The conflict between Israel and Iran is having both international and regional repercussions. The situation has been further inflamed by the U.S. bombing of several Iranian nuclear sites over the weekend, with Tehran responding by threatening retaliation on U.S. soil through the use of sleeper terrorist cells and the possible closure of the Strait of Hormuz, through which over a fifth of the world’s oil supply passes.
While Israel’s geographical position places it at the heart of the Middle East, Iran’s location brings the Islamic Republic into close contact with Central Asia. The consequences of the conflict are therefore likely to be felt heavily in the Central Asian region. The close relations between Tehran and the capitals of Central Asia, due in part to their geographical proximity, are often highlighted. Less explored is the nature of the relationship between Tel Aviv and Central Asia and the lines along which it has developed since the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
On both the Israeli and Central Asian sides, despite all the differences, relations began in the early 1990s, mainly based on certain mutual interests. From Israel’s point of view, relations with Central Asia would mean expanding the circle of Muslim countries with which it had friendly ties, gaining greater influence in the region, and reducing its diplomatic isolation. From the Central Asian perspective, the appeal lay in increasing the number of its international partners, coupled with a desire to access Israeli know-how in numerous fields, and the possibility, through relations with Tel Aviv, of having a privileged channel of dialogue with the United States.
More than three decades after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, relations remain good for the most part. “The positive relationship between Israel and Central Asia is driven by a combination of strategic, economic, and geopolitical factors,” Dr Zeev Levin, Coordinator of the Central Asian Research Unit at the Harry S. Truman Institute, told The Times of Central Asia. “One of the primary drivers is mutual interest in security and counterterrorism. Economically, Israel’s expertise in water management, agriculture, and technology is highly attractive to the arid, resource-seeking nations of Central Asia that aim to modernize their infrastructure and diversify their economies beyond oil and gas. Additionally, fostering ties with Israel provides a means of diversifying the foreign policy portfolios of the Central Asian republics.”
This positive relationship, however, seems to have lost momentum in recent years due to several factors. Central Asian republics have increasingly oriented towards the East, moving closer to China and other players such as South Korea, Japan, and India, or towards other partners, such as the European ones, with Italy at the forefront in this regard. As Levin points out, the relation has cooled due to several factors: “Central Asian republics did look to Israel in the first decade of independence, but in the last decade to a much lesser extent, since Turkey and China are less complicated and cheaper options. For Israel, the region was never a priority or a point of focus – it stood and still stands below many other countries and regions”.
Two years ago, Israel’s decision to open an embassy in Turkmenistan’s capital, Ashgabat, attracted international attention due to its proximity to the Iranian border. It was a move that led some to suggest that Tel Aviv’s primary interest in the region was its proximity to Iranian territory and the possibility of using it as a base for listening to what is happening in the Islamic Republic. This view is shared by Dr Robert Geist Pinfold, Lecturer in Defence Studies at King’s College London. “Proximity to Iran is Israel’s main geostrategic interest in these republics,” he told TCA. “Part of this is a denial strategy – it doesn’t want these states becoming Iranian proxies. The other part is that they are close to Iran and, therefore, a good conduit for spying and reconnaissance missions. But Israel now knows that these states won’t go all-in for Israel. Iran is simply too close and too entrenched in the region for them to abandon ties with Tehran in favor of Tel Aviv. As a result, they play a balancing act of trying to stay on good terms with both sides.”
Levin is more cautious on this point: “There were many reports of strategic military ties of Israel with Azerbaijan, but none of them addressed the Central Asian republics. Unfortunately, the activities of the Israeli embassy in Ashgabat remain limited.”
With regard to the ongoing conflict between Israel and Iran, the outcome of which is still very uncertain, it is clear that it could have a hugely significant impact on Central Asia. An example of this is the natural gas swap agreements between Iran and Turkmenistan, thanks to which the latter would be able to export its natural gas to Iraq and Turkey. There are also a plethora of initiatives on a logistical front, such as Tehran’s approval of Uzbekistan’s participation in the Chabahar Agreement in 2023.
Both Geist Pinfold and Levin believe that the conflict between Israel and Iran could have significant consequences for the Central Asian region. “All these states want to make sure the war does not spillover into their territory and as a result are trying to maintain the delicate balancing act of being on good terms with both Tehran and Tel Aviv,” Geist Pinfold told TCA. Levin, meanwhile, stressed that “if the Iranian regime falls, this will be a critical breaking point for the Central Asian republics, not only for them, but also Russia and China. Central Asia depends on Iran as a transit corridor and is interested in its stability, but at the same time has no interest in its nuclear adventures and fears its religious agenda and possible leaks into their secular systems.”
Regardless of the outcome of the war between Tel Aviv and Tehran, there is no doubt that relations between Central Asia and Iran will undergo changes, and the same can be said of relations with Israel.
