As Turkey increases its influence among Turkic Central Asian nations, Tajikistan – the only Persian-speaking country in the region – is looking to Iran as a potential strategic partner. Dushanbe is aiming to significantly strengthen bilateral ties with Tehran, hoping that such a move will have a positive impact on its economy; but what are the Islamic Republic’s interests in Tajikistan?
On January 15, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian paid an official visit to Dushanbe, where he met with his Tajik counterpart Emomali Rahmon. The fact that he led a delegation of the Iranian business community suggests that Tehran plans to increase its economic presence in the landlocked Central Asian state.
In 2024, the two nations increased their trade volume by nearly 50% compared to 2023. The problem, however, is that their total trade turnover reached “only” $378 million, which is rather modest compared to the $1,12 billion trade volume achieved by Tajikistan and Russia in the first seven months of 2024.
From 1995 to 2013, the Islamic Republic actively invested in the economy of Tajikistan, which led to the construction of the Sangtuda-2 Hydroelectric Power Plant and the tunnel at the Anzob Pass. However, between 2013-2021, economic relations between Tehran and Dushanbe deteriorated significantly. Now, Tajikistan hopes to see more Iranian investments in its economy.
“Trade and the economy are among the priority areas of our bilateral relations. We voiced our interest in developing investment cooperation with the Islamic Republic of Iran,” Rahmon said at a press conference after talks with Pezeshkian.
As a result of their summit, Tajikistan and Iran significantly deepened their bilateral ties by signing 23 memoranda of understanding in sectors such as trade, energy, infrastructure, cultural exchange, and security. Since Daler Juma, Tajikistan’s Minister of Energy and Water Resources attended the meeting between Tajik and Iranian delegations, it is almost certain that energy was one of the main topics that was discussed.
For Dushanbe, it is crucial to secure funding for the completion of the Rogun Hydroelectric Power Plant, the Istiklol tunnel (also known as the Anzob Tunnel), where the Iranian company Farob is engaged in the construction, as well as a number of small and medium-sized projects. For Tehran, the economic aspect of cooperation with Tajikistan is undoubtedly very important, although it seems to have other ambitions in the Central Asian state as well.
“Iran’s primary interest in Tajikistan is related to cultural and religious bonds, as it sees the country as part of its Persian-Iranian-Islamic civilization,” Fereshteh Sadeghi, a Tehran-based journalist who has worked with Iran’s Press TV and Al Jazeera English, told The Times of Central Asia.
In her view, by maintaining a good political relationship with Dushanbe, the Islamic Republic can significantly strengthen these cultural connections.
“Tajiks speak Farsi, love Farsi literature, and are said to be able to recite poems by Persian or Farsi-speaking poets from memory more easily than Iranians themselves can,” she explained, pointing out that religious aspect also plays an important role in Tajik-Iranian relations.
Although Tajikistan is a secular country, the post-Soviet era has seen a marked increase in religious practice in the Central Asian nation, where Sunni Muslims make up around 95% of the population.
“We know there aren’t many Twelver Shia in Tajikistan, but there are Sevener Shia, mostly known as Ismailis. Iran views them as a potential audience for its ideology,” Sadeghi said, emphasizing that the Islamic Republic fears that Tajikistan could become a “breeding ground for Takfiri ideology,” exporting it to neighboring Afghanistan and subsequently to Iran.
“Tehran thinks that by boosting security cooperation with Tajikistan, it can thwart such a project,” Sadeghi concluded.
For Mohsen Solhdoost, the Iranian-born Assistant Professor at the Department of International Studies at Xi’an Jiaotong-Liverpool University, Tehran’s ambitions to strengthen its influence in Tajikistan are related to the Islamic Republic’s strategy of preserving political stability at home.
“By foregrounding language, cultural heritage, and tangible economic development, Iran stands to gain much-needed domestic legitimacy and popular support, even as it navigates ongoing sanctions and continues to weigh its security commitments in the Middle East,” Solhdoost told The Times of Central Asia.
“For the Iranian government, boosting ties with a culturally kindred, Persian-speaking country like Tajikistan can serve as a strategic and symbolic recalibration of its foreign policy. Beyond simply diversifying its regional partnerships, such a move can help align Iran’s external engagement with the preferences of a significant portion of its domestic population, one increasingly critical of costly commitments to proxy groups in Arab states,” he stressed.
It is unlikely to be pure coincidence that Iran, amid strategic defeat in Syria and Lebanon, is looking to increase its presence in the Persian-speaking Tajikistan. The problem for Tehran, however, is that Dushanbe, despite being Russia’s ally in the Collective Security Treaty Organization, does not seem willing to join the Russian-Iranian “axis of the sanctioned.”
Although the CRINK nations (China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea), in their regional strategies, have made substantial inroads in Central Asia (including Tajikistan), the United States, under Donald Trump, is expected to position itself as a counterweight to their influence in the strategically important region. Fully aware of that, Tajikistan will likely seek to balance its ties with the CRINK nations – where Iran plays an important role – and its ambitions to improve relations with the West.
Sergey Kwan
