On January 22 at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev signed President Donald Trump’s new Board of Peace charter. The document matters less than what their participation signifies: recognized access to the White House and a willingness to be publicly associated with a U.S.-led initiative. This is all the more significant as Washington’s relations with several long-standing partners have recently become more fraught and publicly contested. The Central Asian response is part of that story. Their participation indicates that the Trump White House regards them as interlocutors of consequence, and that both Central Asian capitals are embracing that status.
On December 1, Washington assumed the G20 presidency for 2026 and set three priorities: limiting regulatory burdens, strengthening affordable and secure energy supply chains, and advancing technology and innovation. It has also scheduled the leaders’ summit for December 14–15, 2026, in the Miami area. On December 23, Trump said that he was inviting Tokayev and Mirziyoyev to attend as guests. That invitation places Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan inside a host-defined agenda whose working tracks overlap with their strongest external bargaining assets, including energy, critical minerals potential, and transport connectivity. Trump publicly tied the invitations to discussions of peace, trade, and cooperation, which is in line with his subsequent Board of Peace invitations.
Diplomatic Logic and Multi-Vectorism
It is worthwhile situating these developments in the context of Central Asian cooperation, which Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have driven as the regional core. At the August 2024 Consultative Meeting in Astana, all five leaders signed a Roadmap for the development of regional cooperation for 2025–2027, and adopted a “Central Asia 2040” conceptual framework. Tokayev and Mirziyoyev referenced their 2022 allied-relations agreement and announced plans to adopt a strategic partnership program through 2034, including large-scale joint economic and energy projects.
Moscow’s preoccupation with the war in Ukraine has widened the room for maneuver by other external actors, and Central Asian capitals have pursued these opportunities selectively. For example, the EU’s then foreign-policy chief Josep Borrell visited Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in early August 2024, Japan has pursued its “Central Asia plus Japan” line as a counterweight to China’s influence, and Azerbaijan has been building an energy bridge between Central Asia and Europe via the South Caucasus with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.
Washington’s main channel into this complex is the C5+1, and the current U.S. emphasis is to create routines that survive individual summits. The U.S. Special Envoy for South and Central Asian Affairs Sergio Gor and Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau travelled to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in October 2025 ahead of the Washington summit that Trump hosted the following month for the five leaders. Such formats can concentrate attention on the implementation of standardized procurement procedures and regularized dispute resolution that new supply-chain corridors require for interoperable paperwork and predictable customs treatment.
Kyrgyzstan is scheduled to host the second B5+1 forum (the business counterpart to C5+1) on February 4–5, 2026. This has already been prepared by a joint briefing in Bishkek on December 12 that established an agenda linking transport and logistics to sectors such as information technology, agriculture, and critical minerals. In mid-January 2026, Gor was appointed as U.S. Ambassador to India, while remaining Special Envoy for South and Central Asian Affairs. In the latter role, he thereupon immediately undertook, according to the State Department, further discussions with senior officials and business leaders in Turkmenistan about stability and economic collaboration, underscoring U.S. outreach beyond the two largest states in the region.
Minerals, Energy, and Routes
Astana, Tashkent, and Washington have begun turning Central Asian resources into projects that can reach financing and construction. Kazakhstan has been expanding exploration for critical minerals and updating its resource forecasts. The Eurasian Resources Group has said it plans to produce gallium in Kazakhstan beginning in 2026, with a view toward markets in OECD countries. A newly completed analysis by the U.S. Geological Survey, an agency of the Department of the Interior, has reassessed Uzbekistan’s tungsten endowment in particular. In Uzbekistan itself, policy statements have leaned toward building value chains rather than just exporting raw materials. Recent U.S.–Uzbekistan agreements refer to a dedicated investment package for “critical and rare earth” supply chains.
Energy is the second pillar. It includes nuclear fuel and technology as well as hydrocarbons. Washington appears to be treating energy security and energy transition as a single integrated agenda, and Astana and Tashkent are offering project leads in both domains. Kazakhstan’s role in U.S. uranium supply has increased amid U.S. efforts to reduce reliance on Russian inputs on a defined timeline. Civil nuclear cooperation between the U.S. and Kazakhstan has also expanded, with the U.S. emphasizing small modular reactors and responsible-use standards. Uzbekistan’s track is distinct, as it seeks to expand power supply while shifting part of the new capacity toward renewables. Solar and wind output for 2025 was reported as 9 billion kWh, with foreign partners and capital playing a major role.
Transport connectivity is the third pillar. Kazakhstan is working to reduce Trans-Caspian bottlenecks, including the implementation of capacity upgrades at Kuryk port. Operational risks still constrain throughput, however, especially on the maritime segment. Uzbekistan’s interest in the Middle Corridor centers on such procedural issues as trade facilitation, border management, logistics harmonization, and documentation standards. The U.S.–Kazakhstan locomotive and services package between Wabtec and KTZ illustrates how U.S. industrial participation can contribute to corridor performance over time. A U.S. objective is to make east–west routes reliable by institutionalizing routine operating procedures and compliance with expeditious documentation norms.
What Makes This Cycle Different?
Trump’s Board of Peace and G20 invitations to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are best understood as part of Washington’s effort to rebuild leverage through economic governance at a time when alliance politics have become noisier and more contested. In the context of its G20 presidency for 2026, the U.S. has chosen to frame its priorities in growth terms, with deregulation, energy supply chains, and technology and innovation put forward as organizing themes. The choice to hold the 2026 summit in the Miami area at Trump National Doral Miami adds an unmistakably transactional cast to the host year, also heightening the salience of who is invited and why.
In this setting, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are valued for what they can bring or facilitate in line with the host’s defined priorities. What follows from that is not so much a new doctrine as a method. The most plausible way for Washington to stay present in Central Asia, without offering security guarantees at scale, is to make cooperation self-reproducing. The C5+1 becomes a diplomatic driver of that approach, treated in U.S. policy language as a platform of strategic value, not just a scheduling calendar.
Its business track matters for the same reason. As Bishkek is preparing to host the second B5+1 forum on February 4–5, 2026, the December preparatory briefing made it clear that the agenda is designed to tie transport and logistics to investable sectors, including critical minerals and information technology: thus, the focus on procedures, dispute handling, and documentation discipline. The forum’s own Center for International Private Enterprise describes B5+1 as a long-term public-private platform meant to complement C5+1.
Washington is testing whether economic follow-through can create influence, while Astana and Tashkent are testing whether regional cooperation can support external engagement without narrowing their options. The common interest of all three is in regularizing procedures for implementing projects through financing and construction, and in improving corridor performance through routinization.
