• KGS/USD = 0.01143 -0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00192 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10820 0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 -0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00192 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10820 0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 -0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00192 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10820 0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 -0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00192 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10820 0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 -0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00192 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10820 0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 -0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00192 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10820 0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 -0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00192 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10820 0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 -0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00192 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10820 0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 0%
13 December 2025

Kyrgyzstan’s Parliament Advances Restrictive Version of Media Law

Kyrgyzstan’s parliament has ignored more than two years of work by a special commission and adopted a new media law that preserves restrictions on the registration of media outlets. The version parliament passed in its second and third readings on June 25 requires the mandatory registration of all media outlets, including online publications.

The Cabinet of Ministers is given exclusive powers to determine the procedure for registration, re-registration, and the termination of media activities.

Back to Square One?

There were strong objections from media freedom and rights groups to the mandatory registration of media outlets, including online sites, when the draft bill was introduced nearly three years ago.

Since Sadyr Japarov was elected president in January 2021, pressure on independent media outlets has been building.

The presidential administration said Kyrgyzstan’s current media law, which dates back to 1992, was outdated, and submitted a draft of a new media law in September 2022. International and domestic criticism was so strong that the bill was withdrawn, and eventually, a commission with representatives of the media community, including independent media outlets, the government, civil society, and legal experts, was formed.

The draft just approved by parliament was the sixth version of the bill, and, until June 16, it stated that registration for media outlets would be voluntary. On June 16, however, when the Kyrgyz parliament’s Committee on Social Policy was reviewing the bill, four Members of Parliament, Aibek Matkerimov, Ilimbek Kubanychbekov, Ernis Aidaraliev, and Sovetbek Rustambek uulu, introduced amendments.

One of these changes removed voluntary registration for media outlets and replaced that with a clause specifying that a media outlet could only disseminate information after its registration with the Justice Ministry had been confirmed.

The Media Action Platform of Kyrgyzstan, a coalition of media outlets and journalists, complained that the changes introduced by the four deputies negated those that had already been reached after negotiations. The Media Action Platform of Kyrgyzstan also questioned why deputies “who did not participate in the working group, were not present at the parliamentary hearings, and have no professional relationship with the media sphere,” were allowed to propose those amendments.

These objections were apparently ignored when deputies voted on June 25.

The Fate of Foreign-Sponsored Media

Another of the changes from the four deputies stated, “a foreign citizen, stateless person, or foreign legal entity, as well as companies with more than 35% foreign participation, cannot act as founders of media and television organizations.”

That replaces an article in the earlier text that set foreign participation at 50% or more and said only that they “cannot be founders of television organizations.”

There are some 2,740 media outlets registered in Kyrgyzstan, and only a handful receive more than 35% of their funding from foreign sources. One is Radio Azattyk, the Kyrgyz service of the U.S. congressionally-funded Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFERL).

Most of Kyrgyzstan’s presidents have expressed a dislike of Azattyk at one time or another, though the outlet continues to enjoy popularity in Kyrgyzstan according to various surveys.

President Japarov has made his views on Azattyk known several times. In comments to the state media outlet Kabar in January 2024, for example, Japarov claimed Azattyk opposed seeing him come to power. “Who knows,” he said, “maybe they received orders to be against [me] from their foreign owners.” Japarov has also claimed that people in his country “began to hate Azattyk…” and do not believe information that originates “from their chiefs, who finance them from the outside.”

During the Kyrgyz-Tajik border clashes in mid-September 2022, Azattyk posted a report that included comments from Tajik officials and civilians. Kyrgyzstan’s Ministry of Culture said the report contained false information and ordered Azattyk to remove the report from its website. When Azattyk refused, the Culture Ministry ordered Azattyk’s website to be blocked inside Kyrgyzstan, then days later froze Azattyk Media’s bank account in Kyrgyzstan.

In April 2023, a Kyrgyz court upheld the Culture Ministry’s order to shut down Azattyk, and the outlet’s operation remained suspended until July of that year, when Azattyk removed the “disputed video.”

The draft law that was just passed could mean the end of Azattyk, at least in the form in which it has existed since its establishment in 1953.

Away from the Debate

Among the countries of Central Asia, Kyrgyzstan long had the best situation for media, but that has been changing rapidly since Sadyr Japarov was elected president in January 2021. In its annual World Press Freedom Index, Reporters Without Borders ranked Kyrgyzstan 72nd in 2022, 122nd in 2023, 120th in 2024, and in 2025, the country dropped to the 144th position.

Bolot Temirov, the host of the YouTube channel Temirov Live, was expelled from Kyrgyzstan in November 2022. Temirov Live reported on government corruption and had just released a program on shady business deals involving family members of Kyrgyzstan’s security chief when its office was raided in January 2022, and Temirov was detained.

In January 2024, police detained eleven former and current journalists from Temirov Live, including Temirov’s wife, Makhabat Tajybek-kyzy. In October, a court sentenced Tajybek-kyzy to six years in prison and another journalist, Azamat Ishenbekov, to five years. Two other journalists were sentenced to three years of probation, whilst the other seven were found not guilty and released.

Also in January 2024, police raided the office of independent news outlet 24.kg, and its office was closed. Authorities charged the outlet with spreading war propaganda in its coverage of events in Ukraine. In March 2024, ownership of 24.kg was transferred to Almasbek Turdumamatov, who is close to the government.

A Kyrgyz court ordered the closure of independent media outlet Kloop in February 2024. Kloop had a reputation for uncovering corruption in Kyrgyzstan, including the corrupt practices of state officials.

One of the last major independent media outlets, Kaktus.media, is facing financial problems after being sued by privately-owned Vecherny Bishkek for running a story that the latter was about to shut down.

Japarov still needs to sign the bill into law, and has previously sent the draft back for review after facing stiff opposition. However, the eleventh-hour amendments introduced by the four deputies are an ominous sign, giving the impression that someone wanted to undo the results of previous compromises just prior to parliament’s vote.

Kazakh Lawmakers Propose Remote ID System for Drones

Yelnur Beisenbayev, a deputy of the Mazhilis, the lower house of Kazakhstan’s parliament, has submitted a formal inquiry to Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov and Defense Minister Dauren Kasanov, proposing the introduction of a mandatory Remote ID system for drones weighing 250 grams or more.

Beisenbayev noted that while drones of this weight class, especially those equipped with cameras or sensors, are already subject to mandatory registration in Kazakhstan, enforcement remains weak. Drones weighing up to 15 kilograms can still be purchased freely and used without registration, posing a potential threat to public safety.

“This sector, which plays a key role in technological development, must be regulated carefully to prevent its misuse for criminal purposes,” Beisenbayev stated.

He illustrated the potential danger with a hypothetical scenario: a toy drone flying above a mass event such as a concert or football match. “In such situations, evacuation of thousands of spectators would be impossible, and the consequences could be catastrophic,” he warned. He urged the government to tighten both administrative and criminal liability for the unauthorized assembly and use of drones.

Drawing on international examples, Beisenbayev highlighted the United States, where every drone weighing 250 grams or more is required to have a “digital passport” that includes its serial number, coordinates, and the operator’s data. Similar regulations exist in the European Union, Australia, the United Kingdom, and Canada, where drones must carry unique digital markings and flight recorders (“black boxes”).

He proposed that Kazakhstan adopt similar measures, including licensing for drone manufacturers, mandatory digital marking of key drone components, and stricter penalties for violations, especially at mass events.

Currently, the Aviation Administration of Kazakhstan oversees the registration of unmanned aircraft systems. UAVs with a maximum take-off weight of 250 grams or more, or any drone capable of collecting personal or confidential data, must be registered. Drones with a take-off weight of 750 kilograms or more require state registration.

The proposal comes amid recent drone-related incidents near Kazakhstan’s border with Russia. Several UAV crashes have occurred in the West Kazakhstan region, with the Ministry of Defense later confirming the aircraft may have been launched from a Russian test site. As The Times of Central Asia previously reported, in mid-June, debris suspected to be from a drone was also discovered in the Karakiyan district of the Mangistau region.

China’s “Used” Car Exports to Central Asia Raise Questions Over Trade Practices

China has recently surpassed Japan to become the world’s largest automobile exporter. Yet behind this headline lies a controversial trade tactic: the mass export of brand-new vehicles categorized as “used.” Since 2019, this strategy has become a key component of China’s vehicle trade with regions including Central Asia, Russia, and the Middle East.

A Reuters investigation has revealed that these so-called “zero-mileage used cars” are new vehicles that are briefly registered in China to obtain domestic license plates, then exported abroad without being driven. This approach allows automakers to classify the cars as “sold,” enabling local governments to boost export figures and manufacturers to reduce unsold inventory from an increasingly saturated domestic market.

“This is the outcome of an almost four-year price war that has made companies desperate to book any sales possible,” said Tu Le, founder of the Michigan-based consultancy Sino Auto Insights.

Local Governments Fuel the Export Boom

At least 20 provincial and municipal governments in China, including major industrial hubs like Guangdong and Sichuan, actively support this model. Local incentives include issuing additional export licenses, offering tax breaks, investing in export-related infrastructure, and providing free warehouse space near border zones

These measures align with national macroeconomic objectives and offer local officials a tool to demonstrate economic performance through export statistics.

Central Asia: A Strategic Destination

Central Asia has emerged as one of the primary destinations for these vehicles. Many of the exported models are gasoline-powered, as China pivots to electric vehicles (EVs) domestically. Nonetheless, EVs, often heavily subsidized at the production stage, are also part of the export mix.

William Ng, international director at Chongqing-based Huanyu Auto, reported strong profits in 2022-2023. “We were able to earn 10,000 yuan ($1,400) in profit on an electric sedan purchased for 40,000 yuan by selling it in Central Asia,” he told Reuters.

However, Ng warned that the market is becoming oversaturated. “Small dealers and even livestreamers are getting involved. They used to sell wine or vases, now they’re selling cars. This is chaos.”

Industry Pushback and Regulatory Scrutiny

Despite short-term export gains, several Chinese automotive leaders have expressed unease. Zhu Huarong, chairman of Chang’an Auto, warned that the practice could tarnish the global image of Chinese carmakers.

Xing Lei, founder of AutoXing, echoed this sentiment. “How many [sales] are real or inflated? No one knows,” he said, pointing to a growing distrust of industry data.

Importing nations are starting to react. Russia has banned zero-mileage used cars from brands that already have authorized dealerships in the country. Jordan and several Middle Eastern countries have tightened regulations, redefining what qualifies as a “used” vehicle to close loopholes.

These moves reflect mounting concern over what some consider a “dumping” strategy, flooding foreign markets with low-cost or subsidized vehicles that disrupt local competition and undercut domestic dealers.

Why the Practice Continues

China’s centrally managed economy allows for considerable leeway in how provinces achieve growth targets. Export volume, employment figures, and retail sales data are often tied to the promotion prospects of local officials. Within this framework, practices such as reclassifying new cars as “used” are tolerated as long as they boost economic indicators.

Although the long-term viability of this export model remains uncertain, for now it provides a release valve for China’s oversupplied auto industry and an accessible source of affordable vehicles for buyers in Central Asia.

This strategy also supports Beijing’s broader geopolitical aims. As the United States remains focused on the Israel-Iran conflict and Russia is preoccupied with the war in Ukraine, China and the European Union have become the most active external players in Central Asia, a region of growing strategic importance.

Turkic States Push Digital Integration and Organic Farming in Agriculture Sector

The fourth meeting of agriculture ministers from the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) took place on June 25 in Cholpon-Ata, in Kyrgyzstan’s Issyk-Kul region, with a strong focus on organic agriculture and digital transformation in the sector.

Strengthening Regional Agricultural Cooperation

Agriculture ministers from Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey, Uzbekistan, and Hungary convened to reaffirm their shared commitment to sustainable agriculture and explore strategies for deepening regional cooperation. Central to the discussions was the promotion of organic farming as a tool for ensuring food security, preserving natural resources, and adapting to climate change.

The ministers unanimously supported Kyrgyzstan’s proposal to designate Cholpon-Ata as the “Agricultural Capital of the OTS” for one year, beginning in September 2025.

A major outcome of the meeting was the decision to establish a Digital Agro-Platform for OTS member states. This digital initiative is designed to simplify market access for farmers and agribusinesses, reduce trade and customs barriers, and increase transparency in agricultural supply chains. The platform aims to streamline trade within the region and bolster exports.

The ministers also endorsed the promotion of a unified regional label, “OTS-Made”, for agricultural and food products originating from member countries, with the goal of strengthening brand identity and consumer trust.

Kyrgyzstan’s Organic Agriculture Ambitions

During the forum, Kyrgyzstan’s Deputy Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers and Minister of Water Resources, Agriculture and Processing Industry, Bakyt Torobayev, announced a national organic agriculture development program for 2025-2029.

The program sets ambitious targets: expanding certified organic farmland from the current 63,000 hectares (5.25% of arable land) to 200,000 hectares by 2029 and transitioning the Issyk-Kul and Naryn regions entirely to organic farming methods.

In addition to increasing the land under organic cultivation, the government aims to raise the share of organic products to 25% of total agricultural output and increase the proportion of organic goods in agricultural exports to 25%.

“Kyrgyz agricultural products are environmentally friendly, as they are produced in favorable agro-climatic conditions, on mountain pastures irrigated with clean glacial waters, and on fertile lands,” said Torobayev.

By positioning organic agriculture as a regional priority and embracing digital tools, the OTS member countries are taking coordinated steps to modernize their agricultural sectors and ensure long-term food and environmental sustainability.

Opinion: As Kazakhstan-China Trade Booms, Tokayev and XI Strengthen Relations

On June 16th, Kazakhstan’s President Tokayev hosted Chinese President Xi Jinping and the presidents of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan in Astana at the second China-Central Asia Summit.

The six countries signed the ‘Treaty of Permanent Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation’, which reinforced their strategic cooperation in multiple areas, particularly in trade and investment. Aggregate China-Central Asia trade is up 10.4% this year.

Kazakhstan is a pivotal player in transcontinental Eurasian trade and integration. Its geographic location, multimodal transport networks, and strategic partnerships with neighboring countries, particularly China, position Kazakhstan as Central Asia’s primary overland gateway to Europe and West Asia. It’s no surprise, therefore, that President Xi Jinping visited Astana – his sixth trip to Kazakhstan and sixteenth to Central Asia.

Over the past two decades, Kazakhstan has reclaimed its historic role as a nation of merchants and intermediaries, revitalizing trade routes like the middle corridor and logistics hubs such as Khorgos Gateway—a dry port facilitating container transshipment between Chinese and Kazakh railways en route to Europe. These are just two examples of infrastructure projects in Kazakhstan; there are many more in development.

In Astana, Presidents Tokayev and Xi underscored the importance of further socio-economic progress arising from enhanced economic linkages. Tokayev reiterated Kazakhstan’s support for mutually beneficial business opportunities, emphasizing the principle of national sovereignty and independence.

Recent trade figures reflect the robust economic ties in infrastructure and connectivity. Kazakhstan’s construction sector, driven by investments in transport, are poised to increase by 6.8% in 2025, according to Kazakhstani economists.

Sino-Central Asian trade, according to China’s General Administration of Customs, reached $94.8 billion in 2024, with Kazakhstan accounting for 46% of that total—$43.8 billion—making it China’s largest partner in the region. This contrasts with Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan’s combined total of $28.1 billion, and Kyrgyzstan’s $22.7 billion, driven largely by re-exports and gold.

Kazakhstan remains the anchor economy in Central Asia – the strategic hinge between China and the West – as confirmed not only by the volumes of freight entering and leaving Kazakhstan, but by its upstream and downstream economic benefits, causing a multiplier effect across the country. Over 80% of land cargo from China to Europe passes through Kazakhstan.

What factors have led to this development? A key factor has been global demand for raw materials, but that’s only part of the story. What stands out as the principal driver of Kazakhstan’s success in boosting trade over the past 20 years was its commitment soon after independence in 1991 to invest in transport and logistics, while creating a regulatory and legal framework in parallel to facilitate operability.

In other words, Kazakhstan’s success is no accident. It was the country in Central Asia to embrace economic liberalization not as ideology, but as a pragmatic approach to address the inefficiencies of a centralized command economy. This visionary approach facilitated economic liberalization, including getting rid of oppressive centralized planning and embracing private capital and deregulation without relinquishing sovereignty.

Kazakhstan also pushed ahead in developing a banking sector that over time provided a foundation for retail, trade-related and SME lending as well as local and foreign direct investment.

Kazakhstan’s success also stems from its commitment to regional cooperation, as was just seen in Astana last week. Regional leaders have set aside geopolitical and socio-religious differences in favor of constructive collaboration in trade and cross-border dealings, fostering win-win outcomes. In the event, it proved far better to work together with the other countries of Central Asia than to fuss over past slights and grudges – a key factor in the region’s success.

A Strategic Mindset

Kazakhstan’s strategic vision is yielding significant returns. In the first five months of 2025, according to the Kazakhstan Bureau of National Statistics, its transport sector surged 23.1%, generating nearly $5.5 billion in revenue, with $4.3 billion from freight alone. Over 450 million metric tons were transported, marking an 11.9% year-on-year increase, with notable growth in pipeline (18.2%), rail (14.1%), and road transport (2.3%).

Kazakhstan’s role as a trans-Eurasian bridge is flourishing, though exports to China remain concentrated in basic metals (40.4%), metal ores (26.5%), crude oil and natural gas (21.7%), chemicals (3.8%), food and agricultural products (7.1%). The EU imports more raw materials from Kazakhstan than China, prompting further development of trans-Caspian routes.

Imports to Kazakhstan, primarily machinery, equipment, vehicles, electronics, and consumer goods, come mainly from Russia and China, with the EU in third place. Kazakhstan maintains a regional trade surplus with China, reflecting its strong position as an exporter and supplier of raw materials.

Central Asia-China Engagement 

Kazakhstan and China have a long history of high-level communications. Tokayev and Xi’s recent tête-a-tête strengthened this relationship, and it shows no signs of weakening. High-level meetings between countries take place regularly. There have been six China-Central Asia Foreign Ministers’ meetings since 2020; there will be many more.

And like it or not, trade across Central Asia benefits from efforts to establish an all-weather payment mechanism free from third-party interference, exemplified by the 2022 Memorandum on Mutual Settlements between Kazakhstan and China, allowing trade settlements in Kazakh tenge and Chinese yuan. Other initiatives are in the works—part of a broader regional shift toward financial independence and visa-free travel.

Kazakhstan’s emergence as the region’s principal transport and trade facilitator results from its long-term vision, sustained investments, smart diplomacy, and embrace of economic pragmatism. This integration strategy may be its most valuable export.

Addressing Xi Jinping in Astana, Tokayev recalled the well established friendship and cooperation between Kazakhstan and China, a relationship distinguished by mutual understanding and goodwill. Assuming global economic stability, Kazakhstan and China may push their trade volumes to $75 billion per annum in the coming years. The other Central Asian countries are looking for similar outcomes and are equally hopeful.

Perhaps Kazakhstan’s success—and the attention it is giving its neighbors—helps explain why the United States, after years of neglect, has been paying closer attention to Central Asia than at any time in recent memory.

***

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the publication, its affiliates, or any other organizations mentioned.

What’s Behind the Rising Infertility Rates in Kazakhstan?

The number of people diagnosed with infertility in Kazakhstan has nearly tripled over the past five years, according to a recent study by Finprom.kz. While the numbers are stark, experts say the increase reflects improved diagnostics and wider access to reproductive healthcare rather than a sudden rise in medical infertility.

Threefold Increase in Five Years

According to data from the Ministry of Health, cited in the “Kazakh Families – 2024” report by the Institute for Social Development, the number of patients officially diagnosed with infertility rose from around 10,000 in 2019 to 29,200 by mid-2024. Nearly all of these cases involve women; only 102 men are recorded.

The sharpest increases occurred in 2021 and 2022, with patient numbers rising by 51.8% and 49.7% respectively. Analysts attribute much of this growth to the state-funded Aңsaғan Sәbi (“Longed-for Child”) program, which offers around 7,000 quotas annually for in vitro fertilization (IVF). To qualify, couples must first be registered at a medical facility, which has incentivized greater diagnostic activity.

Geographic and Gender Disparities

The highest official incidence is in Almaty (4,200 cases), followed by Astana (2,600) and the Zhambyl region (2,500). Experts caution that these figures likely reflect differences in diagnostic availability and public awareness, rather than actual regional variation in infertility rates.

Men remain drastically underrepresented in official statistics. For instance, 39 men are registered in the Zhambyl region, compared to just three in the more populous Turkestan region. In four regions, North Kazakhstan, Zhetysu, Pavlodar, and Astana, there is no available data on male patients. Experts attribute this to a lack of andrological screening and persistent cultural taboos.

Yet at the XIV International Congress of Reproductive Medicine in Almaty, it was noted that male factors account for up to 40% of infertility cases requiring assisted reproductive technologies (ART). In 2024, just one IVF clinic in Kazakhstan treated approximately 2,000 men for andrological conditions and performed surgeries on 1,500 of them.

IVF Program Success and Medical Tourism

Kazakhstan’s IVF sector has seen major advances. Over the past 30 years, ART procedures have resulted in the birth of 39,000 children in the country, 11,000 of them under the state program. The first IVF laboratory in Kazakhstan was established in 1994.

Success rates for ART in Kazakhstan have risen from 12% to 42%. Some private clinics report rates as high as 54%, while the national “take-home baby” rate, the percentage of live births per IVF cycle, stands at approximately 30%. These achievements, along with competitive costs, have turned Kazakhstan into a regional hub for fertility treatment.

Analysts from the Institute for Social Development also link rising IVF demand to the post-pandemic surge in medical screenings, as many women delayed care during COVID-19 lockdowns. But broader social shifts are also at play.

Reproductologists note a growing trend toward delayed marriage and childbirth. As ovarian reserves typically begin to decline after age 35, this delay contributes to fertility challenges. In response, the practice of social egg cryopreservation is becoming increasingly popular as a proactive measure.

While infertility affects an estimated 17% of couples in Kazakhstan, a rate consistent with global averages, experts emphasize that an effective response requires more than medical infrastructure. Cultural attitudes, particularly surrounding male infertility, remain a barrier to early diagnosis and treatment.

A growing number of healthcare professionals, policymakers, and advocates are calling for a comprehensive strategy that combines prevention, public education, and accessible treatment to address the full scope of the issue.