The visit of Kazakhstan’s Foreign Minister Murat Nurtleu to Kabul (July 10–11) was a turning point not only for bilateral relations but also for the entire regional logistics agenda. While Astana’s previous statements about its readiness to participate in the Trans-Afghan Corridor were viewed by many with skepticism as a demonstration of goodwill without practical substance, these doubts have now been dispelled.
Kazakhstan has not only reaffirmed its commitment to the project but also reinforced it with concrete commitments. An interdepartmental memorandum on the implementation of the Torgundi-Herat railway line has been signed, and Astana has confirmed its readiness to invest up to $500 million in the Trans-Afghan railway project. This is an important step in the formation of future transport corridors within the Central Asia to South Asia (CA2SA) initiative. Practical matters such as tariff policy, border crossing procedures, logistics, and digitalization were also discussed.
The visit also carried diplomatic weight. Kazakhstan is demonstrating its willingness to engage pragmatically with Afghanistan’s de facto authorities. This is not a step towards recognizing the Taliban regime, but an effort to involve Kabul in economic processes without altering Kazakhstan’s legal or political stance.
Attempts to link this visit to Russia’s recognition of the Taliban appear superficial. Such trips are not planned spontaneously — in diplomatic practice, visits at this level are prepared for weeks, if not months. The very structure of the negotiations made it clear what the priorities were: infrastructure, transport security, and economic cooperation, not political recognition.
Given Kazakhstan’s balanced foreign policy, formal de jure recognition of the Taliban regime is unlikely in the foreseeable future. The current status quo — practical cooperation without political legitimization — is acceptable to all parties, regional states, and Afghanistan alike.
At most, we may see an elevation of diplomatic representation. Currently, both countries are represented by temporary chargés d’affaires. After the visit, extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassadors may be appointed. However, even this would not mean recognition. Diplomatic missions are a means of communication, not a political endorsement.
Kazakhstan’s position continues to be guided by that of the United Nations. Until the Credentials Committee changes its position on the Afghan side’s participation in the General Assembly, Astana will not force events. From 2021 to 2024, the committee rejected the Taliban’s applications for accreditation, which de facto means a refusal of international recognition at the global level. Although these decisions are not legally binding, they serve as the main political guideline for states that adhere to a collective approach. In matters of recognition, it is essential not to get ahead of geopolitical realities.
It is important that Kazakhstan’s actions are not isolated: they are in line with other countries in the region, especially those bordering Afghanistan. Whereas previously the policy of Central Asian countries towards their southern neighbor was determined by security issues, the focus is now shifting to trade, logistics, and infrastructure development.
Across all regional capitals, there is growing recognition that supporting Afghanistan is not a formality, but a rational strategic choice. After more than 40 years of instability, Central Asia needs a stable neighbor, not a “burning heart of Asia.”
Approaches to the Trans-Afghan Railway differ somewhat among the Central Asian states. Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are actively promoting the western route — from Herat to Kandahar and on to the port of Gwadar. Uzbekistan, on the other hand, is betting on the eastern corridor, which is supposed to connect Mazar-i-Sharif, Kabul, and Peshawar, providing access to Pakistan’s seaports. The first project is already being implemented, while the second is still under discussion due to its engineering complexity and high costs.
However, both routes are complementary, especially in light of proposals to link Termez and Herat. This would give Uzbekistan access to Iran and the Persian Gulf via western Afghanistan.
From a regional standpoint, both rail lines are elements of the Open Road Initiative, which seeks to transform Afghanistan into a central hub of a new Eurasian logistics network.
Tajikistan remains on the sidelines for now: its relations with the Taliban government remain politically charged. However, there are increasing signs that Dushanbe is shifting towards pragmatism.
Tajikistan has a direct interest in regional energy and transit projects. One example is the CASA-1000 project, which would allow electricity to be exported to South Asia via Afghanistan. The success of such projects depends on stable working relations with Kabul’s de facto authorities.
Moreover, Afghanistan has the potential to significantly enhance regional connectivity, including via the so-called “Five-Nation Corridor” (China–Kyrgyzstan–Tajikistan–Afghanistan–Iran). While this initiative exists mostly on paper for now, construction of the Herat–Mazar-i-Sharif railway could serve as a catalyst for its revival. At the very least, it would offer Tajikistan access to the Persian Gulf and the Lapis Lazuli Corridor, which connects through Turkmenistan to Turkey.
In this context, trans-Afghan projects are becoming not just logistical routes, but a tool for regional consolidation. Despite differences in approach, the countries of Central Asia are demonstrating a common desire not to isolate Afghanistan, but to involve it in a sustainable infrastructure system.
The idea of the “Silk and Stone Axis” is no longer a metaphor, but a reflection of the region’s strategic course. Nurtleu’s visit and Kazakhstan’s approach as a whole are not exceptions, but part of a common regional logic.
By helping Afghanistan integrate into regional processes, Central Asia is simultaneously strengthening its own stability, not for the sake of recognition, but out of strategic calculation.
