• KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00192 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10879 0.28%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 -0.28%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00192 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10879 0.28%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 -0.28%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00192 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10879 0.28%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 -0.28%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00192 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10879 0.28%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 -0.28%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00192 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10879 0.28%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 -0.28%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00192 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10879 0.28%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 -0.28%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00192 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10879 0.28%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 -0.28%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00192 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10879 0.28%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 -0.28%
12 December 2025

Japarov Urges Kyrgyz Citizens Not to Obstruct Small Hydropower Plant Construction

Kyrgyzstan’s President Sadyr Japarov has urged citizens to support the construction of small hydroelectric power plants (HPPs) across the country, emphasizing their importance for energy independence.

According to Japarov, 40 small HPPs are currently operational in Kyrgyzstan, generating 312.5 million kWh of electricity annually. Construction has begun on 37 additional small HPPs, with 18 set to be commissioned in 2025, adding a total capacity of 385.2 million kWh.

Additionally, Kyrgyzstan has launched solar and wind power projects with a combined capacity of 5,624 MW to diversify its energy sources.

Untapped Energy Potential and Local Resistance

Despite having the capacity to generate 142 billion kWh of electricity annually, Kyrgyzstan currently produces only 14 billion kWh, utilizing just 10% of its potential. Meanwhile, the country imports 3 billion kWh of electricity each year.

Japarov noted that in regions where small HPPs are under construction, local residents have blocked roads and disrupted work, citing concerns about water pollution.

“We are a country located at the source of water resources, yet we still import electricity,” Japarov stated in his address.

“To resolve this crisis, we launched the large-scale construction of small and medium-sized HPPs in 2021. Additionally, work has begun on the Kambarata-1 HPP, which will further strengthen our energy security. Our goal is to eliminate dependency on imports, achieve energy self-sufficiency, and eventually export surplus electricity.”

Appeal for Public Cooperation

Japarov called on local communities to cooperate, urging them to endure temporary inconveniences during construction.

“Construction lasts a maximum of three months. Work is carried out during the day, so in the mornings, before any impact on water, residents can collect clean water for their daily needs. These projects will serve our country, our people, and future generations.”

In many remote rural areas of Kyrgyzstan, access to piped drinking water remains limited, forcing residents to rely on rivers and lakes for their water supply. While environmental concerns persist, the government maintains that small HPPs are essential for long-term energy sustainability and economic development.

International Human Rights Activists Demand Release of Tajik Journalist Rukhshona Khakimova

The Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders has strongly condemned the sentencing of Tajik journalist Rukhshona Khakimova, calling on Tajik authorities to release her immediately and unconditionally​.

In a statement issued on March 3, the Observatory asserted that Khakimova’s prosecution is linked to her participation in a politically sensitive poll on China’s influence in Tajikistan. The survey, commissioned by the Kyrgyz NGO Barometer, included interviews with political figures, some of whom belong to the opposition and face pressure from authorities​.

“Ms. Khakimova is officially charged with ‘high treason’ under Article 305 of Tajikistan’s Criminal Code. This charge is part of a broader investigation into an alleged coup attempt, despite the absence of credible evidence. It is being used to suppress critical voices,” the statement said.

Concerns Over Due Process and Human Rights Violations

Human rights organizations have raised concerns about the secrecy of the trial, closed court sessions, and lack of transparency in the investigation. Activists argue that these factors indicate serious violations of due process.

A particularly troubling aspect of the case is Khakimova’s separation from her two young children, who are two years old and nine months old. At the time of her arrest, she was still breastfeeding her younger child. Authorities have denied her mother’s request to bring the infant to the detention center, and her property has been confiscated, exacerbating her family’s financial difficulties.

The Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders has urged the Tajik government to:

  • Release Khakimova immediately.
  • Respect her rights as a mother and consider the wellbeing of her children.
  • Ensure a fair and transparent judicial process.

International Condemnation

Several other human rights organizations, including Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Reporters Without Borders (RSF), have also condemned the eight-year prison sentence handed to Khakimova.

The 31-year-old journalist was convicted of “complicity in high treason using her official position”, a charge that has sparked public outrage and widespread debate on social media.

On February 13, the Chairman of Tajikistan’s Supreme Court acknowledged public criticism of the verdict but defended the decision, stating that Tajik law does not provide for leniency in cases involving “especially grave crimes”.

Khakimova’s case has become a symbol of shrinking press freedoms in Tajikistan. With global human rights organizations increasing pressure, the Tajik government now faces growing calls to reconsider her sentence and uphold freedom of the press and due process.

Kyrgyzstan Hails Border Deal with Tajikistan as Major Diplomatic Success

Kamchybek Tashiyev, head of Kyrgyzstan’s State Committee for National Security (GKNB), addressed parliament for the first time regarding the Kyrgyz-Tajik border agreements. He clarified the terms of the final agreement and explained the territorial concessions Kyrgyzstan made to prevent future border conflicts. The document has sparked mixed reactions in Kyrgyz society, with some deputies expressing dissatisfaction with the delimitation results, while ordinary citizens hope for lasting peace between the two countries.

Final Agreement

Tashiyev stated that the border agreement was based on the 1991 accords, countering earlier Tajik proposals to rely on documents from 1924-27. Years of work by geographers enabled both sides to reach mutual compromises.

The Kyrgyz-Tajik border spans 1,006 kilometers. By 2011, 520 kilometers had been delineated, while the remaining 486 kilometers were settled over the past three years.

“We have prepared several documents for signing by the presidents of both countries, including an agreement on the state border, an agreement on water resources—a previous water dispute in 2022 led to armed conflict—as well as agreements on cross-border road use and new infrastructure projects,” Tashiyev said.

Over the past three years, the two nations have held numerous bilateral meetings, resulting in the signing of 45 protocols. Tashiyev noted that the process could be finalized within a month, as the Kyrgyz parliament has already approved the agreement, leaving only the leaders’ signatures.

Parliamentary Debate

“We are making history! We have responsibly completed border delimitation with Uzbekistan. We approved the agreements with Tajikistan without debate. The people appreciate this. But public opinion is divided—that is common. If 50-60% of citizens support it, stability will follow,” said MP Nadira Narmatova during the parliamentary session.

However, some MPs opposed the government’s decision. Sultanbai Aizhigitov, an MP from Batken Oblast, criticized the transfer of Dostuk village, where Kyrgyz authorities had previously built roads and reinforced the state border. He also disapproved of the shared water intake arrangement, arguing that the territory had always belonged to Kyrgyzstan.

Voices from Border Villages

In an interview with The Times of Central Asia, Kanybek Myrzamuratov, a resident of Samarkandek village near the border, said most locals supported the government’s decision. While some land was ceded, he emphasized that peace was the priority.

“In some places, one street belongs to two countries—Tajiks on one side, Kyrgyz on the other. Disputes often started over minor issues but escalated into larger conflicts. At times, entire villages would mobilize against each other, leading to casualties,” he said.

According to villagers, tensions with Tajikistan became serious in 1996, though minor disputes occurred even during Soviet times. The Soviet authorities, however, downplayed such incidents. Both sides engaged in stone-throwing, livestock theft, and occasional violence.

Myrzamuratov noted that Kyrgyz authorities kept negotiations with Tajikistan confidential to prevent unrest among border residents.

“In Dostuk, Leilek District, houses were burned down in last year’s clashes. Residents would not have accepted a transfer to Tajikistan. To prevent confusion and disputes, the authorities remained silent,” he said. He added that locals now look forward to reopening the border to resume trade.

Afghanistan: Rentier State or Hostage to Foreign Aid?

The current geopolitical turbulence presents Afghanistan and the countries of Central Asia with serious challenges. After the Taliban’s return to power in 2021, Afghanistan found itself in a state of deep economic crisis, and its continued stability once again depends on external assistance.

However, with the shifting global order, traditional donors such as the U.S. and the European Union are scaling back their involvement in Afghan affairs, while new sources of support remain uncertain. This creates significant risks for the countries of the region, which must find ways to minimize the consequences of Afghanistan’s crisis and ensure their own security.

Historical context: dependence through the ages

Afghanistan has always been dependent on external sources of income. This historical context was explored by Ali Nuriyev (historian, blogger, and researcher of the Ottoman world) in his article for TRT, “Afghanistan: The Graveyard of Empires or a Rentier State?”

“As flattering as it may be for Afghans to have a reputation as [a nation that has kept its independence despite incursions from Great Powers], everything comes at a price, including Afghanistan’s independence”.

Nuriyev provides a detailed analysis showing that since the founding of modern Afghanistan in the 18th century by Ahmad Shah Durrani, the country has built its economy and politics on external sources of income. Durrani financed his campaigns through raids on India, while his successors received subsidies from the British in exchange for maintaining neutrality in the “Great Game” between the British Empire and Russia.

Later, in the 20th century, Afghanistan skillfully played on the rivalry between the USSR and the U.S., securing billions of dollars for infrastructure, education, and military modernization. By the 1970s, two-thirds of the country’s state budget came from foreign aid.

Even after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 and the overthrow of the Taliban regime in 2001, Afghanistan continued to rely on external support. The governments of Hamid Karzai and Ashraf Ghani survived primarily due to funding from the United States and its allies.

Today, following the Taliban’s return to power in 2021, Afghanistan is once again searching for new sources of income. Sanctions and frozen assets have forced the Taliban to seek support from China, Russia, and other nations, further proving that the country’s reliance on foreign aid remains unchanged.

This is the historical reality: Afghanistan is a state that, for centuries, has survived thanks to external resources. Its independence has always been closely tied to its ability to extract benefits from the geopolitical maneuvers of great powers.

In the present day, this historical context can be interpreted in different ways. However, one fact remains clear, today’s geopolitical turbulence is already having a negative impact on Afghanistan.

Afghanistan’s adaptation

As the global order shifts, the key players on the “Afghan track” are adjusting their strategies toward Afghanistan, exacerbating the country’s economic crisis.

United States – For Afghanistan, the new realities in the U.S. mean reduced aid and frozen assets. The U.S., which had long been Afghanistan’s primary donor, is unlikely to increase financial support soon. Following the withdrawal of troops and the Taliban’s return to power, Washington has reassessed its policy toward Kabul, focusing on diplomatic pressure and economic sanctions. Now, even American humanitarian assistance through international organizations is at risk. Several Western donor agencies have already announced the cessation of their activities in Afghanistan due to a lack of funding.

The first steps taken by the new administration in Washington indicate that, amid geopolitical competition with China and Russia, it will maintain an interest in the region but act cautiously, avoiding major financial commitments. As a result, Afghanistan remains on the strategic periphery of U.S. foreign policy.

European Union – Characterized by internal challenges and waning interest in Afghanistan. EU countries are grappling with growing social and political tensions related to inflation, climate change, and the rise of populist movements. It is evident that Brussels will adopt a more pragmatic and frugal approach in the future, prioritizing its influence in the Balkans, Eastern Europe, and the Indo-Pacific region. This leaves fewer opportunities for active involvement in resolving the Afghan crisis.

Overall, as noted in the Munich Security Conference report, major global actors, including the U.S., China, the EU, Russia, India, and Japan, are all seeking to expand their influence, making it difficult to establish coordinated responses to global challenges.

Thus, modern geopolitics places Afghanistan in an extremely difficult position, with the consequences being felt most acutely in Central Asia.

Afghanistan remains a hostage to its historical model of dependence on external resources, an ‘inheritance’ that continues to shape the region’s future.

Challenges for the countries of the region

It may be time for the Central Asian republics to rethink Afghanistan’s model of dependence and seek new pathways to their own stability and development.

If not, ongoing turbulence could pose serious threats to the region. Worsening poverty, hunger, destabilization, and the potential rise of extremism in Afghanistan could trigger a new wave of refugees, increase transnational crime, and negatively impact Central Asian security.

With traditional donors reassessing their involvement, Central Asian states face significant risks. They must consolidate efforts and develop new approaches to humanitarian and economic support for Afghanistan to ensure regional security and stability.

It is evident that regional countries must seek alternative solutions. While they cannot fully replace major donors like the U.S. and the EU, they must establish a joint mechanism for minimal but stable humanitarian and economic assistance to Afghanistan. This mechanism could include:

  • Resource Consolidation: Establishing a regional fund, such as CentralAsiaAid or CA-Unity, for humanitarian aid and infrastructure support in Afghanistan. This initiative could involve international organizations, foreign governments, regional alliances, and the private sector. New donors such as China, Japan, India, the Gulf monarchies, and Southeast Asian nations could play a growing role.

Central Asia continues to successfully attract financial resources. Programs from international organizations such as the World Bank, IMF, Asian Development Bank, and Islamic Development Bank play a crucial role in concessional financing” Evgeny Vinokurov, Chief Economist of the Eurasian Development Bank

  • Diplomatic Engagement: Coordinating efforts on the international stage to draw attention to regional challenges and secure new sources of funding.
  • Security and Migration: Developing joint programs to strengthen border security, prevent radicalization, and manage migration flows.
  • Economic Cooperation: Expanding trade and economic ties with Afghanistan to help stabilize its economy and reduce reliance on foreign aid.

Additionally, the role of major geopolitical players, such as China and Russia, must be considered, as they could contribute to regional stability.

Thus, Afghanistan remains not only a “rentier state” but also a key element of regional security. The consolidation of Central Asian efforts and the development of new approaches to the Afghan crisis are not just matters of humanitarian aid but strategic imperatives for ensuring long-term stability and security.

For the five Central Asian countries, assisting Afghanistan is not merely a formal obligation — it is a rational choice and an objective necessity in the absence of alternatives. Geopolitically, they have the greatest interest in Afghanistan’s stability.

Of course, Central Asia alone cannot fully fill the security vacuum in Afghanistan, even with support from key stakeholders like China, Russia, India, Turkey, and the Gulf states. However, through pragmatic engagement, economic cooperation, and regional integration, Central Asian countries can mitigate threats and contribute to Afghanistan’s stabilization, thus ultimately strengthening security for the entire region.

New motivation for Central Asian countries

The conditions outlined above can also serve as additional motivation for deeper integration among Central Asian nations. Given the unpredictable nature of current developments, these countries must enhance their cooperation and establish a new model of regional collaboration.

With decreasing attention from the U.S. and the EU, alongside intensifying global power competition, a vacuum has emerged, one that Central Asian states can leverage to strengthen their role in international affairs.

Incorporating Afghanistan into regional economic and infrastructure projects would not only contribute to stabilizing the country but also provide further incentives for Central Asian integration. This includes:

  • Strengthening Economic Ties: Developing new transportation and energy corridors to enhance connectivity and trade.
  • Joint Humanitarian Efforts: Pooling resources to address the socio-economic consequences of the crisis.
  • Political Convergence: Formulating a unified stance in international relations to amplify regional influence.

Today’s challenges act as a powerful catalyst for greater unity among Central Asian nations. They have a unique opportunity to lay the foundation for a new system of regional relations, with Afghanistan playing a central role. This would not only reintegrate Afghanistan into the global system but also ensure long-term security and development for the entire region.

Thus, in this shifting geopolitical landscape, Central Asia has the potential not only to mitigate risks but also to turn them into opportunities, enhancing internal stability and bolstering its influence on the world stage.

Uzbekistan Ratchets Up Drive Against “Evil” of Corruption

Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev announced a major shakeup of Uzbekistan’s campaign against corruption on Wednesday, ordering the dismissal of the heads of anti-corruption bodies in 117 ministries and departments and saying many officials had fostered mistrust by failing to deliver clean government as promised.

Mirziyoyev, who took office in 2016, described corruption as an obstacle to Uzbekistan’s efforts to reform its economy. He said that, while there had been progress toward transparency, virtually every sector in the nation, including the media, schoolteachers, non-governmental groups and neighborhood authorities, should mobilize alongside the state to fight the scourge. 

“Corruption is such an evil that it undermines people’s trust in the state, the Constitution and laws, and becomes a serious threat to sustainable development and security,” Mirziyoyev said at a meeting of the National Anti-Corruption Council, which was established in 2020 to lead efforts to curb graft. 

International groups that study corruption have long said that autocratic tendencies, opaque bureaucracy and weak justice systems in Central Asia make it hard for those countries to get a comprehensive grip on the problem and hold the powerful – regardless of their political allegiances – to account for any wrongdoing. 

Even so, Kazakhstan has taken some notable steps, expanding its outreach to other countries in an effort to recover stolen assets and considering the establishment of a public register of officials convicted of corruption-related offenses. 

Uzbekistan has similarly made advances, while falling short on enforcement and other pledges. A 2024 report by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development noted that prosecution of corruption offenses in Uzbekistan “is generally ensured, but more efforts should be directed at countering high-level corruption;” that there is no specialized legislation related to the protection of whistleblowers; and that while Uzbekistan has a business ombudsman institution, “companies do not report cases of corruption for fear of negative repercussions from the state.”

Mirziyoyev’s remarks, which included scathing criticism of the alleged passivity of some officials, appeared designed to give new momentum to the kind of openness that his government deems essential to a successful, diversified economy.  

“The Prime Minister was instructed to dismiss the heads of the “internal anti-corruption control” structures in 117 ministries and departments and replace them with honest, dedicated and professional personnel, and to set clear tasks for them,” Sherzod Asadov, the presidential press secretary, said in an account of the meeting that he posted on Facebook. Ministers will directly employ regional compliance officers and “take political responsibility and personally answer for corruption in the entire system,” according to the account. 

Uzbekistan’s Minister of Emergency Situations, Abdulla Kuldashev, was recently fired because of fire safety bureaucracy and legal violations, the president said. He also expressed frustration that he had to personally instruct measures against wasteful spending in investment and healthcare programs last year, resulting in the saving of several hundred million dollars.  

“But why should these works begin after the president gives an order?” he said.  

One measure that Uzbekistan previously introduced is an index that rates the openness of state agencies. In the 2023 index, the statistics agency scored highest and the regional administration of Andijan, near the border with Kyrgyzstan, was at the bottom.   

Uzbekistan’s government has had an often fraught relationship with journalists and bloggers who say they fear persecution if they report on alleged wrongdoing by high-ranking officials or comment critically on sensitive issues. But the government appears to welcome a growing role for the media in calling attention to corruption.  

“Previously, this topic was completely closed to journalists,” Asadov said on Facebook. “Currently, the current situation has completely changed in the direction of openness and transparency.”

Russian Insurer Pays Compensation for AZAL Crash Near Aktau

The Russian insurance company AlfaStrakhovanie has completed payments under aviation hull insurance for the Embraer 190 aircraft operated by AZAL Airlines that crashed near the Kazakhstani city of Aktau. Additionally, compensation payments to passengers have begun, according to Ilya Kabachnyk, Deputy General Director for Aviation and Space Insurance at the company. 

“Full payment for the aircraft was made in February,” Kabachnyk stated, noting that a significant portion of the risk was reinsured by the Russian National Reinsurance Company (RNPC). While the exact amount of compensation has not been disclosed, industry experts estimate it to be between $25 million and $30 million.

Compensation payments to passengers began in January and are ongoing. These payments are being made in accordance with the Montreal Convention of 1999 and Russia’s Compulsory Insurance of Civil Liability of Carriers (OSGOP) law, which provides for compensation of up to 2 million RUB (approximately $22,000) for injury or loss of life.

Regarding potential claims for damage to third parties, Kabachnyk said no such claims have been received so far.

“If they arise, we will work with the airline accordingly,” he added.

Investigation and Cause of the Crash

The crash occurred on December 25, 2024, during an AZAL flight from Baku to Grozny. There were 67 people on board, 38 of whom died, the majority of them Azerbaijani citizens.

According to Reuters, citing an unnamed source, the aircraft was shot down by a Russian Pantsir-S missile. Azerbaijani authorities have supported this claim, stating that they have recovered fragments of the missile.

In early February, Kazakhstan published a preliminary report on the crash, which described external damage to the aircraft.