05 May 2025

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How Tokayev’s Kazakhstan Bridges Global Powers

Amid the ongoing reshaping of the global order, Kazakhstan is seeking to enhance its role as an emerging middle power. Preserving strong relations with all key geopolitical actors, strengthening its position as a de facto leader in Central Asia, and developing closer ties with other influential states on the world stage appear to be Astana’s top foreign policy priorities. The largest Central Asian state is one of the few countries that maintains good relations with geopolitical rivals such as China and the United States, as well as Russia and the European Union. At the same time, Astana is actively developing closer ties with the Turkey-led Organization of Turkic States, while firmly upholding its longstanding commitment to international law. It is, therefore, no surprise that, during the recently held EU- Central Asia summit in Samarkand, Kazakhstan, along with Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, backed two UN resolution from the 1980s that reject the unilaterally-declared independence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and deem all secessionist actions there legally invalid. Such a policy perfectly aligns with Kazakhstan President’s Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s 2022 statement, in which he affirmed Astana’s non-recognition of Taiwan, Kosovo, South Ossetia, or Abkhazia, and the entities he described as quasi-states, namely Luhansk and Donetsk. “In general, it has been calculated that if the right of nations to self-determination is actually realized throughout the globe, then instead of the 193 states that are now members of the UN, more than 500 or 600 states will emerge on Earth. Of course, it will be chaos,” Tokayev stressed. In other words, Kazakhstan upholds the principle of territorial integrity for all UN-member states, a stance similar to China’s policy. Despite their history of often supporting the right to self-determination over the principle of territorial integrity, Russia and the West do not seem to oppose Tokayev’s approach. As a result, the President of Kazakhstan remains one of the few world leaders who can attend the May 9 Victory Day parade in Moscow, regularly meet with EU officials, and participate in China-led initiatives. As the first Central Asian leader to speak with newly elected U.S. President Donald Trump in December 2024, Tokayev is also signaling his intention to deepen relations with the United States. All these actions demonstrate that, for Kazakhstan under Tokayev, the well-known multi-vector foreign policy remains without an alternative at this point. Although it is Nursultan Nazarbayev, Kazakhstan’s first president, who initiated this approach, it is Tokayev who has been actively implementing it since he came to power in 2019. That, however, does not mean that "multivectorism" has become Astana’s official ideology. It is rather a tool the energy-rich nation’s policymakers are using to improve their country’s position in the international arena. Nowhere is that more obvious than at the Astana International Forum – an annual summit taking place in Kazakhstan’s capital – where leaders from diverse countries, often with differing goals and values, come together to discuss global challenges, foster dialogue, and seek common ground. The fact that this year Astana will host...

Gas Crunch in Uzbekistan: Industry Falters as Demand Surges

In the first two months of 2025, Uzbekistan's natural gas production declined by 4.2% compared to the same period in 2024, continuing a troubling trend that has seen output fall from 61.59 billion cubic meters in 2018 to 44.59 billion cubic meters in 2024. This persistent decrease raises concerns about the nation’s energy security and economic stability. Once among Central Asia’s energy success stories, Uzbekistan became a net importer of natural gas in 2023, a symbolic turning point for a country whose identity was long intertwined with hydrocarbon abundance. The extent of the strain was demonstrated in December 2024, when gas stations around the country were forced to close during a cold snap as heating systems across the country kicked into action. This led drivers of methane-powered cars, which are common in the country given that it costs about $15 to fill the tank as opposed to $40-50 in a gasoline-powered vehicle, into a desperate hunt for places to fill up. Kilometer-long queues formed, and drivers ferociously competed to be first to the pump. Such scenes have become a familiar sight in the Uzbek winter as gas production has fallen. “Uzbekistan’s gas production is already quite mature,” Anne-Sophie Corbeau of Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy told The Times of Central Asia. “The existing fields are entering a phase of decline. The reserve-to-production ratio was around 18 years based on 2020 data, and the situation is unlikely to be much better now.” Put simply, the country is running out of easy gas. Despite repeated efforts to locate new reserves, particularly in the under-explored Ustyurt region, exploration has so far failed to yield significant breakthroughs. Even if discoveries are made, the timeline to bring new fields online would mean little impact before 2030, at best. In parallel, demand for gas has remained stubbornly high. Corbeau noted that “the country’s energy mix and electricity generation are very dependent on natural gas. And Uzbekistan is one of the countries with the lowest wholesale gas prices in the world.” Those prices have long distorted both domestic consumption and investor interest, keeping demand high while choking off potential upstream capital. [caption id="attachment_30630" align="aligncenter" width="1209"] Image: Wholesale Gas Price Survey 2024 Edition. International Gas Union. https://www.datocms-assets.com/[/caption] This sentiment is echoed by Irina Mironova, Senior Energy Analyst at the New Energy Advancement Hub. “Domestic production is declining faster than consumption,” she said, “and domestic gas pricing is not market-based. It remains below the price of imported gas, which undermines the investment appeal of upstream projects for foreign investors.” The government has undertaken some measures to control demand over the past year, raising the tariffs for electricity and gas by 52.5% and 71% respectively, hitting consumers in the pocket in an attempt to alter the wasteful use of scant resources. On the supply side, the government has declared a bold ambition to raise production to 62 billion cubic meters annually under its Uzbekistan–2030 development strategy, but observers remain skeptical. “They’ve tried to facilitate exploration, especially in the...

Opinion – Storm Clouds Over Kazakhstan: Oil Slump and Global Risks Threaten Economic Stability

The persistent decline in Brent crude prices is the latest sign of a looming 'perfect storm' for Kazakhstan’s economy, the largest in Central Asia. With the mining sector comprising nearly half of its GDP and oil as a cornerstone resource, the nation’s economic stability is facing a cascade of potential shocks. Oil Prices and Budget Vulnerability Kazakhstan is grappling with significant economic headwinds amid forecasts of a global recession and declining energy prices. In April 2025, OPEC+, including Kazakhstan, unexpectedly agreed to raise oil production by 411,000 barrels per day, pushing prices below $65 per barrel. Given the country's reliance on hydrocarbon exports, such price drops jeopardize state revenues. Analysts say Kazakhstan needs oil prices to remain above $42.30 per barrel in 2025 to maintain fiscal stability. However, the threat extends beyond oil. As energy journalist Oleg Chervinsky noted on his Telegram channel, global commodity prices across the board are falling, a signal that recession is imminent. “The bad news for Kazakhstan is that prices are dropping not only for oil but for all raw materials,” Chervinsky wrote. “JP Morgan estimates the global recession probability at 60%. Even though oil and gas are exempt from Donald Trump’s new tariffs, the broader protectionist policies could fuel inflation, curb growth, and escalate trade tensions”. Trump's Trade War and Kazakhstan President Donald Trump’s sweeping tariffs are designed to limit low-cost imports and incentivize domestic production. Kazakhstan has been hit with a 27% tariff, the highest among the Central Asian nations. Its strategic location within China’s Belt and Road Initiative positions it as a potential re-export hub, prompting higher trade scrutiny. Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Trade and Integration has downplayed the immediate economic impact, noting that U.S.-bound exports account for less than 5% of total trade, and the country still holds a $1 billion trade surplus with the U.S. While the direct fallout may be limited, the broader implications of a global trade war could severely strain Kazakhstan’s economy. If a global recession takes hold, demand for Kazakhstan’s key exports, oil, uranium, and metals, will drop, dragging prices down further. Currency Pressures and Investor Retreat With shrinking export revenues, the tenge faces devaluation, leading to inflation, rising import costs, and weakened consumer purchasing power. In addition, recessions typically dampen foreign direct investment, especially in emerging markets like Kazakhstan, where perceived risk grows amid uncertainty. The China Factor The U.S.-China trade conflict is another critical variable. Trump’s strategy aims to undercut Beijing’s economic strength, but for Kazakhstan, China is its largest trading partner, representing over 15% of foreign trade. A slowdown in China would reduce demand for Kazakhstani raw materials and transit services. Such a downturn could also jeopardize President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s ambition to establish Kazakhstan as a vital trade corridor between China and Europe. While the Belt and Road Initiative is unlikely to collapse, reduced cargo flows would strain state revenues. China is also the primary buyer of Kazakhstan’s copper, aluminum, and ferroalloys. Any industrial slowdown there immediately impacts Kazakhstan's export volumes. Converging Risks Taken...

A New Great Game: Multipolar Competition in Central Asia

At a time when the European Union, China, and Turkey are seeking to strengthen their presence in Central Asia, the United States administration is consumed with bilaterally implementing a seismic shift in its trade policy with the entire world. Although this region of post-Soviet space is widely seen as a new front of rivalry between Washington and Beijing, in many aspects, American influence in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan lags far behind that of other actors. Culture (soft power) has always played an important role in the foreign policy of every great power. The Soviet Union was no exception. As a result, even today, Russian, rather than English, is still the lingua franca in Central Asia, although Moscow, following its invasion of Ukraine, has had a hard time preserving remnants of its former dominance in the region. Russian cinema, however, maintains a notable presence in most, if not all, Central Asian states. While Hollywood movies have a strong global presence, Russian films in Central Asia often act as a link between Western content and the region's cultural traditions. Millions of Central Asian migrants working in Russia also serve as a bridge between their nations and the Russian Federation, facilitating cultural exchange, economic ties, and the spread of the Russian language. However, Russia’s fiasco in Ukraine has created space for the EU to assert its influence in a region that has traditionally been in Moscow’s geopolitical orbit. Nevertheless, although Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, are Tajikistan are members of the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization, they have remained neutral in the Ukraine conflict. For Central Asian nations, the EU serves as a counterweight they can use to balance their relations with Moscow. The EU, however, faces strong economic competition from China. With a trade volume of $94.8 billion with Central Asian states, Beijing is positioning itself as the major economic power operating in the five regional nations. Although the European Union’s influence in Central Asia is expected to continue to grow in the coming years, if investment trends from recent years persist, the balance in the region will likely tilt towards China, which will increase its presence and influence at the expense of Russia. But where does the United States fit into this dynamic? Even though the U.S. is the largest economy in the world, with which almost everyone wants to engage, American bilateral trade with the region has never been particularly strong, with the exception of Kazakhstan. Interestingly enough, it is Astana that is expected to suffer the most among Central Asian actors due to U.S. President Donald Trump’s decision to impose tariffs – 27% on Kazakhstan compared to 10% on all other nations in the region. Exceptions may be made for Kazakhstan’s critical minerals, however, which are now the third largest in the world based on a recent discovery, with reports suggesting that some goods, including “certain minerals that are not available in the United States,” as well as energy, will not be subject to the tariffs. According to Kazakhstan’s Ministry...

Chinese Investor to Launch $400 Million Cotton Cluster in Southern Kazakhstan

Chinese company Xinjiang Lihua (Group) Co., Ltd. plans to invest nearly $400 million to establish a cotton-textile cluster in Kazakhstan’s Turkestan region. The announcement was made by Zhang Qihai, Chairman of the Board of Directors of Xinjiang Lihua, during a meeting with Kazakhstan’s Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov. The large-scale investment project will be implemented within the TURAN Special Economic Zone, located in southern Kazakhstan. It envisions a vertically integrated cotton agro-industrial complex, from cultivation to the production of finished textile goods, including yarn, fabric, and clothing. More than 50,000 hectares of land have been allocated for cotton cultivation. The project also includes the construction of ten factories. Two of these will manufacture drip irrigation systems using modern water-saving technologies. Four others will handle the primary processing of cotton near the fields. The remaining four facilities, including garment, dyeing, and finishing factories, will produce the final textile products. The total investment exceeds 200 billion tenge (approximately $398 million), and the cluster is expected to create 3,000 permanent jobs in the region. To support the project’s needs, a plant for producing polyvinyl chloride (PVC) pipes has already been launched, and construction of the textile factories is underway. Xinjiang Lihua is also developing an irrigation system, including a canal network fed by a dedicated pumping station. Chairman Zhang Qihai praised Kazakhstan’s favorable investment climate and the region’s suitable agricultural conditions. He noted that the first finished products from the cluster are scheduled for release by October this year. “The creation of a cotton-textile cluster in Turkestan Region contributes to increasing the added value of domestic products, promoting agricultural development through processing, and enhancing the country’s export potential,” said Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov. “The government will provide all necessary support for this initiative.” As previously reported by The Times of Central Asia, China also plans to support the establishment of a Scientific and Technical Innovation Center for Hydrogen Energy in Kazakhstan.

Is Beijing’s Educational Diplomacy Turning the Dial on Central Asian Public Opinion?

OSH, KYRGYZSTAN – On the eastern bank of the Ak-Buura River, a mini-Chinatown is developing. At Osh’s old bus station, buses and taxis hawk their services to Kashgar, 300 kilometers away over the Pamir Mountains in China’s Xinjiang Province. Blue-plated SUVs stand by the roadside, sporting the 新 character that also symbolizes their origin in Xinjiang. At the Kelechek Bazaar, hordes of money changers shout the best rates for Dollars, Uzbek Som, and Chinese Yuan. Tucked away from the mêlée behind the Peking Hotel is the five-story Confucius Institute. “The Chinese language is in huge demand right now,” said Ali, a student who has moved to Osh from nearby Uzbekistan to study here. He believes the move will be good for his career. “It’s the best opportunity for anyone in this region,” he told The Times of Central Asia, before enthusing about his plans to study in China next year. [caption id="attachment_30054" align="aligncenter" width="1600"] The Confucius Institute in Osh, Kyrgyzstan; image: Joe Luc Barnes[/caption] “There’s a strong possibility that the younger generation will have a more positive view towards China,” Yunis Sharifli, a non-resident fellow at the China Global South Project told TCA. “This is good for China-Central Asia relations because we know that in the past, anti-China sentiments have hindered cooperation.” Chinese diplomats often refer to win-win diplomacy, where engagement between states can lead to positive outcomes for both sides. This is viewed with understandable cynicism by those who see Beijing’s diplomacy as entirely self-interested, but when it comes to education, even if we avoid the term win-win, the opportunities that it offers young Central Asians are hard to deny. In return, China hopes to create a network of influence and goodwill from people like Ali. Nevertheless, the jury is out on whether it is working. [caption id="attachment_30053" align="aligncenter" width="1600"] China-plated cars are an increasingly common sight in Kyrgyzstan; image: Joe Luc Barnes[/caption] Swelling numbers Given that numerous questions have been asked about the accuracy of China’s own population data, monitoring the number of foreign students in the country can be a fiendish task. The consensus is that the numbers are increasing. Chinese state media outlet Xinhua claimed that student numbers grew from 11,930 to 29,885 between 2010 and 2018, and have recovered since the pandemic. One recent report put the number of Kazakh students alone at “approaching 20,000”. These numbers are unlikely to dethrone Russia as the top destination for Central Asian students any time soon. Moscow claimed in 2023 that 168,000 Central Asians were studying in the country, with around a third of them being funded by the Russian government. However, Sharifli believes that Russia’s luster is beginning to wane. “Moscow State University has historically been very attractive for Central Asian people, particularly in the social science or the technical fields,” said Sharifli. “But since the war [in Ukraine] began there has been a lot of discrimination against Central Asians in Russia.” This was demonstrated in a recent account given to The Times of Central Asia by...