Russia and Azerbaijan have signed a program to build and modernize facilities for repairing armored vehicles used by the Azerbaijani military. The agreement was announced on November 1, two days after the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) summit in Ankara, which Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev did not attend amid growing tensions with Turkey.
“An entire program has been signed that provides for the modernization and construction of facilities to repair armored vehicles in service with the Azerbaijani army,” Dmitry Shugayev, director of Russia’s Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation, told Zvezda television.
Shugayev also mentioned the possibility of future deliveries of Pantsir-S1 air defense systems.
Arms Supplies and the Karabakh Wars
Russian defense companies have long supplied equipment to Azerbaijan’s armed forces. Azerbaijan has purchased T-90S tanks, BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles, BTR-82A armored personnel carriers, artillery, and air defense systems. Maintaining this equipment requires spare parts, specialized facilities, and technical documentation.
Russia supplied weapons to both sides of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Russian equipment accounted for approximately 60% of Azerbaijan’s imports of major weapons and 94% of Armenia’s between 2011 and 2020.
Deliveries became more difficult after Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. In December 2024, Aliyev spoke about delays in fulfilling existing contracts because Russian defense manufacturers were occupied with orders for their own armed forces. Baku nevertheless intended to continue purchasing Russian weapons.
Weapons from other suppliers played a significant role in Azerbaijan’s military operations during the 2020 war. Turkey supplied Bayraktar TB2 armed drones as well as TRG-300 guided missiles. Israel provided Hermes drones and Harop loitering munitions, which are designed to crash into targets. It also supplied Spike anti-tank missiles, LORA (Long-Range Artillery) ballistic missiles, and Barak-8 air defense systems.
Drones were used for reconnaissance and strikes against Armenian military equipment, artillery, and air defense positions. According to SIPRI, Israel accounted for approximately 69% of Azerbaijan’s imports of major weapons between 2016 and 2020.
Military cooperation between Azerbaijan and Turkey expanded following Baku’s victory in the 2020 war. In September 2023, Azerbaijan established control over the entire territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. Following the military operation, almost the entire ethnic Armenian population of the region, approximately 100,000 people, fled to Armenia.
In February 2024, Aliyev visited an airbase where Turkish-made Bayraktar Akıncı heavy combat drones were displayed. These aircraft can carry heavier weapons than the TB2.
Why Baku and Ankara Are at Odds
In October, a dispute erupted between Baku and Ankara over school uniform rules introduced in Azerbaijan in September. Restrictions on wearing hijabs drew criticism from Turkish politicians and public figures. Azerbaijani authorities regarded the criticism as interference in domestic affairs and barred 31 Turkish citizens from entering the country.
In comments on X reported by The National on October 17, Vasif Huseynov of Azerbaijan’s state-run Center for Analysis of International Relations and Multiculturalism said the restrictions on religious clothing reflected Baku’s efforts to protect the state’s secular character and counter external ideological influence, particularly from Iran. In his view, Turkey’s experience with disputes over hijabs cannot be directly applied to Azerbaijan.
Aliyev did not attend the OTS summit despite a personal invitation from Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Azerbaijan was represented by Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov. An Azerbaijani news agency attributed Aliyev’s absence to a prior commitment, but Baku has not officially linked it to the dispute.
The summit brought together the leaders of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, making Aliyev’s absence conspicuous at a meeting intended to demonstrate unity among Turkic states.
In an October 23 article for Foreign Policy, researcher Sam Harshbarger linked the dispute to differing perceptions of the alliance in Ankara and Baku. In his assessment, some members of Turkey’s political establishment view Azerbaijan as a junior partner, while Baku insists on independence in its domestic and foreign policy.
Another source of tension is Israel. Turkey strongly criticizes the Israeli government’s actions in Gaza, while Azerbaijan continues cooperating with Israel in defense and energy. Azerbaijan provides Israel with an important partner near Iran’s borders.
The tensions coincide with efforts by Baku, Ankara, and Yerevan to reopen borders and transportation routes following the end of hostilities in Karabakh.
Armenia and Diplomacy in the South Caucasus
Turkey closed its land border with Armenia in 1993 in support of Azerbaijan during the First Karabakh War. Ankara has long linked normalization with Yerevan to resolving the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict.
Negotiations accelerated after Azerbaijan regained control of Karabakh. In August 2025, Armenia and Azerbaijan initialed a peace agreement under United States mediation. The document provides for mutual recognition of territorial integrity, renunciation of territorial claims, and a commitment not to use force.
In May 2026, Turkey permitted direct trade with Armenia through third countries. The land border remained closed, but Ankara and Yerevan continued negotiations.
Baku also began discussing practical economic cooperation with Yerevan. On August 31, Aliyev and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan reviewed further steps to implement the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity, a proposed transportation route across Armenian territory connecting mainland Azerbaijan with the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic. The two leaders also noted deliveries of Azerbaijani petroleum products to Armenia and the transit of goods through Azerbaijan.
For Kazakhstan and other Central Asian countries, opening new transportation links in the South Caucasus could expand trade opportunities with Turkey and Europe. Shipments across the Caspian Sea and Azerbaijan currently depend on the existing Middle Corridor infrastructure. A route through Armenia could complement that network.
