• KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00194 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10841 -0.37%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00194 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10841 -0.37%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00194 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10841 -0.37%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00194 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10841 -0.37%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00194 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10841 -0.37%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00194 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10841 -0.37%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00194 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10841 -0.37%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00194 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10841 -0.37%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
17 December 2025

Turkmenistan and Spain Eye Regional Center to Combat Desertification in Central Asia

Turkmenistan and Spain have discussed closer cooperation to address desertification in Central Asia, including the possible creation of a regional center focused on land degradation. The talks took place in Ashgabat during a meeting between Turkmenistan’s Minister of Environmental Protection and Spain’s ambassador to Russia, Ricardo Martínez Vázquez, who is also accredited in Turkmenistan.

The discussions followed Turkmen President Serdar Berdimuhamedov’s proposal at the United Nations General Assembly to establish a specialized regional center to combat desertification in Central Asia. The initiative is intended to strengthen cooperation among regional states and attract international expertise and funding.

Image: mineco.gov.tm

Desertification is a growing concern across Central Asia, a region where arid and semi-arid landscapes dominate much of the territory. The United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification defines desertification as land degradation in dry areas caused by climatic variations and human activities.

According to the UNCCD, more than 20% of land in Central Asia is already degraded, affecting around 30% of the population. Much of this damage is linked to unsustainable water use, intensive agriculture, overgrazing, and the long-term effects of climate change.

Spain’s interest in desertification in Turkmenistan is rooted in their shared status as nations on the front lines of climate change. As one of the European countries most vulnerable to soil degradation, Spain co-launched the International Drought Resilience Alliance (IDRA) to export its expertise in “dryland” management and water conservation, which is directly applicable to the arid landscapes of Central Asia. This common challenge has fostered a diplomatic partnership focused on the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD), where countries exchange strategies for land restoration and drought resilience.

Beyond environmental solidarity, Spain views Turkmenistan as a critical emerging market for its advanced engineering and agricultural sectors. Major Spanish firms, such as TYPSA, are already active in the region, providing technical assistance for massive infrastructure projects, such as desalination plants on the Caspian Sea, and modernizing irrigation systems for thousands of hectares of farmland. This commercial engagement is bolstered by Spain’s support for Turkmenistan’s proposal to host a Regional Center for Climate Change Technologies, which would serve as a hub for Spanish green tech in Central Asia.

The bilateral relationship also aligns with the broader EU Strategy for Central Asia, which prioritizes environmental stability as a means of ensuring regional security. By helping Turkmenistan manage its dwindling water resources and combat the encroaching Karakum Desert, Spain contributes to the EU for a Green Turkmenistan initiative. This cooperation helps prevent resource-driven migration and instability, and strengthens trade ties in a region that is becoming increasingly vital for global energy and logistics.

One of the most visible examples of desertification in the region is the collapse of the Aral Sea. Once the world’s fourth-largest inland lake, the Aral Sea began shrinking rapidly in the 1960s after its feeder rivers were diverted for large-scale irrigation projects. By the early 2000s, the sea had lost roughly 90% of its volume.

Desert ships on the former Aral seabed, Moynaq, Uzbekistan; image: TCA, Stephen M. Bland

The retreat of the Aral Sea created a new desert known as the Aralkum, covering more than five million hectares. The exposed seabed generates frequent dust storms that carry salt and chemical residues across Central Asia, damaging farmland and harming human health. The World Bank estimates that tens of millions of tons of dust and sand are lifted annually from the dried seabed.

Beyond the Aral Sea basin, desertification is advancing in steppe and pasturelands across Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Rising temperatures and more frequent droughts are worsening soil moisture loss and accelerating erosion. According to the World Meteorological Organization’s State of the Climate in Asia 2024 report, Asia is currently warming nearly twice as fast as the global average, a trend that has accelerated heatwaves, droughts, and other climate extremes across the region.

Governments in the region have launched national and regional initiatives to slow land degradation. Both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have planted large areas of drought-resistant saxaul shrubs on the bed of the former Aral Sea to help stabilize soil and reduce dust storms. Kazakhstan has also invested in the partial restoration of the North Aral Sea through infrastructure projects that have raised water levels and revived some fisheries.

All five Central Asian countries are parties to the UN Convention to Combat Desertification and have endorsed the global goal of achieving land degradation neutrality by 2030. Regional cooperation mechanisms, including the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea, are aiming to coordinate environmental responses and attract donor support.

The proposed regional desertification center discussed by Turkmenistan and Spain would add to these efforts by creating a permanent platform for research, training, and policy coordination. While details remain under discussion, officials see the idea as a way to pool expertise and improve long-term resilience in one of the world’s most environmentally stressed regions.

As climate pressures intensify, the success of such initiatives may determine whether Central Asia can slow the spread of deserts and protect livelihoods tied to fragile ecosystems.

Mirziyoyev: Uzbekistan’s Natural Resources Valued at Up to $79,000 Per Person

Uzbekistan’s vast underground wealth has drawn renewed attention following the release of an international ranking of countries by natural resource value per capita, as reported by Uzbek publication Zamin.

According to the ranking, Saudi Arabia tops the list, with natural resources valued at approximately $1 million per person, driven largely by its extensive oil reserves. Canada and Australia follow, each exceeding $700,000 per capita, supported by a combination of oil, forests, minerals, iron ore, coal, and natural gas. Russia ranks fourth, with more than $520,000 in resources per person.

Although accurately assessing Uzbekistan’s total natural resource value remains difficult due to fluctuating global commodity prices and ongoing geological exploration, the country’s long-term potential is considered substantial.

In July 2018, Azam Qadirhodjayev, then Deputy Chairman of Uzbekistan’s State Committee for Geology and Mineral Resources, estimated the total potential value of the country’s mineral resources at approximately $5.7 trillion. Of this, over $1 trillion stemmed from explored and currently developed deposits. At the time, only about 20% of Uzbekistan’s territory had been fully studied, leaving considerable room for new discoveries.

Additional details were provided in December 2023, when Ilyos Jumayev, a representative of the Ministry of Mining Industry and Geology, announced at a press conference that Uzbekistan officially possesses 101 gold deposits and three silver deposits. According to the ministry, the country holds nearly all mineral types found globally, including gold, silver, copper, uranium, oil, natural gas, lithium, molybdenum, tungsten, manganese, nickel, cobalt, tantalum, and niobium. Major gold reserves serve as the raw material base for the Navoi and Almalyk mining and metallurgical complexes, while copper deposits are primarily located in the Tashkent region.

The value of Uzbekistan’s natural resources was also a key topic at the Tashkent International Investment Forum in June 2025. President Shavkat Mirziyoyev stated that the country’s underground wealth is valued at approximately $3 trillion. He emphasized that the global demand for technological minerals is rising amid the fourth industrial revolution and identified strategic reserves of lithium, tungsten, magnesium, graphite, titanium, and vanadium as vital for developing high value-added industries.

Based on the president’s $3 trillion estimate and Uzbekistan’s current population of roughly 38.24 million, the per capita value of natural resources stands at approximately $78,000 to $79,000. While lower than the per capita resource wealth in countries like Saudi Arabia or Canada, officials argue that incomplete geological surveying leaves room for this figure to grow.

Uzbekistan’s resource base includes not only precious and rare earth metals but also energy resources such as oil and natural gas, underscoring the country’s strategic position in the global minerals landscape.

Alisher Sultanov Leaves Office After a Decade of Declining Gas Production in Uzbekistan

Alisher Sultanov was relieved of his post as presidential representative on energy security on December 16, ending some ten years of dubious performance as one of Uzbekistan’s top energy officials. Under Sultanov’s watch as head of the state oil and gas company and then as a top official in Uzbekistan’s Energy Ministry, the country’s oil and gas production decreased, and Uzbekistan went from being a gas exporter to an importer.

A Career in the Gas and Oil Sector

Sultanov started working in Uzbekistan’s energy sector in the mid-1990s and gradually made his way through the ranks at the state oil and gas company Uzbekneftegaz. In 2015, Sultanov became Uzbekneftegaz’s chairman, serving in that position until 2018.

In 2017, Sultanov was appointed Deputy Prime Minister in charge of the fuel, energy, and industrial sector, and in February 2019, he was named Energy Minister. He stepped down as Energy Minister in April 2022, officially for health reasons, but by 2023 was back as presidential advisor on oil and gas, chemical, and energy matters, though that title was changed in July 2025 to the president’s representative on energy security.

Stagnation and Decline

Uzbekistan does not have large oil reserves. BP’s Statistical Review of World Energy has continually put Uzbekistan’s oil reserves at somewhere around 600-620 million barrels. Uzbekistan does have significant natural gas reserves of at least some 1.1 trillion cubic meters, however, according to the BP Statistical Review of World Energy.

The country has been working with international partners to explore for new deposits, particularly in areas of the recently dried out Aral Sea.

In 2011, Uzbekistan’s average oil production was some 80,000 barrels per day (bpd), and gas production for that year was some 56.6 billion cubic meters (bcm). Uzbekistan was still sourcing from many fields that had been producing since Uzbekistan was a Soviet republic, and it was not surprising that yields from these depleted fields started decreasing after 2011.

Sultanov became head of Uzbekneftegaz in August 2015, and that year, oil production had already dropped to some 60,000 bpd and gas to some 53.6 bcm. Both fluctuated only a little over the next three years, ending 2018 at an average of 64,000 bpd and 58.3 bcm. The 2018 figure for gas was the peak production year of the 2011-2020 period, though it fell well short of the 66 bcm Uzbekneftegaz was predicting for 2018.

After Sultanov was named Energy Minister in 2019, the figure for gas production fell significantly. In 2019, gas production was 57.5 bcm, but in 2020, only 47.1 bcm, though oil output held steady at 67,000 bpd and 61,000 bpd, respectively.

Gas production increased slightly in 2021 to 50.9 bcm, but then dropped to 48.9 bcm in 2022. The decrease continued after Sultanov stepped down as Energy Minister in April 2022, plummeting to 44.2 bcm in 2023 and 42.2 bcm in 2024.

With a rapidly growing population and expanding industrial sector, Uzbekistan’s domestic gas consumption was sharply increasing, rising from 43.6 bcm in 2020 to 54.6 bcm in 2024.

Heating and electricity shortages in winter were particularly noticeable from 2020 onwards, despite redirecting some gas that was previously exported toward domestic use. By 2023, the situation was becoming so dire that Uzbekistan reached a deal to import gas from Russia via the same pipelines that until a few years earlier had been shipping Uzbek gas to Russia for decades.

It appears Uzbekistan will purchase some 7.7 bcm of Russian gas in 2025, and there has been talk of Russia’s gas exports to Uzbekistan eventually reaching 11 bcm annually.

Russia’s Man in the Uzbek Energy Sector

In 2017, Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev called for boosting gas and oil output, stating that the government had invested billions of dollars into Uzbekneftegaz in the 2010-2016 period to help the state energy company increase production.

Sultanov, as head of Uzbekneftegaz, Energy Minister, and later as the president’s advisor on energy policies, was unable to parlay this outlay of funds into an increase in the domestic production of gas.

Questions were quietly raised over the years about how Sultanov was able to keep his lofty positions despite seeming to fail so miserably at achieving any improvement. Some feel Sultanov’s connections to the Russian government and officials in energy companies LUKoil and Gazprom, the two top foreign investors in Uzbekistan’s gas sector, helped keep him at the top of Uzbekistan’s energy business.

If these connections did indeed prevent Sultanov from being sacked in disgrace, it is not inconceivable that he could return to Uzbekistan’s energy sector in some new incarnation. However, there did seem to be a parting shot at Sultanov as he left his presidential advisory position.

On the same day that Sultanov’s departure from the energy security advisor post was announced, Uzbekistan’s current Energy Minister Jurabek Mirzamakhmudov said the launch of new fields starting in 2026 would stabilize the oil and gas sector and halt the ”sharp decline in production” Uzbekistan has been experiencing for years.

Turkmenistan Considers Cotton Exports to Kyrgyzstan

Turkmenistan is exploring the possibility of exporting cotton to Kyrgyzstan as part of a broader effort to jointly develop the textile industry, according to Danil Ibrayev, a member of the presidium of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) Business Council and President of the Kyrgyz Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs. He shared the update during an interview with Birinchi Radio.

Ibrayev noted that both countries are currently discussing practical mechanisms for supplying Turkmen cotton to Kyrgyz enterprises, where it would be processed into finished textile products. These products could then be sold domestically or exported, including to other EAEU member states.

“Turkmenistan produces large volumes of cotton. We are now discussing how to organize its delivery to Kyrgyzstan and develop textile production here,” Ibrayev said.

The initiative aligns with Kyrgyzstan’s strategy to revitalize its light industry by securing stable sources of raw materials. Turkmenistan, meanwhile, is seeking to diversify export routes for its agricultural commodities, with cotton remaining a vital component of its economy.

Experts cited by local media suggest that such cooperation could deepen industrial integration within Central Asia and reduce dependence on textile imports from outside the region. With growing demand for locally produced goods and the expansion of import substitution policies, regional partnerships are gaining strategic significance.

Last year, Kyrgyz officials emphasized the government’s commitment to expanding domestic textile production and actively sourcing raw materials from neighboring states. Cotton processing was identified as one of the quickest pathways to job creation and increased exports through value-added manufacturing.

Tajikistan Remains in 113th Place in Global Social Progress Index

The newly released Global Social Progress Index offers a mixed assessment of Tajikistan, where improvements in water and sanitation have been overshadowed by a sharp decline in civil liberties, limiting the country’s overall advancement in global rankings.

Tajikistan ranks 113th out of 170 countries in the AlTi 2025 Global Social Progress Index, with a score of 58.15 points, according to the latest report from the international research initiative AlTi Global Social Progress Index. The index evaluates non-economic aspects of quality of life, including healthcare, education, rights, and freedoms.

Covering data from 2011 to 2024, the report shows Tajikistan has improved its overall score by 5.98 points over the period. However, the country was classified as having “stagnant indicators” in 2024, reflecting a lack of measurable progress in the past year.

One of the most significant achievements noted in the report is Tajikistan’s improvement in access to water and sanitation. Since 2011, this component has risen by 38.83 points, placing the country among the global leaders in this area. The report notes that investments in water and sanitation infrastructure have long-term impacts on public health, education, and social well-being, contributing meaningfully to the country’s overall index score.

Conversely, the most concerning decline has been in the Rights & Voice category, which includes measures of political rights, freedom of speech, media independence, academic freedom, and equality before the law. Tajikistan’s score in this area has dropped by 15.94 points since 2011, placing it among the ten countries with the worst downward trends in civil liberties worldwide.

According to the report, this deterioration in rights and freedoms is the primary barrier to further social progress in Tajikistan.

Within the Central Asia region, which has generally seen upward trends since 2011, Tajikistan ranks lowest. Kazakhstan currently ranks 58th, Uzbekistan 76th, and Kyrgyzstan 81st.

The report concludes that sustainable social progress in the region is impossible without significant improvements in civil rights and freedoms. While infrastructure development and educational gains are important, they cannot offset systemic issues related to political and civil liberties.

Kazakhstan Fast-Tracks Delivery of Caspian Pipeline Equipment

Kazakhstan has expedited the delivery of two new offshore berthing facilities for the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), a move prompted by recent drone attacks on CPC infrastructure. The initiative aims to restore the stability of oil exports and ensure uninterrupted operations at the key marine terminal in Novorossiysk.

The two new remote mooring devices (RMDs) were procured from a manufacturer in the United Arab Emirates for installation at the CPC Marine Terminal. Kazakhstan’s Energy Minister Yerlan Akkenzhenov announced on December 15 in Astana that the delivery timeline has been moved up from April 2026 to January 2025.

“The Ministry of Energy of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the national oil and gas company KazMunayGas are making every effort to deliver the two new RMD units. We are now pushing ahead with this and plan to deliver them in January,” said Akkenzhenov, highlighting the logistical complexity of transporting the technologically advanced equipment to Novorossiysk.

According to the CPC press service, the two devices being replaced, CPC-1 and CPC-2, were originally commissioned in 2001. The contract for their replacement was signed in January 2024, and both new units are expected to be completed by December 2025.

These upgrades are part of a recovery program following a series of attacks on CPC infrastructure. At the same time, repair work continues on VPU-3, another remote berthing facility. However, efforts have been hindered by severe weather conditions in Novorossiysk, where strong winds and currents have disrupted underwater installation work.

“The weather in Novorossiysk is difficult, with very strong winds causing high waves and currents. Divers are descending under the dome to install underwater hoses,” Akkenzhenov explained.

The Caspian Pipeline Consortium remains one of the largest energy projects in the post-Soviet space. The 1,511 kilometer Tengiz-Novorossiysk pipeline transports more than two-thirds of Kazakhstan’s oil exports, along with output from Russian fields, including those in the Caspian Sea.

The CPC’s marine terminal in Novorossiysk is equipped with three remote mooring devices, enabling tankers to load safely offshore and ensuring continuous export operations.

Since autumn 2025, CPC facilities have been repeatedly targeted. The first attack occurred on September 24, when drones struck the consortium’s office, injuring employees and bystanders. Other key incidents included attacks on the Kropotkinskaya base (February 17 and March 24), the Kavkazskaya facility (March 19), and the Novorossiysk marine terminal (September 24-25).

The most serious incident occurred on November 29, when the terminal’s pier was damaged, rendering VPU-2 inoperable. Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Energy estimated losses of 480,000 tons of oil and condemned the attack as “unacceptable and dangerous for global energy security.”

The emergency acquisition and fast-tracked delivery of the new berthing units are seen as a strategic investment by Kazakhstan, not only to secure its export capacity but also to reinforce the stability of one of the region’s most critical energy corridors.