• KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00201 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09166 -0.11%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28573 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00201 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09166 -0.11%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28573 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00201 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09166 -0.11%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28573 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00201 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09166 -0.11%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28573 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00201 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09166 -0.11%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28573 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00201 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09166 -0.11%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28573 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00201 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09166 -0.11%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28573 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00201 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09166 -0.11%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28573 -0.14%

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 368

Afghanistan: Rentier State or Hostage to Foreign Aid?

The current geopolitical turbulence presents Afghanistan and the countries of Central Asia with serious challenges. After the Taliban's return to power in 2021, Afghanistan found itself in a state of deep economic crisis, and its continued stability once again depends on external assistance. However, with the shifting global order, traditional donors such as the U.S. and the European Union are scaling back their involvement in Afghan affairs, while new sources of support remain uncertain. This creates significant risks for the countries of the region, which must find ways to minimize the consequences of Afghanistan’s crisis and ensure their own security. Historical context: dependence through the ages Afghanistan has always been dependent on external sources of income. This historical context was explored by Ali Nuriyev (historian, blogger, and researcher of the Ottoman world) in his article for TRT, "Afghanistan: The Graveyard of Empires or a Rentier State?" “As flattering as it may be for Afghans to have a reputation as [a nation that has kept its independence despite incursions from Great Powers], everything comes at a price, including Afghanistan’s independence”. Nuriyev provides a detailed analysis showing that since the founding of modern Afghanistan in the 18th century by Ahmad Shah Durrani, the country has built its economy and politics on external sources of income. Durrani financed his campaigns through raids on India, while his successors received subsidies from the British in exchange for maintaining neutrality in the "Great Game" between the British Empire and Russia. Later, in the 20th century, Afghanistan skillfully played on the rivalry between the USSR and the U.S., securing billions of dollars for infrastructure, education, and military modernization. By the 1970s, two-thirds of the country's state budget came from foreign aid. Even after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 and the overthrow of the Taliban regime in 2001, Afghanistan continued to rely on external support. The governments of Hamid Karzai and Ashraf Ghani survived primarily due to funding from the United States and its allies. Today, following the Taliban’s return to power in 2021, Afghanistan is once again searching for new sources of income. Sanctions and frozen assets have forced the Taliban to seek support from China, Russia, and other nations, further proving that the country’s reliance on foreign aid remains unchanged. This is the historical reality: Afghanistan is a state that, for centuries, has survived thanks to external resources. Its independence has always been closely tied to its ability to extract benefits from the geopolitical maneuvers of great powers. In the present day, this historical context can be interpreted in different ways. However, one fact remains clear, today’s geopolitical turbulence is already having a negative impact on Afghanistan. Afghanistan's adaptation As the global order shifts, the key players on the "Afghan track" are adjusting their strategies toward Afghanistan, exacerbating the country’s economic crisis. United States – For Afghanistan, the new realities in the U.S. mean reduced aid and frozen assets. The U.S., which had long been Afghanistan’s primary donor, is unlikely to increase financial support soon. Following...

Opinion: Washington Needs a Stronger Policy for the Middle Corridor

The inauguration of President Donald Trump marks a new phase in U.S. foreign policy with direct implications for the Middle Corridor, a key trade route linking China to Europe via Central Asia and the South Caucasus. This corridor, also known as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), has been gaining increasing strategic importance as global trade patterns shift and great-power competition intensifies. During Trump’s first term, U.S. engagement in the region was sporadic and lacked a comprehensive strategy. While some policy initiatives were undertaken to counterbalance Russian and Chinese influence in Eurasia, these efforts remained piecemeal. The Biden administration attempted to address this gap by allocating limited funding for infrastructure development and engaging in regional negotiations aimed at fostering greater connectivity. However, Biden’s approach ultimately fell short of a coherent, long-term policy, allowing Moscow and Beijing to consolidate their positions in the region. The significance of the Middle Corridor has been underscored by increased international investment. Beyond economic concerns, the Middle Corridor plays a critical role in Europe’s energy security. The corridor facilitates the westward flow of Caspian resources, providing an alternative to Russian energy exports. The development of the Middle Corridor offers a strategic means of achieving this goal, reinforcing the EU’s energy independence while simultaneously strengthening economic ties with the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Azerbaijan has emerged as a central player in the development of the Middle Corridor. As a crucial transit country, Baku has actively pursued infrastructure investments to bolster the corridor’s efficiency. Azerbaijan’s role is further magnified by its growing energy exports to Europe, solidifying its position as a strategic partner in regional energy security. The Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway, a vital component of the corridor, has received continued investment, underscoring Azerbaijan’s commitment to enhancing trade and transit connectivity. However, Azerbaijan’s increasing importance also intersects with ongoing geopolitical complexities, particularly its relationship with Armenia. The absence of Armenian participation in the Middle Corridor remains a notable gap, one that is directly tied to the resolution of long-standing territorial disputes. The prospect of an Armenia–Azerbaijan peace treaty has gained traction in recent years, supported by Western diplomatic efforts. U.S. policymakers have recognized that sustainable peace between the two nations would not only stabilize the South Caucasus but also unlock Armenia’s potential role in the corridor. Armenia’s geopolitical realignment presents both opportunities and challenges. While Yerevan has signaled its interest in deepening ties with the West, it remains economically dependent on Russia, particularly in energy and financial sectors. Increased Armenian exports to Russia, some of which analysts suspect may involve re-exports of sanctioned goods, further complicate efforts to shift its economic orientation. Recent discussions within U.S. policy circles indicate a growing recognition of the Middle Corridor’s strategic importance. American policymakers have begun exploring ways to expand support for infrastructure development in the region, recognizing that a proactive approach could yield multiple geopolitical and economic benefits. By investing in the Middle Corridor, the U.S. has an opportunity to enhance regional stability, strengthen economic ties with key partners, and counterbalance Russian...

Does the European Parliament Judge Central Asia Fairly?

In 2024, European Parliament (EP) resolutions on Central Asia emphasized its increasing significance in a world that is being reshaped by Russia’s war on Ukraine and China’s growing assertiveness. They focused on strengthening the EU’s partnerships with Central Asia while seeking to advance democratic values and human rights. These Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreements aim to support economic reforms, foster sustainable development, and encourage regional cooperation. At the same time, reflecting the EU’s strategic focus on stability and resilience in the region, the EP’s resolutions urged the Central Asian states to decrease their dependency on Russian energy and avoid facilitating sanctions evasion. For the Central Asian countries, all these initiatives present opportunities to address pressing challenges and pave the way for growth. Advancing democratic governance and protecting fundamental rights, for example, can foster more inclusive and stable societies. Deeper engagement with the EU also offers access to advanced technologies and investments (as well as global markets), which are necessary for innovation and infrastructure upgrades. Likewise, the diversification of energy sources enhances regional self-reliance, reducing vulnerabilities that are tied to over-dependence on a single partner. Alignment with EU priorities, including resistance to autocratic pressures, gives Central Asia a better chance to develop its resilience and interconnected future. Some voices in the region, however — particularly among government officials and more traditionally-minded citizens — view the European Parliament's 2024 resolutions as overly critical, indeed influenced by special interests that fail to take into account the region’s unique challenges and priorities. From a Central Asian perspective, the criticisms contained in the EP’s resolutions lack essential context, focus narrowly on perceived shortcomings, and fail to give adequate consideration to the complex situation underlying governmental decisions. Such a one-sided approach, they suggest, overlooks essential cultural, historical, socio-political, and geopolitical factors. The result is a significant gap between the EU’s expectations on the one hand, and, on the other, what is reasonable to expect given the realities on the ground. The drafters of these documents often focus excessively on identifying deficiencies in democratic processes. They report violations without contextualizing the governments’ choices and often omit any mention of the views of the general public. The unfortunate consequence is that such criticisms vitiate good-faith attempts to build cooperation and partnership. The ideal becomes the enemy of the possible. Most Europeans still have a poor understanding of Central Asia. Many MEPs lack the time or resources to grasp the region’s complexity. Instead, their decisions are too often informed by resolutions that are drafted by a small group of “experts”. The language of these resolutions often reflects the drafters’ personal biases, which in turn risk deforming Europe’s strategic relationships with the region. A lack of proper scrutiny is all the more alarming in light of the Qatargate scandal, which exposed how state-funded lobbyists can distort human rights narratives to advance specific agendas. Maria Arena, the former head of the European Parliament's Subcommittee on Human Rights (DROI), played a central role in shaping judgments on democratic practices in Central Asia,...

Kazakhstan Ends Era of Cheap Fuel: Price Controls Set for Abolition

On January 17, the Ministry of Energy of the Republic of Kazakhstan published a number of draft orders on the Open NLA (normative legal acts) portal, which were to be discussed within five days. In total, the Ministry proposed the abolition of eleven orders regulating wholesale and retail prices for petroleum products, which have been under price control since 2014. In addition, it intends to change the calculation formulas and price ceilings for wholesale and retail sales of liquefied and natural gas. I have been writing about the need for price liberalization since 2018, as seen in articles such as “#Kazneft, part 2: The Bermuda Gasoline Triangle - Why Prices Will Rise” and “#Kazneft, part 4: We Rank Seventh in the World for the Cheapest Gasoline. Is It Sold at a Loss?” This is a landmark event for the Government of Kazakhstan, which has long maintained not only the lowest fuel prices in the region but some of the lowest globally. The country consistently ranks among the top ten nations with the cheapest energy resources, including fuel, natural gas, coal, and electricity.   Cheap and Even Cheaper According to Global Petrol Prices, as of January 20, 2025, fuel prices per liter in dollar terms across the EAEU, CIS, and neighboring countries are as follows: (Table 1) Country RON-95 Diesel Turkmenistan 0,43 0,29 Kazakhstan 0,47 0,55 Russia 0,61 0,71 Azerbaijan 0,65 0,59 Belorussia 0,75 0,75 Kyrgyzstan 0,81 0,81 Afghanistan 0,83 0,83 Uzbekistan 0,99 0,95 Georgia 1,09 1,06 China 1,15 1,02 Ukraine 1,39 1,37 Mongolia 1,49 1,19 Kazakhstan ranks seventh globally for the affordability of RON-95 gasoline, trailing behind Angola, Egypt, Algeria, Kuwait, Turkmenistan, and Malaysia. At the same time, there are “throwaway” prices in Iran, Libya, and Venezuela, but these price indicators do not reflect the actual availability of fuel in these countries. Turkmenistan also shows relatively low fuel prices, primarily due to the use of alternative fuels, such as methane, in transportation. Kazakhstan has historically had nearly double the price gap compared to its neighboring countries, which has facilitated the shadow export of fuel despite an official ban on exporting petroleum products.   A Leaky Bucket I have described Kazakhstan's domestic fuel market as a "leaky bucket"— no matter how much fuel is produced, it is constantly in short supply. In 2024, the country processed about 18 million tons of oil, with its three major refineries — Atyrau: 99% owned by the national company KazMunayGas (KMG), Shymkent: 51% owned by China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), and 49% by KMG, and Pavlodar: 100% KMG — accounting for approximately 17 million tons. Mini-refineries produced an additional one million tons. The production of petroleum products (excluding fuel oil) amounted to around 14.5 million tons.   The balance of petroleum products for 2025 is as follows, million tons: (Table 2) Product Production in the Republic of Kazakhstan Import from Russia Import to production, % RON-92, RON-95, RON-98 5,0 0,29 6 % Diesel fuel 5,1 0,45 9 % Jet fuel 0,75 0,3 40 % Bitumen/tar 1,1 0,50 45 % For 2025,...

Afghanistan as Part of Central Asia: Expectations, Reality, Challenges, and Threats

Afghanistan has increasingly been regarded in expert and journalistic circles as part of Central Asia, which is justifiable from a physical-geographical perspective. However, given current regional realities, it is still premature to classify the country as part of Central Asia in terms of being internationally recognized as such. The outcome of the 19th-century rivalry between the British and Russian Empires for influence in Central Asia, known as the "Great Game," not only established the modern southern borders of the region but also set Afghanistan and its northern neighbors on entirely different social and historical paths. The countries differ in value systems, ideologies, public consciousness, and, of course, economic development. At the same time, experts from the Russian Institute for Central Asian Studies note that "In the early 21st century, approaches to analyzing regional realities shifted towards geo-economics. The spatial dimension of Central Asia began to be seen as a zone for pipeline transit." This perspective is hard to argue against — Afghanistan’s current geopolitical interests and challenges are largely tied to the economic interests of countries at the regional level. This includes India, Iran, China, the UAE, Pakistan, Russia, Turkey, and the Central Asian states, for whom Afghanistan's prospects are evident. Chiefly, these prospects concern its transit potential as a territory connecting various parts of Asia. Four out of the six logistics corridors under the Asian Development Bank’s Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation Program (CAREC) pass through Afghanistan into Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. Other relevant projects include the "China–Pakistan Economic Corridor" under the "One Belt One Road" initiative, the "Trans-Afghan Corridor," and the TAPI Gas Pipeline. However, Afghanistan's current situation, particularly given the stagnant Afghan-Pakistani conflict, casts doubt on the feasibility of these and other major projects involving Afghanistan. As previously stated by TCA, the future of these large-scale projects involving Central Asian countries, as well as regional stability, a fundamental condition for steady economic development, depends directly on whether an understanding is reached between these two nations. Thus, a geo-economic approach to redefining Central Asia’s new boundaries still requires a different reality. Meanwhile, within Central Asia itself, there is little enthusiasm for political rapprochement with Taliban-ruled Afghanistan. The primary focus is on trade/economic and humanitarian cooperation, with no broader agenda, particularly at a regional level. Tajikistan’s position is significant here, as its authorities continue to view the Taliban as a threat and tread cautiously in building relations with them.  What Prevents Central Asian Countries from Accelerating Relations with Afghanistan? The answers lie not only in different developmental trajectories and scenarios. First and foremost, Afghanistan is still associated with "uncertainty" and numerous risks, particularly in terms of security. According to many assessments, the Afghan-Pakistani zone will, in the long term, remain a source of terrorist and religious-extremist threats to Central Asia. These conclusions are based on a retrospective analysis of escalating tensions, current processes in Afghanistan, and the geopolitical confrontation of global powers in the area. For example, the Soviet invasion in 1979 fostered the consolidation of the Afghan mujahideen,...

Kazakhstan Could Save America’s Energy Future

The energy crisis gripping Europe has made clear for all to see the limits of solar and wind power. Years of investment and unbridled ambition have not created renewable sources that can deliver the consistent, large-scale energy that modern economies need. Nuclear power has emerged as the only viable solution for achieving zero-emissions energy while maintaining reliability. Europe’s urgent need to reduce its dependency on Russian gas has made all that even clearer. Meanwhile, the United States faces its own energy challenges. Its nuclear industry urgently requires a secure and stable uranium supply; yet U.S. foreign policy has largely overlooked Kazakhstan, the world’s largest uranium producer. It gets worse. No sitting U.S. president has ever visited Kazakhstan, which produces over 40% of the world’s natural uranium. Russia and China have filled this diplomatic vacuum, embedding themselves deeply in Kazakhstan’s energy sector. The United States and Europe must act decisively to build stronger ties with Kazakhstan and Central Asia, if they are to achieve energy independence by securing their nuclear futures. Europe’s dependence on Russian natural gas has been its geopolitical Achilles’ heel for decades. Russia's illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, driving home the need to diversify energy sources, has further increased that vulnerability. Nuclear power offers Europe a path to energy independence. This hinges, however, on access to uranium, of which Europe imports 97% of its supply. Moreover, much of that uranium is enriched in Russia, creating a dependency analogous to that on Russian gas. That problem can be solved by deepening cooperation with Kazakhstan, the world’s largest uranium producer. Unfortunately, Europe’s engagement with Kazakhstan has been half-hearted at best; yet the country's reserves are essential for powering Europe’s nuclear plants. Strategic investments and partnerships are needed to unlock Kazakhstan’s role as a reliable uranium supplier to Europe, but logistical hurdles and a lack of political focus have so far stymied efforts to make that happen. Kazakhstan, the world's leading uranium producer, offers the United States a critical opportunity to secure its energy and national-security needs, yet Washington has ignored this and made little effort to deepen its ties with Kazakhstan. By contrast, China sources 60% of its uranium imports from Kazakhstan, supported by investments in mining and nuclear fuel facilities. Likewise, Russia has, through Rosatom, forged strong partnerships with Kazatomprom. These efforts give Beijing and Moscow significant leverage over global uranium markets. The U.S., however, has failed to foster the political and economic relationships necessary for long-term nuclear-energy security. Kazakhstan is a particularly glaring case in point. Over the past two decades, Kazakhstan has come to account for nearly half of global uranium production, giving it a key position in the global uranium supply chain. Neighboring Uzbekistan, the fifth-largest producer, adds another 6%, and Mongolia also has significant undeveloped reserves of future potential. Yet Kazakhstan remains heavily dependent on Russian infrastructure for uranium transport and enrichment. Until the late 2024 signature of an agreement to supply nearly half of its annual uranium ore production to China through the...