The velvet-draped tables of New Delhi’s 4^th India-Central Asia Dialogue convened under the stewardship of External Affairs Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar on June 6, 2025, radiated congeniality, with history and strategy converging. This high-level engagement, attended by foreign ministers from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, marked more than a diplomatic ritual — it signaled India’s deepening resolve to recalibrate its strategic posture in a region too long shaped by other powers. Yet beneath pledges of shared civilizational futures and energy corridors, an uncomfortable truth lingered as India remains a guest, not a player, in Central Asia’s great power theatre.

Further, India’s internal socio-political landscape presents notable challenges that inadvertently shape its foreign policy credibility, particularly in the eyes of Central Asian nations. Persistent communal tensions — most visibly manifested in the Hindu-Muslim divide, the controversial demolition of the Babri Masjid in 1992, and the politically charged construction of the Ram Mandir — have deepened perceptions of religious polarization. Such domestic developments, while largely internal, resonate beyond India’s borders, especially in the Muslim-majority Central Asian republics, raising concerns about inclusivity and pluralism in India’s governance model. Simultaneously, India’s strained relations with key neighbors — Pakistan, and China, and increasingly volatile dynamics with Nepal, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka — have reinforced a regional image of discord and inconsistency. These internal and regional complexities contribute to a trust deficit, making Central Asian countries cautious in placing long-term strategic confidence in India. For New Delhi to emerge as a dependable partner in the region, addressing internal fissures and presenting a coherent, inclusive national vision is as vital as economic or diplomatic outreach.

Central Asia sits at the center of ancient trade routes and modern geopolitical competition. For India, its importance is twofold: the region is a bridge to Eurasia and a repository of energy resources critical to India’s growing economy. But India’s historical connectivity to Central Asia — through the Silk Road, shared cultural legacies, and spiritual exchanges — has, for decades, been overshadowed by geographic and political barriers, notably the lack of direct overland access due to Pakistan. Recognizing these constraints, the dialogue showcased a strategic pivot. India reaffirmed its commitment to enhancing regional connectivity through the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) and the Chabahar Port in Iran.

While geopolitical instability in Iran and Afghanistan poses challenges, India’s emphasis on multimodal routes demonstrates pragmatic flexibility. In an era defined by supply chain resilience and multipolar geopolitics, connectivity is no longer just an infrastructure question — it is a currency of influence. The dialogue also addressed the evolving regional security architecture. India’s proposal for counter-terrorism cooperation, capacity building, and intelligence sharing was timely and necessary. However, the dialogue echoed with familiar refrains, viz. civilizational bonds, shared destiny, and multipolar cooperation. Yet beneath the diplomatic choreography lies a haunting question. Can India transcend its historical role as Central Asia’s cultural cousin to become its strategic confidant? History whispers caution.

The Burden of History: From Silk Roads to Shadow Roads

For centuries, the Silk Road pulsed with Indian spices, ideas, and pilgrims. The Mongols, Tsars, and Soviets used it as a cordon sanitaire or resource reservoir. India’s medieval links — Buddhist monasteries in Balkh, Sufi khanaqahs in Bukhara — were cultural exports, not political anchors. Sufi saints traversed the Pamirs. But as historian S.F. Dale notes in Indian Merchants and Eurasian Trade, “this influence was transactional, not transformational,” while historian Frederick Starr notes in Lost Enlightenment, “Central Asia’s intellectuals once shaped global science and philosophy, but its modern destiny has been dictated by outsiders”.

Post-1991, as the new republics emerged, India’s outreach prioritized cultural reconnection — Sanskrit chairs in Bishkek, Bollywood screenings in Dushanbe — while China deployed $60 billion in BRI infrastructure and Russia consolidated military dominance via the CSTO. India’s cultural capital, while significant, lacks material leverage. Central Asia respects Indian philosophy but invests in Chinese rails. India offered yoga and Bollywood — soft power assets, but no match for pipelines or energy.

The SWOT Mirage: India’s Self-Delusions

Despite India’s democratic credentials and cultural affinity, geography remains an unforgiving obstacle. Kazakhstan’s oil still detours over 8,000 kilometers via Russia to reach Gujarat, while the much-touted Chabahar Port manages only 6 million tons annually — compared to China’s Gwadar handling nearly 50 million. The infrastructural bottlenecks are not merely physical but psychological. Pakistan’s blockade functions as more than a logistics issue — it entrenches a mindset among Central Asian elites that views India through a prism of civilizational fatigue, as a country struggling with internal contradictions and unable to assert coherent regional leadership.

Further compounding the challenge is the continued underperformance of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), envisioned to span 7,200 kilometers but currently only 30% functional. Meanwhile, China’s overland routes via Kazakhstan now move over 1.5 million containers annually to Europe, rendering India’s connectivity projects sluggish and aspirational rather than operational.

Moreover, even where India shows promise, such as digital governance tools like UPI and Aadhaar, practical barriers persist. India’s diplomatic rhythm also raises questions. While India celebrates its principle of transparent, rules-based engagement, Central Asian perceptions — shaped by post-Soviet memory and grounded in realist expectations — see inconsistency. Literature and strategic commentary from the region express doubts about India’s reliability. The External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar stated himself that “Some friends may also be more complicated than others. They may not always share the same culture of mutual respect or ethos of diplomatic etiquette.” He underlined that “friends are not always black and white, nor will friendship be linear in development. Friendships are also not exclusive, particularly so in a multi-polar world”.

However much India speaks of eternal friendship, its ambassadors change every three years, and projects stall. China’s envoys stay for a decade — and deliver. The Belt and Road Initiative may lack clarity, but its material presence — through railroads, power plants, and jobs — is undeniable. In contrast, India’s hallmark projects like the 2009 Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline have become textbook cases of bureaucratic inertia.

In essence, India’s strengths — its democracy, digital prowess, and cultural diplomacy — are being blunted by systemic weaknesses, geographical isolation, inconsistent follow-through, and a precarious neighborhood. These dynamics, when left unaddressed, not only diminish India’s credibility in Central Asia but also risk squandering a historic window of strategic opportunity.

The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the publication, its affiliates, or any other organizations mentioned.