Uzbekistan International Affairs - The Times Of Central Asia

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Iran

Central Asia Recalculates as the Iran War Enters a New Phase

Central Asia’s first response to the Iran war was public and urgent. Governments organized evacuations, welcomed a ceasefire, and watched the Strait of Hormuz because the region’s trade routes, fuel costs, and food prices were already under pressure. The next phase looks different. Following the April 12 collapse of U.S.-Iran talks in Islamabad, Washington moved to block maritime traffic entering and leaving Iranian ports. That step does not formally close Hormuz to all shipping, but it pushes the crisis into a more serious phase for any country or company still treating Iran as a viable corridor. That distinction is important in Central Asia because the region does not need a formal legal closure of Hormuz to feel the shock. It only needs insurers, banks, freight forwarders, airlines, and traders to decide that the southern option has become too risky for routine planning. That process was already underway. The route through Iran had come under strain in southern corridor traffic, food systems, and in the wider pricing of regional connectivity. A U.S. move against Iranian ports is likely to reinforce that view. Official statements across Central Asia still reflect the ceasefire moment more than the latest escalation. On April 8, Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev welcomed the truce and said he hoped it would support global trade and prosperity. Kyrgyzstan’s Foreign Ministry also welcomed the ceasefire and praised efforts to reduce tensions. Uzbekistan’s Foreign Ministry did the same, calling the truce an “important step toward de-escalating tensions,” and stressing that it should serve as a pathway to a broader political settlement. Tajikistan’s Foreign Ministry also welcomed the ceasefire agreement between Iran and the United States. Turkmenistan, meanwhile, had already taken a practical line, saying on March 4 that it was keeping all international checkpoints open and providing passage for foreign citizens, vehicles, and rail stock across the Turkmen-Iranian border. Since then, public messaging has lagged behind the latest escalation. By April 13, Qazinform’s foreign news flow had shifted to the failed Islamabad talks and Trump’s blockade order, while the latest publicly visible official positions elsewhere in the region still reflected the April 8 ceasefire. That does not mean backchannel diplomacy has stopped, but it does suggest that Central Asian governments prefer caution in public as the conflict shifts from direct strikes to pressure on shipping and trade. For the region, the economic logic is now clearer than the politics. Approximately 20% of global oil supplies and one-third of global fertilizer trade move through the Strait of Hormuz, while urea prices surged by almost 46% between February and March 2026. The World Bank’s April Europe and Central Asia Economic Update said growth in the developing economies of Europe and Central Asia is expected to slow to 2.1% in 2026, down from 2.6% in 2025, as the Middle East conflict, wider geopolitical tension, and trade fragmentation weigh on the region. Those pressures were already significant. The collapse of the main post-ceasefire diplomatic effort, followed by oil rising back above $100 a barrel, has made them harder...

CIS

Moldova Moves to Leave CIS as Post-Soviet Bloc Loses Another Member

Moldova’s parliament approved, in final reading on April 2, the country’s withdrawal from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), with 60 deputies voting in favor. President Maia Sandu then promulgated the denunciation decrees, which were published in the Official Journal on April 8 and entered into force, with the Foreign Ministry set to notify the CIS. If Moldova’s withdrawal takes full legal effect after notification and the relevant notice period, eight CIS member states would remain: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. The CIS was created immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union as a framework to manage the breakup and maintain post-Soviet cooperation among former republics. Moldova’s denunciation concerns a structure originally formed by 11 former Soviet states, not all 15 Soviet republics. Moldova’s exit further weakens the CIS politically, though the bloc will continue to exist if the remaining member states stay in place. Moldova has already approved the denunciation of the 1991 Agreement on the Establishment of the CIS, the related Protocol, and the 1993 CIS Statute. The Moldovan authorities say the CIS’s core values and principles are no longer being respected, especially the recognition of territorial integrity and the inviolability of borders. They cite Russia’s war against Ukraine, acts of aggression against Georgia, and the illegal military presence of Russian troops on Moldovan territory. Chisinau says the move is consistent with Moldova’s European path, while the European Union remains its main economic partner. Economic ties with the Commonwealth have significantly declined: in 2025, CIS countries accounted for 5.9% of Moldova’s exports, while the European Union accounted for 67.5%. Moldova’s final withdrawal from the CIS may not, therefore, come as a surprise to its other members. On January 19, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Mihai Popșoi announced the start of the process to denounce the three core CIS agreements underpinning Moldova’s membership. “We are already in the process of getting approvals for the denunciation of three agreements with the CIS. They are the agreements that form the basis of our affiliation to the CIS, namely: the CIS Statute, the CIS Founding Agreement, and the Annex to this agreement,” Popșoi said. He added that this would mean Moldova was no longer a CIS member legally, while participation had already been suspended de facto. Moldova set a course toward breaking its remaining ties with its Soviet past after the 2020 presidential elections, when new president, Maia Sandu, announced a path toward EU integration and refused to participate in CIS summits. Moldova has spent the past several years unwinding CIS-linked agreements. As of January 2026, Moldovan officials said the country had signed 283 CIS agreements, of which 71 had already been rescinded, and about 60 more were in process. On December 12, 2025, Moldova’s parliament approved the denunciation of the 1992 Bishkek agreement on visa-free travel for CIS citizens. For Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and several other states, visa-free travel with Moldova remains in place under bilateral agreements. Moldovan authorities said the denunciation of the Bishkek agreement would affect...

Middle East Crisis

Central Asia Welcomes Ceasefire, Urges Talks as Energy Risks Persist

Central Asian governments have cautiously welcomed the two-week ceasefire between the United States and Iran, describing it as a necessary pause in a conflict that has already begun to affect regional stability, trade, and energy flows. Across the region, official statements struck a consistent balance: support for the truce, alongside calls to translate it quickly into negotiations rather than allow it to become a temporary pause in hostilities. Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev described the agreement as a “ceasefire and truce” reached through international mediation, including efforts involving Pakistan’s leadership. According to the presidential press service, Tokayev said that “this agreement became possible due to the goodwill and wisdom of the President of the United States, Donald Trump, and the senior leadership of Iran, as well as all countries involved in the military conflict.” Tokayev went on to express his hope that the agreement would prove sustainable and contribute to global trade and economic stability. Uzbekistan’s Foreign Ministry described the ceasefire as an “important step toward de-escalating tensions” and stressed that it should serve as a pathway to a broader political settlement. Tashkent called for “all parties to exercise restraint, [and] refrain from actions that could further escalate the situation, warning that further escalation risks widening the conflict and undermining regional stability. The statement reaffirmed Uzbekistan's “unwavering position on the need to resolve conflicts exclusively by peaceful means in strict accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.” Tajikistan’s Foreign Ministry also welcomed the agreement, expressing hope that the ceasefire would open the way to a comprehensive and long-term peace. Dushanbe emphasized that the conflict has “no military solution and its continuation will only worsen the already difficult situation in the Middle East and cause colossal damage to all countries in the region.” The statement urged all parties to “abandon the use of force” and use political and diplomatic mechanisms in accordance with international law and the UN Charter. Kyrgyzstan’s Foreign Ministry said it “welcomes the achievement of a ceasefire agreement in the Middle East,” highlighting the role of Pakistan’s mediation efforts in reducing tensions. Bishkek reaffirmed that disputes must be resolved exclusively through political and diplomatic means on the basis of the UN Charter and international law, and expressed its “hope for achieving sustainable and long-term peace in the region.” Turkmenistan had not issued an official public statement on the ceasefire at the time of publication, in line with its longstanding policy of neutrality and cautious approach to external conflicts. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan’s Foreign Ministry also welcomed the “announced ceasefire” and praised the efforts of mediators who helped broker the agreement. Baku called on all parties to “engage in productive dialogue aimed at resolving existing problems and strengthening mutual trust” and signaled its readiness to “support initiatives aimed at strengthening lasting peace, security, and cooperation in the region.” The convergence in tone reflects more than diplomatic routine. The conflict has already spilled into Central Asia’s political and humanitarian agenda, prompting coordination on evacuations, aid deliveries, and contingency planning....

Critical Minerals

Opinion: Supply Chains of Power: How Critical Minerals Are Shaping China–U.S. Competition in Central Asia

Central Asia is no longer a distant frontier for global geopolitics. It is developing into a central arena of competition for critical minerals, supply chains, and industrial power, where minerals are no longer simple commodities but have instead become key components of contemporary statecraft. In essence, this transformation highlights a recognition in Washington and other capitals that critical mineral supply chains are fundamental to next-generation energy systems, the development of artificial intelligence (AI), and strategic defense capabilities. Even as the global economy is multipolar, critical mineral supply chains remain highly concentrated and dominated by China. Control of rare earths is increasingly geopolitical, with clear economic, political, and security consequences. The significance of that imbalance is now shaping U.S. foreign policy, Central Asia’s development strategies, and the future of global economics. China’s Strategy: Control the Chain, Not Just the Mine Though many years in the making, China’s critical minerals strategy is still often misunderstood as focused primarily on resource access. However, Beijing’s efforts are far broader and more effective. Not only securing raw materials, the Chinese leadership has also worked to control the entire supply chain—from extraction to processing, refining, and manufacturing. China’s long-term focus and investments began in the 1980s with efforts that culminated in the Made in China 2025 plan for national and overseas manufacturing. In 2023 alone, Chinese firms invested more than $120 billion in overseas mining and processing, targeting key elements used in energy supply chains. Beijing also fed its industrial base by providing over $220 billion for the production of electric vehicles, batteries, and renewable infrastructure. As a result, China now controls approximately 60% of lithium processing, more than 70% of cobalt refining, and over 90% of battery material manufacturing. Strategically, China controls roughly 90% of global rare earth refining and associated technologies. Early investments in supplies enabled Beijing to subsequently concentrate funds into refining capacity to feed its industrial sector. This integrated approach has shifted the power dynamic for global supply chains tied to the critical minerals economy. As evidenced by Beijing’s near monopoly on processing, market control is not just associated with geological supplies but with processing capacity. China’s willingness to weaponize access not only to rare earths but also to processing technology demonstrates Beijing’s market muscle. This distinction is critical. Rare earth elements are not inherently scarce, but they are rarely found in concentrated deposits, making them difficult to extract and refine. Over decades, Beijing developed unique refining capabilities and subsidized an industrial base that disincentivized competition and encouraged processing to shift to China. The Vicious Circle Prohibitive investment costs, long development timelines, and market volatility have discouraged Western investment in alternative supply chains. Each stage (mining, processing, refining, manufacturing) is interdependent: miners won’t invest without buyers and offtake agreements, processors and refiners need secure financing and stable mineral supply, and manufacturers need steady inputs. Such interdependence creates an investment standoff and heightens perceptions of risk. By integrating all stages, Beijing exerts influence across global markets, from pricing to production. This has conditioned global markets...

U.S.-Uzbekistan Relations

The American-Uzbek Business Council Launches in Washington

Washington D.C. - At the launch of the American-Uzbek Business and Investment Council in Washington on April 6, the most revealing line came early. Ambassador Sergio Gor, the White House’s special envoy for South and Central Asia, and Co-Chair of the Council, did not begin with trade statistics or a list of deliverables. He began with a blunt assessment of how the region has been treated in Washington. “For too long, this region has not found the attention that it deserves,” he said. That observation is hardly novel to anyone who follows Central Asia. What made it notable was the speaker and the setting. U.S. policy toward the region has often been episodic, driven at different times by Afghanistan, by Russia, by sanctions enforcement, or by concern over Chinese influence rather than sustained by a coherent regional economic strategy. Gor’s remarks suggested an attempt, at least by the current administration, to correct for that pattern. He was equally clear, however, that this was a political opening, not yet a settled doctrine. “Take this opportunity that the next two and a half years present,” he told the room, an unusually candid acknowledgment that Washington’s attention may be real without yet being durable. His other key formulation explained how the administration wants to make that attention count. “Never before in the history of the U.S. government has commercial diplomacy been such a major pillar of U.S. foreign policy,” Gor said. Whatever the phrasing, the intended shift was clear. Washington is signaling that in Central Asia, economic statecraft will not be treated as a side channel to politics, but as a primary instrument of policy. In that sense, the new council is less a ceremonial bilateral upgrade than a mechanism for turning political attention into projects, financing, and institutional follow-through. [caption id="attachment_46673" align="aligncenter" width="1600"] Image: TCA[/caption] Saida Mirziyoyeva, head of Uzbekistan’s presidential administration and the Uzbek co-chair of the council, answered that shift with a line that was just as pointed. “We are no longer at the stage where we speak about potential,” she said. “We are at the stage where we must deliver.” For a government that has spent years presenting Uzbekistan as a reforming economy open to outside capital, that was a significant change of emphasis. The argument is no longer that Uzbekistan deserves credit for opening up but that it now expects to be judged by execution. Her most substantive remarks were about institutions rather than ambition. The council matters, she said, because it should help “solve problems quickly, without unnecessary bureaucracy” and ensure that “no project is lost along the way.” That is a more serious claim than the language of partnership that usually fills these forums. Mirziyoyeva was effectively acknowledging the gap that often opens between political endorsement and project delivery. Uzbekistan’s challenge is no longer simply attracting attention from foreign partners but getting projects through financing, approvals, and implementation without losing momentum inside the state apparatus. That urgency reflects the scale of the opportunity. Uzbekistan, with a...

C6+1

Opinion: Trump Has Golden Opportunity to Launch C6+1 on Sidelines of UN

Representatives of the five Central Asian states — Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan — along with Azerbaijan, are expected in New York for the United Nations General Assembly in September. Historically, meetings between the Central Asian states and the United States – the C5+1 – have taken place on the sidelines of the United Nations. It is the most natural and logistically efficient venue for President Donald Trump to re-engage with the C5 partners he hosted at the White House last November. As of now, only foreign ministers are expected to attend the UNGA. But this could change if Trump extends an invitation to the leaders, according to a Central Asian diplomatic source. This time, however, he has the opportunity to add Azerbaijan, transforming the format into a C6+1. Baku has already been invited to participate as a full member in Central Asian gatherings, and Washington should build on that momentum. Azerbaijan is uniquely positioned: close to both Israel and Turkey – two of America’s most important regional partners – it sits astride one of the most important connectivity corridors linking Europe and Asia. Its inclusion would turn the C5+1 into a genuinely trans‑Caspian framework that reflects the emerging realities of Eurasian integration. The move would also link two major diplomatic achievements of Trump’s second term: the launch of the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), a 43-km strategic transit corridor connecting mainland Azerbaijan to its Nakhchivan exclave through Armenia, and Trump’s elevation of the C5+1 to a White House-level summit. While TRIPP was discussed at the C5+1 meeting in November, bringing Azerbaijan into the next gathering would allow the administration to present itself as the architect of a new Eurasian trade and energy map. Strategically, a C6+1 format carries significant implications for great-power competition with China. This is because Central Asia is so crucial to Beijing’s grand strategy. In its recently adopted 15th five-year plan, neighborhood diplomacy is listed as the top priority — ahead of relations with major powers or developing countries. Beijing seeks to build a “community with a shared future” with 17 neighboring states, including all five in Central Asia, to “create a favorable external environment” for national rejuvenation, as Foreign Minister Wang Yi has stated. For China, Central Asia is a vital “hinterland” for energy and resource security, and a buffer against maritime disruptions. The United States does not need to dominate the Eurasian Heartland or force Central Asian states to choose between Washington and Beijing. It simply needs to ensure that any Chinese westward access runs through a vast landmass of countries that maintain constructive relations with the United States. A C6+1 format helps shape that environment without confrontation. A stable Middle Corridor – the energy and trade route running through Central Asia, across the Caspian Sea and through Azerbaijan to Turkey and the Mediterranean – also benefits America's energy-hungry allies in Asia, such as Japan and South Korea. Both increasingly look to Kazakhstan as an alternative oil supplier as they...