Shared rivers and joint water management can shape a new regional partnership

Central Asia and Afghanistan sit on the same rivers, yet often behave as if they belong to different regions. Water ties them together more firmly than any border, but the politics of the past have kept Afghanistan outside the regional system. Today, as climate pressures intensify and development accelerates on both sides of the Amu Darya, the case for integrating Afghanistan into Central Asia has never been stronger. And the path to that integration begins with water.

The debate around the Qosh Tepa Canal makes this evident. Afghanistan was never part of the agreements that govern the Amu Darya River (Protocol 566 of the Soviet Union and the Almaty 1992 agreement). It did not sign allocation protocols and never joined regional basin institutions. Still, it was expected to follow rules it had no hand in shaping. Now, that old arrangement has reached its limit. The canal will bring new agriculture to the north of Afghanistan, but downstream states depend on the same river. The real question is not whether Afghanistan should develop, but how to shape that development jointly so the river can sustain all sides.

Central Asia already has cooperative models that Afghanistan could join. Uzbekistan and Tajikistan have shown how two neighbors can jointly manage a transboundary river through their collaboration in hydropower on the Zarafshan. Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan have signed a similar mechanism with the KambarAta-1 project, which will generate energy and regulate seasonal flows for downstream agriculture. These experiences show that once countries share responsibility for a river, trust can grow and benefits expand.

Afghanistan can become part of this regional architecture. The 161-meter-high planned dam on the Kokcha River, set to generate 445 megawatts of electricity, offers a clear entry point. A jointly governed dam on this river would give Afghanistan energy, while downstream states would benefit from its flow in terms of agriculture. When operations are transparent and agreed upon, water becomes a field of cooperation rather than tension.

Energy trade adds another layer of opportunity. Central Asia has a long record of exchanging electricity and gas in return for upstream releases. Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have done this with Kyrgyzstan for many years through a joint water and energy agreement. The same model can work with Afghanistan. The country needs power, and it can offer coordinated water management in return. A structured energy for water arrangement would give Afghanistan an incentive to cooperate and offer Central Asia predictability.

Agriculture is another arena where cooperation promises immediate gains. Uzbekistan’s policies on water-saving technologies offer a strong example. They subsidize drip, sprinkler systems, canal improvement, land levelling, efficient pumps, and even solar-powered irrigation. These investments reduce water losses while increasing yields only if their rebound effect, such as further expansion of agriculture, is controlled. The same approach could be applied in the northern provinces of Afghanistan, including in the area under the Qosh Tepa Canal. With similar financial support and technical guidance, Afghan farmers could modernize irrigation, reduce wastage, and improve productivity. Such upgrading requires financial support, which could be facilitated by third‑party funding organizations from the private sector, if the countries agree.

Moreover, water saving could be boosted by transitioning from water‑intensive crops to less water‑consuming ones. But farmers change crops only when the market gives them a reason. In northern Afghanistan, rice is important because of excess water and brings a stable income. If Central Asian states want farmers to transition toward crops that use less water, then regional trade must incentivize this. Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan can import vegetables, fruits, and legumes from Afghanistan. Turkmenistan already imports large quantities of vegetables from other countries, which could be replaced by Afghanistan, and shift more of that demand onto Afghan producers. Such trade would ease pressure on Turkmen water resources and give Afghan farmers stable buyers for crops that consume less water, gradually steering cultivation away from rice.

Upgrading agriculture can also support peace and stability. When farmers see improved incomes from modern techniques and expanded markets, pressure on water and land decreases. Cooperation between communities becomes easier. These programs fit naturally within peacebuilding, climate adaptation, and rural development portfolios, and third-party organizations can finance them. Joint pilot farms, training programs, and technology transfers along the Amu corridor would benefit all sides.

Another critical area for cooperation is early warning systems. Floods, glacial lake outbursts, and sudden climate-related disasters affect both Afghanistan and Central Asia. Shared monitoring, regional data platforms, and coordinated warning protocols would protect lives and livelihoods. Afghanistan could join the regional systems that already exist, or new ones could be built that link hydrometeorological services across the Amu basin. When neighbors detect threats together and respond together, regional resilience grows.

Security concerns remain central to Central Asia’s hesitation toward deeper integration with Afghanistan. Cross-border trafficking, extremist movements, and instability along the Amu corridor pose risks to regional peace. The Taliban, as the de facto authority, can play a constructive role by committing to joint border monitoring, curbing militant groups that threaten its neighbors, and cooperating on intelligence-sharing mechanisms. If Afghanistan demonstrates its reliability in addressing these concerns, trust will grow, and water cooperation will be reinforced by a foundation of security.

All these developments point toward a larger shift. Afghanistan’s natural place is within Central Asia. Its climate challenges match those of its northern neighbors, and its long-term interests align with the region’s priorities. Central Asia can help Afghanistan stabilize its water use, modernize agriculture, and integrate with regional trade. Afghanistan can offer regulated flows, hydropower potential, and a new market for energy and technology. Moving away from the endless friction associated with Pakistan in the south and stepping into the regional structures of the north is both logical and advantageous.

Beyond water and energy, integration offers significant economic dividends. Afghanistan’s northern provinces can become a hub for agricultural exports, hydropower trade, and transit routes linking Central Asia to South Asia. Coordinated infrastructure projects—roads, railways, and transmission lines—would reduce costs and open new markets. Regional investment in Afghanistan’s modernization would not only stabilize its economy but also expand Central Asia’s access to diversified trade corridors, creating a win‑win dynamic that strengthens resilience against external shocks.

This is the moment to shape a shared water future. A future in which Afghanistan is not an unpredictable upstream actor, but a constructive partner. A future in which development in Afghanistan is aligned with water security in the entire region. Central Asia has the experience and tools. Afghanistan has the need and potential. What has been missing is the choice to move forward together. Now is the time to make that choice. A shared water future, reinforced by security cooperation and economic integration, can be the bridge that brings Afghanistan fully into Central Asia.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the publication, its affiliates, or any other organizations mentioned.