Although the Central Asian republics officially uphold secular governance, they may be experiencing a subtle, creeping Islamization beneath the surface. While state-controlled media across the region maintain that religious movements are well-managed, occasional incidents suggest a growing divergence between official narratives and societal realities.
One such incident recently drew attention in Kazakhstan, where a photo circulated online showing girls in burkas holding a Kazakh flag inscribed with Arabic script. The image prompted Mazhilis Deputy Yermurat Bapi to call on the government to intensify efforts against radical religious movements.
“Our attention was drawn to the fact that the inscriptions on the flag in Arabic script were produced with a special printing tool. This is not just hooliganism or inappropriate behavior. It is a direct challenge to our society, our statehood, and our national traditions,” Bapi said.
Citing “national interests, traditions, and culture,” Bapi has previously campaigned for a ban on religious clothing, specifically hijabs and niqabs, in public places.
On social media, proponents of a Central Asian caliphate have railed against national traditions, denouncing Nauryz, criticizing local costumes and instruments, and rejecting pre-Islamic cultural heritage.
Since President Shavkat Mirziyoyev took office in 2016, Uzbekistan has cautiously liberalized its religious policy. However, strict state control persists. Imams must be approved by the Muftiate, unregistered religious groups are banned, and mosque inspections are routine. The state endorses the Hanafi madhhab as the “national form of Islam” and recognizes Naqshbandi Sufism as part of its cultural heritage. Salafi and extremist movements are actively suppressed, and while former “black lists” of suspected extremists are being revised, some religious prisoners are being rehabilitated. Islamic education is expanding through madrasas, Islamic colleges, and the Islamic Academy of Uzbekistan.
Tajikistan has pursued an aggressive campaign to secularize public life. The Islamic Renaissance Party, once a legal political force, was banned in 2015 as “extremist.” The state restricts youth access to mosques, prohibits the hijab in schools and public offices, and has shuttered over 1,500 mosques since 2011. As previously reported by TCA, a 2024 law bans “foreign clothing” – widely interpreted as targeting Arabic attire, including the hijab – to promote national dress. Islam is framed as a cultural element within state ideology, with the Committee on Religious Affairs closely monitoring clerics.
Kyrgyzstan is widely viewed as the most religiously open state in the region. Post-Soviet liberalization allowed Islam to grow organically, with little initial oversight. Today, numerous Islamic groups, including Salafis, operate within the country. Rural communities and youth increasingly identify with Islam. Private madrasas and Islamic NGOs are flourishing, and hijab adoption is on the rise. Though the government has begun tightening oversight following incidents of radicalization, Salafi influence continues to grow. By 2023, there were 130 Islamic educational institutions, including 34 madrasas for girls.
In Turkmenistan, one of the world’s most closed societies, religious freedom is strictly curtailed. All religious activity is monitored, and Islamic institutions are intertwined with nationalist and presidential cult rhetoric, often referred to as “Turkmen Islam.” Unregulated Islamic movements and foreign affiliations are prohibited. State-sanctioned mosques are part of a highly controlled religious landscape.
Kazakhstan’s constitution guarantees religious freedom, yet Islam is tightly managed through the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Kazakhstan (DUMK). Interest in Islam is surging, particularly among youth and in southern regions such as Turkestan and Zhambyl. The number of mosques and Hajj pilgrims continues to climb. Although officially secular, signs of creeping Islamization are emerging. Analysts point to the appointment of religiously affiliated individuals, often educated in Islamic institutions abroad or tied to religious NGOs, into governmental roles. Some suggest an unspoken “quota” system exists to appease devout constituencies.
While the state promotes “traditional” Hanafi Islam, this narrative may mask the influence of soft political Islam. In the 2000s, religious graduates from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan began occupying influential roles in NGOs and religious foundations with access to public funding. State-led initiatives such as Rukhani Zhangyru (Spiritual Renewal) infuse Islamic values into national development projects, reinforcing Islam as a moral pillar of society.
Prominent elites have also played a role. Convicted in September 2022 for grand theft, Kairat Satybaldyuly, nephew of former President Nursultan Nazarbayev, has been linked to the Salafi movement, reportedly funding mosques and supporting related causes. In 2023, MP Yermurat Bapi accused Satybaldyuly of promoting Wahhabism with Nazarbayev’s tacit approval, a claim Satybaldyuly denied, stating his efforts were focused on Islamic development with his uncle’s blessing. The Salafi movement was reportedly among the forces destabilizing Kazakhstan during the January 2022 unrest, when national stability was seriously threatened.
The question of Islamist penetration into the political and civic fabric of Central Asian states remains unresolved. While authorities project an image of controlled secularism, the growing influence of religious ideology, both overt and subtle, calls for deeper scrutiny, particularly in Kazakhstan’s evolving landscape.
