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02 Jan 2026

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New Port in Mangystau: Strategic Asset or Risk of Overcapacity?

December 31, 2025
By Times of Central Asia

Kazakhstan has announced plans to build a new seaport in the Mangystau region, presenting the initiative as a strategic move to strengthen the country’s role in the East-West transit corridor. However, with existing Caspian ports in Aktau and Kuryk operating at less than one-third of their capacity, questions are being asked about whether the project addresses actual logistical needs or merely redistributes existing cargo flows.

Kazakhstan’s current maritime infrastructure on the Caspian Sea includes the ports of Aktau and Kuryk, which together have a combined throughput capacity of over 27 million tons per year. Yet, in the first nine months of 2025, transshipment volume stood at only 6 million tons, despite a 9% year-on-year increase, placing current utilization at roughly 30%.

Despite this, authorities in the Mangystau region argue that the proposed port in Karakiya district will boost national transit capacity, shorten delivery times on the China-Europe route by 7-15 days, and reduce logistics costs by 18-25%. The port’s design capacity is projected at 20 million tons annually.

Proponents of the project cite periodic bottlenecks at Aktau and Kuryk, such as temporary loading restrictions and railcar congestion, as justification for new infrastructure. Still, forecasts from international institutions suggest that freight volume on the Trans-Caspian route could reach 10-11 million tons by 2030, while the eastern branch of the North-South corridor may handle up to 24.7 million tons. In light of these projections, some question whether expanding and modernizing existing facilities might be a more cost-effective solution.

Indeed, upgrades are already underway. The container hub in Aktau is set to increase capacity to 250,000 TEU, while the multifunctional Sarzha terminal in Kuryk is expected to handle up to 12 million tons annually, developments that could significantly enhance throughput without requiring large-scale capital investment.

Investment details are also attracting scrutiny. The new port’s estimated construction cost is $300 million, with several Chinese companies, owners of cargo bases and logistics assets, lined up as investors. Observers warn this could lead to a shift in transit flows in favor of the new facility, undermining existing ports in a scenario of economic “cannibalization.”

There are also concerns about whether concession agreements might include compensation clauses for underutilized capacity, placing additional financial risk on the state.

The project is slated to unfold in three phases: construction from 2025 to 2027; joint operation with Chinese partners from 2028 to 2037; and a phased transfer of management to the Kazakh side after 2038. The development is expected to create more than 2,000 jobs and will feature a railway connection and automated container terminal.

In parallel, regional authorities are exploring maritime tourism as a complementary development strategy. Plans include launching Caspian Sea cruise routes and enhancing passenger facilities at the port of Kuryk, with a goal of attracting up to 625,000 tourists annually by 2028, envisioning a synergistic effect for the broader transport sector.

While Mangystau has the potential to emerge as a key logistics hub in Central Asia, the success of the new port will hinge not on the scale of its infrastructure but on the strength of its strategic planning. Critical factors include actual demand, alignment with existing logistics networks, and environmental considerations, particularly the declining water level of the Caspian Sea, which is already affecting vessel loading operations.

02 Jan 2026

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Kazakh-Spanish Film La Tregua to Premiere on Netflix

January 2, 2026
By Times of Central Asia

Following its premiere at the San Sebastian International Film Festival this fall, where it received a special award, the Kazakh-Spanish film La Tregua (The Truce) has been released in cinemas in Spain and Kazakhstan. It is now set to become the first Spanish-language film featuring Kazakhstan to appear on Netflix.

“Although critics say the film is not for popcorn viewing, given its focus on little-known and tragic chapters in the histories of Kazakhstan and Spain, its release has generated strong emotional responses in both countries,” said Yerlan Bekhozhin, a prominent Kazakh journalist and co-producer of the film, in an interview with The Times of Central Asia. “It speaks to the timeless struggle of human confrontation.”

The film presents a Kazakh narrative about Spaniards caught on opposing sides of ideological conflict. “It is a story from the last century, yet it addresses the present day,” Bekhozhin said. “When we look at today’s world, it’s clear that people lack the ability to engage in dialogue. The main message of the film is: There is always a way to negotiate.”

Netflix is expected to stream the film in 2026. Distribution discussions are also underway for theatrical releases in Mexico and other Spanish-speaking countries in Latin America.

Still from La Tregua

From Karaganda to the Screen

The story is rooted in the history of Karlag, the Karaganda labor camp that operated in Kazakhstan from 1937 to 1959. Victims of Stalinist repression from across the Soviet Union, including foreign nationals, were imprisoned there for dissent, free expression, or as victims of denunciations.

The idea for the film came from Spanish producer César Benítez, inspired by an event from over 30 years ago. During the Soviet era, the identities of Spanish citizens imprisoned in Karlag were kept secret. After Kazakhstan gained independence, its government handed the list of repressed Spaniards to the King of Spain, a gesture that sparked widespread attention in Spain, allowing many families to finally discover the fate of their relatives.

Years earlier, the Spanish documentary, The Forgotten in Karaganda, had drawn significant attention to the subject. Now, Benítez has transformed the story into a feature film.

“The title The Truce is deeply relevant today, at a time when peace requires people to sit at the same table,” said Bekhozhin.

Still from La Tregua

Kazakh Identity on a Global Stage

Bekhozhin also emphasized the film’s role in portraying Kazakh identity. “Its global release will introduce the world to the law of the steppe, the law of hospitality,” he said. “Kazakhs have long demonstrated empathy forged under harsh conditions. It’s part of our national character to welcome others, regardless of nationality or faith.”

One scene in the film shows a Kazakh family near the camp inviting Spanish prisoners into their home and setting a traditional dastarkhan, a generous table of lamb-based dishes. The prisoners are seated in the place of honor, or torge, in keeping with Kazakh custom.

“In the film, the hostess explains that when people from foreign lands appear at your door, you invite them in,” Bekhozhin said. Another scene, ultimately cut to maintain a 2.5-hour runtime, depicted villagers throwing kurt (hard cheese) over the camp fence to feed the prisoners.

Still from La Tregua

Bilbao’s Mini-Karlag

One regret, Bekhozhin admitted, was that the film’s winter scenes were not shot in Kazakhstan, where Karlag’s original buildings still stand.

“Initially, we planned to film in Kazakhstan,” he said. “But after the January 2022 unrest, Spanish insurers declined to cover shooting in the country. They insisted it be done in Europe.”

Filming took place in Bilbao, where a replica of Karlag was built. Local authorities were so impressed by the project that they asked producers to preserve the set for use as a tourist site showcasing this chapter of Spanish history. “They treated the story with seriousness, care, and purpose,” Bekhozhin noted.

02 Jan 2026

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From Rupture to Resilience: Kazakhstan’s Political Recalibration After January 2022

January 5, 2026
By Times of Central Asia

The upcoming anniversary of the events that started on 2 January 2022 in Kazakhstan invites a measured reflection rather than simple retrospection. The protests and subsequent violence marked a decisive turning point in the country’s recent history, exposing deep structural challenges and forcing a reassessment of the relationship between state and society. More than merely presenting an occasion to recall a time of crisis, this anniversary should also serve as an opportunity to assess how Kazakhstan has since evolved — specifically, whether the lessons of that rupture have been translated into durable political reforms and have created a more resilient path forward.

Remembering the onset and evolution of the events

The January 2022 protests were triggered by a sudden surge in liquefied petroleum gas prices, a critical cost for many households, particularly in western regions of Kazakhstan. The immediate economic shock quickly gave rise to broader demands rooted in long-standing grievances over rising living costs, inequality, corruption, and the concentration of political power.

The violent escalation also unfolded against resistance from some political elites to President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s emerging reform agenda. As Svante E. Cornell of the Washington D.C.-based Central Asia Caucasus Institute notes, efforts to curb entrenched patronage networks and rebalance authority had already generated opposition within the ruling elite, and the January crisis exposed these internal fractures. This context helps explain why the unrest moved beyond socioeconomic protests to a direct challenge to constitutional order.

Initially peaceful, the demonstrations deteriorated as state authority weakened and organized groups linked to the old political elite exploited the unrest, transforming socioeconomic protest into coordinated violence. While the relative roles of spontaneous escalation, elite manipulation, and institutional failure remain contested, armories were raided, government buildings set ablaze, and security forces attacked in a coordinated manner, most notably in Almaty. Official figures put the death toll at at least 238, including 19 law-enforcement officers, marking a clear rupture between legitimate protest and armed unrest driven by criminal networks, intra-elite contestation, and failures of command and control. Had the violent seizure of power by non-constitutional means succeeded, it would likely have entrenched authority through force, foreclosed institutional reform, and plunged Kazakhstan into prolonged instability and isolation.

Investigations followed the January 2022 violence, but key aspects—including the sequence of events and responsibility for deaths of peaceful civilians—have not been fully clarified in a comprehensive public account. While the state restored order and proceeded with reforms, dissatisfaction persists, particularly from some of the families of the deceased.

Subsequent reforms and policy shifts

After January 2022, President Tokayev moved quickly to stabilize the country and initiate a series of political and constitutional reforms. The unrest exposed longstanding structural imbalances in governance and state–society relations, reinforcing the rationale for a reform agenda centered on a “Fair and Just Kazakhstan” and a state more responsive to citizens’ needs. Significant constitutional changes adopted by referendum in June of 2022 were a key part of this process.

These reforms reduced the concentration of presidential power, strengthened parliament, limited presidential terms, eased party registration, expanded the space for independent candidates, and barred close relatives of the President from obtaining senior state roles. Decentralization measures and expanded local elections further broadened formal political participation. Taken together, these changes altered the legal framework governing political authority and were intended to reduce reliance on entrenched patronage networks by formalizing rules of governance.

The political impact of these changes has unfolded more gradually. While the legal framework shifted decisively, entrenched practices and institutional habits have been slower to adjust. Executive authority, though reduced compared to the pre-2022 period, remains a central feature of day-to-day governance, alongside gradual adjustments in legislative and political practice. The durability of reform will depend less on formal statutes than on their consistent application across electoral cycles, and outcomes continue to hinge on implementation capacity over time.

In parallel, Tokayev paired political reform with economic and social measures aimed at reinforcing state capacity and addressing grievances exposed by the crisis. Social spending was expanded, unpopular pricing mechanisms were reversed, and an asset recovery campaign was launched to identify and recover assets linked to corruption among senior officials. Recovered funds were then directed toward public projects such as schools, hospitals, and regional infrastructure, linking redistribution to visible state action.

At the same time, leading business figures have emphasized that recent reforms have improved the policy environment for private enterprise, aligning commercial interests with the government’s economic reform trajectory.

The state’s structural vulnerabilities revealed in January 2022, particularly in the energy sector, were also addressed through infrastructure upgrades and plans to diversify the energy mix, including nuclear energy development. These initiatives were intended to reduce exposure to supply shocks and reinforce long-term economic stability.

Taken together, these reforms sought not only to restore order but to strengthen institutional capacity and place Kazakhstan on a more balanced and durable trajectory.

Persistent challenges

Despite reforms introduced since January 2022, the translation of legal change into everyday governance has been uneven. While institutional frameworks have shifted, implementation—particularly at the local level—has varied, reflecting differences in administrative capacity and coordination.

Kazakh political commentator Janibek Suleev told The Times of Central Asia that “the events of January 2022 became a turning point for a new phase in public expectations in Kazakhstan,” while noting that the pace of change has been slower than many initially hoped.

On the foreign stage, paramount for Kazakhstan’s sovereignty and economic security, Suleev says that “Kazakhstan’s external position remains stable,” where “President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, who has considerable diplomatic experience, has managed to strengthen the country’s international image and maintain balance amid global turbulence. Kazakhstan is increasingly present at key international forums and is perceived as a predictable partner.”

Suleev adds that the main challenge ahead is converting this external credibility into tangible domestic results, particularly by easing inflationary pressures, supporting the middle class, and ensuring that reforms deliver visible benefits across society.

Indeed, states undergoing elite restructuring and administrative reform often experience extended lags between legal redesign and practical outcomes, especially where regional inequality places uneven demands on governance capacity. In Kazakhstan, these structural constraints continue to shape how reforms are implemented and experienced across the country.

External assessments add another layer of pressure. Human Rights Watch continues to criticize restrictions on political freedoms and media across Central Asia, as well as in Russia and China, and Kazakhstan is not exempt from this judgment. Some of these critiques predate January 2022, while others point to unresolved constraints that reforms have yet to address fully, highlighting the persistence of limits within the political operating environment.

Economic capacity underpins progress across all reform areas. The war between Russia and Ukraine has strained Kazakhstan’s economy through disrupted oil exports, supply-chain shocks, and inflationary spillovers, narrowing fiscal space at a time when reform implementation requires sustained resources. In response, diversification efforts have expanded toward critical minerals, transport and logistics, and the digital economy, though these initiatives will take time to generate durable growth and fiscal relief.

A Measured but Positive Trajectory

The outlook for Kazakhstan after January 2022 compares favorably with most post-Soviet states and structurally similar upper-middle-income economies, though important institutional constraints remain. Under President Tokayev, post-crisis reforms have aimed to recalibrate the balance of power, constrain the influence of the country’s entrenched patronage networks, and strengthen more rules-based governance. While implementation remains uneven, the direction marks a clear departure from the pre-January 2022 political equilibrium.

Kazakhstan’s strong regional position reinforces this assessment. Within Central Asia, it continues to lead on indicators critical to long-term state performance, including fiscal capacity, wages and pensions, access to healthcare, education, utilities, energy security, and the size of the formal labor market. More developed institutions and advanced digital service platforms further support consistent policy delivery relative to regional peers.

Some constraints persist, however. Political pluralism remains limited, implementation varies across regions, and external pressures—particularly economic spillovers from the Russia-Ukraine war—will continue to shape outcomes. Even so, to date, compared with its peers, Kazakhstan has demonstrated a stronger ability to absorb shocks, sustain reform momentum, and translate post-January 2022 stability into durable institutional development.

Ultimately, the significance of Kazakhstan’s trajectory will be measured less by institutional design than by outcomes. Reform matters insofar as it produces more predictable governance, greater economic security, and tangible improvements in daily life. Even as progress remains uneven, the combination of reform momentum and state capacity has the potential, over time, to translate political stability into a better quality of life for Kazakhstan’s citizens. Four years after January 2022, the test lies not in reform, but in the institutionalization of stability.

02 Jan 2026

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Opinion: Prospects for Central Asia’s Access to Persian Gulf Infrastructure

December 31, 2025
By Times of Central Asia

The agreement signed on December 8, 2025, between Saudi Arabia and Qatar to construct a high-speed railway linking Riyadh and Doha marks a pivotal development in transport connectivity across the Persian Gulf. Beyond its bilateral implications, the project could have broader consequences for transregional logistics, particularly for Central Asia and Kazakhstan.

The 785-km railway will pass through key cities in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province, including Dammam and Al-Hufuf, and will connect King Salman and Hamad International Airports. Trains are expected to reach speeds exceeding 300 km/h, reducing travel time between the two capitals to approximately two hours. The six-year project is projected by officials to boost the combined GDP of both countries by around $30 billion and create up to 30,000 jobs.

The Gulf Railway and New Regional Connectivity

The Riyadh-Doha line is a central element of the Gulf Railway initiative, which is seeking to establish a unified railway network among Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Oman, with a target date of around 2030.

Originally envisioned primarily as a freight system, the Gulf Railway is increasingly incorporating high-speed passenger services alongside freight, reflecting the region’s push for greater internal integration and reduced dependence on air travel. The Riyadh-Doha segment forms a vital axis between the Gulf’s political and financial hubs and is expected to link with Saudi, Emirati, and Omani infrastructure, laying the groundwork for a more integrated regional transport system.

Beyond the Peninsula

While the Gulf Railway’s scope is geographically confined to the Arabian Peninsula, meaningful integration with Eurasia would require additional connectivity, particularly via land and multimodal routes through Iran, Turkey, and the Caspian region. Among these, the overland corridor through Iran is especially significant, though constrained by sanctions, financing risks, and political uncertainty.

Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan-Iran Corridor

Unlike many conceptual infrastructure proposals, the Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan-Iran railway, operational since 2014, is already a functioning freight corridor. It provides Central Asian nations with direct access to Persian Gulf ports and Middle Eastern markets.

For Kazakhstan, the route offers strategic diversification away from traditional corridors. While no formal plans exist to link GCC rail infrastructure directly with Central Asia, the emergence of high-capacity Gulf rail corridors reshapes the long-term connectivity landscape. A future interface could allow Astana overland access to Gulf markets, while enabling reciprocal flows from the Gulf into Central Asia, China, and Europe.

President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has previously described Iran as a “gateway” to Southeast Asia and Africa. Kazakhstan has also outlined plans to establish its own logistics terminal in the Iranian port of Shahid Rajai in Bandar Abbas, further enhancing its position in Gulf-Eurasia trade flows.

Iran’s Evolving Role

Historically, Iran’s role as a transit state has been hampered by international sanctions and regional tensions. However, the 2023 normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, brokered by China, has altered the regional calculus. Although still fragile, this diplomatic thaw improves prospects for long-term infrastructure projects involving Iran as a critical transit link between the Persian Gulf and Eurasia.

Alternatives and Their Limitations

In parallel, multimodal routes via ports in the UAE, Qatar, and Oman, such as Jebel Ali, Hamad, and Sohar, offer complementary options. These established hubs provide access to global maritime trade but do not offer seamless land-based rail connections to Central Asia. They enhance supply chain resilience but fall short of delivering the strategic depth offered by integrated land corridors.

Even under favorable geopolitical conditions, integrating Central Asia’s rail systems with GCC infrastructure would face multiple challenges: the high capital requirements of such projects, differing rail gauges, incompatible technical standards, fragmented management systems, and bottlenecks in specific segments of the network.

Addressing these issues would require investment from international financial institutions, sovereign wealth funds, and public-private partnerships. China could also play a role under the framework of its Belt and Road Initiative.

Outlook

The Riyadh-Doha high-speed railway is not merely a regional upgrade; it signals a broader transformation of the Gulf’s transport architecture. As the GCC evolves into an integrated transport and economic zone, the need for external connectivity will grow.

This creates a strategic opening for Kazakhstan and its Central Asian neighbors. Strengthening the existing Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan-Iran corridor, and positioning it to interface with future Gulf infrastructure, could position Kazakhstan as a northern hub, bridging the Persian Gulf with continental transport corridors across Eurasia.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the publication, its affiliates, or any other organizations mentioned.

02 Jan 2026

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What’s Really Happening With Waste Processing in Kazakhstan

December 31, 2025
By Vagit Ismailov

Official statistics suggest that Kazakhstan is making steady progress in recycling solid municipal waste (SMW), but a closer look reveals a significant technological shortfall. According to an analysis by Energyprom.kz, behind the rising recycling percentages lies a troubling gap between reported sorting and actual reuse.

As of December 2025, the share of municipal waste reportedly recycled or reused had reached 28.6%, up from 25.9% at the end of 2024. On paper, this suggests progress toward the Ministry of Ecology’s target of 40% by 2040.

However, the real picture is more complex. Only 1.1% of all municipal waste actually results in the production of secondary raw materials. Analysts emphasize the wide gap between the amount sorted and the amount truly recycled.

According to Kazakhstan’s National Statistics Bureau, the country generates between 4.2 million and 4.8 million tons of municipal solid waste annually. In 2024, the figure hit a peak of 4.8 million tons. Of that, about 1.3 million tons were sorted and recorded as recycled or reused, more than one-quarter of the total. But crucially, this refers only to the volume that passed through sorting facilities. Much of the remaining 4.5 million tons was ultimately sent to landfill, including a significant share of the sorted waste.

In 2024, 37.1% of sorted municipal waste, about 490,400 tons, was still landfilled. In other words, more than a third of the “recycled” waste never became usable raw material.

In some regions, the situation is even more stark. At certain waste processing plants, including in Almaty, up to 85% of sorted waste ends up in landfill due to outdated technologies and limited processing capacity. Without substantial upgrades to equipment and processes, this is unlikely to change.

That said, there has been measurable improvement. In 2023, 65.9% of sorted waste was landfilled, compared to 37.1% in 2024. Meanwhile, the volume of waste actually sent for recycling rose from 358,900 tons to 588,200 tons.

Even so, only 49,200 tons of waste were ultimately processed into secondary raw materials, just 8.4% of the sorted waste and a mere 1.1% of Kazakhstan’s total municipal waste. For comparison, the figure was just 0.7% the previous year.

More than 40% of waste processed at SMW facilities in 2024 consisted of plastic and paper, with plastic being the most straightforward to recycle. That year, 112,400 tons of plastic were recycled, an 8.5% increase over 2023. Waste paper collection reached 124,400 tons. Other materials processed include glass, metals, and used tires. Tire recycling has grown particularly quickly, with volumes increasing nearly twentyfold year-on-year.

Despite this modest progress, Kazakhstan’s waste accumulation problem remains severe. The country has already amassed 48.3 million tons of solid waste. Of the approximately 3,000 landfills currently in operation, only 20.6% meet national standards.

The best-performing regions include Zhambyl and Ulytau, as well as the cities of Astana and Shymkent. The worst conditions are found in North Kazakhstan, Turkestan, and Abai regions, where fewer than 3% of landfills comply with regulations.

In 7 of Kazakhstan’s 20 largest cities, landfill capacity is nearing exhaustion. In Astana, landfills are 98% full. In Atyrau, Turkestan, Shymkent, Uralsk, and Petropavlovsk, capacity is around 90%. Zhezkazgan’s landfill is already overflowing.

01 Jan 2026

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Water Shortages Cut Hydropower Output in Uzbekistan

December 30, 2025
By Sadokat Jalolova

Electricity generation at Uzbekistan’s hydropower plants has declined significantly due to water shortages, Energy Minister Jurabek Mirzamahmudov told lawmakers during a recent session of the Legislative Chamber of the country’s parliament, the Oliy Majlis, according to reports in Uzbek media.

Mirzamahmudov said water inflows to major hydropower facilities had fallen by 35%, directly impacting electricity production compared with last year. He was responding to a question from deputy Saydullo Azimov, who inquired about the ongoing decline in hydropower output.

“The main reason for the drop in electricity generation at large hydropower plants compared to last year is the reduced water inflow,” Mirzamahmudov said. He added that while Uzbekistan has commissioned a number of small and micro hydropower stations, with capacities ranging from one to five megawatts, these facilities collectively produced only about 140 million kilowatt hours of electricity. This output, he noted, remains limited and cannot compensate for the shortfall at major plants.

Mirzamahmudov reaffirmed the government’s commitment to further developing the hydropower sector but acknowledged its heavy reliance on water availability. To reduce dependence on natural gas and enhance energy security, Uzbekistan is increasingly investing in alternative energy sources. “We are paying special attention to solar and wind power, as well as energy storage systems,” he said, noting that these options offer more consistent short-term performance.

He also revealed plans to construct pumped-storage power plants, which store excess electricity for use during peak demand periods. However, he pointed out that building a large hydropower facility typically takes six to ten years, making green energy projects the most viable option for addressing immediate energy needs.

In a related development, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan agreed in July to a new phase of electricity trade. Under the deal, power from Tajikistan’s Rogun Hydropower Plant will be exported to Uzbekistan at an initial rate of 3.4¢ per kilowatt hour. The agreement, which has a 20-year term with automatic extensions, builds on electricity exports that Tajikistan has supplied to Uzbekistan each summer since 2018.