One of the elements most highlighted by the recent military confrontation between Israel and the U.S. on one side and Iran on the other is the geographical relevance of Central Asia to the situation. This is particularly true in the case of Turkmenistan, a country that shares a border of almost 1,200 kilometers with Iran. During the most intense days of the conflict, in a particularly unusual move, Turkmenistan opened its borders to foreign citizens seeking to escape from Iranian territory, which was under Israeli air strikes at the time.

On the diplomatic front, there have also been several high-level meetings and talks involving Turkmenistan; just after his meeting in Moscow with Russian President Vladimir Putin, the Iranian Foreign Minister, Abbas Araghchi, travelled to Ashgabat for a meeting with his Turkmen counterpart, Rashid Meredov. The day after, Meredov had a telephone conversation with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov arrived in Ashgabat for a meeting with the Turkmen leader, Serdar Berdimuhamedov.

Focusing primarily on the mutual isolation of Turkmenistan and Iran, Luca Anceschi, Professor of Eurasian Studies at the University of Glasgow, gave The Times of Central Asia his interpretation of these developments: “In my opinion, there is a fundamental issue, which is Turkmen isolation. When we see a small shift, we think that things are changing, but nothing changes. The second isolation is that of Iran, which in this case is not intentional. The reality we have seen in recent days is that Iran is isolated at the regional level. Russia has made it clear that Iran is expendable, and has not given reassuring answers. We see that there is an attempt to remedy this forced isolation on the part of Iran. To get out of these regional arrangements, they have tried to go everywhere, including Ashgabat.”

Operational agreements on the energy side are certainly weighing on Tehran’s desire to reassure Turkmenistan about the stability of the theocratic regime that rules Iran. These agreements are particularly useful to Iran in meeting the energy needs of the northern part of the country, which is remote and poorly connected to the south, where the country’s main natural gas fields are located. According to Temur Umarov, a Fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, “Since 2022, Turkmenistan’s visibility in Eurasian politics has certainly increased, and this is also the result of geopolitical changes that have taken place in the region in recent years,” Umarov told TCA. “What happened in Iran further increases Ashgabat’s visibility, but it was coincidental that Lavrov’s visit to Turkmenistan took place during the clash between Israel and Iran, as it was part of a wider tour of the region by the Russian Foreign Minister.”

Another aspect that should be considered is the change in tone on the part of Turkmen diplomacy, which at first glance appears much more assertive than in the past. A few weeks ago, Ashgabat issued a very harsh statement regarding Trump’s decision to include Turkmenistan among the countries subject to travel bans, and, at least according to Iranian media reports, during the meeting between Araghchi and Meredov, the latter referred to Israel as a “Zionist regime.”

Anceschi remains cautious on this point, too. “We are used to such low levels of diplomatic activism on the part of Turkmenistan that even the smallest reaction risks being overestimated,” he told TCA. “As for the reaction to the U.S. decision, cynically speaking, the fact that there is one less destination for Turkmenistan is to the regime’s advantage. With regard to Meredov’s definition of Israel, I think it is the Iranian regime that has used that term.”

This interpretation is also shared by Umarov. “I believe that Turkmenistan wants to maintain stable relations with Israel as well as with Iran,” he told TCA. “Ashgabat is therefore trying to balance its close relationship with Iran, especially on the commercial front, without breaking ties with Israel, with whom Turkmenistan has a stable relationship.”

Umarov also links Turkmenistan’s decision to open its border to allow the escape of some thousand foreign nationals, mainly from Central Asia, to its political proximity to Iran: “Many countries have asked Turkmenistan to facilitate the passage of people wishing to leave Iran, and Ashgabat has agreed both because of its cooperation with Tehran, and to seek international attention at a time when other Central Asian republics are receiving a lot of it.”

On this point, Anceschi favors a more pragmatic approach. “I think that the border between Iran and Turkmenistan is less impermeable than we generally think. We saw this with Covid, which most likely entered Turkmenistan from Iran, even though the Turkmen regime has always denied its presence in the country. I therefore think that Ashgabat’s decision is a matter of practical expediency, making official a border permeability that already exists in practice.”

In the case of Turkmenistan, it is always difficult to understand which dynamics are temporary and which represent long-term changes. This largely stems from the nature of the Turkmen regime, which has always relied on international isolation to maintain its internal stability. Given its proximity to an unstable Iran, however, this could slowly be starting to change.