Two weeks ago, Kazakhstan officially joined South Korea’s Employment Permit System (EPS), becoming the 18th country admitted to the program. Even before the change, thousands of Kazakhstani nationals were working in South Korea, many without legal status. Kazakhstani authorities estimated the total at around 15,000 in 2025, including 11,000 without legal documentation. To work legally in South Korea under the EPS, applicants must pass the EPS-TOPIK, a standardized Korean-language test. In this context, learning Korean has become a direct route to better-paid work for many young people in Kazakhstan.
Japan, however, has generated no comparable rush.
A Widening Gap, By the Numbers
The contrast is also evident in language-learning trends. In 2022, Jang Ho-jong, a professor at the Kazakh Ablai Khan University of International Relations and World Languages, told The Korea Times that Korean ranked alongside English and Chinese among Kazakhstan’s three most popular foreign languages and was taught at 15 to 20 universities. About 400 students were taking Korean courses at his university, compared with just three or four when the program opened 20 years earlier.
South Korea has also expanded teaching and testing infrastructure. In July 2026, the King Sejong Institute at Akhmet Baitursynuly Kostanay Regional University became Kazakhstan’s first official center for the Sejong Korean Language Assessment (SKA), allowing candidates to take the exam without traveling abroad. Official enrollment data from the King Sejong Institute Foundation show that 1,320 students were enrolled at its institutes in Kazakhstan in 2025, down slightly from 1,481 in 2024.
The picture is very different for Japanese. The Japan Foundation counted 581 learners across eight institutions in Kazakhstan in 2024, compared with 1,569 learners in 2006.
In Uzbekistan, Korean-language education has expanded even faster. The country recorded the largest increase worldwide in 2025, adding 68 schools offering Korean classes. Sri Lanka placed second with 43.
Enrollment at King Sejong institutes in Uzbekistan rose from 1,873 in 2021 to 7,931 in 2024. It eased to 6,308 in 2025, according to the same official dataset.
Japanese-language study has also grown in Uzbekistan, but more slowly. The same Japan Foundation survey counted 4,201 learners across 19 institutions in 2024, up from 3,579 at 18 institutions in 2021. Although the two datasets cover different types of institutions, the nationwide Japanese total remained below enrollment in Uzbekistan’s King Sejong network that year.
A More Complicated Picture Next Door
Across the rest of Central Asia, however, the comparison is less clear-cut.
The Japan Foundation’s 2024 regional survey recorded 1,708 Japanese-language learners at 14 institutions in Kyrgyzstan, taught by 50 teachers. That was almost three times Kazakhstan’s total, even though Kyrgyzstan’s population is roughly one-third as large. Among the learners in Kyrgyzstan, 411 were in primary or secondary education.
A 2020 account by a Japan Foundation specialist described young people learning through anime and the internet, while Japan International Cooperation Agency volunteers introduced Japanese in rural schools. Some later traveled to Bishkek for more formal study. This points to demand developing from the ground up alongside institutional support.
Korean-language enrollment is also substantial. The King Sejong Institute Foundation data cited earlier show that enrollment in Kyrgyzstan rose from 3,467 in 2021 to 4,252 in 2022. It then declined to 3,172 by 2025. The latest available figures show strong demand for both languages, although Korean enrollment remained higher even within the King Sejong network.
Reliable information on Tajikistan is scarcer. According to the university’s history, a Korean Language and Culture Center opened at what is now the Tajik International University of Foreign Languages named after Sotim Ulughzoda in 2008. It took the King Sejong name in 2012 and was renovated by the foundation in 2015.
Enrollment rose from 423 in 2021 to 1,226 in 2023, according to King Sejong Institute Foundation data. The figure eased to 1,164 in 2025.
Japanese enrollment remains lower. The Japan Foundation recorded 174 learners at three institutions in 2024, supported by eight teachers. No learners were recorded in primary or secondary education. Of the total, 119 were in higher education and 55 were in non-school programs.
Turkmenistan, however, overturns the regional pattern. Following Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s 2015 visit, Japanese-language education expanded under an initiative led by then-President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov. At the time, Japanese was taught at one higher education institution and one secondary school, with about 50 learners. By 2024, the Japan Foundation counted 14,844 learners at 20 institutions. The survey also recorded 88 teachers.
Japan has also financed teaching infrastructure through the “Japanese Language Teaching Equipment Project.” The project provided upgraded classrooms at the Dovletmammet Azadi Turkmen National Institute of World Languages in 2023.
Korean-language enrollment in Turkmenistan is far smaller, but it has also risen since the country’s first King Sejong Institute opened in Ashgabat in 2019. King Sejong Institute Foundation data show 327 students in 2021, rising to 586 in 2023. By 2025, the total had reached 798.
Turkmenistan therefore shows how decisive public policy can be. Japan has overtaken South Korea there by building Japanese-language instruction into the education system. This complicates any claim of a simple regional triumph for Korean.
South Korea’s clearest advantage remains in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, where Hallyu and employment opportunities reinforce each other. Koryo-saram communities add a historical connection.
Why Korean Leads in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan
Hallyu provides the most visible explanation. The reach of Korean popular culture has made the language part of a wider cultural world that many young people in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan already follow.
Central Asia’s Koryo-saram communities add historical depth. Many are descendants of ethnic Koreans deported in 1937, although Korean communities existed in the region before then. Their presence gives Korean culture a local historical connection that Japan lacks.
Employment provides the most immediate incentive. In Kazakhstan and the three other Central Asian participants in South Korea’s Employment Permit System, passing the EPS-TOPIK is a formal step toward legal employment. Unlike cultural appeal alone, this offers a direct financial return on language study.
Japanese in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan lacks the same combination of cultural reach and historical connection. Its labor pathways are real, however. Uzbekistan participates in Japan’s Technical Intern Training Program, while the Specified Skilled Worker system requires applicants to pass language and skills tests. The official examination schedule includes Uzbekistan.
Japan therefore does have a language requirement. The difference lies in the scale and public visibility of its labor routes compared with the EPS. Grassroots interest in Kyrgyzstan and state-backed expansion in Turkmenistan show that Tokyo can close the gap if it makes language education and employment pathways easier to see and use.
The Long View
Soft power built through cultural appeal and accessible labor pathways develops more slowly than summit communiqués, but it can prove more durable. Japanese enrollment in Kazakhstan was once much higher than it is today, while Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan demonstrate that decline is not inevitable.
In Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, Japan still has cultural recognition and established labor programs. What it lacks is a single, visible route linking language study to opportunity. South Korea’s advantage comes from Hallyu and institutional teaching, reinforced by the EPS.
Unless Tokyo turns cultural interest and existing employment programs into a clearer pathway to study and work, Seoul’s advantage among younger generations in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan is likely to widen.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the publication, its affiliates, or any other organizations mentioned.
