• KGS/USD = 0.01143 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00196 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09790 0.41%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00196 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09790 0.41%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00196 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09790 0.41%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00196 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09790 0.41%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00196 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09790 0.41%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00196 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09790 0.41%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00196 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09790 0.41%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00196 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09790 0.41%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 0%
25 May 2025

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 696

Opinion – The Quiet Competition: How the U.S. Is Losing Ground to China in Central Asia

Over the past decade, China has steadily expanded its presence in Central Asia, not through military force, but by building roads, trade corridors, and digital infrastructure. As the United States scaled back its regional footprint following its withdrawal from Afghanistan, Beijing moved quickly to fill the void. Today, China has positioned itself as the region's dominant external power, while the U.S. risks being left on the sidelines. At the heart of China’s strategy is the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which has provided over $1 trillion into infrastructure projects globally since its launch in 2013. This includes $704 billion in construction contracts and $470 billion in non-financial investments. In 2024 alone, BRI engagement reached $121.8 billion – $70.7 billion in construction and $51 billion in investments – and trade between China and the countries of Central Asia hit a record $95 billion, highlighting the depth of China's economic integration. This engagement has also created significant financial dependencies. Central Asian countries owe China roughly $15.7 billion, about 8% of the region's total external debt, and these loans are often opaque and carry terms that provide Beijing with outsized political leverage. Chinese firms are also laying fiber-optic networks and constructing electric vehicle corridors to link western China with its neighbors. In Tajikistan, for example, contractors are upgrading the Pamir Highway to support cross-border EV transport. Huawei and other Chinese tech giants are also expanding the region’s telecommunications infrastructure, raising serious concerns about surveillance, data sovereignty, and long-term digital dependency. China’s economic outreach is reinforced by high-level diplomacy. The China–Central Asia (C+C5) format has become the centerpiece of Beijing’s regional engagement. At the 2025 summit, leaders from across the region gathered to coordinate on connectivity, climate resilience, and trade facilitation. The regularity and substance of these summits stand in sharp contrast to the United States’ more sporadic diplomatic presence. The U.S. maintains the C5+1 platform and launched a promising Critical Minerals Dialogue in 2024. However, these initiatives have yet to match the scale or consistency of China's approach as U.S. infrastructure investment is limited, its commercial footprint is small, and diplomatic engagement is too infrequent to shift the region’s strategic trajectory. This matters. Central Asia is strategically located, resource-rich, and increasingly central to global supply chains and geopolitical competition. Kazakhstan alone supplies more than 40% of the world’s uranium. The region also serves as a testing ground for competing development models, and if the United States fails to become a more engaged and credible partner, China’s infrastructure-heavy, state-centric model may become the default. To remain competitive, Washington should recalibrate its approach in Central Asia. This includes pursuing bilateral deals that deliver real impact, such as deepening ties with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan through targeted investment packages, trade agreements, and joint-sector initiatives. It also means securing access to critical minerals by expanding private-sector investment in mining, processing, and transport infrastructure aligned with U.S. supply chain needs. Offering digital infrastructure alternatives is equally essential; the United States must support secure, interoperable, and transparent technology networks that...

Cuts to USAID Leave Central Asia Facing Development Challenges

When American President Donald Trump announced a freeze and overhaul of his country's foreign aid in early 2025, the move sparked concern across Central Asia. For more than three decades, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) had been a key contributor to development in the region, supporting education, healthcare, agriculture, and environmental protection. Support for Weaker Economies USAID’s role was particularly critical in economically vulnerable countries like Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Its sudden withdrawal now leaves local governments scrambling to compensate with limited domestic resources. The cuts have not been uniform, but the overall impact has been profound. According to the Center for Global Development, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan lost 78 percent and 69 percent of their USAID-backed programs, respectively. In Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, nearly all aid programs were discontinued. Foreign aid to the region has often reflected shifting geopolitical dynamics. In Uzbekistan, for example, support surged from $6 million to $40 million in 2016 following President Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s rise to power. Kyrgyzstan received $75 million in 2010 amid negotiations over the U.S. military base there. In contrast, aid to Turkmenistan fell to just $2.8 million by 2024. Limited Time to Adjust While Kazakhstan’s more robust economy allowed for a gradual reduction in U.S. assistance, American companies remain active in its vital oil sector. Yet the abrupt nature of the broader aid pullback has disrupted numerous projects with little warning. Health and education initiatives were halted, as were efforts to bolster trade and cross-border infrastructure, critical for Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan as they seek to deepen global economic ties. Environmental initiatives also suffered. With Central Asia especially vulnerable to climate change, USAID had funded resilience-building programs focused on water access and renewable energy. These efforts have largely ceased, raising concerns among farmers and local communities who had come to rely on them. Civil Society Under Strain Some governments in the region may quietly welcome the cuts, particularly those wary of foreign-backed NGOs. USAID frequently partnered with local civil society organizations and media outlets, entities that Central Asian authorities often view with suspicion. The loss of U.S. support has left these groups increasingly exposed to state pressure. Tajikistan offers a telling case. In 2020, USAID partnered with the Aga Khan Foundation during the COVID-19 pandemic. But two years later, following unrest in the country's Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region, the government launched a crackdown on the foundation. This underscores how some aid programs, especially those linked to civil society, are perceived as threats. Although USAID did not operate programs directly, its funding empowered local partners. With that backing gone, and less pressure from Washington, several Central Asian governments have tightened their control over independent organizations. Seeking Alternatives Replacing USAID’s role will not be easy. The European Union and countries such as France and Germany have long supported development in Central Asia, but their resources are stretched, especially with increased attention and funding directed toward Ukraine. Despite EU pledges of investment via the Global Gateway initiative, support for democracy, civil society, and human rights...

Russia: Thousands of Central Asia-Born Russians Sent to Ukraine Front Line

A senior Russian official has said that thousands of migrants from Central Asia who became Russian citizens were sent to fight in Ukraine after they tried to dodge conscription. "Our military investigations directorate conducts regular raids,” Alexander Bastrykin, head of Russia’s Investigative Committee, said on Tuesday in remarks that were reported by the Russian state-run TASS news agency. “So far, we've tracked down 80,000 such Russian citizens who didn't just avoid the front lines — they wouldn’t even show up at military enlistment offices. We’ve registered them for military service, and about 20,000 of these 'new' Russian citizens, who for some reason no longer want to live in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, or Kyrgyzstan, are now on the front lines," Bastrykin said at the St. Petersburg International Legal Forum. Bastrykin’s comments contributed a piece to the often murky picture of the involvement of people from Central Asia in Russia’s war effort in Ukraine in the last three years. In addition to conscription measures, Russia has also sought to replenish its ranks by offering contracts and other incentives to foreigners willing to fight. Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are among Central Asian countries that ban their nationals from fighting in foreign conflicts and there have been several high-profile prosecutions of citizens who fought for Russia and returned home. It is a sensitive political matter in Central Asia, a region that seeks to project neutrality in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Kazakhstan has said it is reviewing a report by a Ukrainian institution that said about 661 Kazakh citizens have fought for Russia since it launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The I Want To Live center, which is run by the Ukrainian security services and assists with surrender requests from soldiers fighting for Russia, published a list of what it said were the Kazakh nationals. Of the 661, at least 78 have been killed, according to the center. Without providing details, it said it received the list from its own sources within the Russian military. Uzbekistan is conducting a similar investigation based on data from the Ukrainian group.

Cuts to USAID Leave Central Asia Facing Development Challenges

When American President Donald Trump announced a freeze and overhaul of his country's foreign aid in early 2025, the move sparked concern across Central Asia. For more than three decades, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) had been a key contributor to development in the region, supporting education, healthcare, agriculture, and environmental protection. Support for Weaker Economies USAID’s role was particularly critical in economically vulnerable countries like Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Its sudden withdrawal now leaves local governments scrambling to compensate with limited domestic resources. The cuts have not been uniform, but the overall impact has been profound. According to the Center for Global Development, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan lost 78 percent and 69 percent of their USAID-backed programs, respectively. In Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, nearly all aid programs were discontinued. Foreign aid to the region has often reflected shifting geopolitical dynamics. In Uzbekistan, for example, support surged from $6 million to $40 million in 2016 following President Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s rise to power. Kyrgyzstan received $75 million in 2010 amid negotiations over the U.S. military base there. In contrast, aid to Turkmenistan fell to just $2.8 million by 2024. Limited Time to Adjust While Kazakhstan’s more robust economy allowed for a gradual reduction in U.S. assistance, American companies remain active in its vital oil sector. Yet the abrupt nature of the broader aid pullback has disrupted numerous projects with little warning. Health and education initiatives were halted, as were efforts to bolster trade and cross-border infrastructure, critical for Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan as they seek to deepen global economic ties. Environmental initiatives also suffered. With Central Asia especially vulnerable to climate change, USAID had funded resilience-building programs focused on water access and renewable energy. These efforts have largely ceased, raising concerns among farmers and local communities who had come to rely on them. Civil Society Under Strain Some governments in the region may quietly welcome the cuts, particularly those wary of foreign-backed NGOs. USAID frequently partnered with local civil society organizations and media outlets, entities that Central Asian authorities often view with suspicion. The loss of U.S. support has left these groups increasingly exposed to state pressure. Tajikistan offers a telling case. In 2020, USAID partnered with the Aga Khan Foundation during the COVID-19 pandemic. But two years later, following unrest in the country's Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region, the government launched a crackdown on the foundation. This underscores how some aid programs, especially those linked to civil society, are perceived as threats. Although USAID did not operate programs directly, its funding empowered local partners. With that backing gone, and less pressure from Washington, several Central Asian governments have tightened their control over independent organizations. Seeking Alternatives Replacing USAID’s role will not be easy. The European Union and countries such as France and Germany have long supported development in Central Asia, but their resources are stretched, especially with increased attention and funding directed toward Ukraine. Despite EU pledges of investment via the Global Gateway initiative, support for democracy, civil society, and human rights...

Kazakhstan Extends Border Crossing Closure with Uzbekistan Until September

The Tajyen-Daut Ata border checkpoint between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan will remain closed to pedestrians, passenger vehicles, buses, and light cargo transport until September 1. The extension was agreed upon by both governments, according to Kazinform, citing Kazakhstan’s State Revenue Committee under the Ministry of Finance. Officials explained that the continued closure is necessary to ensure traveler safety and facilitate the progress of major construction and renovation work at the site. Ongoing repairs include the installation of metal structures, engineering systems, and the comprehensive refurbishment of buildings. In parallel, from May through August, Kazakhstan’s national road company, KazAvtoZhol, will construct a new road in the neutral zone separating the Tajyen (Kazakhstan) and Daut Ata (Uzbekistan) checkpoints. Uzbekistan is expected to carry out similar infrastructure upgrades on its side of the border. The checkpoint was originally closed on February 1, to accommodate the reconstruction project. Kazakhstan subsequently proposed extending the closure for an additional four months, a request that was supported by Uzbek authorities. Officials have advised citizens of both countries to factor in the closure when planning their travel and transport routes. This development aligns with broader efforts by Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to upgrade regional transport and trade infrastructure. As previously reported by The Times of Central Asia, both nations are investing in projects aimed at enhancing regional connectivity, including transit links to Pakistan. Kazakhstan is also positioning itself as a key player in the Middle Corridor, part of the larger Trans-Caspian International Transport Route connecting Central Asia with South Asia and Europe.

Italy Raises the Bar in Central Asia: What to Expect from Giorgia Meloni’s Visit

In recent years, Italy has emerged as one of the European countries most keen to maintain close relations with the countries of Central Asia. In mid-April, confirmation arrived that Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni would be travelling to the region this spring. The purpose of the trip is to visit Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan and attend a summit in Astana with the presidents of the five countries.  Meloni's visit is scheduled for the end of May, although the exact dates are not yet known. Italy was the first European country to involve the Central Asia region in a "1+5" summit. The first meeting was held in Rome in December 2019, and involved the then Italian Foreign Minister, Luigi Di Maio, and all Central Asian Foreign Ministers. This meeting took place a few months after Italy, the first and only EU country to take this step, signed a memorandum of understanding with China on the Belt & Road Initiative (in 2023, Rome decided to withdraw from the project). Central Asia is one of the regions at the heart of the original BRI project: the launch was announced in Kazakhstan in 2013. The most recent meeting at foreign minister level took place in May 2024, again in Rome, and was attended by the current Italian Foreign Minister, Antonio Tajani. But now Italy has decided to raise the bar and directly involve Meloni and her Central Asian counterparts. The multilateral forum is complemented by frequent visits to Italy by leaders from the region: Uzbekistan's Mirziyoyev in June 2023, Kazakhstan's Kassym-Jomart Tokayev in January 2024 and Tajikistan's Emomali Rahmon at the end of April 2024. For Italy, President Sergio Mattarella visited Uzbekistan in November 2023 and Kazakhstan in March 2025. Italy is one of the main economic partners in the region, and especially in Kazakhstan; the country ranks third (behind only China and Russia) in terms of trade with Astana. Trade turnover between Kazakhstan and Italy rose 25% in 2024 and reached almost $20 billion. The relationship is particularly strong in the energy sector, with over $18 billion accounted for exports of Kazakh oil and petroleum products in 2024. The Italian national oil and natural gas company Eni has been present in Kazakhstan since 1992, where it is a co-operator of the Karachaganak oil field and participates in the North Caspian Sea PSA consortium responsible for operations at the Kashagan oil field. Other significant sectors of trade between Italy and Kazakhstan are those of agricultural machinery and agricultural production. One area that could be subject to greater cooperation is defense, as demonstrated by the visit to Italy by Kazakhstan's Minister of Defense, Ruslan Zhakssylykov, in March this year. The potential is truly remarkable: during Mattarella's aforementioned flash visit to the country this March, with a meeting with Tokayev held directly at Astana airport, the Italian president emphasized the potential for further deepening the strategic partnership between Rome and Astana, which has been in place since 2011. Speaking of official documents, in June 2023, Italy and Uzbekistan...