Kazakhstan Featurees - The Times Of Central Asia

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Aviation

Kazakhstan Expands Aviation Hub with Focus on U.S. and Long-Haul Flights

Kazakhstan is preparing for an audit by the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) that would allow the country to launch direct flights to the United States. To achieve this, the government must demonstrate the reliability of its aviation regulatory system, the presence of an independent and effective oversight body, and transparent airline certification procedures. The country is also planning to acquire modern long-haul aircraft and has begun construction of its first maintenance center to service them. The Times of Central Asia spoke with representatives of Kazakhstan’s aviation industry about the progress of these efforts, when direct flights to North America may begin, and what challenges remain. As part of efforts to expand international routes and strengthen Kazakhstan’s position as an aviation hub between Europe and Asia, Bauyrzhan Umiraliyev, head of the Aviation Safety Department at the Civil Aviation Committee, said the national carrier Air Astana plans to purchase 15 Boeing 787 Dreamliner aircraft, with deliveries scheduled between 2026 and 2035. “This is a strategically important decision that can significantly boost civil aviation, the economy, and the country’s international standing,” an aviation authority representative told The Times of Central Asia. “Long-haul aircraft will allow airlines to launch direct flights to destinations in North America, Europe, Asia, and Australia that were previously inaccessible or required layovers.” The aircraft will also enhance Kazakhstan’s attractiveness as a transit hub and tourist destination, while enabling airlines to compete internationally through improved efficiency, pricing, and service quality. The purchase of these aircraft, previously delayed twice since 2025 due to production backlogs at Boeing, is expected to open new opportunities for Kazakhstan’s aviation sector, particularly following the anticipated attainment of Category 1 (CAT-1) safety status, confirming compliance with international aviation standards. CAT-1: The Path to the U.S. In 2024, Kazakhstan’s aviation authorities and the FAA signed an agreement to conduct a technical assessment under the International Aviation Safety Assessment (IASA) program. According to Aslan Satzhanov, Acting Executive Director of the Aviation Administration of Kazakhstan, the assessment identified areas requiring improvement in flight safety oversight. “We are currently working on amendments to regulatory acts to implement modern safety procedures and standardize processes, with technical support from FAA experts,” Satzhanov said. In parallel, experts from the U.S. Transportation Security Administration have conducted preliminary assessments of airport security under the Export Control and Border Security Program. The first visit, in October 2021, resulted in a generally positive evaluation of Kazakhstan’s aviation security framework. A follow-up visit in August 2022 focused on screening procedures for passengers, baggage, and cargo at Astana Airport. “The capital’s airport received a positive assessment, and the coordinated work of aviation security personnel was noted,” Satzhanov said. According to preliminary information, the full IASA audit may take place after long-haul aircraft enter service and relevant infrastructure is fully prepared; though, it should be noted that Kazakhstan does not control the timing of the IASA audit. Industry Awaits New Aircraft Preparations for launching new international routes, including previously announced flights to New York and Tokyo, are already underway....

EAEU

EAEU Trade Frictions Deepen Despite Shymkent Integration Push

The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) met in Shymkent on March 26-27 with a long agenda and a familiar promise: deeper integration, smoother trade, and a more modern common market. Kazakhstan, which holds the bloc’s 2026 chairmanship, used the meeting to push artificial intelligence, digital logistics, industrial cooperation, and the removal of internal barriers. Twelve documents were signed, covering areas including industrial cooperation, transport, and digital integration. “Kazakhstan aims to become a fully-fledged digital country. We have built a modern ecosystem, including Astana Hub and the Alem.ai AI center, and are ready to share experience with EAEU partners on digital regulation and economic transformation,” Kazakh Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov stated. That sounds ambitious, but it also highlights the bloc’s central weakness. The EAEU has no shortage of plans; it has a shortage of trust between its members, and that matters more. The dynamics extend across the bloc, but are most visible in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. The EAEU was built to ensure the free movement of goods, services, capital, and labor across Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia. But the reality keeps drifting away from the treaty. Kazakhstan’s chairmanship agenda calls for a barrier-free internal market, yet the bloc is entering a new phase of tighter controls, retaliatory measures, and disputes over who really benefits. Shymkent made that contradiction impossible to miss. Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov promoted an AI-based system to coordinate cargo flows across the union and speed up transit. He also backed the full electronic handling of veterinary and phytosanitary checks, all of which are practical ideas. Central Asia needs faster, cheaper, and more predictable logistics, but digital tools do not solve a political problem. A system becomes more efficient only if its members want it to be open. When they want leverage instead, technology can only make the controls smarter. [caption id="attachment_46024" align="aligncenter" width="1920"] Image: primeminister.kz[/caption] Kazakhstan’s priorities already show where the friction lies. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev opened his chairmanship by calling for digital transformation, better transport links, and the elimination of internal trade barriers. He also pushed a stronger external profile for the EAEU, with wider links across Asia, the Arab world, and the Global South. That is a serious agenda for a bloc trying to present itself as a Eurasian logistics hub. That push for external expansion comes at a time when internal frictions are becoming harder to manage. It sits uneasily beside everyday trade practice inside the union, where growing trade disputes have become part of the EAEU’s normal life, not an exception to it. The clearest recent example is Russia’s SPOT import-control system, which takes effect for road shipments from EAEU countries on April 1. Importers must submit shipment information two days before trucks reach the border and receive a QR code. Moscow has presented the change as a tax-compliance and anti-fraud measure, with additional financial guarantees expected in later phases of its implementation. In practice, it adds cost, time, and uncertainty before goods even reach the border, the opposite of what a customs union...

Drone Crash

Repeated Drone Incidents Expose Airspace Risks on Russia–Central Asia Frontier

A new drone-related incident in western Kazakhstan has reinforced a pattern that is becoming harder to dismiss. Police in West Kazakhstan Region confirmed that an object resembling an unmanned aerial vehicle was found in the Akzhayik district near the village of Karaulytobe. Images circulating locally appeared to show a largely intact fixed-wing drone. No casualties or damage were reported. “The object was discovered outside a populated area. All circumstances of the incident are being investigated,” the department said. Reports and images of the object initially circulated on messaging apps before being confirmed by regional authorities. This latest discovery fits a sequence of similar incidents across the same region over the past year. As previously reported by The Times of Central Asia, on March 18, 2025, a drone about three meters long was found near Atameken village in Taskala district, around 60 kilometers from the district center. That case followed another discovery on February 18, 2025, in the Bokeyorda district, where a smaller unidentified object was recovered in a remote area. Within days, further debris was found near the Russian border in Zhanibek district, marking the third such case in a single month. The pattern continued later in the year. On October 23, 2025, a drone of unknown origin exploded near Kyzyltal village in the Burlin district. Residents reported an explosion that damaged rooftops and left a crater near the village, although no casualties were recorded. Authorities opened a criminal case, with the military prosecutor’s office involved alongside police and emergency services. Similar findings have appeared beyond the West Kazakhstan Region. On June 19, 2025, fragments resembling a UAV were found in Mangistau Region near the Bolashak border station. The debris was located in an uninhabited area, and no damage was reported. Taken together, these incidents form a clear geographic cluster along Kazakhstan’s western frontier. Most occurred near the Russian border and in sparsely populated areas. The objects were typically discovered after impact, with no confirmed flight paths or official attribution. Investigations into earlier cases have linked several incidents to areas used for Russian military testing. Western Kazakhstan includes zones connected to long-standing Russian defense activity under bilateral agreements, and parts of the region remain associated with testing operations. This context explains the cautious official response. None of the incidents have been described as attacks, and none have been attributed to a foreign state. At the same time, the repeated discoveries point to a growing exposure that goes beyond routine testing. The wider regional environment has shifted rapidly. The war in Ukraine has driven a sharp expansion in drone use across Eurasia. Both Russia and Ukraine deploy long-range UAVs for reconnaissance and strikes, often over extended distances. Drone activity has already affected infrastructure linked to Kazakhstan’s economy. On February 17, 2025, a drone attack targeted the Caspian Pipeline Consortium’s Kropotkinskaya pumping station in Russia’s Krasnodar region, part of a key export route for Kazakh oil. Further attacks on offshore loading facilities and terminals continued later in the year, with additional incidents...

Bilateral Trade

Despite Growth Plans, Trade Between Kazakhstan and Russia Declined in 2025

Trade and economic ties between Kazakhstan and Russia showed signs of slowing in 2025. By the end of the year, bilateral trade totaled $27.4 billion, a slight decrease compared with the previous year. The figures were announced by Kazakhstan’s Minister of Trade and Integration, Arman Shakkaliev, following talks in Astana between Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov and Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin. A year earlier, bilateral trade had demonstrated growth. In 2024, trade turnover increased by 3% to reach $27.8 billion, largely driven by rising imports of Russian goods into Kazakhstan. At the same time, exports of Kazakhstani products to Russia declined, pointing to a persistent imbalance in the structure of trade. The contraction recorded in 2025 reflects a broader trend, a slowdown in growth while overall trade volumes remain relatively high. Despite the decline, both sides continue to set ambitious targets for expanding economic cooperation. “At the same time, the goal has been set to bring bilateral trade to $30 billion. During the meeting of the heads of government, measures and priority sectors that could generate additional trade growth were discussed. These include energy, commerce, transport and logistics. We also reviewed issues related to the negotiation process and our integration agenda,” Shakkaliev said. Kazakh authorities expect digitalisation measures to help accelerate trade flows. Kazakhstan’s Deputy Minister of Finance, Yerzhan Birzhanov, outlined plans to introduce electronic waybills and modernize 30 checkpoints along the Kazakhstan–Russia border. These steps are expected to reduce transit times and improve operational transparency. Russia remains one of the largest investors in Kazakhstan’s economy. “There is a very significant presence of Russian business in Kazakhstan, and we welcome it. We are ready to explore new areas of cooperation. I am confident that there are ample opportunities for this. The Government of Kazakhstan will make every effort to intensify and enhance our cooperation,” Bektenov said. In turn, Mishustin highlighted prospects for further joint initiatives. “There is considerable potential in bilateral cooperation to launch joint projects in energy, industry, transport infrastructure, agriculture and the digital economy,” he stated. In addition to economic issues, the two sides discussed joint efforts to preserve the ecosystem of the Caspian Sea and implement environmental initiatives. External factors are also influencing trade dynamics. In particular, tighter foreign trade procedures introduced by Russia could reshape logistics routes and alter commodity flows across Central Asia.

Southern Corridor

The Iran Conflict Is Stress-Testing Central Asia’s Southern Corridors

Kazakhstan President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s proposal of Turkestan city as a venue for Iran-war negotiations shows how directly the conflict had already begun to affect Central Asia itself. The region is no longer simply observing events in Iran. By the time Tokayev made the offer, Central Asian governments were already dealing with evacuations, route disruption, emergency diplomatic coordination, and growing concern over the war’s economic effects. The Iran war has thus become a real test of Central Asia’s southern diversification strategy. Governments across the region have, in recent years, sought to widen access to world markets through Iran, the South Caucasus, and, in some cases, Afghanistan and Pakistan. These channels reduce dependence on northern routes by opening access to Türkiye, Europe, Gulf markets, and the Indian Ocean. The present crisis subjects that strategy to wartime conditions. The strain of war makes it easier to distinguish durable links, conditional ones, and routes that remain more aspirational than real. The C6 and Crisis Coordination The first effects have been practical. Turkmenistan has opened four additional checkpoints along its frontier with Iran, supplementing the Serakhs crossing, while Azerbaijan’s overland route through Astara became another critical outlet, evacuating 312 people from 17 countries between February 28 and March 2. Turkmenistan, according to official reporting, transited more than 200 foreign citizens from 16 countries during the same period. Uzbekistan used the Turkmen route to repatriate its citizens, while Kazakhstan directed its nationals toward overland exits through Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Türkiye. The war is already affecting borders, consular work, and the regional diplomatic agenda. This immediate response gives sharper political meaning to the widening of the Central Asian C5 into a C6 with Azerbaijan. The March 2 call among the five Central Asian foreign ministers and Azerbaijan showed that the format was already there to be used under pressure. What had until now appeared mainly as a corridor framework shaped by summit diplomacy and expert work appeared instead as a working format for crisis coordination linking Central Asia to the South Caucasus. The C6 idea is becoming more practical and more overtly diplomatic. The Organization of Turkic States adds a second, broader layer. Its foreign ministers met in Istanbul on March 7 and issued a joint statement expressing concern over the escalation in the Middle East, condemning actions that endanger civilians, warning against further regional destabilization, and affirming that threats to the security and interests of member states concern the organization as a whole. The statement was cautious, and the OTS is not turning into a military instrument. Even so, the war is testing whether a Turkic political space extending from Turkey through the South Caucasus to Central Asia can do more than express concern as regional security deteriorates. The C6 is becoming a working format for immediate coordination, while the OTS remains the broader political frame within which that coordination takes on institutional meaning. Corridor Stress and Resilience The trans-Iran transit option offers Central Asia a continuous land arc from regional railheads and road networks...

Podcast

Pannier and Hillard’s Spotlight on Central Asia: New Episode Out Now

As Managing Editor of The Times of Central Asia, I’m delighted that, in partnership with the Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, from October 19, we are the home of the Spotlight on Central Asia podcast. Chaired by seasoned broadcasters Bruce Pannier of RFE/RL’s long-running Majlis podcast and Michael Hillard of The Red Line, each fortnightly instalment will take you on a deep dive into the latest news, developments, security issues, and social trends across an increasingly pivotal region. This week, the team examine a series of major developments across Central Asia, from the results of Kazakhstan's constitutional referendum to the announcement of new Chinese-funded border outposts and fortifications along Tajikistan's frontier. We also look at the continuing fallout from the security shake-up in Kyrgyzstan, with further arrests and resignations, as well as the increasingly strange foreign movements of Turkmenistan's senior leadership while war continues to rage just across the border in Iran, alongside Tehran's threats to strike Turkmen infrastructure. The episode then turns to the escalating conflict between Afghanistan and Pakistan, where some of the heaviest fighting in months is raising fresh questions about border stability, regional security, and the risk of wider spillover. Finally, for our main story, we bring on a panel of experts to discuss the growing issues surrounding the Rogun Dam and its resettlement project, and how both are likely to affect the states downstream. On the show this week: - Eugene Simonov (Rivers Without Boundaries Coalition) - Mark Fodor (Coalition for Human Rights in Development)