• KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00196 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10899 -0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 -0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00196 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10899 -0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 -0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00196 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10899 -0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 -0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00196 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10899 -0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 -0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00196 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10899 -0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 -0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00196 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10899 -0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 -0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00196 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10899 -0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 -0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00196 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10899 -0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 -0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
08 December 2025

Half a World Away: Central Asian Workers on British Farms

Few countries have more patriotic supermarkets than Britain. Whether it’s a sortie through the sausage section, or browsing the fruit aisle, customers are almost guaranteed to be confronted with the red, white and blue of the Union Jack.

In a country not famed for its food, it’s perhaps strange to see the national flag given such prominence. The practice is far less common in continental Europe. Nevertheless, over the past decade there has been a push, propelled by an odd alliance of environmentalists and nationalists, to source homegrown food. Retailers have cottoned onto this and seem glad to leave the customer with the warm, bucolic feeling that they have aided embattled farmers, reduced their carbon footprint, and even helped to correct the country’s balance of payments deficit by buying British.

“Supermarkets get more than just the profit margin for the [British] fruit they sell,” says Dr Lydia Medland, a research fellow at Bristol University. “We call it farmwashing: they get publicity, they get kudos; they use this ripe, fresh, local image to sell more products.”

There’s only one snag. The people who pick the fruit and vegetables which are then packaged up with British flags, are not exactly local.

British flags adorn food packaging in the country’s supermarkets.
Images: Yvonne Mould (left); Elke Morgan (center and right)

Central Asia and Britain: An Unlikely Match

Seasonal workers have been traveling to the island of Britain for over a hundred years. In the nineteenth century, farmers would travel across the Irish Sea to help bring in the harvest. However, in the late 1990s, the number of people arriving on seasonal visas began to rise significantly. This was followed in the 2000s by a spike in workers from Europe, taking advantage of visa-free access to Britain’s labor market under the auspices of the European Union. They served as a pool of flexible, cheap workers for a farming industry that was being increasingly squeezed by the buying power of the country’s major supermarket chains.

When Britain voted to leave the EU in 2016, the farming industry panicked at the prospect of losing much of this cut-price labor force. They successfully lobbied the government to relaunch the Seasonal Worker Visa program on a trial basis. Originally designed in the 1940s for European students, the scheme was repackaged to empower private recruitment agencies to hire workers from across the world to work in the fields for six months a year. When the visa debuted in 2018, 2,500 people came. By 2021 – the year that freedom of movement between Britain and the EU officially ended – the government had already raised the quota to 30,000.

At the other end of Europe, the collapse in the value of the Russian Ruble since the start of 2023, combined with a crackdown on foreign laborers, has seen a mass exodus of Central Asians from Russia. By October 2024, there were around 30% fewer migrants in the country than there were on the eve of the Covid-19 pandemic.

Central Asian governments are actively seeking to create new employment opportunities for their citizens abroad to reduce reliance on Moscow. As a result, almost from nowhere, the UK Seasonal Worker Visa has become one of the hottest tickets in town. By 2023 (the last year for which the British Home Office has provided figures), almost 70% of these visas were granted to Central Asian nationals.

Country of residence Seasonal Work Visas
issued in 2023
Percentage of total visas
issued in 2023
Kyrgyzstan 7,958 24.3%
Tajikistan 5,665 17.3%
Kazakhstan 5,014 15.3%
Uzbekistan 4,091 12.5%
Ukraine 2,535 7.7%
Moldova 2,163 6.6%
Others 5,298 16%

Source, British Home Office

When it works, the scheme makes economic sense for all concerned. On the right farm at the right time of year, workers can expect 60-70 hours of work at the British minimum wage, which this year will be raised to £12.21 ($15) per hour. Working 70-hour weeks means potential wages, after tax and accommodation, of almost £3,000 ($3,700) per month.

“The farm rewarded good work, almost everyone received bonuses,” says Maksat, a farmworker from northern Kyrgyzstan who spent the first of his two years in England working on an apple orchard in Kent, in the southeast of the country. He asked to be referred to by his first name only. “The English know that if you give one person more, others will also want to work harder to get more as well. They are smart people; this is how they conquered the whole world!” he laughs.

The huge sums quoted above help to sell the idea of working in Britain to people back home; average monthly wages in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan hover slightly above $400, whereas in Tajikistan they are as low as $240.

However, given the seasonal nature of the business, 70-hour weeks are hard to guarantee. Doolotbek Bektimov, who comes from a village in Kyrgyzstan’s Batken region, was delighted at the long hours he was given picking zucchini in Cornwall, southwest England, but after transferring to a tomato farm in Kent, he found his weekly workload was reduced to no more than 35 hours.

The accommodation, mandated to cost no more than £9.99 per day, is quite spartan, usually consisting of five people sharing a caravan. Other costs that must be considered are the visa, transport to work, medical insurance, and, especially, flights.

“My outbound flight ticket via Istanbul cost close to $400 as I bought it at the last minute,” says Bektimov. “People often have to do this because as soon as the visa is issued, you need to fly out there to make the most of the six months. The return flights are closer to $200.”

Nevertheless, despite these costs, he says he managed to come home with around one million Kyrgyz Som (around $12,000).

Left: Visa centers are opening across Bishkek promoting work in countries other than Russia.
Right: Bureaux de Change are increasingly accepting British Pounds. Images: Joe Luc Barnes

Lacking Leverage

The scheme is not without its critics. Chief amongst them is the idea of employer sponsorship itself, says Andrei Savitski of the Work Rights Centre, a charity that campaigns for employment justice. “Your visa is tied to your employer, and that employer has a level of bargaining power over you. That means workers might not wish to state grievances, or they might tolerate certain conditions that they otherwise wouldn’t.”

Bektimov agrees with this assessment. “You can’t complain; and if you do, the supervisors always reply in a very rude manner. If you don’t like something, then your contract will be stopped immediately.”

Daniyar and his wife Guljan, who traveled together to England, said they were warned before they arrived that the work would not be easy. “They made it very clear that the hours would be long and tiring, and that we should not complain about this. So, we knew what to expect,” says Guljan.

This vulnerability is exacerbated by the fact that many workers have taken on debt to come to Britain. The results of the British government’s Seasonal Workers Survey 2023 found that around 40% of respondents took out a loan, either from friends, family, or a formal institution, to fund their upfront costs.

This is particularly prevalent in Uzbekistan, where nearly half of workers reported having to pay extra fees for training, medical exams, or payments to the migration ministry. Source: Gov.uk

“All the risk burden lands on the worker,” says Dr. Medland. “There’s no independent trade union scheme that’s incorporated… it’s so much worse than the system before Brexit where EU migrants could come with full access to the labor market, full access to social services, they could bring their families, and they could come and leave. It was a more equal relationship.”

Troubleshooting

With such a new scheme, the British government has moved quickly to iron out some of the more egregious issues, one of which has been the number of scams involving fake firms promising non-existent jobs. Britain’s Gangmaster and Labour Abuse Authority has worked with both Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan to stamp out this trade, signing deals in 2023 to share information about specious recruitment agencies. In Kyrgyzstan, the government’s official migration portal means there is now a state-approved route for applicants, with no fees to pay aside from the visa (£298/$350).

Another step forward has been the requirement, since April 2023, for sponsors to provide a minimum of hours 32 hours work per week. At the scheme’s inception, for all the talk of 70-hour weeks, many workers were on so-called “zero-hours contracts” and were left in the lurch when work dried up.

Such precarity pushed some to the black market. Javlon, from the Sughd region of Tajikistan, who asked that his name be changed to protect his identity, harvested apples on a farm in Gillingham, around 50 kilometers from London, in October 2022. At the end of the harvest, he was told there was no more work for him. Frustrated, he got in touch with friends who quickly found him casual work in the construction sector. “Previously I worked on a construction site in Russia, so I found work doing that in England. It was very good money, much better than farming,” he said.

Even since the introduction of the 32-hour mandate, many workers continue to turn to the illegal labor market when work dries up. Maksat tells of his second trip, where he too worked in the black market after his contract on a vineyard near Chichester ended.

“There were five hundred of us, all with our contracts cut,” he said. “And of course, I’d already seen how many people work illegally, how easy it was. I went to a town called Kingston, just southwest of London; there was a car wash run by Albanians and they had many illegal workers. I spent two weeks working there. Then at the end of November, according to the contract, the recruitment agency provided another farm job, so I went to Manchester and worked until the end of the visa.”

He also alleges that some participants in the seasonal visa scheme simply used it as a means for more permanent illegal migration to Britain.

“There was just one guy who went with us, he flew to London, and people were waiting to collect him at the airport train station. He didn’t even work for one day. There were others on the farm who also fled to London. I guess everyone, as they say, has one life. I think lots of people must do it. I used to think that in England there were only the English,” he laughs. “And then I saw… Oh my, how wrong I was! I think this is why people talk about a migration crisis.”

Dr. Medland, however, believes that such stories are overstated. “One of the main responsibilities of the scheme operators is to ensure that the workers return. If the scheme operators can’t prove a very high returns percentage of people they sponsor, they are liable to lose their license.” She cites a House of Commons briefing which stipulates that this return percentage must be as high as 97%.

A Sustainable Long-Term Program?

Despite these problems, the scheme is proving popular in a region where job opportunities are sparse. All workers interviewed for this article signaled their intention to return to Britain in 2025. The British government, while under increasingly intense pressure to reduce migration and claiming to want to move towards automation in the agricultural sector in the long term, has nonetheless set a quota of 45,000 seasonal worker visas this year, and has extended the scheme as a whole until 2029.

For the foreseeable future a good chunk of local, home-grown, British food is likely to be harvested by Central Asian hands. For Dr. Medland, the issue is systemic: “Everybody in the food chain is under pressure. The just-in-time production demanded by the supermarkets creates a year-round demand for a very homogenous product at short notice and at speed. The migration system has been put in place to support that.”

Uzbekistan Approves Regular Flights from Malaysia, South Korea, and Egypt

Uzbekistan has approved regular flights for airlines from Malaysia, South Korea, and Egypt, the Civil Aviation Agency under the Ministry of Transport of Uzbekistan announced.

Under an intergovernmental air services agreement between Uzbekistan and Malaysia, AirAsia X Berhad received approval on February 3, 2025, to operate regular flights between Kuala Lumpur and Tashkent.

On the same day, South Korea’s T’way Air was also granted permission to launch regular flights on the Seoul-Tashkent-Seoul route under the Uzbekistan-South Korea air services agreement. Both AirAsia X Berhad and T’way Air will operate these flights using Airbus A330 aircraft.

On February 4, Egypt’s Red Sea Airlines received approval to operate regular flights between Sharm el-Sheikh and Tashkent. This decision follows the Uzbekistan-Egypt air services agreement, and the airline will use Boeing 737 aircraft for these flights.

Previously, The Times of Central Asia reported that Uzbekistan Airways altered its flight routes to Europe starting in January, bypassing Russian and Belarusian airspace. The airline’s press service stated that the decision was based on recommendations from the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), and was not related to the recent Azerbaijan Airlines crash.

The Twilight of Starlink in Kazakhstan?

For every country in the world, the appearance of the internet has presented vast possibilities but also formidable challenges.

This was especially true in Central Asia where the governments are obsessed with controlling information that can be accessed by the public.

Kazakhstan is unique among the Central Asian states in that the Kazakh government has expended significant energy and resources to make Kazakhstan a modern country with a tech savvy population.

Control over the internet remains an issue and has sparked a debate in Kazakhstan about the use of foreign telecommunications satellites.

Countrywide Connections

In late 2024, Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Digital Development stirred controversy by proposing new regulations on imports of telecommunications equipment. One proposal would ban the use of equipment from foreign companies that do not have control centers inside Kazakhstan.

In December 2024, the Digital Development Ministry specifically named Inmarsat, Thuraya, Iridium, and Starlink as targets for a usage ban. Kazakhstan actually has a national security law that “prohibits the establishment and operation of communication networks within Kazakhstan if their control centers are based outside the country.”

However, Kazakhstan is a large country with most of its population living in roughly the eastern third of its territory. Cities, towns, and villages scattered across the western two-thirds of Kazakhstan are poorly connected to the internet and Kazakh authorities started discussions with Musk’s SpaceX about use of Starlink, a subsidiary of SpaceX with a network of satellites.

In October 2023, Kazakh authorities “introduced broadband internet in ten rural schools using Starlink technology in a test mode.” The pilot project envisioned sending Starlink terminals to 2,000 schools. By April 2024, the system was already connecting 447 rural schools to the internet, and by August the number had climbed to 1,731 schools.

Kill Switch Required

In November 2023, the director of the Ministry of Digital Development’s Telecommunications Committee, Dias Tolegenov, warned citizens that  private use of Starliink terminals was illegal in Kazakhstan. The “current version” of Starlink “violates current (Kazakh) legislation, as it does not meet safety requirements,” Telugenov said.

This ban is still In effect.

In May 2024, the director of Kazakhstan’s Kokterek Space Communications Center, Roman Ermashov, reiterated that according to Kazakhstan’s laws, “projects using foreign satellite communication systems in non-geostationary satellite orbits,” such as Starlink, must have “a gateway (interface) station on the territory of Kazakhstan.”

SpaceX refused to install the station in Kazakhstan.

“This is about safety,” Ermashov said, “Because if any information security incident occurs, such as a data leak, everyone turns to the state.”

This comment by Ermashov cuts to the heart of the matter.

During the mass unrest in Kazakhstan in January 2022, authorities cut off the internet around the country to prevent protesters from coordinating their actions or releasing information about what was happening to the world outside Kazakhstan.

Later that same year, Tajikistan ‘s government cut off the internet connection to the eastern Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast during unrest, and Uzbek authorities did the same to the western Karakalpakstan Republic when violence broke out there in early July.

Certainly, Kazakh officials would like to have the ability to provide information to citizens across the country, including rural areas, especially in a time of emergency, such as the severe flooding that hit much of Kazakhstan in 2024.

Kazakh officials, however, do not want citizens to be able to disseminate anti-government information or organize or coordinate protests using technology that the government cannot shut down at a moment’s notice.

Other Options

The laudabe project to connect rural schools to the internet using Starlink is continuing, though that project will finish in 2026 and it is unclear what will happen after that.

The Digital Development Ministry withdrew the proposal after it sparked strong resistance, but it seems likely to be reintroduced. The Ministries of Digital Development, Finance, trade, and National Economy are currently reviewing the proposal and making revisions. The Digital Development Ministry noted the Eutelsat-OneWeb operator “meets national security requirements and provides communication services via non-geostationary satellites.”

Kazakh authorities are also in talks with Amazon Kuiper and Shanghai Spacecom Staellite Technology Co., both of which seem amendable to the idea of establishing gateway stations in Kazakhstan, though neither can provide all the services of Inmarsat, Thuraya, Iridium, or Starlink.

Kazakhstan’s National Security Committee (KNB) says devices with control centers outside Kazakhstan pose a potential threat to data security of citizens and state bodies. The KNB has reason to worry since in February 2024 it helped uncover a group of Chinese hackers who had access to Kazakhstan’s telecommunication operators, pension fund, Defense Ministry and more for two years.

The main point for Kazakhstan is that the government wants its people to be as knowledgeable as possible about computer technology and internet use so that the country can grow and compete globally. But the Kazakh government does not want citizens to use the internet to foment popular unrest or even spread information and narratives that run counter to the state’s policies.

USAID’s Retreat from Kazakhstan: Central Asia Braces for a New Power Struggle

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has long been a key player in funding various projects in Kazakhstan and Central Asia, supporting both development initiatives and media organizations. However, under the new administration of U.S. President Donald Trump, the agency’s activities have been significantly curtailed. With USAID scaling back its operations, the question arises: Who will step in to fill the gap?

USAID’s Departure: A Near Total Withdrawal

While USAID is reducing its presence, it is not shutting down entirely. The Trump administration has announced plans to retain a mere 294 of the agency’s more than 10,000 employees worldwide, according to a BBC report. Following these drastic cuts, only twelve staff members will remain in USAID’s Africa bureau and eight in its Asia bureau.

USAID’s website states that nearly all of its employees will be furloughed, foreign aid programs have been suspended, and control over the agency has effectively shifted to the U.S. State Department. The agency’s annual budget previously exceeded $50 billion.

In Kazakhstan, USAID’s official website is now inaccessible. The platform contained key data, including lists of grant recipients – journalists, media professionals, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that received funding for various projects. While some USAID-backed initiatives supported modernization efforts, healthcare, and education, others were seen as promoting U.S. political interests.

According to available data, in 2024, USAID allocated $15.2 million to Kazakhstan, distributed as follows:

  • Healthcare – $8.8 million
  • Democracy, human rights, and governance – $3.7 million
  • Support programs – $1.39 million
  • Peace and security – $833,000
  • Economic development – $438,000
  • Humanitarian assistance – $23,000
  • Education and social services – $4,000

Despite these allocations, Kazakhstan does not rank among the top ten recipients of USAID funding.

The Trump administration has also disclosed additional details regarding U.S. foreign aid spending. White House Press Secretary Caroline Leavitt stated that under President Joe Biden, $4.5 million was allocated to combat disinformation in Kazakhstan. Leavitt criticized such expenditures, claiming that alongside Kazakhstan’s disinformation initiatives, U.S. taxpayers had also funded projects such as gender reassignment programs in Guatemala ($2 million), tourism promotion in Egypt ($6 million), a new Sesame Street show in Iraq ($20 million).

Reactions in Kazakhstan

Public opinion in Kazakhstan regarding USAID’s role is divided. Many officials and commentators have criticized what they perceive as foreign interference in the country’s internal affairs.

Mazhilis Deputy Magerram Magerramov has accused USAID of lobbying for the interests of the LGBT community, citing U.S. officials, including Elon Musk and Donald Trump, who have labeled USAID a “criminal organization.”

“Official White House statements claim that USAID has been unaccountable to U.S. taxpayers and has funneled huge sums into ‘absurd’ and ‘harmful’ projects. For example, between 2022 and 2025, USAID allocated $2 million to ‘strengthen human rights and equality’ in Central Asia. However, the program’s executor is the European International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Intersex Association. We need full transparency regarding which funds are allocated, by whom, for what purposes, and who benefits from them. This must end in Kazakhstan,” Magerramov stated.

The deputy argues that the rise of LGBT and feminist activism in Kazakhstan is not driven by internal societal demands, but rather by external financial support. Magerramov claims that USAID has financed various minority protests in the country.

Political scientist Gaziz Abishev emphasized the need to differentiate between humanitarian aid and political influence.

“I have no objections to states and international organizations funding charitable and developmental projects, such as support for people with disabilities, education, and science. However, politicized projects are a different matter. These initiatives often come wrapped in an appealing narrative but ultimately serve as instruments of foreign influence – and, at times, pressure,” Abishev wrote on social media. The political scientist warned that American taxpayers might be unknowingly funding questionable projects. Kazakhstan, he argues, must carefully scrutinize foreign investments.

Who Will Step In?

Despite USAID’s withdrawal, many believe U.S. influence in Central Asia will persist.

Political scientist Daniyar Ashimbayev views the agency’s restructuring as a temporary adjustment rather than a permanent retreat.

“American informational interference in other countries’ internal affairs will not end. What we are witnessing is a redistribution of influence and budgetary resources in Washington. First, USAID-funded networks actively opposed Trump and failed to realign in time. Second, Washington’s geopolitical interests have become entangled with ideological agendas that damage its global image. Third, any large bureaucracy with an uncontrolled budget eventually becomes inefficient. The current apparatus and its beneficiaries are being dismantled, but they will soon be replaced,” Ashimbayev stated.

Other analysts argue that Trump’s decision to scale back USAID hands a strategic advantage to the United States geopolitical rivals. Dosym Satpayev, director of the Risk Assessment Group, predicts that other powers will move to fill the void.

“China, which has been actively investing in educational programs in the region, will likely step in, funding certain segments of civil society in alignment with its interests. The European Union is unlikely to take a leading role due to its internal challenges and limited financial resources. Russia, given its increasing influence in Asia and the strategic importance of Central Asia, may partially fill the gap by investing in proxy organizations and soft power initiatives,” Satpayev explained.

Meanwhile, some nations are taking a different approach. In early February, Azerbaijan simultaneously banned both USAID and Rossotrudnichestvo, Russia’s state agency for international humanitarian cooperation. The Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry formally notified both Washington and Moscow of the decision.

Established in 2008 under the Russian presidency, Rossotrudnichestvo officially aims to “strengthen Russia’s humanitarian influence worldwide.” Azerbaijan’s move to expel both U.S. and Russian organizations underscores a growing trend among some nations to shield themselves from foreign influence altogether.

A Shifting Landscape

As USAID scales back its operations in Central Asia, the region faces a shifting geopolitical landscape. While some see the agency’s departure as a positive step toward national sovereignty, others warn that new players – whether China, Russia, or other global actors – will inevitably step in to exert influence. Whether Kazakhstan and its neighbors will embrace, resist, or regulate this evolving dynamic remains to be seen.

Are Registry Errors Behind Migrants’ Bank Account Freezes in Russia?

Dozens of migrants in Russia have complained that they were wrongfully included in the newly launched Register of Controlled Persons, leading to blocked bank accounts, detentions at the border, and job dismissals, according to human rights activist Valentina Chupik.

During the first two days of the registry’s operation, 31 people sought Chupik’s assistance: 13 were citizens of Kyrgyzstan, eight from Tajikistan, seven from Uzbekistan, and one each from Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan. Among them were three holders of Russian residence permits and one with a temporary residence permit. All claim they were added to the list without justification.

The majority – 17 people – discovered their inclusion in the register through blocked bank accounts, with 12 of them clients of T-Bank. Four were notified by police following their detention, another four were denied entry at the Russian border, and one individual lost their job.

Interviews with those affected revealed no valid reasons for their inclusion in the registry, except for four cases where there might have been formal grounds for entry bans. However, none of these migrants had received prior notification. In addition, five had previously faced unlawful restrictions: three were expelled, one was stripped of a residence permit, and another was banned from entry – though all these decisions were later overturned.

Chupik advised migrants to withdraw their money from Russian banks immediately, warning that indiscriminate entries into the registry put their finances at risk. “Since they enter the register indiscriminately, I advise you to withdraw all your funds and send them home, leaving only the necessary minimum,” she said.

Baza, a Telegram channel linked to Russian law enforcement agencies, also reported the mass blocking of hundreds of foreign nationals’ accounts. Additionally, human rights activist Alexander Kim stated that refusals to provide state services, including migration registration, have become increasingly common.

The Register of Controlled Persons was launched in summer 2024 following the adoption of a law on the expulsion of foreign citizens. The move came amid an anti-migrant crackdown that intensified after the Crocus City Hall terrorist attack. Foreign nationals included in the register face deportation and lose the right to register businesses and property in Russia.

Switzerland to Return $182 Million in Confiscated Gulnara Karimova Assets to Uzbekistan

On February 6, in Tashkent, Uzbekistan’s Minister of Justice, Akbar Tashkulov, and Switzerland’s Ambassador to Uzbekistan, Konstantin Obolensky, signed an agreement on the repatriation of confiscated assets, the Uzbek Ministry of Justice reported.

Under the agreement, approximately $182 million will be returned to Uzbekistan. These funds were illegally obtained by certain Uzbek citizens and were fully confiscated in 2012 by the Swiss Prosecutor General’s Office as part of criminal proceedings against Gulnara Karimova, the eldest daughter of former President Islam Karimov. The money will be transferred through the United Nations Uzbekistan Vision 2030 Fund Multi-Partner Trust Fund.

This is not the first such agreement. In August 2022, Uzbekistan and Switzerland signed a similar agreement in Bern, outlining principles and mechanisms for returning illegally acquired assets. That agreement confirmed that the returned funds would be used for the benefit of Uzbekistan’s population through the UN trust fund.

Under the 2022 agreement, Uzbekistan was set to receive around $131 million. With this latest deal, the total amount of repatriated funds will now reach $313 million.

The Uzbekistan Vision 2030 Fund will allocate these funds to socially significant projects, particularly in healthcare and education.