As domestic competition intensifies and protectionist barriers rise in Western markets, Chinese electric vehicle (EV) manufacturers are increasingly looking outward. One region emerging as a key destination is Central Asia, where China’s green tech ambitions align with local efforts to modernize and decarbonize transport systems. From affordable passenger cars aimed at private drivers to electric buses transforming public transit, Chinese EVs are quietly gaining traction across Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.

Companies like Yutong are supplying e-buses for urban mobility, while fleets of electric taxis are beginning to appear in Dushanbe’s streets. This growing presence is more than just commercial – it signals a deeper shift in China’s regional engagement strategy, using clean technology as a vehicle for influence in a strategically contested space.

There is an upward trend in the import of electric vehicles from China to Central Asia, particularly in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. In 2024, Uzbekistan imported over 24,000 EVs, with Chinese manufacturers accounting for a staggering 99.5% of all imports. This marked an increase of more than 8,000 units compared to 2023 – nearly a 1.5-fold growth in just one year. A similar surge is visible in Kazakhstan. In 2023, the country imported around 6,875 Chinese EVs, but by 2024, although official figures are yet to be released, industry reports indicate a 36-fold increase in the sales of Chinese EVs year-on-year.

Drivers of Import: Policy and Perception

The surge in EV imports into Central Asia is driven by a convergence of motivations from both China and the region’s domestic policies. On the supply side, the rapid influx of Chinese EVs reflects a blend of strategic export redirection by Chinese automakers and receptive policy environments in the region. Faced with mounting trade restrictions and increasing regulatory pressure in Western markets, Chinese EV producers are pivoting toward emerging economies to safeguard growth. Central Asia has become a promising destination due to its untapped consumer base.

On the demand side, Central Asian governments are enacting supportive policies to accelerate the green transition, making EV imports more accessible. For example, Uzbekistan has removed both excise taxes and customs duties on imported electric vehicles, while Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan benefit from a Eurasian Economic Union ruling that extends duty-free EV imports until the end of 2025, creating a favorable environment for consumers and fleet operators.

In addition to these policy frameworks, a growing positive perception of Chinese EVs has emerged across the region. Chinese manufacturers are seen as offering a combination of affordability and quality, a crucial advantage in price-sensitive markets like Central Asia. For consumers and taxi fleet operators, the appeal goes beyond the sticker price – electric vehicles are significantly cheaper to operate. Unlike gasoline-powered cars that require frequent oil changes and filter maintenance, EVs offer lower long-term operating costs, making them a practical and economically attractive choice.

Beyond Exports: Assembling a Local Presence

However, China’s electric vehicle expansion in Central Asia goes beyond exports – it increasingly involves local production through joint ventures and assembly plants. In Uzbekistan, the state-owned UzAuto Motors launched a joint venture with Chinese EV giant BYD in 2023, marking one of the region’s most high-profile partnerships. Meanwhile, in Kyrgyzstan, a $115 million project is underway between local firms and China’s Hubei Zhuoyue Group to assemble both electric and internal combustion vehicles, including commercial and passenger models.

Tajikistan has also entered the EV manufacturing space through a joint venture with China aimed at producing around 1,500 electric vehicles per year. These partnerships show how Chinese companies are moving beyond simple exports by working closely with local industries, supporting domestic manufacturing goals in Central Asia while broadening their presence in the region.

China’s expanding role in Central Asia’s EV market brings a range of strategic advantages. First, it supports Beijing’s goal of diversifying export markets for its EV industry, while aligning with Central Asian governments’ policies to promote green transition, where EV adoption plays a key role. Second, local production offers Chinese companies practical benefits that cover avoiding tariffs and high logistics costs, accessing government incentives, and reducing the risk of political backlash tied to heavy import dependence.

Moreover, this growing EV-focused engagement is also deepening China’s broader economic footprint in the region. As Chinese EVs become more visible across Central Asia’s roads and charging networks, they may gradually displace Western and even Russian automakers. While Russian vehicles still enjoy popularity, particularly in the rural areas, the rise of Chinese EVs – supported by infrastructure development – signals a shift. Over time, this could further reduce Russia’s economic influence in a region where China is steadily consolidating its position.

Opportunities and Risks for Central Asia

For Central Asian countries, China’s EV expansion presents both opportunities and risks. On the environmental front, the growing presence of EVs helps reduce carbon emissions and supports national efforts to promote environmental sustainability. From an economic perspective, EV adoption can lower reliance on gasoline imports – particularly from Russia – helping to ease the region’s energy import burden. Moreover, the localization of EV production brings the promise of job creation and industrial growth. For example, the BYD-Uzbekistan joint venture has already generated 1,200 jobs in its initial phase, offering a boost to local employment.

These ventures also contribute to the development of skilled technicians, strengthening the region’s human capital over the long term. Furthermore, local manufacturing not only meets domestic demand but can also enable regional countries to become exporters of EVs and components. As local supply chains mature, cross-sector linkages – such as in electronics and logistics – could multiply the developmental impact.

Yet, this rapid influx of Chinese electric vehicles is not without its downsides for regional economies. An unbalanced transition toward EVs risks unsettling the existing automotive landscape, particularly in countries like Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, where traditional internal combustion engine manufacturing plays a significant economic role. While joint ventures with Chinese firms may generate new jobs in EV assembly, the shift could simultaneously erode employment in conventional auto sectors – especially among suppliers of components such as gearboxes and powertrains that are largely obsolete in electric vehicle production.

Another key risk lies in the nature and depth of localization within Central Asian countries. If localization of Chinese EV production is limited to basic assembly or low-value component manufacturing, the region may end up serving primarily as an assembly hub rather than evolving into a fully developed manufacturing base. Such a shallow form of industrial participation could result in a technological lock-in, where local industries become dependent on imported high-value components – such as batteries, electric motors, and advanced electronic systems – which remain predominantly produced in China.

This imbalance risks skewing the region’s industrial development toward low-skill, low-value activities, thereby constraining long-term capacity building. Over time, this dynamic may cause Central Asian economies to become embedded in narrowly defined supply chains, reducing their ability to diversify industrial partnerships and build more autonomous, innovation-driven sectors.

Moreover, this path of limited localization could deepen structural dependence on China, adding another layer of asymmetry to the relationship. As a result, the flexibility of regional countries in shaping their economic and geopolitical choices vis-à-vis China may become increasingly constrained.