• KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00192 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09224 0.55%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00192 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09224 0.55%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00192 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09224 0.55%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00192 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09224 0.55%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00192 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09224 0.55%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00192 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09224 0.55%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00192 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09224 0.55%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00192 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09224 0.55%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 -0.14%
22 January 2025

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 69

Kazakhstan Could Save America’s Energy Future

The energy crisis gripping Europe has made clear for all to see the limits of solar and wind power. Years of investment and unbridled ambition have not created renewable sources that can deliver the consistent, large-scale energy that modern economies need. Nuclear power has emerged as the only viable solution for achieving zero-emissions energy while maintaining reliability. Europe’s urgent need to reduce its dependency on Russian gas has made all that even clearer. Meanwhile, the United States faces its own energy challenges. Its nuclear industry urgently requires a secure and stable uranium supply; yet U.S. foreign policy has largely overlooked Kazakhstan, the world’s largest uranium producer. It gets worse. No sitting U.S. president has ever visited Kazakhstan, which produces over 40% of the world’s natural uranium. Russia and China have filled this diplomatic vacuum, embedding themselves deeply in Kazakhstan’s energy sector. The United States and Europe must act decisively to build stronger ties with Kazakhstan and Central Asia, if they are to achieve energy independence by securing their nuclear futures. Europe’s dependence on Russian natural gas has been its geopolitical Achilles’ heel for decades. Russia's illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, driving home the need to diversify energy sources, has further increased that vulnerability. Nuclear power offers Europe a path to energy independence. This hinges, however, on access to uranium, of which Europe imports 97% of its supply. Moreover, much of that uranium is enriched in Russia, creating a dependency analogous to that on Russian gas. That problem can be solved by deepening cooperation with Kazakhstan, the world’s largest uranium producer. Unfortunately, Europe’s engagement with Kazakhstan has been half-hearted at best; yet the country's reserves are essential for powering Europe’s nuclear plants. Strategic investments and partnerships are needed to unlock Kazakhstan’s role as a reliable uranium supplier to Europe, but logistical hurdles and a lack of political focus have so far stymied efforts to make that happen. Kazakhstan, the world's leading uranium producer, offers the United States a critical opportunity to secure its energy and national-security needs, yet Washington has ignored this and made little effort to deepen its ties with Kazakhstan. By contrast, China sources 60% of its uranium imports from Kazakhstan, supported by investments in mining and nuclear fuel facilities. Likewise, Russia has, through Rosatom, forged strong partnerships with Kazatomprom. These efforts give Beijing and Moscow significant leverage over global uranium markets. The U.S., however, has failed to foster the political and economic relationships necessary for long-term nuclear-energy security. Kazakhstan is a particularly glaring case in point. Over the past two decades, Kazakhstan has come to account for nearly half of global uranium production, giving it a key position in the global uranium supply chain. Neighboring Uzbekistan, the fifth-largest producer, adds another 6%, and Mongolia also has significant undeveloped reserves of future potential. Yet Kazakhstan remains heavily dependent on Russian infrastructure for uranium transport and enrichment. Until the late 2024 signature of an agreement to supply nearly half of its annual uranium ore production to China through the...

Kazakhstan’s High-Stakes Balancing Act in the Aktau Crash Investigation

The Aktau crash of the Azerbaijan Airlines Embraer 190 aircraft, which killed 38 people on 25 December, was a tragic event with significant international repercussions. This devastating accident not only claimed lives but also raised critical questions about aviation safety and the handling of sensitive investigations. As investigators sought to determine its cause, Kazakhstan faced an important decision regarding the handling of the flight recorder. Ultimately, the country chose to transfer the recorder to Brazil, the manufacturer of the aircraft, rather than to the Interstate Aviation Committee (IAC) of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), as Russia had proposed. This decision reflected both technical and diplomatic considerations, marking a crucial moment in the unfolding investigation. By taking this decision, Kazakhstan adhered to established industry procedures for aviation safety investigations. Such a step highlights the country's commitment to transparency and global norms in aviation. The move is typical of the country's foreign policy under President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, whose long diplomatic experience leads him to emphasize a rules-based approach over political considerations and to act in accord with established procedural norms. This choice ensured that the investigation would follow established international practices, thereby lending credibility to the process and reassuring global aviation stakeholders. This behavior is also in line with Kazakhstan's broader commitment to international law and a rules-based global order. Another notable example of this approach was its endorsement of the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity through its refusal to recognize Russia’s annexation of Crimea or the independence of the Donbas regions. These decisions were not necessarily easy ones, given Kazakhstan’s economic and security ties with Russia, but they reinforced its commitment to global standards. While some observers might frame decisions like the Aktau recorder transfer as a “snub” to Russia, such characterizations would miss the point. Like Kazakhstan’s refusal to recognize Donbas as independent and its efforts to prevent the flow of military components in violation of Western sanctions, its actions are not meant to be about rejecting one partner in favor of another. Rather, acting in its own autonomous interests, Kazakhstan seeks to "do the right thing," because this maintains a consistent international profile with a steady foreign-policy course grounded in international law and practice. Kazakhstan’s mediation efforts extend beyond formal multilateral forums, showcasing its active engagement in regional and global diplomacy. The country provided a neutral platform for discussions between opposing factions in the conflict over Syria; and it has also worked to ease tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan, hosting purely bilateral consultations and thus demonstrating its capacity to engage constructively in regional conflicts without taking sides. These efforts are in line with Kazakhstan’s larger foreign-policy strategy to act as a principled and impartial intermediary on the global stage, fostering dialogue and reducing hostilities. Similarly, Kazakhstan’s leadership in the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA) reflects its dedication to multilateralism and peaceful conflict resolution. Kazakhstan exemplifies the rising middle-power archetype also through its significant contributions to global nuclear non-proliferation. Its foreign policy operates on...

How the Azerbaijan Airlines Crash Could Shake Relations with Russia

The crash of an Azerbaijan Airlines (AZAL) airplane in Aktau, Kazakhstan, has the potential to significantly effect Azerbaijan's relations with Russia if Moscow mishandles the situation. To date, there has been a lack of transparency and responsiveness on the part of the Kremlin. The implications could include accelerating the deterioration of Moscow's influence in the region. These implications, therefore, concern not only the local countries, but any international actor having strategic interests in the South Caucasus and Central Asia, or otherwise concerned with their future role and place in the evolving post–Cold War international system.   The Facts of the Disaster Given the rapid dissemination of information in the 2020s by electronic means, whereby authentic real-time videos made by first responders to the fuselage on the ground were uploaded to social media and available worldwide within minutes, the overall outline and some details of the incident are by now generally well known. The airplane was en route from Baku to Grozny, the capital of Chechnya, when explosions in the air damaged the cabin. Very soon after, but not as a result of these explosions, the pilots completely lost all electronic orientation and navigation capabilities. According to one source close to Azerbaijan's investigation into the crash, preliminary results showed the plane was struck by a Russian Pantsir-S air defense system and its communications were then paralyzed by electronic warfare systems on the approach into Grozny. Ukrainian military drones have repeatedly targeted Russia’s southern regions, triggering Russian air defenses. “No one claims that it was done on purpose,” the source said; but “taking into account the established facts, Baku expects the Russian side to confess to the shooting down of the Azerbaijani aircraft.” After being hit, the plane was refused emergency landing permission at Grozny (2.5 kilometers from where the incident occurred) and at least two other Russian airports in the North Caucasus (Makhachkala, 155 kilometers away, and Mineral’nye Vody, 225 kilometers), before being directed by local air control out over the Caspian Sea. Once there, the pilots made the decision to try to land in Aktau (435 kilometers away). Against all odds, they succeeded in avoiding the need to ditch the aircraft into the sea, which would have undoubtedly killed all on board and also destroyed the craft, making any investigation into what had happened impossible. In the event, according to the Kazakhstani authorities, out of 62 passengers and five crew, 32 survivors were initially rescued. Captain Igor Kshnyakin, Co-pilot (First Officer) Alexander Kalyaninov, and Purser Hokuma Aliyeva died when the front wheel touched down ahead of the back wheels, as a result of which the cockpit was thrown violently away from the ongoing wreck. However, this is what created the conditions for at least some of the passengers to survive, as it split the fuselage in two. The event has garnered international attention, including for the professionalism of the crew.   What Has Happened Since At first, Kazakhstan declared its own unilateral competence to investigate the crash, which occurred on...

Opinion: What Will a New Trump Presidency Mean for Central Asia?

During his presidency, Donald Trump introduced a foreign policy approach that recalibrated U.S. engagement with Central Asia, a region strategically critical yet overshadowed by the influence of China and Russia. Trump’s policies, targeting the collective challenge of CRINK (China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea), aimed to foster regional autonomy and counter external dependency. This policy shift, aimed at countering the global influence of CRINK has extended to the vital region of Central Asia. Further, it is geographically wedged between Russia and China and serves as a critical bridge for U.S. interests. The CRINK nations, in their regional strategies, have made substantial inroads in Central Asia. Additionally, each nation is pursuing influence through economic, political, or military avenues. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union, for instance, have been noted as major forces reshaping Central Asian economies as well as infrastructure. In 2013, the BRI of China was launched, which has channeled billions into roads, railways, and other infrastructure projects in Central Asia, seeking to create new trade routes connecting Asia to Europe. On the other side, Russia has promoted its Eurasian Economic Union as a trading bloc that has aimed at fostering economic integration among Central Asia and neighboring countries. These initiatives have provided economic incentives for Central Asia but also intensified its reliance on external powers, particularly China and Russia​. During his presidency, Trump emphasized a CRINK-focused strategy, which prioritized Central Asia's sovereignty and reduced dependency on China and Russia. This strategy laid the groundwork for U.S. engagement in the region, influencing current policy directions. In 2020, Trump’s administration unveiled a comprehensive strategy for Central Asia, marking the first such effort in over two decades. The policy emphasized U.S. support for border security and defense collaboration, including financial aid to Tajikistan and military training for Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. These measures, though initiated under Trump, continue to shape current U.S. approaches to combating terrorism and fostering regional stability. For example, the U.S. has established the C5+1 initiative as a dialogue platform between the United States and the five Central Asian nations (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan). It was developed further to promote mutual goals in regional security, economic development, and environmental resilience​. Security cooperation is a vital aspect of this U.S. strategy which has given the threats of terrorism and also potential instability at CRINK’s peripheries (Sciutto, 2024). In particular, Afghanistan’s proximity to Central Asia poses both risks as well as opportunities for these nations. The U.S. has provided financial support to Tajikistan to strengthen border security and counter drug trafficking. Furthermore, while also assisting Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan with training and equipment to improve their defense capabilities the US has financially supported the nation. This military cooperation has aimed to prevent the encroachment of extremist groups like ISIS, which could exploit regional instability and threaten U.S. interests​. Trump’s presidency emphasized private sector investments as an alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Although modest compared to China’s commitments, these investments reflected an effort to position...

How Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan Anchor a Strategic Middle-Power Hub in Central Asia

Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are driving Central Asia’s global significance. Together, they are turning Central Asia into a strategic middle-power hub. The two countries increasingly act as central nodes in a region key to global supply chains and, inevitably, geopolitical competition. However, they are not merely reactive to changes around them, but are highly dynamic. What does it mean to say that the region is emerging as a strategic middle-power "hub"? The notion of a hub extends beyond the national profiles of the two principals, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, to include the aggregation of collective influence. Central Asia is recognized as a cohesive entity in global forums. Kazakhstan’s energy wealth combines with Uzbekistan’s demographic strength, creating an influential synergy beneficial to the entire region. The interplay between their respective strengths allows them to amplify Central Asia’s voice in international institutions and negotiations collectively. By integrating their regional strategies within global frameworks — such as the Organization of Turkic States (OTS), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) — Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan enhance the region’s geopolitical relevance. Kazakhstan, for example, has successfully advocated for the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR, also called the "Middle Corridor"). This transcontinental trade route is emerging as a lynchpin in Eurasian logistics, connecting China to Europe via the Caspian Sea. Uzbekistan, for its part, has emphasized the integration of transport and energy infrastructure. These initiatives align with the broader vision of a unified Central Asia. The leadership of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan has reinforced the region's collective identity as the "C5" group, also including Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. This regional bloc has become a diplomatic focal point for major powers like the United States, China, Germany, and Japan. All of them engage with Central Asia through structured consultations within the C5 framework. These meetings have given the region traction in international diplomacy. The elevation of the C5 group reflects the region's new prominence. The United States engages with the C5 on issues ranging from regional security to sustainable development, emphasizing its commitment to a secure and prosperous Central Asia. China’s cooperation under the C5+1 mechanism complements its transcontinental infrastructure initiatives. Germany focuses on sustainable energy and governance, while Japan prioritizes infrastructure and technology transfers. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan together have over two-thirds of the region's gross domestic product and two-thirds of its population. Kazakhstan's vast natural resources undergird its economic influence, while its geographic expanse (as the ninth-largest country in the world) makes it central to major connectivity initiatives. Through President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev's nuanced foreign policy, Kazakhstan has adeptly balanced relationships with major powers, ensuring that it remains a key partner for Russia, China, and the European Union. Uzbekistan has surged to prominence through its ambitious domestic reforms and proactive engagement for regional cooperation under the leadership of President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, who has implemented market liberalization measures attracting foreign investment and reinvigorating its economy. As the most populous country in Central Asia, Uzbekistan is an indispensable actor in regional affairs....

Kazakhstan, with China’s Help, Plans to Export Green Energy to Europe

Although Kazakhstan is a major producer of all fossil fuels – coal, crude oil, and natural gas – it also has the capacity to secure its energy future by prioritizing renewable energy. Fully aware of that, the European Union – one of the former Soviet republic’s most significant trade partners – aims to strengthen its energy ties with Astana, hoping to begin importing not only “green electricity” from the Central Asian nation, but also green hydrogen. On November 25, at Nazarbayev University in Astana, the “Energy in Transition – Powering Tomorrow” traveling exhibition was held, and one of the major topics discussed by energy experts was green hydrogen – hydrogen produced using renewable energy sources such as solar and wind power. It is unlikely a pure coincidence that the German Federal Foreign Office initiated the event. Over the past few years, Germany has shown interest in the development of the Kazakh green hydrogen sector. The most prominent green hydrogen project in Kazakhstan is currently being developed by Hyrasia One, a subsidiary of the German-Swedish energy company, Svevind. In 2021, the company announced its plans for €50 billion ($55 billion) green hydrogen project in the Mangystau Region in western Kazakhstan. It is expected that Hyrasia One will begin the production of green hydrogen in 2030, and the power plant will reach full capacity by 2032. Meanwhile, the authorities in Astana will need to find a way to export this form of renewable energy to Europe, a major energy market for Kazakhstan. Although Astana and Brussels signed a strategic partnership on the production of green hydrogen in November 2022, several challenges remain in the implementation of the deal. Issues such as the high cost, water scarcity in the largest Central Asian state (with water being the key component of green hydrogen production), and a lack of transport infrastructure, are significant barriers to exporting hydrogen from Kazakhstan to Europe. Using Russian gas pipeline systems for transportation of the Kazakh green hydrogen to Europe is not an option given current geopolitical circumstances. To resolve this transportation issue, the Kazakh authorities and their European partners could build hydrogen pipelines across the Caspian Sea, the Caucasus and Turkey to reach southern European countries. The problem is that building such a pipeline infrastructure is very expensive, and it remains uncertain who would be willing to fund such a project. That, however, does not mean that Kazakhstan cannot become Europe’s major green hydrogen supplier. What Astana would have to do, according to experts, is to convert the green hydrogen into green ammonia and then export it to Europe via the Middle Corridor – running through Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. On the Black Sea coast, ammonia would be loaded onto ships and transported past the Bosphorus to EU members such as Greece, Romania, and Bulgaria. From there, it would be sent further north, where green hydrogen would eventually be extracted from the ammonia. This is a rather complex process, and it is unclear how feasible and...