50 to $3.50. But this marginal lifeline is vanishing as police expel day laborers from Gurtly and threaten to drive non-residents out of the capital entirely.

The area has developed its own informal employment system. Several women operate as unofficial coordinators, posing as passengers at the bus stop. They maintain notebooks filled with phone numbers, service prices, and available workers. Locals approach them with tasks, such as moving furniture or doing basic repairs, and are promptly matched with laborers who remain discreetly nearby.

Raids and Intimidation

Authorities appear intent on dismantling this system. Eyewitnesses say police conduct daily patrols in Gurtly, stopping young men, checking residency documents, and confiscating their earnings. The money is allegedly pocketed by officers, with no official record kept.

Victims report being insulted, intimidated, and threatened with deportation to their home provinces before being released following brief “educational conversations.”

Such operations are not new. In late October, Ashgabat police issued mass fines to non-resident taxi drivers. During the summer’s UN forum in Avaza, day laborers in Turkmenbashi were reportedly detained en masse, held in temporary facilities, and then forcibly returned to their home region. These actions are part of what appears to be an ongoing, unofficial campaign of pressure against internal migrants.

Erasing Poverty from the Capital’s Image

Some Ashgabat residents believe the relocation of the main bus hub to the outskirts is part of a broader strategy to conceal poverty behind the capital’s polished facade. “This is an attempt to cleanse the capital of any hints of the real, unsightly side of life,” one resident remarked.

Income levels outside the capital remain significantly lower. For many families, irregular work in Ashgabat is their only source of supplemental income. Yet instead of addressing inequality, observers argue that authorities are reinforcing regional discrimination, further marginalizing non-resident workers.

Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan Aim to Boost Trade to $3 Billion by 2030

Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have reaffirmed their commitment to increasing bilateral trade to $3 billion annually by 2030. This objective was emphasized during the 13th meeting of the Kazakh-Kyrgyz Intergovernmental Council, held on November 13 in Astana and co-chaired by Kazakhstan’s Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov and Adylbek Kasymaliev, Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers of Kyrgyzstan.

The meeting covered a broad spectrum of cooperation, including trade, investment, water and energy management, as well as cultural and humanitarian initiatives.

Kasymaliev highlighted recent progress, noting that bilateral trade reached $1.7 billion in the first nine months of 2025, a 15% increase compared to the same period in 2024.

Direct investment from Kazakhstan to Kyrgyzstan totaled nearly $64 million in the first half of 2025. “This demonstrates the Kazakh business community’s trust in Kyrgyzstan and the broad opportunities for new projects,” said Kasymaliev.

Key Infrastructure Projects and Trade Hubs

The Council identified priority areas to strengthen cooperation. Chief among them is the construction of an industrial, trade, and logistics complex near the Karasu and Ak-Tilek road checkpoints at the border. This facility is expected to become a major regional hub for cargo consolidation, processing, and distribution, advancing industrial integration between the two economies.

Another key project is the establishment of a wholesale storage and distribution center for fruits and vegetables in Kazakhstan’s Almaty region. This facility aims to secure uninterrupted agricultural trade between the two countries.

Bilateral trade in agricultural products surged by 42% in the first eight months of 2025, reaching $326 million. Over 80% of that trade volume comprised exports from Kazakhstan.

Energy Cooperation and Border Infrastructure

The sides also discussed potential supplies of Kazakh oil and motor fuel to Kyrgyzstan. The latter consumes about 1.6 million tons of motor fuel annually, with 93% imported from Russia. Fuel prices in Kyrgyzstan have climbed since mid-2025, driven by higher wholesale costs in Russia, linked to reduced refining capacity, damage from Ukrainian drone attacks, and sanctions-related difficulties in acquiring technological equipment.

Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan stressed the need to complete the ongoing reconstruction of three key border checkpoints, Kichi-Kapka-Besagash, Ak-Tilek-Karasuu and Karkyra-Kegen-which are expected to significantly facilitate cross-border trade.

Tourism and Cultural Cooperation

The two countries are also prioritizing mountain tourism. Plans include reviving tourist routes to Khan Tengri Peak, a destination located on the border and shared by both states, offering mutual opportunities to boost tourism-related revenues.

American Companies Explore Investment Prospects in Tajikistan

President Emomali Rahmon’s recent visit to the U.S. has sparked renewed interest in the Tajik economy. In New York, a major investment forum showcased large-scale development projects to American companies from hydropower initiatives to green data centers.

U.S.-Central Asia Engagement via C5+1

An event titled Presentation on Tajikistan’s Investment Opportunities was held at the Vista LIC Hotel in New York. It was organized by the state-owned Tajinvest enterprise with support from the State Committee for Investment of Tajikistan and the U.S., Tajikistan Business Council. The gathering marked the tenth anniversary of the C5+1 platform, a regional framework for economic cooperation between the U.S. and Central Asia.

Timed to coincide with Rahmon’s official visit to Washington, the event was designed to promote Tajikistan’s economic potential to U.S. businesses.

Jonibek Ismoil Hikmat, Tajikistan’s permanent representative to the United Nations, opened the event with a speech emphasizing the country’s strategic aspirations.

“Today, we are creating a new Silk Road, not of caravans and goods, but of ideas, innovations, and investments,” he stated.

Elena Son, Executive Director of the U.S.-Tajikistan Business Council, encouraged American firms to more actively explore the Tajik market. She shared her experience accompanying major U.S. companies to Dushanbe, affirming that Tajikistan is increasingly ready for serious investment.

“They sometimes take a long time to get started, but once they do, no one can catch up with them,” she noted, describing the pace of Tajik partners once projects are underway.

Investment Mechanisms and Key Projects

Tajinvest CEO Dilshod Jurazoda delivered a presentation titled How to Invest in Tajikistan? He outlined legislative guarantees, investor support mechanisms, and the implementation of a One-Stop-Shop model within Tajinvest to streamline business entry.

Jurazoda highlighted a portfolio of strategic projects open to foreign investment, including:

  • Dushanbe Mall
  • Dushanbe Arena Hall
  • Expo Center Dushanbe
  • Sugdbarktaminot energy complex
  • Mehrgon agro-cultural complex in Sughd
  • Green data centers leveraging Tajikistan’s hydropower capacity
  • Tourism infrastructure development projects

U.S. Businesses Signal Interest

The event featured interactive sessions, with participants pitching projects, engaging in open discussions, and networking in an informal setting.

Representatives of major U.S. investment and tech firms were in attendance, including Edward Mermelstein (Atlantic Bridge Capital), Val Kogan (Mid-Atlantic-Eurasia Business Council), Burke McCormack (Ardmore Capital), Mack Kerker and David Halpert (Penataran), Leon Nektalov (Leon Diamond), Sam Bousfield (Samson Sky), and Erkin Mustafokulov (United Bros LC).

The U.S. delegation stressed that direct dialogue with Tajik officials offered valuable insights into the local market and practical opportunities for cooperation.

The New York presentation underscored growing American interest in Tajikistan. With major projects on offer, abundant energy resources, and demonstrated government support, prospects for deepening bilateral economic ties appear increasingly favorable.

Kyrgyzstan’s Sugar Market: a Story of Revival

According to the Kyrgyz Ministry of Water Resources, Agriculture, and Processing Industry, which oversees national food security through agricultural production monitoring, domestic production now fully covers the nation’s sugar needs, turning what was once a chronic import dependency into a cautious success story of agro-industrial revival.

Soviet Legacy

In Soviet times, despite Kyrgyzstan’s southern position and thanks to large quantities of glacier water, the republic grew a large quantity of sugar beets. Kyrgyzstan’s sugar-beet fields fed a network of processing plants that supplied not only the republic itself but also part of the wider region.

The collapse of that system in the 1990s left the sector fragmented: beet acreage shrank, equipment aged, and the country increasingly turned to imported raw cane sugar and white sugar, often refined abroad.

With the continued operations of the Kaindy-Kant sugar factory and the relaunch of the Koshoi factory in 2017, a partial turnaround began in the late 2010s, backed by development funds and state support. The explicit goal was to rebuild a domestic value chain and reduce exposure to price swings and supply disruptions in neighboring markets.

A story of tariffs

For much of the 2010s and early 2020s, Kyrgyz sugar plants depended on raw cane sugar imports, which they processed into refined sugar for the domestic market.

When Kyrgyzstan joined the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) in 2015, it adopted the bloc’s Common Customs Tariff but secured a sugar-specific concession. For five years after accession, the country could import up to 100,000 tons of raw cane sugar per year, on condition that the resulting white sugar remained in Kyrgyzstan and was not re-exported into other EAEU states.

Once that transition period expired in 2020, Bishkek continued to receive targeted support. In 2022, the Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC) extended 0% customs duty on imports of white sugar and raw cane sugar into Kyrgyzstan until 31 October 2022. In 2023, the EEC again introduced duty-free quotas for raw cane sugar, allowing designated volumes to enter Kyrgyzstan at zero duty for refining.

These measures effectively subsidized the input costs of Kyrgyz refineries, helping them stay afloat at a time when many local farmers still preferred other crops and when cheap finished sugar from larger EAEU producers was flooding the market.

Reaching self-sufficiency

Since 2020, sugar beet production has roughly doubled. In 2024, officials reported that farmers harvested more than 620,000 tons of sugar beet. When processed, it was enough to meet the estimated annual domestic sugar requirement of about 120,000 tons of sugar.

By late 2024, the government declared that Kyrgyzstan had fully covered its sugar demand from domestic production, a status it confirmed again for the first nine months of 2025. Sugar now stands among six “socially important” food products for which domestic output is deemed sufficient to secure food security, alongside potatoes, milk, meat, vegetables and eggs.

Kyrgyzstan now aims to raise annual sugar production to 200,000 tons by 2030.

Caught between protection and competition

Bishkek’s tariff and subsidy policy has walked a fine line: using duty-free raw cane sugar imports and temporary trade measures to avoid sudden shortages and price spikes, while simultaneously pushing for local beet planting.

On one side, farmers in the Chuy and Talas regions have long complained that cheap imported sugar can undercut the economics of beet cultivation, despite subsidies. Many producers are considering abandoning sugar beet in favor of more profitable crops.

On the other side, the country could quickly slip back into dependence on imported sugar. Growing water scarcity increases the risk of weather shock that could drastically reduce sugar beet output.

Strategy outlook

For now, Kyrgyzstan’s sugar market sends a positive signal. Food-security metrics have improved: the country can credibly claim self-sufficiency in sugar, at least on an average-year basis. Tariff policy has shifted from enabling cheap raw imports to increasingly emphasizing domestic beet production, though emergency zero-duty measures remain a tool in the government’s kit. Raising sugar production to 200,000 tons by 2030 will require significant investment alongside deeper coordination between farmers and factories.

Kyrgyzstan Elections 2025: Short Campaign, High Stakes

Campaigning for seats in Kyrgyzstan’s upcoming parliamentary elections is underway, and it is already shaping up to be a race unlike anything seen before in Kyrgyzstan. The 467 candidates competing for the 90 seats in parliament have only 20 days to make their cases to voters in their districts. Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov’s government has vowed to keep these elections clean and fair, and threatened severe punishment for those who attempt to cheat in any way.

Uneven Electoral Landscape

The country is divided into 30 voting districts, and in each district, the three candidates who receive the most votes will win seats.

The level of competition varies, depending on the district. Electoral district 11, which is Manas city (formerly Jalal-Abad), has 155,023 eligible voters. Only five candidates are running in the district, three of whom are women. According to new election rules, a woman (or a man) must win at least one of the three seats available in each district.

Name recognition is always important, and especially so in elections with many newcomers seeking seats in parliament. One of the candidates in District 11 is Shairbek Tashiyev, the brother of the current head of the State Committee for National Security (GKNB), Kamchybek Tashiyev. He is almost certain to win one of the seats.

In electoral district 19 in Kyrgyzstan’s northern Chuy Province, with 138,373 eligible voters, there are 25 candidates competing.

The two districts with the largest number of voters, district 15 in the Aksy area of western Kyrgyzstan with 160,218 voters, and district 28 in the Zhety-Oguz area of eastern Kyrgyzstan with 160,181 voters, have, respectively, 15 candidates and 17 candidates. In the districts where there are 15 or more candidates, the three winners might only receive around 10,000 votes, or even less.

The candidates are out meeting with voters, but many are relying on social networks to promote their image and spread their message. Domestic television stations, ElTR and UTRK, are airing candidate debates that “will be distributed regionally, depending on the candidates’ electoral districts.”

Not Running

Eleven of the current 90 deputies in parliament have opted not to run for reelection. Among them are Iskhak Masaliyev – currently in the Butun (United) Kyrgyzstan Party but previously the long-time head of Kyrgyzstan’s Communist Party – the son of Absamat Masaliyev, who was first secretary of the Communist Party of the “Kirghizia” Soviet Socialist Republic from 1985 until independence in August 1991.

Another current member of parliament who is not running is Jalolidin Nurbayev, whose attempt to register was rejected due to two criminal cases having previously been opened against him, one in 2006, the other in 2021.”

A new election rule prohibits people whose cases were “terminated on non-rehabilitating grounds” from being eligible to hold public office. Effectively, this means that any case against them has been closed without declaring the person innocent, but without restoring their reputation, even though they are no longer being prosecuted.

Members of organized criminal groups and their family members have won seats in previous elections.

Back in September 2005, Member of Parliament Bayaman Erkinbayev was shot dead outside his home in Bishkek. A wealthy businessman, Erkinbayev was widely believed to have connections to organized crime.

Some 20 years ago, Ryspek Akmatbayev was allegedly the top kingpin in Kyrgyzstan’s organized criminal world. His brother, Tynychbek, was an MP when he was killed when a riot broke out at a prison he was visiting outside Bishkek. Ryspek ran for his slain brother’s vacant seat in parliament and won the April by-election, but was gunned down a month later while leaving a mosque in Bishkek.

More recently, Iskender Matraimov was elected to parliament in 2015, reelected in 2020, and in the snap elections of 2021. His younger brother, Raimbek, a former Customs Service deputy chief, was allegedly one of the biggest underworld figures in Kyrgyzstan and the subject of several investigative reports. GKNB chief Tashiyev started a crackdown on organized criminal groups in late 2023, and Raimbek fed the country. The CEC finally stripped Iskender of his deputy’s mandate in February 2024.

On November 7, the CEC announced it had denied the registration documents of 34 people, several of whom were rejected because of their connections to organized crime. In total, the CEC refused to register 122 would-be candidates for the upcoming parliamentary elections.

Enforcing the Rules

Since the snap elections were first announced in late September, President Japarov and GKNB chief Tashiyev have repeatedly warned that the abuses seen in past elections will not be tolerated. Tashiyev said just days after the date of the early elections was announced that “any fraud will be exposed, and the punishment will be the harshest.”

Since Kyrgyzstan’s inaugural parliamentary vote in 1995, elections have been consistently marred by vote-buying. Speaking at a youth forum on November 10, Japarov said, “We have established strict controls on voter bribery.” One candidate from electoral district 3 has already been caught and disqualified after he arranged a small meeting with some 15 voters and promised them “material rewards” for casting their ballots for him.

The practice of buying votes is unfortunately deeply entrenched in Kyrgyzstan’s parliamentary elections, so while this example is encouraging, it is unlikely to discourage everyone in the country from attempting to bribe people for their vote.

The Field of Candidates

The change from elections decided by party (2007, 2011, 2025, 2020) or partially party lists and single-mandate (2021) to the impending elections decided solely by single-mandate districts has led to an interesting array of candidates. Most of the candidates are politicians or state employees, many are businessmen, several dozen are listed as “unemployed,” there are some bloggers, and a few academics and activists.

Changes to the constitution approved in a national referendum in 2021 transferred most of the political power to the executive branch. However, Kyrgyzstan’s legislative branch has often been weaker in the past than the executive branch, yet deputies were still able to use parliament to carry out changes and keep presidents in check.

Parliament has been relatively quiet since the 2021 elections, outside of the scandals that surrounded some of the 27 deputies whose mandates were revoked during the four years since the last elections. Perhaps the new parliament, with some new lawmakers, can re-energize the role the legislative branch plays in the country.

Balancing Act: Kyrgyzstan’s Strategy to Manage Chinese Debt

In recent years, China’s economic engagement across Eurasia has become increasingly diverse and complex. What began with large-scale infrastructure projects under the Belt and Road Initiative has expanded into a wide range of sectors, including critical minerals, energy, pharmaceuticals, and textiles. Alongside these investments, China has also deepened its soft power presence through Luban Workshops, educational exchanges, and media cooperation with regional countries.

While this growing influence strengthens China’s position as a major development partner, it has also raised public concern about debt dependency. Kyrgyzstan illustrates this issue more clearly than most. In 2022, more than 40% of the country’s official external debt was owed to China. This heavy reliance has sparked debate over whether the relationship creates long-term vulnerabilities that could limit economic independence and policy flexibility.

The scale of the debt has generated several layers of concern within Kyrgyz society. Many worry that national resources are being redirected from essential public needs toward debt repayment. Others fear that financial obligations could eventually lead to asset-for-debt arrangements or serve as a tool of political influence. Kyrgyz governments have therefore explored various ways to ease their debt burden, but with limited success.

Direct Negotiations with China and Innovative Approaches

The first approach has been to negotiate directly with China for relief. However, these talks have mostly produced temporary payment deferrals rather than genuine debt reduction. In November 2020, China Eximbank agreed to postpone $35 million in loan repayments until the period between 2022 and 2024. The agreement remained purely commercial, requiring a 2% fee on the deferred amount and likely continued interest payments.

This arrangement differs from the more concessional restructuring models often offered by multilateral lenders or Paris Club members, which are designed to restore debt sustainability and support economic reform. Chinese state lenders such as the Eximbank tend to approach debt through a commercial logic, emphasizing the protection of contracts and the profitability of Belt and Road projects. As a result, debt forgiveness is considered an unattractive option from the perspective of Chinese financial institutions.

Kyrgyzstan has also experimented with more innovative ideas. The government proposed that creditors forgive part of its debt in exchange for investments in environmental and climate-related projects. These initiatives, often described as debt-for-nature swaps, would redirect funds from debt service toward renewable energy, reforestation, or carbon reduction programs. Although several European partners expressed interest, China declined to participate in 2024.

China’s reluctance reveals an important feature of its lending philosophy. Despite its growing global presence, Chinese state banks continue to prioritize financial security and measurable returns over experimental or non-monetary arrangements. Even when Beijing publicly supports global climate cooperation, its institutions remain cautious about initiatives that fall outside traditional commercial frameworks.

Kyrgyzstan’s New Debt Management Strategies

Kyrgyzstan’s approach to managing its external debt is undergoing a gradual but meaningful transformation. The government has introduced new policies and sought diversified financial partnerships in an effort to strengthen fiscal stability and reduce dependency on any single creditor.

One of the most significant steps has been the adoption of a legislative debt ceiling that prevents the government from owing more than 45% of its total external debt to any one actor. This measure responds to public concerns about the country’s exposure to Chinese lending, while also reinforcing a sense of fiscal responsibility. The debt ceiling serves a dual purpose by helping officials justify the pursuit of alternative financing and by creating an institutional safeguard against excessive concentration of debt.

In addition to legislative measures, Kyrgyzstan has begun to explore new instruments to access international capital markets. The government announced plans to raise $1.7 billion through the issuance of ten-year sovereign bonds in Hong Kong. Entry into global bond markets can provide Bishkek with greater financial independence, offering new opportunities to attract investment and diversify sources of capital. Over time, this approach may help establish a more balanced debt structure that is less reliant on bilateral lenders.

Another key component of this evolving strategy is Kyrgyzstan’s growing engagement with multilateral banks and international financial institutions. The country’s borrowing from the World Bank now stands at around $815 million, and its loans from the Asian Development Bank amount to approximately $793 million.

The Eurasian Fund for Stabilization and Development, to which Kyrgyzstan owes about $258 million, has already surpassed the International Monetary Fund, whose loans total $238 million. This shift reflects a deliberate effort to widen the country’s financial partnerships and strengthen its economic resilience.

As a result of these adjustments, the share of external debt owed to China has declined from around 40% to 36%. This change demonstrates that Kyrgyzstan’s diversification strategy is beginning to take effect.

Diversification Goals and Strategic Shifts

Kyrgyzstan’s diversification policy serves several interconnected goals. The first objective is to gradually reduce long-term dependence on Chinese financing while easing public concerns about debt exposure. By doing so, Bishkek is seeking to create the conditions for a more balanced and mutually beneficial partnership with Beijing.

The second goal reflects a qualitative shift in development priorities. Instead of focusing primarily on large infrastructure projects, the government is aiming to channel future financing toward long-term structural needs such as community development, climate resilience, and local governance capacity. The third and perhaps most strategic aim is to enhance Kyrgyzstan’s overall financial credibility, which would help the country mobilize additional resources and attract new investment in the years ahead.

Although the diversification strategy is designed to reduce dependency on Chinese loans, it does not signal an intention to end cooperation with Beijing. On the contrary, the Kyrgyz government continues to view China as an essential economic partner and is looking to shift the relationship from one dominated by debt toward one centered on productive investment and trade.

The success of this approach will depend on Bishkek’s ability to maintain constructive engagement with China while expanding partnerships with other regional and global financial actors. Achieving this balance will be critical for ensuring both fiscal sustainability and long-term development stability.