• KGS/USD = 0.01149 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00191 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09217 0.44%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28615 0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01149 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00191 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09217 0.44%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28615 0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01149 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00191 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09217 0.44%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28615 0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01149 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00191 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09217 0.44%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28615 0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01149 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00191 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09217 0.44%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28615 0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01149 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00191 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09217 0.44%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28615 0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01149 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00191 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09217 0.44%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28615 0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01149 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00191 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09217 0.44%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28615 0.14%
21 December 2024

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 360

How Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan Anchor a Strategic Middle-Power Hub in Central Asia

Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are driving Central Asia’s global significance. Together, they are turning Central Asia into a strategic middle-power hub. The two countries increasingly act as central nodes in a region key to global supply chains and, inevitably, geopolitical competition. However, they are not merely reactive to changes around them, but are highly dynamic. What does it mean to say that the region is emerging as a strategic middle-power "hub"? The notion of a hub extends beyond the national profiles of the two principals, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, to include the aggregation of collective influence. Central Asia is recognized as a cohesive entity in global forums. Kazakhstan’s energy wealth combines with Uzbekistan’s demographic strength, creating an influential synergy beneficial to the entire region. The interplay between their respective strengths allows them to amplify Central Asia’s voice in international institutions and negotiations collectively. By integrating their regional strategies within global frameworks — such as the Organization of Turkic States (OTS), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) — Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan enhance the region’s geopolitical relevance. Kazakhstan, for example, has successfully advocated for the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR, also called the "Middle Corridor"). This transcontinental trade route is emerging as a lynchpin in Eurasian logistics, connecting China to Europe via the Caspian Sea. Uzbekistan, for its part, has emphasized the integration of transport and energy infrastructure. These initiatives align with the broader vision of a unified Central Asia. The leadership of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan has reinforced the region's collective identity as the "C5" group, also including Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. This regional bloc has become a diplomatic focal point for major powers like the United States, China, Germany, and Japan. All of them engage with Central Asia through structured consultations within the C5 framework. These meetings have given the region traction in international diplomacy. The elevation of the C5 group reflects the region's new prominence. The United States engages with the C5 on issues ranging from regional security to sustainable development, emphasizing its commitment to a secure and prosperous Central Asia. China’s cooperation under the C5+1 mechanism complements its transcontinental infrastructure initiatives. Germany focuses on sustainable energy and governance, while Japan prioritizes infrastructure and technology transfers. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan together have over two-thirds of the region's gross domestic product and two-thirds of its population. Kazakhstan's vast natural resources undergird its economic influence, while its geographic expanse (as the ninth-largest country in the world) makes it central to major connectivity initiatives. Through President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev's nuanced foreign policy, Kazakhstan has adeptly balanced relationships with major powers, ensuring that it remains a key partner for Russia, China, and the European Union. Uzbekistan has surged to prominence through its ambitious domestic reforms and proactive engagement for regional cooperation under the leadership of President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, who has implemented market liberalization measures attracting foreign investment and reinvigorating its economy. As the most populous country in Central Asia, Uzbekistan is an indispensable actor in regional affairs....

Turkmenistan’s Geopolitical Shift Toward the West

Turkmenistan, whose foreign policy since 1995 has been based on the principle of permanent neutrality, is reportedly seeking to establish closer ties with the West, primarily with the United States. The energy-rich nation has long expressed an intention to export natural gas to Europe, but its leadership’s recent moves suggest that Ashgabat might also aim to develop closer political and economic relations with Western countries. Over the past few months, Turkmen and American officials have held several very important meetings. Most recently, on November 25, Turkmenistan’s President Serdar Berdimuhamedov hosted Steve Daines, U.S. Senator from Montana and member of the U.S. Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources. The fact that the Turkmen leader told the American politician that Ashgabat is “implementing a strategy for diversifying energy export routes” clearly shows that Turkmenistan’s ambition to begin exporting natural gas to Europe was on the agenda. But energy was unlikely the only reason why Daines came to Ashgabat. He also met with the Turkmen Minister of Foreign Affairs Rashid Meredov, with whom he discussed “key aspects of partnership cooperation in political and diplomatic, trade and economic, cultural, humanitarian and other spheres.” According to reports, “the active dynamics of development of political ties at the highest state level was emphasized,” indicating that Turkmenistan has begun implementing its 2023 plan to strengthen ties with the United States.  Moreover, as a result of the U.S. Senator’s visit to Ashgabat, a meeting of the Turkmenistan-US Business Council is scheduled to take place later this month. One of the reasons why the Turkmen authorities seek deeper economic ties with Washington is because they hope that such an approach can help their country join the World Trade Organization (WTO).  On November 20-22, just days before Daines’ visit to Turkmenistan, the Ministry of Finance and Economy organized a training seminar as part of the country's preparation for joining the WTO.  Interestingly enough, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) “made a significant contribution to the event's preparation”, while the U.S. Ambassador to Turkmenistan Elizabeth Rood attended the seminar.  The United States undoubtedly sees Turkmenistan as an important regional actor. In February, American companies including John Deere, Boeing, Exxon Mobil, and General Electric met with the Turkmen business delegation in Washington, discussing various forms of cooperation. Nine months later, on November 6, Rahimberdi Dzhepbarov, Chairman of the Board of the State Bank for Foreign Economic Activity of Turkmenistan, was on a working visit to Washington to discuss “issues of further strengthening economic and environmental cooperation with the United States.” The following day, according to the Turkmen Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the U.S. “highly praised Turkmenistan's achievements in fulfilling its international commitments on climate change.” But Washington did not always have such a positive view on Turkmenistan. In 2018, in an annual State Department report, Ashgabat was criticized for "alleged torture, arbitrary arrests and detentions, involuntary confinement, imprisonment of political prisoners, severe corruption, lack of free and fair elections, and restrictions on freedom of religion, assembly, and movement.” Also, in...

Kazakhstan, with China’s Help, Plans to Export Green Energy to Europe

Although Kazakhstan is a major producer of all fossil fuels – coal, crude oil, and natural gas – it also has the capacity to secure its energy future by prioritizing renewable energy. Fully aware of that, the European Union – one of the former Soviet republic’s most significant trade partners – aims to strengthen its energy ties with Astana, hoping to begin importing not only “green electricity” from the Central Asian nation, but also green hydrogen. On November 25, at Nazarbayev University in Astana, the “Energy in Transition – Powering Tomorrow” traveling exhibition was held, and one of the major topics discussed by energy experts was green hydrogen – hydrogen produced using renewable energy sources such as solar and wind power. It is unlikely a pure coincidence that the German Federal Foreign Office initiated the event. Over the past few years, Germany has shown interest in the development of the Kazakh green hydrogen sector. The most prominent green hydrogen project in Kazakhstan is currently being developed by Hyrasia One, a subsidiary of the German-Swedish energy company, Svevind. In 2021, the company announced its plans for €50 billion ($55 billion) green hydrogen project in the Mangystau Region in western Kazakhstan. It is expected that Hyrasia One will begin the production of green hydrogen in 2030, and the power plant will reach full capacity by 2032. Meanwhile, the authorities in Astana will need to find a way to export this form of renewable energy to Europe, a major energy market for Kazakhstan. Although Astana and Brussels signed a strategic partnership on the production of green hydrogen in November 2022, several challenges remain in the implementation of the deal. Issues such as the high cost, water scarcity in the largest Central Asian state (with water being the key component of green hydrogen production), and a lack of transport infrastructure, are significant barriers to exporting hydrogen from Kazakhstan to Europe. Using Russian gas pipeline systems for transportation of the Kazakh green hydrogen to Europe is not an option given current geopolitical circumstances. To resolve this transportation issue, the Kazakh authorities and their European partners could build hydrogen pipelines across the Caspian Sea, the Caucasus and Turkey to reach southern European countries. The problem is that building such a pipeline infrastructure is very expensive, and it remains uncertain who would be willing to fund such a project. That, however, does not mean that Kazakhstan cannot become Europe’s major green hydrogen supplier. What Astana would have to do, according to experts, is to convert the green hydrogen into green ammonia and then export it to Europe via the Middle Corridor – running through Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. On the Black Sea coast, ammonia would be loaded onto ships and transported past the Bosphorus to EU members such as Greece, Romania, and Bulgaria. From there, it would be sent further north, where green hydrogen would eventually be extracted from the ammonia. This is a rather complex process, and it is unclear how feasible and...

Kazakhstan and Taliban Afghanistan: An Overview of Relations

Diplomatic relations between Kazakhstan and Afghanistan began more than 30 years ago, on February 12, 1992. However, in April of that year, the republican regime in Kabul fell, and the country plunged into the abyss of civil war after becoming the Islamic State of Afghanistan. Such chaos had never been seen before. The first Taliban Emirate was established and then overthrown by the US-led coalition, after which the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan was proclaimed Politics Kazakhstan's first diplomatic mission in Kabul was opened in September 2002, less than a year after America launched Operation Enduring Freedom. In 2003, it was transformed into an embassy. From then on, the relationship between the countries became operational. The new starting point of the Kazakh-Afghan relationship was August 15, 2021, when the Taliban seized power in Kabul. Kazakhstan's foreign policy was put to a test, but Astana demonstrated foresight and pragmatism. The Kazakh embassy, unlike most other countries, was not evacuated, diplomats continued to work in the new conditions and began to establish the first contacts with the Taliban authorities. From the very beginning, Kazakhstan took a clear and understandable position and began to promote it at various levels. A month after the Taliban seized Kabul, Kazakhstan's President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev drew attention to the situation in Afghanistan at the SCO meeting in Dushanbe (September 17). As he stated, "Kazakhstan sees future Afghanistan as a truly independent and united state living in peace with itself and its neighbors. At this crucial historical moment, the multinational people of Afghanistan should not be left alone in the face of unprecedented difficulties". A few days later, on September 22, during the UN General Assembly, the Kazakh president detailed the position of his country and was one of the first politicians to point out the current problem of “inclusiveness.” Tokayev reaffirmed that Kazakhstan supports the UN Security Council's call for the formation through negotiations of a new government that would be inclusive and representative. In his words, “It is necessary to create a consensus-based system in which groups with different values or ethnic, religious and gender backgrounds can coexist in one country.” For a better understanding and retrospective assessment of Astana's actions on the “Afghan track,” it is worth citing other theses mentioned by the president in New York at a time when most of the world was still doubting the success of the Taliban campaign. "Afghanistan must continue to fulfill its international obligations and ensure that its territory does not become a springboard for terrorists, drug trafficking, and human traffickers. Regardless of our political or personal convictions, we must not abandon the people of Afghanistan to their fate now. The acute humanitarian situation must be our top priority. UN agencies and other humanitarian organizations must have immediate, safe, and unimpeded humanitarian access. Kazakhstan has provided for the temporary relocation of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and other UN offices in Afghanistan. We are ready to provide a logistical platform for the delivery of humanitarian aid to Afghanistan...

Kazakhstan and Serbia Strengthen Ties Despite Different Geopolitical Paths

Serbian President Vucic (54) might physically resemble Kazakh leader Kassym-Jomart Tokayev (71), but the geopolitical positions of Sebia and Kazakhstan could not be more different. While the Balkan nation – a European Union candidate since 2012 – remains in the EU’s “eternal waiting room”, the Central Asian country – a member of the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union – seems to have found a delicate balance between Russia, China, and the West. Those differences, however, have not prevented Serbia and Kazakhstan from strengthening their bilateral ties. Over the past six months, the two countries have been actively preparing for Tokayev’s trip to Serbia. This year, he spoke by phone with Vucic twice, while various Serbian and Kazakh officials held several meetings. On November 18-19, Tokayev finally visited the Southeastern European nation, where he met with his Serbian counterpart. According to the Kazakh leader, they discussed strengthening trade and economic relations and bilateral partnerships between the two nations. “It is essential that we develop cooperation. We had constructive talks and reached important deals,” Tokayev stressed. During his visit to the Balkan country, Serbian and Kazakh ministers signed several bilateral agreements. One of them is a 2025 plan on military cooperation. It is, therefore, no surprise that, following the talks in Belgrade, Vucic and Tokayev attended an exhibition of arms and military equipment at the Batajnica military airport near the Serbian capital. Indeed, military ties seem to be an important aspect of the Serbian-Kazakh relationship. Back in 2017, the two nations signed a memorandum of understanding in the field of military-technical collaboration. Six years later, in November 2023, Kazakhstan and Serbia inked intergovernmental agreements on military-technical cooperation, while in June of this year Serbian and Kazakh defense ministers discussed in Astana military relations between the two countries. Also, in September, Roman Vassilenko, Kazakhstan’s Deputy Foreign Minister, announced that Belgrade and Astana plan то expand cooperation in the defense industry. It remains to be seen how Moscow – Astana’s nominal ally in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) – will react to Kazakhstan’s ambitions to deepen military ties with Serbia – a nominally neutral country that has indirectly supplied Ukraine with $885 million worth of weapons. Despite being in different geopolitical positions, Serbia and Kazakhstan seem to share the same approach regarding Ukraine. Both nations support the Eastern European country’s territorial integrity, while trying to preserve relatively good relations with the Kremlin. At the same time, they support each other’s territorial integrity, which is particularly important for Serbia given that Kazakhstan does not recognize the 2008 unilateral independence of Kosovo. In 2022, sitting next to Russian President Vladimir Putin, Tokayev said that if the right to self-determination is put into practice worldwide, then there will be over 600 countries instead of the 193 states which are currently members of the United Nations. “For this reason, we do not recognize either Taiwan, or Kosovo, or South Ossetia, or Abkhazia… This principle will also be applied to quasi-state territories, which, in our opinion, are Lugansk and...

Risk and Reward: Why Savvy Investors Should Dive into Central Asia-Caspian Region

Central Asia-Caspian basin has long been a geopolitical chessboard — fragmented by conflict but dependent on cooperation. In an era of shifting alliances, political instability, and economic uncertainty, multinational corporations (MNCs) must reassess their strategies. While the region's challenges remain considerable, it also presents unique investment opportunities that should not be overlooked. Since the 1990s, operating in post-Soviet Eurasia has been synonymous with political risks. The Central Asian states have sought foreign direct investment (FDI) but face significant obstacles, including weak rule-of-law, inconsistent regulatory frameworks, and entrenched corruption. Yet despite these barriers, the region continues to attract international capital, signaling its long-term potential. Traditionally reliant on oil and gas exports, these countries are now pivoting toward diversification. Nations like Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan are strengthening ties with the European Union (EU) to balance their historical reliance on Russia’s energy network. This shift is opening new frontiers for investment, particularly in green energy, infrastructure, and technology. However, geopolitical instability remains a critical risk. The war in Ukraine has intensified uncertainties, with Russia, China, the EU, and the U.S. vying for influence. Energy security, once an afterthought, has become a central issue. The closure of the Novorossiysk terminal in early 2023, halting Kazakh oil exports, underscored how quickly geopolitical disruptions can affect supply chains, prompting companies like ExxonMobil to reassess their regional strategies. Yet this volatility also creates opportunities. The region’s economic shift away from resource dependence toward a knowledge-based economy offers fertile ground for businesses willing to invest in infrastructure, technology, and renewable energy. The Caspian basin’s strategic location, as a transit hub for energy to Europe, only heightens its importance in the EU’s efforts to reduce dependency on Russian supplies. For international businesses, this means new markets, sectors, and investment channels are emerging. The post-Covid landscape adds complexity, with digital transformation accelerating across industries. Countries in the Central Asia-Caspian basin are under pressure to adopt these technologies, which could drive long-term economic growth. Yet the gap between ambitious reform plans and their implementation remains wide. Regulatory inefficiencies and bureaucratic hurdles continue to hamper progress, presenting a challenge for foreign investors looking for stability. For multinational corporations, the region presents both risks and significant upsides. On one hand, border disputes, political unpredictability, and regulatory uncertainty create barriers. On the other, the region’s growing role as an energy transit hub and its emerging sectors, from green energy to infrastructure, offer promising avenues for investment. Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, in particular, have been proactive in bolstering energy exports to Europe, positioning themselves as critical players in the global energy transition. If the conflict in Ukraine continues to escalate, the region’s geopolitical risks will undoubtedly increase. However, external actors — particularly the U.S., the EU, and China — are also likely to deepen their involvement, further reshaping the region’s economic and political landscape. The rise of Sino-American tensions only adds another layer of complexity to an already volatile environment. Yet, for companies that can navigate these complexities, the rewards are significant. Central Asia-Caspian basin remains...