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Bridging Continents: The China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Railway – A Tale of Opportunities, Challenges, and Controversies

On June 6, 2024, an agreement was signed in Beijing to begin the construction of a railway between China and Uzbekistan which will pass through Kyrgyzstan, a strategic infrastructure project designed to create a new land transport corridor between Central and East Asia. For 27 years, this project remained a pipe-dream. Now, the presidents of the three countries have confidently declared that this railway, with a length of 523 kilometers, is extremely necessary and will be highly profitable for the entire region. However, such sentiments were not always the case, and doubts have long lived in the heads of multiple Kyrgyz presidents. Both Askar Akayev, who ruled the country from 1990 until the revolution in 2005, his successor Kurmanbek Bakiyev, also overthrown as a result of revolution in 2010, and Almazbek Atambayev, were not sure of the benefits of this project. Until 2017, that is, shortly before Atambayev’s resignation and the transfer of power to his, as it seemed to him at that time, reliable friend Sooronbay Jeenbekov, Atambayev was more or less consistent in defending the interests of his country, but later his focus shifted towards China. Why was there such a turn from Atambayev towards Beijing? This later became clear. On January 26, 2018, an accident occurred in the old part of the Bishkek Combined Heat and Power Plant (CHP), which was supposed to have been modernized by that time. This incident served to reveal large-scale corruption and financial violations at the CHP. The contract for implementation of the modernization was signed on July 16, 2013 between the owner of the CHP, Electric Stations OJSC, and the Chinese company, TBEA, in the amount of $386 million dollars. The financing was provided as a loan by a state fund of China, the Export and Import Bank of China (Eximbank), and Kyrgyzstan had to return approximately $500 million including interest. However, after the accident and the transfer of the case to court, it transpired that the real cost of the subhead modernization was a maximum of $250-260 million. Hence, the cost was hugely inflated; as an example, a pair of pliers was invoiced for $640, and fire extinguishers for $1,600. A similar situation occurred with the Datka-Kemin power line, the construction of which began in 2012, when Atambayev was president. The project was implemented by the same Chinese company, TBEA, which carried out work on modernization of the CHP, and the amount cited for the project was the same, $386 million. Again, the loan was issued by Eximbank. As a result of corruption scandals which were revealed in 2019, Atambayev was deprived of presidential immunity and paid with his freedom. Kyrgyzstan’s accumulated debt since its independence in 1991 is estimated at $6.2 billion - 45% of GDP - around $1.7 billion of which is owed to Eximbank. After Sadyr Japarov came to power in November 2020, issues surrounding the Kumtor Gold Mine came to the fore. Discovered by geologists in 1978, the largest open pit gold mine in Central Asia,...

Central Asians Beaten and Deported from Russia

The punishment for many Central Asians in Russia whose work or residency documents are not in order is pain and humiliation, and then possibly deportation. Xenophobia targeting Central Asians in Russia has been on the rise since the March 22 terrorist attack on Moscow’s Crocus City Hall that left more than 140 people dead. Russian authorities apprehended a group of ethnic Tajiks who allegedly carried out the attack and after that the level of prejudice against Central Asians in Russia, which has always existed, dramatically worsened. The treatment of Central Asians at the Sakharovo migration center on the outskirts of Moscow is an example. Moscow courts are likely to send Central Asians caught with document problems to the Sakharovo center. Radio Free Europe’s Kyrgyz Service interviewed several people who passed through the Sakharovo center. Their descriptions shed light on the conditions inside. One man who spent 18 days in the center said, “The day we entered there, they intimidated us, forced us to walk in single file, run fast… then they examined us and beat us with a stun gun.” That jibes with another man’s description. “They call your last name, then you go out into the corridor and run. There they hit you on the back of the head and tell you to ‘run.’” Then, the man continued, “They made me face the wall, forced me to raise my arms up, spread my legs, and started hitting me with a stun gun.” There is an anti-Islamic element to the treatment of detainees at Sakharovo. A different person remembered this about his detention. “They fed us food with pork. Since we were hungry, we removed the meat and ate what was left.” He said there were some people who recited their daily prayers in their rooms. “When one guy was saying namaz, the guards entered. Then one of them (the guards) hit him in the face twice.” When the person continued saying his prayers, the guards said, “Let him go to Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and read his prayer there.” Some of the detainees with beards were forcibly shaved. Batygul Moldobayeva is from Kyrgyzstan. She was detained in Moscow this summer with an expired work permit and sent to Sakharovo. Moldobayeva said the guards yelled at women detainees and were rude to them. She added that sometimes the guards “asked them to be their ‘temporary wives.’” Moldobayeva said there were pregnant women in the center, some as far along as six months, and the guards did not pay any attention to their condition. According to Moldobayeva, there were some Kyrgyz citizens at Sakharovo who had been there for three or four months. Askar Uskenbayev is another Kyrgyz citizen who was detained in Moscow in mid-June and sent to Sakharovo. He said he met fellow Kyrgyz citizens who had been there six months. After being deported back to Kyrgyzstan, Moldobayeva posted about her experience on social media and warned Kyrgyz citizens to be sure all their documents were in order if they...

Balancing Regional Integration Amid Global Rivalries

Central Asia has become a focal point for world and regional powers such as China, Russia, the European Union, the United States, and Turkey. Amid geopolitical uncertainty and a shifting global order, regional cooperation seems to be a top priority for Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan in their foreign policy. The problem, however, is that the absence of a unified regional identity among Central Asian nations poses a major obstacle to their ambitions to strengthen regional integrations. They have different views on their regional identity due to their unique cultures, histories, politics, and economies. But in spite of that, on June 9, in the Kazakh capital of Astana, leaders of the five Central Asian countries gathered to discuss closer economic cooperation, stability and security in the region. They sought to expand ties in trade, industry, transport and logistics, energy, agriculture, as well as in the water management. As a result of the summit, regional leaders signed several key agreements, including the Roadmap for development of regional cooperation for 2025-2027, as well as the Conceptual framework of development of regional cooperation Central Asia 2040. These documents indicate that the regional integration will be a long-term process that will last for decades. In the meantime, Central Asian states will almost certainly continue strengthening bilateral ties. The Consultative Meetings of the leaders of Central Asian countries gave Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan another opportunity to deepen cooperation in various fields. The two nations, who signed an agreement on allied relations in 2022, announced their plans to adopt a strategic partnership program until 2034, and also to jointly launch several big economic and energy project. Prior to the meeting in Astana, presidents of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan held talks with Azerbaijani leader Ilham Aliyev. They were also scheduled to meet with Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio, but he canceled his visit to Astana after the Japan Meteorological Agency issued a warning of a potential earthquake in the Nankai Trough. Unlike him, Josep Borrell, Vice-President of the European Commission and High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, visited Central Asia in early August. He traveled to Kazakhstan and neighboring Kyrgyzstan– a country that signed the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the European Union on June 25. Although both nations are members of the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) Moscow’s preoccupation with the war in Ukraine has allowed other actors, including the European Union, to strengthen its presence in the strategically important region. While the EU’s goals in Central Asia are mainly related to energy, Japan’s plans to expand cooperation with the five regional countries serve as Tokyo’s strategic tool to counterbalance China's growing influence in the region. Azerbaijan, on the other hand, seeks to create a strategic energy bridge linking Central Asia and Europe via the South Caucasus. That is why Baku’s collaboration with Central Asian countries in the energy sector has become more crucial than ever. It is no surprise...

Olympic Success Nudges Central Asians Closer Together in Paris

Uzbekistan’s athletes grabbed the most glory for Central Asia at the Olympic Games, delivering eight gold medals, mostly in boxing, and propelling the nation to 13th on the medal table in Paris. But the occasional displays of solidarity among competitors, coaches and fans from Central Asia were just as inspiring for those who want the region’s countries to draw closer together – at a time when the world seems increasingly perilous. One video clip from the games showed ebullient Uzbek fans in the stands with the flags of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan held aloft in the background. “This moment reflects the shared bonds of our region, showcasing Central Asia’s presence on the global stage at Paris 2024,” said the International Institute of Central Asia, a state-run center in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, that promotes regional cooperation. Then there was Uzbek coach Akmal Hasanov, who helped out Kyrgyz boxer Munarbek Seyitbek uulu because his personal trainer and head coach were absent. Competing in the 57kg category, Seyitbek uulu lost to Uzbekistan’s Abdumalik Khalokov in the final, but it was the first Olympic medal for a Kyrgyz boxer. “Unprecedented unity of fans from all five countries. Love, mutual cheering. Before it wasn't like this at all. I hope politicians will see a potential and will speed up integrational processes. People want it,” Nikita Makarenko, a journalist and producer from Uzbekistan, said on the X platform. The politicians see that potential, judging by recent meetings. On Thursday, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and Uzbek counterpart Shavkat Mirziyoyev met in Kazakhstan and the leaders talked about cooperation, especially in trade. There are plans, for example, for an industrial facility on the border between the two countries that will speed up cargo delivery and reduce logistics costs. On Friday, Kazakhstan hosted a meeting with the leaders of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, all former Soviet republics that today seek to balance their relationships with neighboring powers Russia and China, the United States and Europe, as well as relatively new partners in the Middle East and elsewhere. The goal of Central Asian solidarity – and regional security – is getting more attention as geopolitical tensions simmer, and the war in Ukraine, another former Soviet republic, shows little sign of resolution well into its third year. “Today we notice that the fundamental foundations of the system of international relations have changed. This is a dangerous phenomenon,” Tokayev said at the regional meeting. “It is clear that the current challenges can be overcome only through political dialogue and strengthening measures of mutual trust between our states.” There are moves to translate rhetoric into action. The forces of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan clashed as recently as 2022 over a border dispute, but negotiators of the two countries have pushed methodically toward resolution of the dispute. Last month, several Central Asian countries, plus Azerbaijan, held joint military exercises – Russia, the erstwhile security guarantor in the region, was absent. Water scarcity is acute in Central Asia, whose governments acknowledge they need to collaborate...

Inland Water Transportation in Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan’s inland waterways run to 4,302 km with an infrastructure that includes inland ports in Atyrau and Pavlodar, along with small cargo wharves and docks with access roads and ferry lines. Inland navigation is concentrated in the Ural-Caspian, Ili-Balkhash, and Irtysh river basins, and the Irtysh River is navigated via three locks at Bukhtarma, Ust-Kamenogorsk, and Shulbinsk. As such, Kazakhstan's inland waterways have great potential. Transporting cargo and passengers by ship is cheaper and more environmentally friendly than overland alternatives and has a significant multiplier effect on the development of  recreation and tourism in surrounding areas. However, there are a number of challenges to realizing this potential, including the unsatisfactory condition of navigable routes, an insufficient amount and high wear of coastal infrastructure, the state of the inland fleet and waterway locks, and a shortage of specialists. Over time, the Kazakh government's lack of proper attention to developing inland waterways has translated into falling transportation volumes along the country’s main navigable rivers. In turn, the lower handling volumes have led to a dearth of funds to update and repair port facilities, along with a deterioration of coastal infrastructure on navigable waterways, industrial ships, and waterway locks. In the last five years, Kazakhstan’s inland waterway fleet has decreased from 171 to 150 vessels. Meanwhile, 70% of those in operation are past their service life, while the existing coastal infrastructure is unable to process modern types of cargo at the pace required by the market. As reported by  Kazakhstan’s statistics agency, in the first half of 2024, 156,300 tons of cargo and 74,200 passengers travelled  on inland waterways, down 40.8% and 40.1%, respectively, from the same period last year. A key problem lies in the lack of a comprehensive analysis of the classification and volume of cargo carried through inland waterways. Current developments in shipping are focused around the Irtysh, home to the inland fleet and the main cargo base from which crushed stone is exported to Russia. On the Russian side, plans are in place to further increase shipped imports of both stone and other inert materials, alongside a proposal to import timber to Kazakhstan from Khanty-Mansiysk. The shipment of petroleum products to Chinese refineries from Kazakh and Russian plants is also being explored in tandem with the Chinese side sending back construction materials and consumer goods. At the initial stage, the volume of cargo transportation along the Irtysh is estimated at 350,000-400,000 tons a year, which could be ramped up to 1.5 million tons in the future. Experts note the important role of a strategic task set by the government to develop the transit logistics of integrating inland waterways into the multimodal logistics chain. This is especially relevant amid congestion on Kazakhstan’s railways and roads, the gravitation of export-import cargo to the transport system, and energetic discussions on developing the Russia-Kazakhstan-China transit corridor using the Irtysh. The project entails shipping cargo via the river to Lake Zaysan where reloaded onto trains, it continues its journey through a new Maykapshagay–Jeminay border...

SCO and Afghanistan on the Cusp of a New Relationship

The hype surrounding the recent summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Council of Heads of State in Astana has died down, and the expert community has offered differing takeaways, with some experts optimistic and others cautious. Few, however, have considered what new this summit delivered on Afghanistan. In general, what is the role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in resolving the political issues around long-suffering Afghanistan and rebuilding its economy? Despite the SCO’s previous hands-off approach to Afghan affairs, the issue of Taliban-ruled Afghanistan was raised for the first time at the highest level of the SCO in Astana, which gives hope that the organization will expand its role. In their remarks, almost every SCO head of state touched on Afghanistan in essentially the same vein, stating the need for peace, stability and security, while underlining the fact that Afghanistan is an integral part of Central Asia. Indeed, Afghanistan was mentioned in the final declaration of the Astana summit, with Member States “reaffirming their commitment to asserting Afghanistan as an independent, neutral and peaceful state free from terrorism, war, and narcotic drugs [and voicing] their readiness to support the international community’s efforts to facilitate peace and development in that country.” At the same time, there was a clear message to the Taliban that “the establishment of an inclusive government involving multiple representatives of all ethnic and political groups of Afghan society is the only way toward attaining lasting peace and stability in that country.” These statements represent a rather big step, considering that previously the SCO failed to find a consensus on Afghanistan and develop its own mechanisms to interact with Kabul. The creation of the SCO-Afghanistan Contact Group back in 2005 was rather a spontaneous reaction to the US-led coalition's Operation Enduring Freedom in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attack. The SCO itself says the contact group was created because of the "concerns of the SCO countries about the negative development of the situation in Afghanistan and the intention of the SCO to establish a specific consultative dialogue with Kabul." While the contact group included the members’ permanent representatives to the SCO, only a few events were ever held. Indeed, interest in the contact group was only really apparent from the Afghan side, which was looking for SCO assistance in rebuilding the Afghan economy and SCO participation in implementing various energy and transport infrastructure projects and creating favorable conditions for Afghan goods to access the markets of SCO countries. However, none of this was realized. The SCO states preferred, as they still do, to conduct relations with Afghanistan bilaterally, and did not support the efforts of the SCO Secretariat to intensify the work of the contact group. In 2010, Uzbekistan directly indicated its interest in building relations with Afghanistan exclusively on a bilateral basis and stated that it would no longer take part in the contact group. In June 2012, Afghanistan’s application for SCO observer status was granted. Yet this step was more symbolic and failed to...