Page 372 – The Times Of Central Asia

27 Feb 2025

Business & Economy, Kyrgyzstan, Kyrgyzstan Local Politics, Kyrgyzstan Business & Economy

Kyrgyzstan Faces Labor Shortages Amid Growing Return Migration

February 27, 2025
By Sergey Kwan

As of February 1, 2025, Kyrgyzstan had 6,305 job vacancies, with the highest demand for blue-collar workers, according to the Ministry of Labor, Social Security, and Migration.

The official unemployment rate currently stands at 1.8%. A total of 69,300 people have sought assistance from the employment service, with 49,800 officially registered as unemployed. Since the beginning of the year, 12,246 citizens have applied for job placement, and 1,283 have successfully secured employment.

To enhance job seekers’ competitiveness in the labor market, the employment service has introduced training programs for in-demand professions. These include computer operation, sales, cooking, cosmetology, hairdressing, manicuring, massage therapy, makeup artistry, translation, accounting, sewing, driving, electric and gas welding, plumbing, and beekeeping.

Over the past three decades, hundreds of thousands of Kyrgyz citizens have migrated abroad for work, primarily to Russia. However, in recent years, return migration has been rising due to Russia’s economic downturn, stricter regulations, and increasing anti-immigrant sentiment toward Central Asians.

In response to this trend, the Kyrgyz government has prioritized establishing new industrial enterprises to create job opportunities for returning labor migrants.

27 Feb 2025

Local Politics, healthcare, Kazakhstan Local Politics, Kazakhstan

Proposal to Ban Sex Change Operations in Kazakhstan

February 27, 2025
By Vagit Ismailov

Kazakhstan’s Mazhilis (Parliament) Deputy Magerram Magerramov has proposed a ban on sex change operations, arguing that such procedures contradict national culture, traditions, and common sense.

Magerramov stressed the need to preserve traditional family values and questioned Kazakhstan’s legal framework, which currently allows gender reassignment for individuals diagnosed with gender dysphoria.

“According to the Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan ‘On the Health of the People and the Health Care System’, citizens over 21 years old who do not have mental or behavioral disorders can change their gender identity. However, the very term ‘gender identity disorder’ already implies the presence of a certain deviation,” he said.

The deputy argued that if a person has no physical abnormality but is diagnosed with an identity disorder, it should be classified as a mental or behavioral condition rather than grounds for medical intervention.

“Interfering with a healthy body through hormone therapy and surgical procedures cannot be justified when it comes to mental or behavioral disorders. It is an attempt to bring the body in line with the subjective perception of reality, which, in my opinion, is unacceptable,” he added.

Magerramov also expressed concerns about the impact on social norms, saying that gender transition was influenced by ideas unacceptable to Kazakh culture.

The World Health Organization (WHO), however, removed transgender identity from the list of mental illnesses in its International Classification of Diseases (ICD-11) in 2019.

Magerramov’s speech is not the first time he has criticized what he refers to as “Western values.” Earlier, he accused foreign sponsors, particularly USAID, of funding women’s marches and LGBT events in Almaty.

In addition, his colleague from the People’s Party of Kazakhstan, MP Irina Smirnova, has proposed a law on foreign agents, which would require media and NGOs to disclose sources of foreign funding.

27 Feb 2025

Home, Business & Economy, Kazakhstan, Kazakhstan Business & Economy, Features, Kazakhstan Featurees

Kazakhstan’s Rare Earth Ambitions Hindered by Investment and Control Challenges

March 3, 2025
By Aliya Haidar

Kazakhstan holds significant reserves of rare metals and rare earth elements, sometimes referred to as the “new oil” due to their increasing importance in global industries. However, experts say the country remains far from becoming a major supplier, as geopolitical tensions and a lack of large-scale investment continue to hinder development.

Global Context: Rare Earth Metals in Geopolitics

U.S. President Donald Trump has called for a rare-earth deal with Ukraine, raising international public interest in these minerals. While the specifics of the deal remain unclear, Trump has estimated its potential value at a trillion dollars. Meanwhile, Russia, which holds the world’s fourth-largest rare earth reserves, has expressed interest in cooperating with the U.S. in this sector.

Experts argue that large-scale mining operations in Ukraine are currently unprofitable and impractical. The rare metal sector includes 60 elements, such as lithium, titanium, beryllium, gallium, and tungsten, while rare-earth metals include 17 elements, such as scandium, yttrium, and lanthanides. Their high production costs, complex extraction process, and long payback periods have made large-scale commercial extraction difficult despite growing global demand.

Is Kazakhstan a Promising Market?

China remains the dominant global producer of rare earth metals, followed by Brazil, India, Australia, and Russia. Despite its extensive natural resource base in oil, gas, uranium, and non-ferrous metals, Kazakhstan has yet to prioritize rare-earth extraction.

However, international interest in Kazakhstan’s deposits is growing. France, Germany, and South Korea have already initiated exploration projects in the country. Germany’s HMS Bergbau AG, in collaboration with Qazaq Lithium, is developing lithium deposits in East Kazakhstan Oblast (EKO). Meanwhile, South Korea’s KIGAM has conducted exploration at the Bakennoye lithium deposit, leading to a memorandum of cooperation. The U.S. Embassy in Kazakhstan has also announced upcoming mining and processing projects for critical materials, such as lithium and titanium, involving American companies.

President Tokayev has stated that Kazakhstan’s subsoil contains 50,000 to 100,000 tons of lithium, but substantial investment in exploration and development is required. Kazakhstan already holds an 11% share of the global titanium market, rising to more than 20% in the aerospace industry.

Newly identified rare earth deposits were announced by the government in early 2025, totaling 2.6 million tons, including 400,000 tons of tungsten and 500,000 tons of niobium.

Calls for Stronger State Control

As international interest in Kazakhstan’s resources grows, concerns about foreign control over strategic assets have intensified. Financial analyst Rasul Rysmambetov has warned that major international players, particularly from Russia, may seek to dominate Kazakhstan’s rare-earth sector. “Several large Russian companies already operate in Kazakhstan. It is crucial to ensure that control over these resources remains in the hands of the state,” he said.

Rysmambetov has proposed the creation of a state agency for strategic assets or expanding the jurisdiction of existing institutions, such as the National Security Committee and the Ministry of Finance. He also suggested that sales of strategic resources should require oversight from the Security Council or Parliament.

“We can expect attempts by foreign firms, particularly Russian and Chinese companies, to acquire major Kazakh mining assets. The U.S. is unlikely to compete directly, but its companies may be indirectly involved,” Rysmambetov added.

Experts believe that unused mining waste from Kazakhstan’s industrial sector could also contain significant amounts of rare-earth elements, providing an alternative path to increasing production.

Rare Earth Metals: Economics vs. Politics

Economist and political analyst Peter Svoyk argues that geopolitical uncertainty remains the biggest obstacle to investment in Kazakhstan’s rare-earth sector.

“Mining rare earth metals is labor-intensive, expensive, and requires long-term planning. Just exploration, feasibility studies, and equipment installation can take up to ten years. Investors will only enter the market if they have confidence their projects will remain stable for at least 25-30 years,” Svoyk explained, adding that current geopolitical shifts are delaying new investment across the world.

“For the next 5-10 years, serious investments in rare earth metals will be limited. Instead, countries will focus on strengthening their existing supply chains and securing resources within their geopolitical blocs,” he said.

Svoyk also downplayed recent geopolitical announcements involving rare earth deals by the U.S. and Russia, arguing that they are more about securing strategic influence than about actual mining projects.

“For Kazakhstan, discussions about increasing rare earth extraction have been ongoing for 15 years, with President Tokayev pushing for progress over the last five years. Yet, large-scale development remains stalled, as the sector requires massive financial and technological investment,” Svoyk concluded.

According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), global demand for lithium has tripled over the past five years, while demand for cobalt has increased by 70% and nickel by 40%. Kazakhstan’s subsoil contains 99 of the 118 elements in the periodic table, meaning that if investment challenges are addressed, the country could become a key supplier of critical and rare-earth metals to global markets.

27 Feb 2025

Kazakhstan, International Affairs, Kazakhstan International Affairs, Features, Kazakhstan Featurees

A Blow to the CPC: Geopolitical Intrigue Surrounding the Pipeline

February 27, 2025
By Andrei Matveev

More than a week has passed since Ukrainian drones attacked the Kropotkinskaya oil refinery, part of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) system. However, the incident remains a topic of heated debate in Kazakhstan.

What Happened?

On February 17, the Kropotkinskaya oil pumping station, located in Kavkazsky district, Krasnodar Krai, was targeted by multiple UAVs carrying explosives and metal fragments. While there were no casualties, the facility sustained damage and was taken out of service.

Oil transportation through the Tengiz-Novorossiysk pipeline has since been rerouted via a bypass system, ensuring that shipments from the CPC Marine Terminal continue as normal.

On February 20-21, a Kazakh delegation, including Daniyar Berlibayev, special representative for the CPC project from KazMunayGas, and Yerbolat Mendybayev, Director of Transportation and Logistics at KazMunayGas, visited the Kropotkinskaya station alongside CPC Deputy General Director Hakim Kasymov to assess the damage.

At a CPC shareholders’ meeting in Abu Dhabi on February 25-26, CEO Nikolay Gorban presented a report on the extent of the damage, equipment dismantling progress, and contractor mobilization status. According to the CPC press service, shareholders pledged full support for repair work, which is expected to take approximately two months.

Kazakh Debate: Is Ukraine to Blame?

While CPC shareholders, including entities from Kazakhstan, Russia, Europe, and the United States, treated the issue as a technical problem, Kazakh public discourse took a different turn, led by Mazhilis deputies.

Parliamentarian Nikita Shatalov questioned Ukraine’s motivations on his Telegram channel:

“The Ukrainian side could not have been unaware that 90% of the oil transported through the pipeline is Kazakh, extracted from Tengiz, with revenues benefiting Western companies exporting to the EU. The pipeline is international, with KazMunayGas, Chevron, ExxonMobil, and Italy’s Eni as shareholders. This attack was clearly intended to damage Kazakhstan’s economic interests.”

Shatalov emphasized Kazakhstan’s neutral stance in the Ukraine-Russia war, pointing out that diplomatic contacts between Astana and Kyiv have continued at the highest levels, including President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s engagement with Volodymyr Zelensky.

“Those responsible for this attack on an international consortium must be punished. Kazakhstan must demand accountability from Ukraine for the damage inflicted and the threat to bilateral relations.”

His stance was echoed by Mazhilis deputy Marat Bashimov, who called the attack a “direct assault on Kazakhstan’s interests” in a Facebook post:

“The Ukrainian side knew exactly how strategically vital the CPC pipeline is for Kazakh oil exports.”

Bashimov argued that Kazakhstan has always upheld neutrality, supported diplomatic resolution efforts, and even refused to recognize the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk republics.

Kazakh Debate: Is Russia to Blame?

Not all deputies agreed. Mazhilisman Yermurat Bapi strongly rejected demands for Ukrainian compensation, arguing that Kazakhstan has no moral or legal grounds to make such a claim:

“For more than three years, Ukraine has been fighting for survival against an aggressor that invaded its territory. As part of this war, Ukraine has the right to choose its defense strategies.”

Bapi went further, blaming Kazakhstan’s overreliance on Russian infrastructure for the crisis:

“The CPC pipeline was a strategic mistake of ‘Old Kazakhstan.’ Betting exclusively on Russia, a country with an aggressive foreign policy, was always a risky decision.”

Expert Analysis: The Bigger Picture

Political scientist Daniyar Ashimbayev criticized the polarized debate, particularly arguments claiming the attack was “not Kazakhstan’s concern”:

“It’s amusing to watch certain analysts downplay the attack on the CPC as an ‘accident.’ Let’s not forget that the CPC was initiated by Chevron, which saw the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline as too risky and expensive.”

As tensions rise, the geopolitical intrigue surrounding the attack on the CPC continues to unfold.

27 Feb 2025

Home, Uzbekistan, Uzbekistan Features, International Affairs, Features, Uzbekistan International Affairs

Uzbekistan Sees Opportunities in Afghanistan

April 17, 2025
By Bruce Pannier

Uzbekistan’s business relations with neighboring Afghanistan are booming.

In 2024, Uzbek-Afghan trade came to some $1.1 billion, and more than $1 billion of that was Uzbek exports to Afghanistan. It seems after the February 22-23 visit of Taliban acting Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs Abdul Ghani Baradar to Uzbekistan, that figure is likely to continue climbing.

Baradar met with Uzbek Prime Minister Abdullo Aripov and Deputy Prime Minister Jamshid Khojayev to discuss trade and investment, which is essentially the basis of Uzbekistan’s relations with Taliban-ruled Afghanistan.

The immediate results of these talks were modest, but projects due to start in the near future offer substantial profits for both Uzbekistan and Afghanistan.

Uzbekistan agreed to lift restrictions on imports of Afghan agricultural goods, which facilitated another agreement establishing a free economic zone in Uzbekistan’s border area that would have factories for processing pine nuts and cotton from Afghanistan.

Agricultural goods are the bulk of Afghanistan’s exports to Uzbekistan, which is not surprising since more than 40 years of war have prevented Afghanistan from building many plants and factories for producing finished goods.

A report from November 2024 said in the first ten months of the year, Uzbekistan’s exports to Afghanistan came to some $855.9 million, while Afghan exports to Uzbekistan amounted to only some $28.3 million.

Power On

Uzbekistan is the leading exporter of electricity to Afghanistan, supplying nearly 60% of Afghanistan’s electricity imports, and that amount could increase soon.

Baradar’s delegation discussed progress on the 500 kV transmission line from Uzbekistan’s Surkhan region to Dashti-Alvan, near the Baghlan provincial capital Pul-e-Khumri, which will increase Uzbekistan’s electricity exports to Afghanistan by some 70%. Construction of the 260-kilometer transmission line started in 2018 and has been repeatedly delayed.

Baradar said Uzbek officials agreed to cut the cost of building the transmission line from $252 million to $222 million.

Turkmenistan is also considering building a 500 kV transmission line to Dashti-Alvan.

Uzbek Deputy Prime Minister Khojayev and Baradar reviewed progress at Afghanistan’s Toti-Mardan gas field, just south of the border with Turkmenistan, which is believed to contain vast reserves of natural gas.

In November 2024, Uzbekistan signed a ten-year contract to develop the gas field, pledging to invest $100 million in the project each year. According to reports about Baradar’s recent visit, drilling at the site is expected to begin soon.

Prime Minister Aripov said Uzbek investors were already preparing to start construction of a cement plant in Afghanistan’s Samangan Province. Taliban officials have been offering Uzbek companies opportunities in Afghanistan’s mining sector for months.

The Taliban acting minister of mines and petroleum, Hidayatullah Badri, was part of Baradar’s delegation and he met with Uzbek officials to discuss cooperation in developing Afghanistan’s mineral resources. The Afghan delegation again proposed Uzbek participation in developing mining sites, but there was no word in reports on any agreements.

Aripov mentioned Uzbekistan was interested in the exploration and extraction of oil and gas, both of which Uzbekistan needs for domestic consumption, but did not mention mining.

All Aboard

The most interesting agreement, arguably, came on railway cooperation.

For nearly seven years, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan have been talking about building the Trans-Afghan railway that would connect the three countries. A railway line from Termez, Uzbekistan, already reaches the northern Afghan city of Mazar-i-Sharif.

It is Afghanistan’s major railway link with the outside world.

The Trans-Afghan railway line would link Mazar-i-Sharif to the Afghan capital Kabul, and from there to Peshawar, Pakistan. This would create a new trade link potentially involving Russia, China, the Middle East, and India shipping goods through Uzbekistan and Afghanistan, bringing large transit fees to both the latter two countries.

This project was a topic of conversation during Baradar’s visit, and Uzbek Transport Minister Ilhom Makhkamov said work on extending the railway from Mazar-i-Sharif to Kabul would start this year. However, Baradar said an agreement was reached on a different railroad branch that would go west from Mazar-i-Sharif to Herat.

In 2024, a railway connecting the eastern Iranian city of Khaf to Herat started operation. The line connects to Iran’s railway network, leading west to Turkey or south to the Persian Gulf.

Baradar said Uzbekistan would soon send specialists to conduct a technical assessment of the railway route and construction would begin ten days after the approval of their assessment.

The Elephant in the Room

One of the contentious issues between Uzbekistan and Afghanistan is the construction of the Qosh-Tepa Canal in northern Afghanistan. The canal is not due to be completed until 2028, but once it is opened, it will draw significant amounts of water from the Amu-Darya, the river that marks much of Afghanistan’s border with Central Asia.

Agricultural fields in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan will be severely affected.

Reports on Baradar’s visit did not mention that the issue of water use was discussed in Uzbekistan. But the day after he returned to Afghanistan, Baradar spoke about responsible water use, warning that unnecessarily depleting water supplies could lead to a worsening of political and economic relations among countries.

Only the Start?

Uzbek and Taliban officials have been talking about bringing bilateral trade to some $3 billion in the coming years, and judging from their bilateral trade in 2024, this figure seems possible. According to Uzbekistan’s figures, Uzbek-Afghan trade in 2023 amounted to some $866 million, and $759.9 million in 2022.

Going forward, many questions remain about Uzbekistan’s ability to finance large projects in Afghanistan, and Afghanistan’s ability to pay for Uzbekistan’s exports, but for now, the Uzbekistan-Taliban relationship built on business ties seems to be strengthening.

26 Feb 2025

Central Asia, Tajikistan, Tajikistan Business Economy, Business & Economy

ADB Considers $500 Million Support for Tajikistan’s Rogun Hydropower Plant

February 26, 2025
By Sadokat Jalolova

The Asian Development Bank (ADB) will continue supporting Tajikistan’s Rogun Hydropower Plant (HPP) project in 2025, the bank’s new country manager, Ko Sakamoto, announced on February 25.

Speaking to reporters, Sakamoto emphasized that Rogun HPP is a top priority for the Tajik government, highlighting its significance for Tajikistan’s energy independence, regional stability and climate change mitigation.

The ADB has been invited to join a consortium of financial institutions financing the project. Tajikistan has requested $500 million in assistance, and the bank is currently reviewing the proposal.

“ADB will continue to support the project and share updates as negotiations progress,” Sakamoto said.

In 2024, ADB provided $220 million in assistance to Tajikistan, funding six projects across agriculture, energy, health, public administration and transport. ADB plans to approve four new projects in 2025, including an initiative on digital agriculture aimed at boosting food security.

The bank is developing a five-year strategy that will align with Tajikistan’s long-term development goals. It will support glacier protection efforts, as Tajikistan leads regional climate initiatives. An international glacier conservation conference is scheduled for May in Dushanbe.

As Tajikistan works toward greater energy security, Rogun remains central to its economic and environmental strategy. ADB’s continued involvement signals strong international backing for the project, which has the potential to transform Tajikistan into a key regional energy exporter. If approved, the $500 million in funding would mark a significant step toward completing one of Central Asia’s most ambitious hydropower projects.