• KGS/USD = 0.01143 -0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00192 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10820 0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 -0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00192 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10820 0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 -0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00192 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10820 0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 -0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00192 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10820 0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 -0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00192 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10820 0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 -0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00192 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10820 0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 -0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00192 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10820 0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 -0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00192 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10820 0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 0%
14 December 2025

Ruling Party Urges Government to Revise VAT Reform Plans

Kazakhstan’s ruling Amanat party has called on the government to revise its proposed tax reforms, particularly those affecting the value-added tax (VAT). The party is pushing to double the planned threshold for mandatory VAT registration, warning that the current proposal could harm small and medium-sized businesses.

Under current law, businesses must register for VAT if their annual turnover exceeds 78.6 million KZT (approximately $152,000). The government’s draft reform proposes to lower this threshold to 15 million KZT (around $29,000). It also includes raising the basic VAT rate from 12% to 16%, introducing a zero rate for agricultural producers, a 10% rate for selected industries, and gradually applying VAT to the healthcare sector. The reform also proposes eliminating 128 tax exemptions worth more than 1.3 trillion KZT.

A progressive personal income tax is also under discussion. With a base rate of 10%, the government suggests introducing a 15% rate for annual incomes exceeding 8,500 MRP (monthly calculation index), equivalent to over 33.5 million KZT. For 2025, the MRP in Kazakhstan is set at 3,900 KZT (about $7.50).

The draft Tax Code is scheduled for a first reading in the Mazhilis, Kazakhstan’s lower house of parliament, on Wednesday, April 9. On the eve of the session, government officials presented the proposals at an expanded meeting with Amanat’s parliamentary faction, which holds 62 of the 98 Mazhilis seats.

Amanat deputies voiced strong opposition to the proposed reduction in the VAT registration threshold, warning it could drive businesses into the informal economy. Instead, they urged the government to raise the threshold to at least 30 million KZT (approximately $58,000).

The party also proposed exempting 19 socially important food items from VAT to ease the financial burden on citizens. These items include flour, bread, pasta, eggs, buckwheat, rice, sugar, vegetable oils, various meats (such as beef and chicken), dairy products (milk, kefir, cottage cheese), staple vegetables (potatoes, carrots, onions, cabbage), and salt.

“Particular concern was expressed over proposals to apply VAT to healthcare and to tax financial services,” the party said in a statement. “Such measures would drive up prices and impose additional costs on the population, which is unacceptable under current conditions”.

As The Times of Central Asia previously reported, the government initially considered raising the VAT rate to 20%, but President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev rejected that proposal in favor of a more moderate increase​.

Kazakhstan Limits Duty-Free Smartphone Imports to Two Per Person Annually

Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Finance plans to amend regulations governing the volume of goods citizens may import for personal use without paying customs duties. According to a draft order published on the Open NPAs (Normative Legal Acts) website, individuals will be allowed to bring in no more than two new smartphones and two new tablets per year, duty-free, from outside the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU).

The proposed changes, open for public discussion until April 22, also cap duty-free imports at one new laptop, one new bicycle, one baby stroller, and one car per person annually. All restrictions apply exclusively to newly manufactured goods in factory packaging. Used versions of these items, except for cars, will not be subject to quantity limits.

Additionally, individuals may import up to five pieces of jewelry and one item of fur clothing (including headwear) per year, provided each item differs by name, size, or style. These restrictions are part of a broader effort by authorities to curb the illegal import and resale of consumer goods, especially smartphones.

As The Times of Central Asia reported earlier this year, Kazakhstan intensified efforts in March to clamp down on the smuggling of smartphones into the domestic market. The new limits on personal-use imports are a key part of this crackdown. However, questions remain as to why the regulations do not cover used smartphones, which are also commonly trafficked through unofficial channels.

Gas Crunch in Uzbekistan: Industry Falters as Demand Surges

In the first two months of 2025, Uzbekistan’s natural gas production declined by 4.2% compared to the same period in 2024, continuing a troubling trend that has seen output fall from 61.59 billion cubic meters in 2018 to 44.59 billion cubic meters in 2024. This persistent decrease raises concerns about the nation’s energy security and economic stability.

Once among Central Asia’s energy success stories, Uzbekistan became a net importer of natural gas in 2023, a symbolic turning point for a country whose identity was long intertwined with hydrocarbon abundance.

The extent of the strain was demonstrated in December 2024, when gas stations around the country were forced to close during a cold snap as heating systems across the country kicked into action. This led drivers of methane-powered cars, which are common in the country given that it costs about $15 to fill the tank as opposed to $40-50 in a gasoline-powered vehicle, into a desperate hunt for places to fill up. Kilometer-long queues formed, and drivers ferociously competed to be first to the pump.

Such scenes have become a familiar sight in the Uzbek winter as gas production has fallen.

“Uzbekistan’s gas production is already quite mature,” Anne-Sophie Corbeau of Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy told The Times of Central Asia. “The existing fields are entering a phase of decline. The reserve-to-production ratio was around 18 years based on 2020 data, and the situation is unlikely to be much better now.”

Put simply, the country is running out of easy gas. Despite repeated efforts to locate new reserves, particularly in the under-explored Ustyurt region, exploration has so far failed to yield significant breakthroughs. Even if discoveries are made, the timeline to bring new fields online would mean little impact before 2030, at best.

In parallel, demand for gas has remained stubbornly high. Corbeau noted that “the country’s energy mix and electricity generation are very dependent on natural gas. And Uzbekistan is one of the countries with the lowest wholesale gas prices in the world.” Those prices have long distorted both domestic consumption and investor interest, keeping demand high while choking off potential upstream capital.

Image: Wholesale Gas Price Survey 2024 Edition. International Gas Union. https://www.datocms-assets.com/

This sentiment is echoed by Irina Mironova, Senior Energy Analyst at the New Energy Advancement Hub. “Domestic production is declining faster than consumption,” she said, “and domestic gas pricing is not market-based. It remains below the price of imported gas, which undermines the investment appeal of upstream projects for foreign investors.”

The government has undertaken some measures to control demand over the past year, raising the tariffs for electricity and gas by 52.5% and 71% respectively, hitting consumers in the pocket in an attempt to alter the wasteful use of scant resources.

On the supply side, the government has declared a bold ambition to raise production to 62 billion cubic meters annually under its Uzbekistan–2030 development strategy, but observers remain skeptical. “They’ve tried to facilitate exploration, especially in the Ustyurt region,” says Corbeau. “But even if results are positive, it’s unclear if significant production can be up and running by 2030.”

In 2019, Uzbek state television announced that British oil major BP and Azerbaijan’s state oil company SOCAR would lead exploration into the potential of gas reserves in the Ustyurt Plateau in the far west of the country. BP abandoned the project in 2021, with Tashkent blaming the company’s new focus on low-carbon projects. SOCAR retained an interested and signed a strategic partnership with Uzbekneftegaz in 2024, but six years on from BP’s initial interest, the two companies are still at the “initial exploration” stage, suggesting BP’s concerns may have been more than simply environmental.

Return of the Mack

Right now, Uzbekistan is looking to imports to bridge the gap. The timing is auspicious: Russia’s Gazprom, once focused almost entirely on Europe, has redirected its gaze to Central Asia in the wake of Western sanctions and lost market share. In November 2022, Moscow proposed a “gas union” with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, offering Russian supply to compensate for the region’s faltering output.

Uzbekistan’s energy sector is increasingly propped up by Russian gas imports; image: TCA, Joe Luc Barnes

The Soviet era Central Asia–Center pipeline, once used to transport gas from Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to Russia, has now been engineered to run in reverse. Exports to Uzbekistan in the year to October 2024 exceeded five billion cubic meters.

But are these offers strategic, even predatory?

Not quite, says Corbeau. “Russia stepped in because both Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan each had pipeline export commitments to China – 10 bcm per year each – that they failed to deliver.” She explained that Russia saw an opportunity to fill that gap, sending gas to these two countries, who could then continue to export their own gas on to China. For Russia, it was “a good way to reach China, without building additional infrastructure.”

Mironova agrees that Russia’s motives are largely economic, not geostrategic. “Gazprom is likely to maximize the sales price under current market conditions. Given that Uzbekistan has some level of domestic production, it offers opportunities to integrate local output and optimize costs. If there were a viable opportunity for production expansion, I believe Gazprom would seek involvement rather than attempt to undercut local production.”

That said, Gazprom’s own challenges make it an unreliable savior. The company’s finances have been battered by the collapse in European sales. As Mironova noted, “Following the reduction of gas exports to Europe in 2022 – and especially given Gazprom’s financial difficulties in 2024 – the company’s investment capabilities have been significantly reduced. Uzbekistan is unlikely to be a priority.”

Other sources

In the long run, Tashkent is seeking to diversify. In December, the government announced that twelve modern thermal power plants will be installed by 2027, with almost $5 billion of investment in public private partnerships with companies from France, Germany and Japan. Meanwhile, Russia’s Rosatom has begun work on a small-scale nuclear power plant near the picturesque Tuzkan Lake.

“Uzbekistan aims to derive 54% of its electricity from renewables by 2030,” said Mironova. While current capacity is measly – wind and solar comprised less than 1% of its energy needs in 2023 – the country has made some recent steps forward. The country is currently constructing a series of renewable energy projects worth around $13 billion.

Posters across Tashkent have declared “2025 is the Year of Environmental Protection and the Green Economy”, echoing Mirziyoyev’s announcement in January. Two major wind energy projects in the Bukhara region, built by Chinese and Saudi investors, should have come online by 2026.

Environmental declarations are displayed across the city; image: TCA, Joe Luc Barnes

Meanwhile, in a country which averages 320 sunny days per year, solar has huge potential. A top-down order in January from Energy Minister Jurabek Mirzamakhmudov stipulated that 50% of all roofs in the nation will have solar panels installed on them, although specific details were lacking.

Electric cars are now increasingly populating the streets of Tashkent, with the Chinese firm BYD opening its first factory outside China in Mirziyoyev’s hometown of Jizzakh.

At the recent EU-Central Asia summit in Samarkand, the European Union made climate and energy one of its four key pillars of cooperation with Central Asia. Given Tashkent’s recent push toward regional leadership and Central Asia’s more general push toward economic integration, it also stands to benefit from hydroelectric projects in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

Still, the road to an energy-secure Uzbekistan is bumpy and potholed. Grid infrastructure remains underdeveloped, and familiar allegations of corruption in procurement remain a concern. With the country’s economy and population both booming, demand will continue to surge. As a result, natural gas will likely remain a cornerstone of the energy mix for years to come, leaving the country in a race against time to develop alternatives.

Unpacking the Effects of Trump’s Tariffs on Central Asia

Trade analysts across Central Asia generally agree that the immediate impact of the United States’ tariff policy on the export dynamics of their nations will likely be minimal, as observed in past experiences, except for Kazakhstan.

However, there is a palpable concern regarding potential unforeseen consequences arising from a broader global trade conflict. Notably, the timing of the Trump administration’s announcement regarding global tariffs on imports coincides with a period when Central Asian countries are actively working to enhance their regional trade relationships. This new tariff policy raises significant doubts about the authenticity of recent U.S. efforts to promote increased trade and investment in the region.

The mixed signals coming from Washington may lead Central Asian leaders to re-evaluate their current trade partnerships, especially as they consider the benefits of strengthening ties with China and Russia against the attractiveness of expanding commerce with the United States. Similarly, the European Union may find an opportunity to improve its position, while India could leverage the Chabahar route (a multi-modal transportation route connecting India, Iran, Afghanistan, and potentially Central Asia and Europe). It is worth noting that the market is primarily situated in Asia, and this alternative could have adverse long-term effects on the United States.

Kazakhstan, acknowledged as the United States’ largest trading partner in Central Asia, is poised to face significant repercussions from introducing new tariffs set at 27%. In 2024, trade relations between the U.S. and Kazakhstan reached an impressive total of $3.4 billion, with $1.1 billion in U.S. exports to Kazakhstan and $2.3 billion in imports from Kazakhstan to the U.S. However, a statement from the Kazakh Trade Ministry indicates that exports to the U.S. primarily consist of crude oil, uranium, silver, and other raw materials, all exempt from these tariffs. In 2024, Kazakhstan exported only $95.2 million worth of goods, which will now incur surcharges – a relatively modest figure compared to the country’s overall foreign trade turnover of $141.4 billion. Trade analysts suggest that Kazakhstan has little cause for concern, viewing this situation more as a psychological impact than a serious economic threat. Resource-driven Central Asian economies, such as Kazakhstan, may even find enhanced opportunities in the expanding Asian market.

Trade dynamics in Central Asia reveal a complex landscape, especially concerning the United States. In 2024, Uzbekistan managed to export a modest $42.4 million worth of goods to the US, a small fraction considering its total foreign trade turnover, which reached an impressive $66 billion for that year. This stark contrast highlights the limited engagement of Uzbekistan in the American market. With its total trade turnover of $16 billion in 2024, Kyrgyzstan similarly struggled with exports to the US, which amounted to merely $16.7 million. This reflects a broader trend where Central Asian economies exhibit low volume exports to the US, suggesting significant barriers or challenges in establishing a foothold in this lucrative market.

Tajikistan’s economic performance presented an even more sobering picture. Recording a total trade turnover of $8.9 billion, the country achieved only $4.6 million in exports to the US. This indicates a notable disparity between the country’s overall trade activities and interactions with American markets.

Meanwhile, Turkmenistan did not publicly disclose its total trade turnover; however, it reported a substantial annual trade turnover with China, amounting to $10.6 billion. In contrast, its exports to the US were limited to $14.6 million, further illustrating the challenges these Central Asian nations face in diversifying their trade partnerships beyond their immediate geographic region. In the Caucasus region, Georgia emerged as the leader in trade turnover with the United States in 2024, reporting a total of $1.9 billion. US-bound exports contributed $165.4 million of that figure, marking a more robust engagement compared to its Central Asian counterparts.

The broader implications of these tariffs, starting at a base rate of 10%, impact Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, given their relatively lower trade volumes with the US. This lenient baseline tariff system is mainly designed to address the perceived challenge of integrating these nations into the US market, targeting the export of goods specifically from Uzbekistan and several post-Soviet nations. Overall, the trade relationships between Central Asian countries and the United States are marked by limited export activity and significant challenges, particularly in light of the newly enacted tariffs that could further complicate their economic interactions with one of the world’s largest markets.

The introduction of these tariffs is anticipated to alter the trade landscape across the region fundamentally, reshaping economic relationships and challenging the market accessibility of these countries. As these tariffs come into effect, they will likely influence the volume of trade and the intricate web of political and economic alliances that bind these nations to their trading partners.

The question now arises regarding the effectiveness of the efforts made by the United States and its partners to diminish the overall trade deficit with the rest of the world, and whether these measures will lead to the desired outcomes for America. A critical observation is that Americans persistently spend and invest beyond their means. This economic behavior results in a scenario where the country imports more goods and services than it exports. As this pattern continues unabated, it seems likely that the United States will continue to operate at a deficit, even in the face of increased tariffs imposed on its international trading partners.

Thomas Sampson, an economist from the London School of Economics, provides a thought-provoking viewpoint on this complex issue. Quoted by the BBC, he suggests, “The formula is reverse-engineered to rationalize charging tariffs on countries with which the U.S. has a trade deficit. There is no economic rationale for doing this, and it will cost the global economy dearly.” His assertion highlights the lack of sound economic justification for such tariff impositions, pointing to the potential harm they could inflict on the global financial landscape.

Furthermore, it is essential to acknowledge that trade deficits with particular countries may arise not only from trade barriers. Numerous factors significantly influence these imbalances, including environmental considerations and other interconnected determinants that strongly impact the trade deficit landscape. The multifaceted nature of trade relations highlights the complexity involved in addressing and comprehending the nuances of international trade dynamics. Overall, the Trump tariffs may create new opportunities in Asia, aligning with China’s aspirations to return to the “Asian Century,” where India and China play pivotal roles in world trade. It is crucial to understand that such induced barriers can foster new avenues and innovations, the realities of which U.S. policymakers may struggle to grasp.

Opinion – Storm Clouds Over Kazakhstan: Oil Slump and Global Risks Threaten Economic Stability

The persistent decline in Brent crude prices is the latest sign of a looming ‘perfect storm’ for Kazakhstan’s economy, the largest in Central Asia. With the mining sector comprising nearly half of its GDP and oil as a cornerstone resource, the nation’s economic stability is facing a cascade of potential shocks.

Oil Prices and Budget Vulnerability

Kazakhstan is grappling with significant economic headwinds amid forecasts of a global recession and declining energy prices. In April 2025, OPEC+, including Kazakhstan, unexpectedly agreed to raise oil production by 411,000 barrels per day, pushing prices below $65 per barrel.

Given the country’s reliance on hydrocarbon exports, such price drops jeopardize state revenues. Analysts say Kazakhstan needs oil prices to remain above $42.30 per barrel in 2025 to maintain fiscal stability.

However, the threat extends beyond oil. As energy journalist Oleg Chervinsky noted on his Telegram channel, global commodity prices across the board are falling, a signal that recession is imminent. “The bad news for Kazakhstan is that prices are dropping not only for oil but for all raw materials,” Chervinsky wrote. “JP Morgan estimates the global recession probability at 60%. Even though oil and gas are exempt from Donald Trump’s new tariffs, the broader protectionist policies could fuel inflation, curb growth, and escalate trade tensions”.

Trump’s Trade War and Kazakhstan

President Donald Trump’s sweeping tariffs are designed to limit low-cost imports and incentivize domestic production. Kazakhstan has been hit with a 27% tariff, the highest among the Central Asian nations. Its strategic location within China’s Belt and Road Initiative positions it as a potential re-export hub, prompting higher trade scrutiny.

Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Trade and Integration has downplayed the immediate economic impact, noting that U.S.-bound exports account for less than 5% of total trade, and the country still holds a $1 billion trade surplus with the U.S.

While the direct fallout may be limited, the broader implications of a global trade war could severely strain Kazakhstan’s economy. If a global recession takes hold, demand for Kazakhstan’s key exports, oil, uranium, and metals, will drop, dragging prices down further.

Currency Pressures and Investor Retreat

With shrinking export revenues, the tenge faces devaluation, leading to inflation, rising import costs, and weakened consumer purchasing power. In addition, recessions typically dampen foreign direct investment, especially in emerging markets like Kazakhstan, where perceived risk grows amid uncertainty.

The China Factor

The U.S.-China trade conflict is another critical variable. Trump’s strategy aims to undercut Beijing’s economic strength, but for Kazakhstan, China is its largest trading partner, representing over 15% of foreign trade. A slowdown in China would reduce demand for Kazakhstani raw materials and transit services.

Such a downturn could also jeopardize President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s ambition to establish Kazakhstan as a vital trade corridor between China and Europe. While the Belt and Road Initiative is unlikely to collapse, reduced cargo flows would strain state revenues. China is also the primary buyer of Kazakhstan’s copper, aluminum, and ferroalloys. Any industrial slowdown there immediately impacts Kazakhstan’s export volumes.

Converging Risks

Taken together, global recession, U.S.-China trade tensions, falling oil prices, currency devaluation, potential capital flight, and the structural vulnerability of Kazakhstan’s economy, these forces paint a worrisome picture. Whether this scenario materializes and how Tokayev’s administration responds will be critical in determining the nation’s economic trajectory in 2025.

UNDP and GIZ Renovate Osh Laboratory to Strengthen Tuberculosis Diagnosis in Southern Kyrgyzstan

On April 7, the National Center for Phthisiology and the Osh Region Tuberculosis Center, with support from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ), inaugurated a renovated building of the Osh Interregional Reference Laboratory in southern Kyrgyzstan.

UNDP, in partnership with GIZ, carried out a full-scale renovation, upgraded staff capacities, and certified diagnostic equipment. The modernization enables the facility to enhance tuberculosis (TB) diagnostics and improve treatment effectiveness, UNDP Kyrgyzstan reported.

Accurate and timely diagnosis is essential for effective TB treatment. In this context, UNDP supports the Kyrgyz government’s efforts to expand diagnostic capacity, improve treatment outcomes, and reduce the national TB burden, advancing the goal of a TB-free Kyrgyzstan.

Until 2019, Kyrgyzstan operated two reference laboratories equipped with advanced TB diagnostic technologies. The National Reference Laboratory oversaw supervision, mentoring, and quality control across the country, with a focus on drug susceptibility testing in northern regions. Meanwhile, the Osh facility served the southern regions of Osh, Jalal-Abad, and Batken. Despite having modern equipment, the laboratory was housed in a deteriorating building that compromised diagnostic quality. Operations were scaled down in 2019 due to poor conditions and resumed only after the facility’s renovation in December 2024. The lab now provides full diagnostic services for Osh city and the Osh and Batken regions.

U.S. Support Bolsters National TB Response

Kyrgyzstan has made substantial progress in TB detection and treatment in recent years, with strong backing from the U.S. government. Since 2019, the United States has invested over $20 million in TB-related programs through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).

Declining TB Incidence and Mortality

According to Abdullaat Kadyrov, Director of the National Phthisiology Center, Kyrgyzstan has seen a sustained decline in tuberculosis incidence and mortality over the past 15-20 years.

In 2001, the country recorded 168 TB cases per 100,000 people and a mortality rate of 27 per 100,000. By 2024, this had fallen to 56.3 per 100,000, with mortality dropping to 2.6 per 100,000.