• KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00194 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10896 -0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0.28%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00194 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10896 -0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0.28%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00194 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10896 -0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0.28%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00194 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10896 -0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0.28%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00194 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10896 -0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0.28%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00194 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10896 -0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0.28%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00194 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10896 -0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0.28%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00194 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10896 -0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0.28%
09 December 2025

World Bank Urges Uzbekistan to Deepen Reforms to Sustain Growth and Empower Private Sector

Uzbekistan has made significant progress on economic reforms since 2017, but more decisive action is needed to sustain high growth rates and foster a dynamic private sector, according to the World Bank’s latest Country Economic Memorandum. The report, which analyzes the country’s economic trajectory from 2010 to 2022, outlines key policy recommendations for the coming years.

Between 2010 and 2022, Uzbekistan’s per capita GDP grew at an average annual rate of 4.2%, outpacing the regional averages for Europe and Central Asia and for lower-middle-income countries. However, the World Bank notes that this growth has been driven largely by capital accumulation rather than productivity gains, while the private sector remains underdeveloped.

“To become an upper-middle-income country by 2030, Uzbekistan needs to boost its growth closer to double digits,” the report states. Achieving this requires sharp improvements in total factor productivity, which hinges on reducing regulatory and market distortions, deepening trade integration, and investing in human capital.

State Role and Infrastructure Gaps

State-owned enterprises (SOEs) still dominate many sectors of the economy. As of 2020, over 2,000 SOEs accounted for revenues equivalent to 32% of GDP. Many of these operate in areas where private firms could be more efficient. The report recommends accelerating privatization, particularly in competitive sectors, and enhancing transparency in the process.

Infrastructure remains a major bottleneck to sustainable growth. While Uzbekistan has taken steps to attract private investment, especially in the energy sector, greater efforts are needed. The World Bank urges targeted investment in electricity and transport infrastructure, prioritizing economically strategic regions such as Tashkent and Qarshi, and improving connectivity between hubs like Samarkand, Navoi, and Khorezm.

Trade and Regulation

Since 2017, Uzbekistan’s trade-to-GDP ratio has more than doubled, reaching 71.6% in 2022. Still, only 6% of domestic firms are engaged in exporting. To capitalize on its growing trade openness, the report calls for further tariff reductions, streamlined customs processes, and modernized logistics and transport networks.

To foster a more competitive business environment, the World Bank recommends comprehensive regulatory reforms. This includes establishing independent regulators in sectors such as energy, rail transport, and telecommunications, and enhancing the mandate of the Competition Promotion and Consumer Protection Committee.

If implemented, these reforms could help Uzbekistan accelerate its economic transformation, create more jobs, and strengthen its position in the global economy.

Kyrgyz Government Urges Farmers and Migrants to Cultivate Underused Farmland

Kyrgyzstan’s Ministry of Water Resources, Agriculture, and Processing Industry is encouraging both domestic farmers and citizens working abroad to return and develop the country’s underutilized, low-productivity farmland.

According to the ministry, Kyrgyzstan currently has 614,000 hectares of such land. The initiative invites citizens to convert these idle plots into productive agricultural zones, helping to green the country and generate income.

Those interested will receive comprehensive support from both the ministry and local authorities. Assistance includes the installation of drip irrigation systems, access to preferential loans, supply of high-quality seedlings, and expert consultations.

The ministry recommends planting fruit trees and berry shrubs that thrive in low-fertility, arid soil conditions. Suggested crops include apple, apricot, cherry, mulberry, currant, rosehip, sea buckthorn, hawthorn, as well as walnut and pistachio trees.

This initiative is part of a broader strategy to stimulate agricultural production and exports in Kyrgyzstan, where more than half the population lives in rural areas.

Kazakhstan’s Labor Migration Market: Balancing Interests Amid Rising Violations

Analysts at Finprom.kz have released a new overview of labor migration trends in Kazakhstan. According to the report, as of May 1, 2025, 14,300 foreign citizens were officially employed in the country, a 4% increase compared to the same period last year.

Origins and Occupations

The majority of migrant workers come from China, with 5,100 individuals, a 24.5% year-on-year increase. They are followed by workers from Uzbekistan (1,900), Turkey (1,100), and India (1,100).

Foreign workers are primarily employed in construction, which accounts for 5,000 people, a 19.1% increase from the previous year. Other major sectors include agriculture, forestry, and fisheries (2,300 workers), and mining and manufacturing (1,300 workers in each).

The most common job categories for foreign workers include specialists (4,400), heads of structural divisions (2,400), seasonal workers (2,300), skilled laborers (1,000), and intra-company transferees (3,600). Despite overall growth, the number of foreign specialists has declined by 21.5% compared to last year. The number of foreign nationals in management roles remains largely unchanged at 567, compared to 564 last year.

Quotas, Oversight, and Violations

The Ministry of Labor and Social Protection of the Population of the Republic of Kazakhstan sets annual quotas for hiring foreign labor. In 2024, the quota was capped at 22,000 workers, equivalent to 0.23% of the national workforce.

However, violations related to labor migration are on the rise. Between January and May 2025, authorities recorded 1,600 administrative offenses, an increase of 10.1% compared to the same period in 2024. The highest number of violations occurred in the Karaganda region (224), followed by Astana (141), Shymkent (136), Almaty (110), and the Turkestan region (99).

Those held administratively responsible included 238 individual entrepreneurs and 19 government officials. Authorities also fined 106 foreign nationals for breaches of migration laws.

Total fines amounted to KZT 157.1 million ($303,000), up 22.6% from KZT 128.2 million a year earlier. Of this amount, KZT 130 million (82.7%) has already been collected.

New Plane Crash Allegations Add Fuel to Russia-Azerbaijan Dispute

Earlier this year, Azerbaijan lashed out at Russia over the Dec. 25, 2024 crash of an Azerbaijan Airlines plane that the government said was hit by accidental Russian ground fire before crashing in Kazakhstan. Now, Moscow is coming under fresh scrutiny over the crash, which killed 38 of the 67 people on board, as a broader dispute between Russia and Azerbaijan sharply escalates.

On Wednesday, an Azerbaijani news outlet, Minval Politika, published an anonymous letter and other materials purportedly containing a Russian air defense captain’s assertion that the Russian Defense Ministry gave the order to shoot down the plane as it tried to land in Grozny, Chechnya. The outlet says it can’t confirm the authenticity of the letter, and Russia has previously said an official investigation should run its course. But the dramatic allegation and the timing of the apparent leak to Minval Politika are likely to heighten acrimony at a particularly sensitive moment.

Minval Politika said it felt compelled to publish the information for “society,” and that the “data obtained can serve as useful information for the competent authorities of the Republic of Azerbaijan investigating the circumstances of the tragedy.”

The wider confrontation stems partly from the arrests of dozens of people of Azerbaijani origin by Russian security officials in the Russian city of Yekaterinburg last week. Two ethnic Azerbaijani brothers died in those raids, which Russian officials said were part of an old murder probe. Azerbaijan then detained staff at the Baku office of Russian state media group Sputnik, alleging fraud and other crimes. Russia, in turn, accused Azerbaijan of “unfriendly” conduct.

The rift lays open the delicacy of relations between regional power Russia and most former Soviet republics that, since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, have developed trade, diplomatic, and other ties with Moscow while trying to strengthen their own sovereignty and national identity, and engage with other international partners. Central Asian countries – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan – have generally maintained this balance and looked for diplomatic solutions to concerns such as discrimination against Central Asian migrants in Russia.

At the other end of the spectrum, Ukraine has been in an all-out war with a Russian invading force for more than three years.

Azerbaijan, in the South Caucasus region, has long maintained an alliance with Russia, which has gradually been losing influence in the area as it focuses on the Ukraine war and as Türkiye and other players gain more clout. Azerbaijan’s relationship with Russia soured markedly because of the Azerbaijan Airlines plane crash and what Azerbaijani authorities and commentators saw as an evasive Russian response to the disaster.

The incident put Kazakhstan in a difficult position because the crash happened on its territory, just outside the Caspian Sea city of Aktau, and Kazakh authorities were therefore the leaders of an investigation that required the full cooperation of Russia to understand what really happened. Russian President Vladimir Putin had apologized to his Azerbaijani counterpart, Ilham Aliyev, but did not acknowledge that the aircraft had been accidentally hit by Russian fire before diverting to Aktau. Russia has said the area was under attack by Ukrainian drones at the time.

Numerous aviation and security specialists have said damage to the plane’s fuselage was consistent with shrapnel marks. But a preliminary report released by Kazakhstan in February did not clear up whether Russia had fired on the plane, saying only that objects that were not part of the plane had struck it and caused significant damage.

As The Times of Central Asia reported at the time: “While a full report is in the works, that could take many more months, during which time tensions between Azerbaijan and Russia are likely to stew or escalate unless Azerbaijan gets the full apology and accountability that it demands.”

While ties with Russia deteriorate, Azerbaijan is pursuing brisk diplomacy with other countries in the broader region. On Tuesday, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy telephoned Aliyev. On Wednesday, Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev arrived in Azerbaijan for a visit.

From Migrant to Militant: Uzbekistan Sentences Jihadist

A district court in Uzbekistan just sentenced a 46-year-old Uzbek citizen, Obid Saparov from Kashkadarya Province, to 16 years in prison for joining the Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP) militant group and being involved in a 2022 rocket attack on an Uzbek border city.

Saparov’s involvement with Islamic militant groups predates the rocket attack by nearly a decade, and the evidence gathered by investigators offers a rare and fascinating look at this Uzbek citizen’s journey into jihadism.

From Migrant Laborer to Islamic Militant

The beginnings of Saparov’s radicalization are a common story for hundreds of Central Asian citizens who joined militant groups in the Middle East or Afghanistan.

Saparov went to Ufa, Russia, as a migrant laborer in June 2013. He found audio and video material on the internet produced by extremist groups such as the Islamic Movement of Turkestan and the “Jihodchilar” (“Jihadists). Saparov came into contact with members of the Jihadists in Ufa and in August 2013 left Russia for Baku, and from there went to Zahedan, Iran, and in March 2014 crossed into Afghanistan and eventually reached the town of Mirali in Waziristan, Pakistan.

There, according to Uzbek media reports, he joined the Islamic Movement of Turkestan.

The name of this group is interesting because in a kun.uz report, it mentions that when Saparov was in Ufa, some of the extremist material he found online was based on the ideas of Tohir Yuldash.

Yuldash helped found the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) terrorist organization and led the group until he was killed in a U.S. drone strike in Pakistan in August 2009. The IMU aimed to overthrow the Uzbek government and staged armed incursions into Uzbekistan in 1999 and 2000. The IMU were allies of the Taliban and were in Afghanistan when the U.S.-led military operations started in late 2001.

The IMU suffered heavy losses, and the remnants of the group, including Yuldash, fled across the border into Pakistan.

Ten Years of Militancy

Saparov underwent training at camps in Pakistan after he arrived, and later worked in a militant “supply center.”

According to the Uzbek media reports, the Islamic Movement of Turkestan splintered at the start of 2016, and Saparov joined a militant group from the Islamic State that was operating in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.

The IMU was still based in Pakistan in August 2015 when its leader, Usman Ghazi, swore an oath to the Islamic State, and the IMU split. Part of the IMU followed Ghazi into Afghanistan (where most were killed in fighting in Zabul and Herat provinces), and most of the others went into northeastern Afghanistan.

However, the ISKP did have a presence in Jalalabad that lasted until after the Taliban returned to power in August 2021.

Uzbek investigators said Saparov joined the ISKP and was with the group from 2016 to 2024. Saparov was involved in staging attacks in Jalalabad, Kunduz, Mazar-i-Sharif, and Kabul. Saparov’s group fought against the Afghan government and foreign troops, and against the Taliban.

Saparov was also engaged in recruitment, media propaganda, and preparing terrorist attacks.

Uzbek prosecutors said Saparov helped organize the bombing of the Sikh temple in Kabul in June 2022. The bomb was planted by a citizen of Tajikistan who went by the name “Abu Muhammad Tojiki.”

Saparov was also involved in the bombing at the Russian embassy in Kabul in September 2022. The suicide bomber in the terrorist act at the Russian embassy was a citizen of Uzbekistan who used the name “Ibrohim.” He stayed at the same Kabul flat as Saparov for two days before the attack, and Saparov allegedly drove “Ibrohim” to the embassy.

Saparov was operating under the command of someone called “Torik,” who had a stepson using the name “Zubair.” “Zubair” was a citizen of Kyrgyzstan.

For Uzbekistan, Saparov’s most egregious act of terrorism occurred between the bombings at the Sikh temple and the Russian embassy. On July 5, 2022, five rockets, assembled by “Torik,” were launched from Afghanistan, across the Amu-Darya River that divides the two countries, into the Uzbek border city of Termez.

Uzbek prosecutors presented evidence that Saparov “personally stored, transported, and prepared” the rockets launched at Termez.

The rockets caused property damage but no casualties among the population. However, that attack followed an earlier attempt in April that year to shoot rockets from Afghanistan into Termez. Ten rockets were fired, but all of them landed in the river.

Prosecutors did not connect Saparov to that attack.

The Taliban were detaining Saparov’s cohorts during the summer of 2022, and Saparov fled to Pakistan, where he found refuge with unnamed militant groups.

In September 2024, Pakistani security forces detained 20 of Saparov’s accomplices, among them “citizens of Uzbekistan from Andijan, Namangan, and Syrdarya.” In January 2025, Saparov was detained and extradited to Uzbekistan.

According to reports, Saparov “partially” admitted his guilt and repented for his actions.

As reported by gazeta.uz, “He asked the court to take into account that he had no previous convictions and has a family and three children.”

It is difficult to gauge how much of the prosecutors’ evidence is accurate, and maybe all of it is. Saparov was almost surely in the IMU, but Uzbek prosecutors and the court seemed not to want to mention Uzbekistan’s most infamous homegrown terrorist group, instead using a more generic name that implied members from all around Central Asia and China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.

However, Saparov was in ISKP, and most ISKP militants are killed during their attacks or in security operations. Very few make it into a courtroom, so the account of Saparov’s activities over the course of some 12 years offers a compelling insight into the path of a militant, in this case from Uzbekistan, as he moved from country to country and exchanged one militant group for another.

At EAEU Forum, Kyrgyzstan Calls for Integration in Trade, Logistics, and Migration

At the 4th Eurasian Economic Forum in Minsk, marking the 10th anniversary of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), Kyrgyzstan highlighted ongoing internal barriers that continue to hinder its development. Chief among them are trade delays, logistical bottlenecks, and persistent challenges in labor migration.

Deputy Minister of Economy Sultan Akhmatov reaffirmed Kyrgyzstan’s commitment to Eurasian integration and strengthening economic ties with other EAEU member states. According to the ministry’s press office, Akhmatov emphasized the need for deeper investment cooperation and expressed confidence that enhanced integration would bolster regional stability and mutual economic growth.

He also advocated for expanded academic exchanges, the development of digital and vocational education, and the creation of joint research platforms across the EAEU.

Yet, alongside these ambitions, Akhmatov pointed to systemic obstacles. He urged the removal of trade and customs barriers that burden importers and exporters at border checkpoints. He also emphasized the importance of mutual recognition of quality certifications and ensuring labor mobility within the Union.

Labor Migration: An Economic Lifeline

Labor migration remains a crucial pillar of Kyrgyzstan’s economy. In 2024, remittances from Kyrgyz migrants, most of whom live and work in Russia, reached $3 billion, equivalent to 24% of national GDP. This figure nearly matches the country’s total exports of $3.8 billion during the same period.

However, the number of Kyrgyz labor migrants in Russia has been steadily declining. First Deputy Prime Minister Daniyar Amangeldiev attributed this trend to both domestic economic improvements and new restrictions introduced by Russian authorities, including changes to migration law. As of 2024, foreign workers in Russia are required to sign one-year contracts with employers, a condition that has created legal uncertainty and discouraged long-term employment.

“I Left Moscow Because the Rules Changed”

Aziret Abdiev, a Kyrgyz welder who worked in Moscow for nearly a decade, shared his reasons for leaving:

“I didn’t leave because I disliked the work. I spoke fluent Russian, had a steady job, and was valued for my skills. But over the past year, the pressure increased, inspections, bureaucracy, hostility. It became clear I couldn’t continue. Now I’ve applied for a Schengen visa and will be heading to Lithuania to work in a metal factory.”

Expert Opinion: Migration as a Core Integration Priority

Kyrgyz experts argue that labor migration is central to the country’s national interest. Raising the issue at the Minsk forum, they contend, was both pragmatic and necessary.

“For Kyrgyzstan, labor migration is more than an economic category. It is a matter of social stability, foreign currency inflows, and the future of entire generations,” political analyst Bakyt Baketaev told The Times of Central Asia.

According to official statistics, up to one million Kyrgyz citizens work abroad, primarily in EAEU member states. This makes mutual recognition of qualifications, access to social protections and healthcare, and the safeguarding of migrant rights critical priorities for Kyrgyz policymakers.

Baketaev believes progress is possible, if Kyrgyzstan acts consistently and professionally while building coalitions within the EAEU. He notes that other member states face similar challenges:

“There is room for alignment with Armenia, and even Tajikistan which holds observer status in the EAEU, as well as host countries like Russia and Kazakhstan. After all, their economies also need qualified and legal labor.”

He proposes several institutional reforms to improve labor mobility:

  • Establishing a Eurasian Migration Coordination Center
  • Expanding the Digital Migrant Portfolio to simplify legal compliance
  • Signing a multilateral agreement on mutual recognition of diplomas and professional certifications

“This is the kind of integration capital that Kyrgyzstan can offer. We may lack heavy industry, but we have human capital and deep experience in mobile work and adaptation.”

Baketaev concluded by quoting Jean Monnet, one of the architects of European integration: “We are not uniting states, we are uniting people. Kyrgyzstan is consistently reminding its partners that the human dimension must be at the heart of Eurasian integration. And that is a strong position.”