• KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00213 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10456 0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00213 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10456 0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00213 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10456 0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00213 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10456 0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00213 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10456 0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00213 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10456 0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00213 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10456 0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00213 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10456 0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%

Central Asia Watches as Venezuela Drama Unfolds  

Governments in Central Asia have not made any public comment, so far, on the U.S. military operation that captured Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, at a time when relations between Central Asian countries and the administration of President Donald Trump are growing closer.

The operation on Saturday involved more than 150 American aircraft and extracted Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, from their compound in Caracas, prompting celebrations from many Venezuelan expatriates who viewed Maduro as a dictator, criticism from countries including Russia and China, and concerns that the complex attack violated international law.

Additional questions about Venezuela’s sovereignty emerged after Trump said the United States will “run” the country ahead of a transition and that American oil companies will help to rebuild its oil infrastructure. The U.S. has argued that Maduro himself effectively hijacked Venezuelan sovereignty through electoral fraud, repression and by allegedly funneling illegal drugs to the U.S. Maduro, who has been indicted on narco-terrorism and other charges, denies the allegations.

Countries in Central Asia are more than 10,000 kilometers away from Venezuela and their trade with the Latin American country is minimal, suggesting the uncertain and evolving situation there lies far outside their immediate area of interest. In May, Tokayev met Maduro in Moscow and invited him to visit Kazakhstan after describing Venezuela as an important partner.

“However, he acknowledged that, due to objective reasons, significant achievements in bilateral cooperation have yet to be realized,” Tokayev’s office said at the time.

Still, Tokayev and other Central Asian leaders have spoken in general terms of their adherence to United Nations principles of sovereignty, an issue that is being vigorously debated in some international circles after the U.S. military operation. U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres, who visited Central Asia in 2024 and 2025, has said that the U.S. military operation that extracted Maduro to New York constitutes a “dangerous precedent” and that he was concerned that the rules of international law had not been respected.

The U.S. capture of the leader of oil-rich Venezuela has not had a major impact for now on global oil prices, indicating that Central Asia’s oil and natural gas producers will not see any big fallout. Even so, at a time of ongoing geopolitical tension, a major shock or event in one region could influence distant regions in ways that are difficult to discern.

Russia and China, which are close trading partners with Central Asia and nurtured trade and political ties with Maduro’s government, condemned the U.S. military operation in Venezuela. But the Central Asian countries – Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan – have not joined in the criticism, much as they have refrained from publicly supporting any side over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Central Asia’s balancing act reflects efforts to maintain good ties with major powers even when they are in conflict, and comes during a period of increasing trade collaboration with the United States. The five leaders from Central Asia traveled to Washington in November for a summit with Trump, who later invited Tokayev and President Shavkat Mirziyoyev of Uzbekistan to the G20 summit, which the U.S. plans to hold in Miami in 2026.

Central Asian media are reporting Maduro’s capture, and regional governments could still comment once circumstances surrounding U.S. intentions in Venezuela become clearer.

 

 

Kazakhstan’s MOST Ventures Invests in Uzbek Startup Bito, Valuing Company at $10 Million

Kazakhstan-based venture capital firm MOST Ventures has acquired a stake in Uzbekistan’s Bito, marking a significant cross-border investment in Central Asia’s growing tech ecosystem. The deal, completed in Tashkent on December 25 as part of a Bridge funding round, values the B2B software company at $10 million, a milestone that reflects rising investor confidence in Uzbekistan’s startup landscape.

Bito is a business-to-business software-as-a-service (SaaS) company and a resident of Startup Garage, a leading Central Asian venture studio and accelerator. The company offers a digital ecosystem that integrates enterprise resource planning (ERP), financial technology, and artificial intelligence into a unified operating system tailored for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).

Its platform allows businesses to manage sales, finance, inventory, HR, payments, installment services, and analytics, all in one interface aimed at improving operational transparency and decision-making.

The Bridge round represents a pivotal moment in Bito’s growth trajectory. The company reported that its valuation has tripled over the past ten months, though it has not disclosed the total amount raised. The investment will fund continued product development and regional expansion, with a primary focus on the Uzbek and Kazakh markets.

As part of the transaction, Startup Garage partially exited its position in Bito. The accelerator played a crucial role in the company’s early-stage development, supporting product design, market entry, and initial scaling. Startup Garage founder Mukhammad Khalil said the deal highlights the increasing maturity of Central Asia’s startup ecosystem and its ability to attract institutional capital. “This transaction shows that companies in the region can secure funding based on strong fundamentals and sustainable growth,” he said.

Bito founder Uchqun Tulavov called the investment a validation of the company’s strategic vision. “We are not simply building a product, we are setting a new standard for digital infrastructure for small and medium-sized businesses across the region,” he said. “The support of MOST Ventures confirms our direction as we integrate ERP, fintech, and AI into a unified operating platform.”

Following the funding round, Bito plans to accelerate its regional footprint while consolidating its role as a leading B2B SaaS provider in Central Asia.

Kazakhstan Plans to Send 35 Athletes to 2026 Winter Olympics in Italy

Kazakhstan plans to send a team of 35 athletes to compete at the XXV Winter Olympic Games, which will take place in Italy in 2026 in Milan and Cortina d’Ampezzo.

The 2026 Winter Olympics will be held from February 6 to 22, bringing together approximately 3,000 athletes from 93 countries. A total of 116 sets of medals will be contested.

Kazakhstan’s athletes will compete in 10 disciplines across 58 medal events. These include biathlon, speed skating, figure skating, short track, alpine skiing, Nordic combined, cross-country skiing, ski jumping, freestyle moguls, and freestyle aerials.

Among the strongest medal contenders are figure skaters Mikhail Shaydorov and Sofya Samodelkina; freestyle skiers Anastasia Gorodko and Yulia Galysheva; speed skater Evgeny Koshkin; and a group of short track skaters, including several world championship medalists.

Shaydorov is the current world silver medalist in men’s singles figure skating. Galysheva won bronze in moguls at the 2018 Winter Olympics and was crowned world champion in 2019 in the same discipline. Gorodko has twice earned bronze in parallel moguls at the World Championships, in 2021 and 2025.

Kazakhstan has participated in every Winter Olympics since 1994, when skier Vladimir Smirnov won the country’s first and so far only, Winter Olympic gold medal in Lillehammer, Norway.

To date, Kazakhstan has won eight medals at the Winter Games: one gold, three silver, and four bronze. The Lillehammer Games remain the country’s most successful, with three medals and a 12th-place finish in the overall medal standings. At the most recent Winter Olympics in Beijing in 2022, Kazakh athletes did not reach the podium.

However, the national team delivered a strong performance at the 2025 Winter Asian Games, finishing fourth in the overall standings with 20 medals.

New Port in Mangystau: Strategic Asset or Risk of Overcapacity?

Kazakhstan has announced plans to build a new seaport in the Mangystau region, presenting the initiative as a strategic move to strengthen the country’s role in the East-West transit corridor. However, with existing Caspian ports in Aktau and Kuryk operating at less than one-third of their capacity, questions are being asked about whether the project addresses actual logistical needs or merely redistributes existing cargo flows.

Kazakhstan’s current maritime infrastructure on the Caspian Sea includes the ports of Aktau and Kuryk, which together have a combined throughput capacity of over 27 million tons per year. Yet, in the first nine months of 2025, transshipment volume stood at only 6 million tons, despite a 9% year-on-year increase, placing current utilization at roughly 30%.

Despite this, authorities in the Mangystau region argue that the proposed port in Karakiya district will boost national transit capacity, shorten delivery times on the China-Europe route by 7-15 days, and reduce logistics costs by 18-25%. The port’s design capacity is projected at 20 million tons annually.

Proponents of the project cite periodic bottlenecks at Aktau and Kuryk, such as temporary loading restrictions and railcar congestion, as justification for new infrastructure. Still, forecasts from international institutions suggest that freight volume on the Trans-Caspian route could reach 10-11 million tons by 2030, while the eastern branch of the North-South corridor may handle up to 24.7 million tons. In light of these projections, some question whether expanding and modernizing existing facilities might be a more cost-effective solution.

Indeed, upgrades are already underway. The container hub in Aktau is set to increase capacity to 250,000 TEU, while the multifunctional Sarzha terminal in Kuryk is expected to handle up to 12 million tons annually, developments that could significantly enhance throughput without requiring large-scale capital investment.

Investment details are also attracting scrutiny. The new port’s estimated construction cost is $300 million, with several Chinese companies, owners of cargo bases and logistics assets, lined up as investors. Observers warn this could lead to a shift in transit flows in favor of the new facility, undermining existing ports in a scenario of economic “cannibalization.”

There are also concerns about whether concession agreements might include compensation clauses for underutilized capacity, placing additional financial risk on the state.

The project is slated to unfold in three phases: construction from 2025 to 2027; joint operation with Chinese partners from 2028 to 2037; and a phased transfer of management to the Kazakh side after 2038. The development is expected to create more than 2,000 jobs and will feature a railway connection and automated container terminal.

In parallel, regional authorities are exploring maritime tourism as a complementary development strategy. Plans include launching Caspian Sea cruise routes and enhancing passenger facilities at the port of Kuryk, with a goal of attracting up to 625,000 tourists annually by 2028, envisioning a synergistic effect for the broader transport sector.

While Mangystau has the potential to emerge as a key logistics hub in Central Asia, the success of the new port will hinge not on the scale of its infrastructure but on the strength of its strategic planning. Critical factors include actual demand, alignment with existing logistics networks, and environmental considerations, particularly the declining water level of the Caspian Sea, which is already affecting vessel loading operations.

Kazakh-Spanish Film La Tregua to Premiere on Netflix

Following its premiere at the San Sebastian International Film Festival this fall, where it received a special award, the Kazakh-Spanish film La Tregua (The Truce) has been released in cinemas in Spain and Kazakhstan. It is now set to become the first Spanish-language film featuring Kazakhstan to appear on Netflix.

“Although critics say the film is not for popcorn viewing, given its focus on little-known and tragic chapters in the histories of Kazakhstan and Spain, its release has generated strong emotional responses in both countries,” said Yerlan Bekhozhin, a prominent Kazakh journalist and co-producer of the film, in an interview with The Times of Central Asia. “It speaks to the timeless struggle of human confrontation.”

The film presents a Kazakh narrative about Spaniards caught on opposing sides of ideological conflict. “It is a story from the last century, yet it addresses the present day,” Bekhozhin said. “When we look at today’s world, it’s clear that people lack the ability to engage in dialogue. The main message of the film is: There is always a way to negotiate.”

Netflix is expected to stream the film in 2026. Distribution discussions are also underway for theatrical releases in Mexico and other Spanish-speaking countries in Latin America.

Still from La Tregua

From Karaganda to the Screen

The story is rooted in the history of Karlag, the Karaganda labor camp that operated in Kazakhstan from 1937 to 1959. Victims of Stalinist repression from across the Soviet Union, including foreign nationals, were imprisoned there for dissent, free expression, or as victims of denunciations.

The idea for the film came from Spanish producer César Benítez, inspired by an event from over 30 years ago. During the Soviet era, the identities of Spanish citizens imprisoned in Karlag were kept secret. After Kazakhstan gained independence, its government handed the list of repressed Spaniards to the King of Spain, a gesture that sparked widespread attention in Spain, allowing many families to finally discover the fate of their relatives.

Years earlier, the Spanish documentary, The Forgotten in Karaganda, had drawn significant attention to the subject. Now, Benítez has transformed the story into a feature film.

“The title The Truce is deeply relevant today, at a time when peace requires people to sit at the same table,” said Bekhozhin.

Still from La Tregua

Kazakh Identity on a Global Stage

Bekhozhin also emphasized the film’s role in portraying Kazakh identity. “Its global release will introduce the world to the law of the steppe, the law of hospitality,” he said. “Kazakhs have long demonstrated empathy forged under harsh conditions. It’s part of our national character to welcome others, regardless of nationality or faith.”

One scene in the film shows a Kazakh family near the camp inviting Spanish prisoners into their home and setting a traditional dastarkhan, a generous table of lamb-based dishes. The prisoners are seated in the place of honor, or torge, in keeping with Kazakh custom.

“In the film, the hostess explains that when people from foreign lands appear at your door, you invite them in,” Bekhozhin said. Another scene, ultimately cut to maintain a 2.5-hour runtime, depicted villagers throwing kurt (hard cheese) over the camp fence to feed the prisoners.

Still from La Tregua

Bilbao’s Mini-Karlag

One regret, Bekhozhin admitted, was that the film’s winter scenes were not shot in Kazakhstan, where Karlag’s original buildings still stand.

“Initially, we planned to film in Kazakhstan,” he said. “But after the January 2022 unrest, Spanish insurers declined to cover shooting in the country. They insisted it be done in Europe.”

Filming took place in Bilbao, where a replica of Karlag was built. Local authorities were so impressed by the project that they asked producers to preserve the set for use as a tourist site showcasing this chapter of Spanish history. “They treated the story with seriousness, care, and purpose,” Bekhozhin noted.

From Rupture to Resilience: Kazakhstan’s Political Recalibration After January 2022

The upcoming anniversary of the events that started on 2 January 2022 in Kazakhstan invites a measured reflection rather than simple retrospection. The protests and subsequent violence marked a decisive turning point in the country’s recent history, exposing deep structural challenges and forcing a reassessment of the relationship between state and society.  More than merely presenting an occasion to recall a time of crisis, this anniversary should also serve as an opportunity to assess how Kazakhstan has since evolved — specifically, whether the lessons of that rupture have been translated into durable political reforms and have created a more resilient path forward.

Remembering the onset and evolution of the events

The January 2022 protests were triggered by a sudden surge in liquefied petroleum gas prices, a critical cost for many households, particularly in western regions of Kazakhstan. The immediate economic shock quickly gave rise to broader demands rooted in long-standing grievances over rising living costs, inequality, corruption, and the concentration of political power.

The violent escalation also unfolded against resistance from some political elites to President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s emerging reform agenda. As Svante E. Cornell of the Washington D.C.-based Central Asia Caucasus Institute notes, efforts to curb entrenched patronage networks and rebalance authority had already generated opposition within the ruling elite, and the January crisis exposed these internal fractures. This context helps explain why the unrest moved beyond socioeconomic protests to a direct challenge to constitutional order.

Initially peaceful, the demonstrations deteriorated as state authority weakened and organized groups linked to the old political elite exploited the unrest, transforming socioeconomic protest into coordinated violence. While the relative roles of spontaneous escalation, elite manipulation, and institutional failure remain contested, armories were raided, government buildings set ablaze, and security forces attacked in a coordinated manner, most notably in Almaty. Official figures put the death toll at at least 238, including 19 law-enforcement officers, marking a clear rupture between legitimate protest and armed unrest driven by criminal networks, intra-elite contestation, and failures of command and control. Had the violent seizure of power by non-constitutional means succeeded, it would likely have entrenched authority through force, foreclosed institutional reform, and plunged Kazakhstan into prolonged instability and isolation.

Investigations followed the January 2022 violence, but key aspects—including the sequence of events and responsibility for deaths of peaceful civilians—have not been fully clarified in a comprehensive public account. While the state restored order and proceeded with reforms, dissatisfaction persists, particularly from some of the families of the deceased.

Subsequent reforms and policy shifts

After January 2022, President Tokayev moved quickly to stabilize the country and initiate a series of political and constitutional reforms. The unrest exposed longstanding structural imbalances in governance and state–society relations, reinforcing the rationale for a reform agenda centered on a “Fair and Just Kazakhstan” and a state more responsive to citizens’ needs.  Significant constitutional changes adopted by referendum in June of 2022 were a key part of this process.

These reforms reduced the concentration of presidential power, strengthened parliament, limited presidential terms, eased party registration, expanded the space for independent candidates, and barred close relatives of the President from obtaining senior state roles. Decentralization measures and expanded local elections further broadened formal political participation. Taken together, these changes altered the legal framework governing political authority and were intended to reduce reliance on entrenched patronage networks by formalizing rules of governance.

The political impact of these changes has unfolded more gradually. While the legal framework shifted decisively, entrenched practices and institutional habits have been slower to adjust. Executive authority, though reduced compared to the pre-2022 period, remains a central feature of day-to-day governance, alongside gradual adjustments in legislative and political practice. The durability of reform will depend less on formal statutes than on their consistent application across electoral cycles, and outcomes continue to hinge on implementation capacity over time.

In parallel, Tokayev paired political reform with economic and social measures aimed at reinforcing state capacity and addressing grievances exposed by the crisis. Social spending was expanded, unpopular pricing mechanisms were reversed, and an asset recovery campaign was launched to identify and recover assets linked to corruption among senior officials. Recovered funds were then directed toward public projects such as schools, hospitals, and regional infrastructure, linking redistribution to visible state action.

At the same time, leading business figures have emphasized that recent reforms have improved the policy environment for private enterprise, aligning commercial interests with the government’s economic reform trajectory.

The state’s structural vulnerabilities revealed in January 2022, particularly in the energy sector, were also addressed through infrastructure upgrades and plans to diversify the energy mix, including nuclear energy development. These initiatives were intended to reduce exposure to supply shocks and reinforce long-term economic stability.

Taken together, these reforms sought not only to restore order but to strengthen institutional capacity and place Kazakhstan on a more balanced and durable trajectory.

Persistent challenges

Despite reforms introduced since January 2022, the translation of legal change into everyday governance has been uneven. While institutional frameworks have shifted, implementation—particularly at the local level—has varied, reflecting differences in administrative capacity and coordination.

Kazakh political commentator Janibek Suleev told The Times of Central Asia that “the events of January 2022 became a turning point for a new phase in public expectations in Kazakhstan,” while noting that the pace of change has been slower than many initially hoped.

On the foreign stage, paramount for Kazakhstan’s sovereignty and economic security, Suleev says that “Kazakhstan’s external position remains stable,” where “President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, who has considerable diplomatic experience, has managed to strengthen the country’s international image and maintain balance amid global turbulence. Kazakhstan is increasingly present at key international forums and is perceived as a predictable partner.”

Suleev adds that the main challenge ahead is converting this external credibility into tangible domestic results, particularly by easing inflationary pressures, supporting the middle class, and ensuring that reforms deliver visible benefits across society.

Indeed, states undergoing elite restructuring and administrative reform often experience extended lags between legal redesign and practical outcomes, especially where regional inequality places uneven demands on governance capacity. In Kazakhstan, these structural constraints continue to shape how reforms are implemented and experienced across the country.

External assessments add another layer of pressure. Human Rights Watch continues to criticize restrictions on political freedoms and media across Central Asia, as well as in Russia and China, and Kazakhstan is not exempt from this judgment. Some of these critiques predate January 2022, while others point to unresolved constraints that reforms have yet to address fully, highlighting the persistence of limits within the political operating environment.

Economic capacity underpins progress across all reform areas. The war between Russia and Ukraine has strained Kazakhstan’s economy through disrupted oil exports, supply-chain shocks, and inflationary spillovers, narrowing fiscal space at a time when reform implementation requires sustained resources. In response, diversification efforts have expanded toward critical minerals, transport and logistics, and the digital economy, though these initiatives will take time to generate durable growth and fiscal relief.

A Measured but Positive Trajectory

The outlook for Kazakhstan after January 2022 compares favorably with most post-Soviet states and structurally similar upper-middle-income economies, though important institutional constraints remain. Under President Tokayev, post-crisis reforms have aimed to recalibrate the balance of power, constrain the influence of the country’s entrenched patronage networks, and strengthen more rules-based governance. While implementation remains uneven, the direction marks a clear departure from the pre-January 2022 political equilibrium.

Kazakhstan’s strong regional position reinforces this assessment. Within Central Asia, it continues to lead on indicators critical to long-term state performance, including fiscal capacity, wages and pensions, access to healthcare, education, utilities, energy security, and the size of the formal labor market. More developed institutions and advanced digital service platforms further support consistent policy delivery relative to regional peers.

Some constraints persist, however. Political pluralism remains limited, implementation varies across regions, and external pressures—particularly economic spillovers from the Russia-Ukraine war—will continue to shape outcomes. Even so, to date, compared with its peers, Kazakhstan has demonstrated a stronger ability to absorb shocks, sustain reform momentum, and translate post-January 2022 stability into durable institutional development.

Ultimately, the significance of Kazakhstan’s trajectory will be measured less by institutional design than by outcomes. Reform matters insofar as it produces more predictable governance, greater economic security, and tangible improvements in daily life. Even as progress remains uneven, the combination of reform momentum and state capacity has the potential, over time, to translate political stability into a better quality of life for Kazakhstan’s citizens. Four years after January 2022, the test lies not in reform, but in the institutionalization of stability.