For more than three decades, Turkmenistan has stood apart from its neighbors. Since declaring independence in 1991, it has built its foreign policy around “permanent neutrality,” a status formally recognized by the United Nations in 1995. Neutrality has meant avoiding military alliances, steering clear of regional blocs, and limiting international engagement to carefully managed bilateral relationships. Ashgabat has been especially cautious in its dealings with Washington, keeping contacts minimal while relying overwhelmingly on China to buy its natural gas.

That posture is beginning to shift. In 2025, the outlines of a quiet rapprochement between Turkmenistan and the United States are visible. The latest round of Annual Bilateral Consultations (ABCs) in Washington, coupled with Ashgabat’s more active role in the C5+1 regional dialogue, suggests a gradual warming. On September 19, 2023, Turkmen President Serdar Berdimuhamedov participated in the first C5+1 multilateral summit alongside the U.S. and regional counterparts, highlighting Ashgabat’s more active role in the platform. At the heart of this cautious opening are three themes: energy dependence, security on Turkmenistan’s southern border, and the geopolitics of digital connectivity.

Annual Bilateral Consultations: A Structured Dialogue

The ABCs were launched in 2010 as part of a U.S. initiative to formalize engagement with all five Central Asian states. They are yearly, structured meetings between senior officials that review the state of bilateral relations across political, economic, and security issues.

In August 2025, Foreign Minister Rashid Meredov met Secretary of State Marco Rubio in Washington for the 11th ABC. According to the U.S. State Department release, the two sides “underscored their commitment to advancing U.S.-Turkmenistan relations, including through security cooperation, increased economic and investment opportunities, the advancement of religious freedom, and deepening engagement through the C5+1 diplomatic platform.” The statement was deliberately brief and omitted sensitive matters such as the partial visa restrictions Washington imposed on Turkmen citizens earlier that year. But the very fact of the meeting, following years of minimal contact, marked a notable warming.

From Episodic Contacts to Broader Cooperation

The rapprochement has begun to take shape in concrete ways. Trade between the two countries, though still small, nearly doubled in 2024 to reach $218.5 million. Turkmenistan exported textiles, chemicals, and gas-related equipment, while U.S. exports included aviation technology, electronics, and agricultural machinery. Overall, the trade volume remained the second-lowest among Central Asian states, but the sharp increase pointed to a deliberate effort to expand ties. Reflecting this momentum, on June 8, 2025, Turkmenistan’s Foreign Minister Rashid Meredov met with the Executive Director of the Turkmenistan–U.S. Business Council, Eric Stewart, to discuss cooperation across sectors, including energy, cybersecurity, green technology, and education.

Security cooperation has grown more visible. Turkmenistan’s long border with Afghanistan has long been a vulnerability, and while Ashgabat avoided involvement in the U.S.-led war, it quietly welcomed assistance to reinforce border defenses and counter trafficking. The U.S. has provided equipment, training, and support for Turkmen border services, a low-profile effort documented in a Congressional Research Service report. Turkmenistan has invested over a billion dollars in Afghan infrastructure projects – power lines, roads, and railways – while also backing the long-delayed TAPI pipeline.

Turkmen officials and international backers have long promoted the TAPI pipeline as a stabilizing project that would tie Afghanistan’s fragile economy into a regional energy corridor, creating transit revenue and jobs that could help anchor security along Turkmenistan’s southern border. While Washington has generally favored Turkmenistan’s diversification of export routes, direct endorsement of gas swap deals that transit Iran is unlikely given U.S. sanctions policy, meaning American support is more apt to focus on routes west across the Caspian or south via TAPI.

Humanitarian and environmental programs have been another strand. According to MENAFN, citing USAID, joint water management programs in 2024 “helped reduce water losses in irrigation systems by 10% in pilot regions.” Recently, however, USAID’s footprint inside Turkmenistan has shrunk, with many governance and civil society initiatives curtailed. Religious freedom and human rights remain points of friction – Turkmenistan is still listed by the U.S. as a “country of particular concern” – but their inclusion in the ABC agenda signals that Washington sees room for dialogue.

Positioning Within C5+1

The rapprochement is also framed within the C5+1 format, a diplomatic platform that brings together the five Central Asian states and the United States. Established in 2015, it has grown in importance: in September 2023, U.S. President Joe Biden hosted the first-ever C5+1 presidential summit in New York. For Turkmenistan, the most reticent of the five, active participation represented a shift.

By engaging through C5+1, Ashgabat has signaled that closer ties with Washington are part of a regional process rather than a bilateral alignment that might compromise neutrality. The State Department’s 2025 readout explicitly cited “deepening engagement through the C5+1 diplomatic platform” as a priority, underscoring that bilateral warming is designed to complement multilateral cooperation. For Washington, ensuring Turkmenistan’s participation means that no Central Asian state is left outside U.S. regional outreach.

Gas Wealth and Dependency

Turkmenistan’s geopolitical weight comes from its vast reserves of natural gas. According to the Carnegie Endowment, the country holds approximately 13.4 trillion cubic meters of proven gas reserves, the fourth largest in the world after Russia, Iran, and Qatar. By comparison, the United States has about 12 TCM, while Saudi Arabia has less than 9. The centerpiece is the giant Galkynysh field, one of the largest deposits on earth.

Yet these riches have created a textbook case of dependence. Hydrocarbons provide over 50% of GDP, 90% of export revenue, and 80% of fiscal income. In 2024, petroleum and gas made up nearly 85% of total exports. Turkmenistan exports roughly 35 bcm of gas annually to China, making Beijing not just its primary market but a pivotal anchor of its energy economy, and highlighting the strategic asymmetry that gives China outsized influence in Turkmenistan’s export strategy.

Turkmenistan’s export profile mirrors that of Azerbaijan or Iraq, with hydrocarbons dominating and few alternative sectors, unlike Kazakhstan’s uranium and metals. Diversification strategies have long been discussed but remain mostly aspirational. For Ashgabat, projects such as TAPI, swap deals via Iran to Turkey, Iraq, and Azerbaijan, and a potential Trans-Caspian pipeline are strategically vital. For Washington, only TAPI and the Trans-Caspian appear to fit U.S. diversification goals; Iran-based swaps are viewed cautiously – permitted in some cases (to Azerbaijan) but sanction-sensitive in others (notably with Iraq).

Digital Geopolitics: The Caspian Cable

Energy is not the only game. Digital connectivity has become another arena where U.S.-Turkmenistan rapprochement has resonance. Central Asia’s internet traffic has traditionally flowed north through Russia, creating vulnerability to disruption and surveillance. The proposed Trans-Caspian Fiber-Optic Cable aims to change that.

Backed by Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan as part of a “Digital Silk Way,” the cable will run under the Caspian Sea to connect Central Asia directly with the South Caucasus and Europe. In April 2025, the U.S.-based firm Pioneer Consulting was awarded the contract to supervise construction. The system is designed to carry up to 400 terabits of data per second, creating a fast, reliable corridor that bypasses Russia and Iran.

Some regional observers have suggested that whoever builds these “pipes of the digital future” will shape how data flows. That does not mean U.S. firms will block Russian or Chinese content – a cable only carries traffic; it is not a media platform. Still, control of infrastructure matters. The Caspian link lessens dependence on Russian networks, makes internet access more reliable, and gives the region more exposure to competing ideas that can encourage democratic change. By providing an alternative path, the Caspian link reduces reliance on Russian networks and diminishes Moscow’s ability to throttle or monitor regional traffic.

Washington is aiming to link Central Asia’s connectivity to open, secure networks in line with the State Department’s Clean Network initiative, which is seeking to safeguard digital infrastructure from authoritarian interference. The project holds both commercial promise and geopolitical weight. In Turkmenistan – where internet access remains tightly censored – the immediate effects will be limited. Over time, however, faster and cheaper international connections could boost trade and regional integration, while giving the United States a strategic foothold in Central Asia’s digital future.

Strategic Significance

For Ashgabat, engagement with Washington can complement its long-standing policy of neutrality. By diversifying partnerships – whether through pipelines or fiber cables – Turkmenistan strengthens its options and enhances resilience. Such diversification is increasingly a feature of its foreign and economic policy.

For Washington, the incentive is presence and dialogue. Engagement is framed in terms of supporting Central Asian sovereignty, expanding energy and digital connectivity, and contributing to regional stability in a space where multiple powers, including Russia and China, play leading roles.

The relationship remains cautious and bounded by restraint. No one expects Turkmenistan to abandon its neutral course, nor for the U.S. to become a dominant partner, but the shift from limited contact to more structured engagement is significant. Outcomes will be measured less in communiqués than in concrete projects: gas pipelines beyond existing routes, fiber-optic cables across the Caspian, and gradual improvements in regional infrastructure.

In the end, the outreach underscores a simple reality: in Turkmenistan, where neutrality is doctrine and isolation has long been the default, even incremental steps toward diversified cooperation are notable. For the United States, which emphasizes secure and resilient infrastructure, those steps are worth supporting. For Turkmenistan, it expands its room for maneuver. And for the broader region, practical connections – both physical and digital – offer opportunities that all partners can recognize as contributing to stability and development.