Hungary’s Political Shift Puts Central Asia Partnerships Under Scrutiny
Hungary’s political transition following the defeat of Viktor Orbán’s party and his resignation as prime minister is drawing attention not only in the EU and the United States, but also in Central Asia, where Budapest has built growing energy and investment ties. The key question is whether the policy of cooperation with Central Asia developed under Orbán will continue under the new leadership.
In recent years, under Orbán, Budapest has actively developed its Central Asian foreign policy, primarily driven by the desire to find alternatives to Russian energy supplies. That push reflects Hungary’s long-standing reliance on Russian oil and gas, which has shaped its search for alternative suppliers beyond Europe. Resource-rich Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan became natural partners for diplomatic engagement.
Orbán succeeded in building trust-based relationships with the presidents of the Central Asian republics, grounded in what Hungary’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Péter Szijjártó, described as “sincere friendship” in an interview with Uzbek media.
“In Hungary, we have always viewed Central Asia as one of the fastest-growing regions in the world, with enormous potential. Our efforts to build these relations did not begin today, but decades ago,” he said.
Hungary became the first Central European country to sign a strategic partnership with Kazakhstan in 2014. Currently, the Kazakhstan-Hungary Business Council is in operation, along with a joint agricultural direct investment fund. In 2024, bilateral trade approached $200 million, and from January to August 2025, it grew by another 22.1%, exceeding $164.6 million. Hungarian investments in Kazakhstan’s economy have surpassed $370 million, while the current investment portfolio includes 16 projects worth about $700 million in engineering, agriculture, and logistics.
These links also intersect with wider efforts to expand east–west transport routes through the Caspian region, offering Hungary indirect access to Central Asian energy and trade flows.
In May 2025, Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev held talks with Orbán in Budapest, where both sides highlighted rising trade volumes and a joint investment portfolio of about $500 million. Hungary’s OTP Bank entered into Uzbekistan’s financial market in 2023, acquiring a 73.71% stake in Ipoteka Bank, becoming its principal owner and the majority shareholder of the country’s fifth-largest bank.
As early as 2019, Hungary had intensified cooperation with Turkmenistan. After talks at the Turkmen Foreign Ministry, Szijjártó told the media that Hungary views Turkmenistan as an important country from the perspective of European security.
“We very much hope that Turkmenistan’s gas resources will be integrated into the overall energy flow of Central Europe,” he said.
However, uncertainty remains over whether this policy direction will continue under Orbán’s successor, Péter Magyar. Oil and gas analyst Oleg Chervinsky has suggested that political changes in Hungary could affect cooperation with Kazakhstan’s national company KazMunayGas (KMG).
Chervinsky notes that, having secured a constitutional majority in parliament, Magyar has a mandate to “implement reforms in both foreign and domestic policy [which could] reshape the constitutional structure of the right-wing populist authoritarian system built around Orbán.”
The analyst points to Hungary’s oil and gas company MOL Group, which in recent years has actively expanded cooperation with KMG, as a key pillar of this cooperation.
“In addition to its partnership with KMG within Ural Oil & Gas LLP (the Rozhkovskoye field in West Kazakhstan Region), KMG and MOL signed a framework agreement for oil supplies to Hungary. The first shipment was dispatched in August 2025 from the port of Novorossiysk to Croatia, and then via the Adria pipeline,” Chervinsky noted, a route that allows crude shipped from the Black Sea to reach Central Europe without transiting Russian territory. “It is quite obvious that MOL will be reformed, including in terms of personnel, under Hungary’s new prime minister. What priorities will he set for the new management of the oil company?”
However, most experts remain confident that the diplomatic nous of Kassym-Jomart Tokayev will make it possible to establish constructive relations with Hungary’s new leadership.
Urazgali Selteev, director of the Institute of Eurasian Integration, said Kazakhstan typically maintains pragmatic relations regardless of political changes abroad.
“The key point is that he is legitimate and elected by the people,” Selteev stated, noting that Hungary’s incoming prime minister understands the rules of international politics.
Selteev added that Magyar “emerged from the existing political class… Therefore, there will be no abrupt or radical steps.”
Magyar himself has indirectly confirmed this logic by expressing his intention to maintain pragmatic relations with Russia, according to reporting by Interfax. Like Orbán before him, he does not support Ukraine’s accelerated accession to the European Union. That position broadly aligns with existing Hungarian policy, suggesting continuity on key external issues despite the political transition. According to his party, Tisza, the issue of Ukrainian membership should be decided only after a referendum.
For now, it remains unclear how far Hungary’s new leadership will adjust the foreign policy approach developed under Orbán. For Central Asian partners, the immediate question is whether existing energy, investment, and transport cooperation will continue without disruption.


