Kyrgyzstan Features - The Times Of Central Asia

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Finance

Digital Inequality in Central Asia: Who Is Winning the AI Race in Finance?

AI in Central Asia’s financial sector is no longer a fashionable add-on. It has become a dividing line between leaders and laggards. A comprehensive report by the National Bank of Kazakhstan and the Fintech AI Center highlights a stark reality: while some institutions are building sovereign data centers, others are still attempting to automate basic document management processes. Kazakhstan is setting the pace. In his introduction to the report, Timur Suleimenov, Governor of the National Bank of Kazakhstan, echoes President Tokayev’s digital modernization agenda, writing: “Artificial intelligence is rapidly becoming a new paradigm for the development of the national economy… Our country faces the task of not only avoiding being left on the periphery of the global technological trend, but also of using its potential to accelerate economic modernization.” The regional AI race in finance is effectively underway, and the findings reveal deep digital inequality. The Balance of Power: Leaders and Followers A review of AI implementation across the region shows a pronounced technological divide. Kazakhstan remains the undisputed leader. Its banking sector has moved beyond experimental pilot projects. According to the report, AI is most actively deployed in the development of new products (14% of financial institutions) and marketing (13%), where neural networks enable hyper-personalized offerings. A further 10% of institutions use AI in operational activities and compliance. Elsewhere in Central Asia, governments are developing ambitious strategies, but implementation in the financial sector remains limited. Kyrgyzstan plans to launch a National AI Platform under its Digital Transformation Concept for 2024-2028. However, most of the country’s banks remain at the pilot or early implementation stage. Current AI applications focus primarily on decision-making optimization and advertising materials rather than complex financial operations. Tajikistan has positioned itself prominently at the policy level. It adopted an AI Development Strategy through 2040, the region’s first long-term framework, and initiated a United Nations General Assembly resolution on AI for Central Asia in July 2025. Yet in practice, the country’s financial market is dominated by microfinance organizations (MFOs), which are cautious in adopting advanced technologies. Their AI use is largely confined to risk management and documentation, while automation, software development, and data processing lag behind. Only 7% of institutions apply AI in financial consulting and customer support. Uzbekistan has taken a different route, prioritizing international and regional partnerships. In October 2024, the government approved its AI Development Strategy through 2030. Rather than building infrastructure independently, Tashkent is partnering with global technology providers. The state is working with Huawei to develop physical AI infrastructure and deploy ready-made industry solutions. At the same time, Uzbekistan is strengthening its academic capacity, including investments in high-performance computing for Inha University in Tashkent. Regional integration is also central to its strategy: IT Park Uzbekistan has signed a memorandum with Kazakhstan’s Astana Hub to integrate startup ecosystems. This combination, collaboration with global vendors, academic investment, and regional partnerships, is enabling Uzbekistan to narrow its technological gap more quickly. People Instead of Servers Digital inequality is most evident in spending priorities. Investment structures...

History

An Early European View of Nomadic Central Asia

During a period when Central Asia remained largely unknown to European audiences, Among Kirghiz and Turkimans offered Western readers a rare first-hand account of the vast steppe and desert regions. The book was written in the late nineteenth century by Richard Karutz, a German traveler whose work belongs to the broader tradition of European exploratory travel literature. I first encountered this book while studying in the United States and later incorporated it into my research. A copy preserved in the library of the Catholic University of America in Washington, D.C., was published in Leipzig in 1911. Since then, it has been regarded as one of the more noteworthy works in early European writing on Central Asia. Who Was Richard Karutz? Richard Karutz was a late nineteenth-century German traveler and writer who journeyed through parts of the Russian Empire’s Central Asian territories. Though not widely known today compared to some British or Russian explorers, Karutz represents a generation of European intellectuals fascinated by the perceived “frontier zones” of empire, regions seen as remote, exotic, and culturally distinct. [caption id="attachment_44400" align="aligncenter" width="312"] Richard Karutz[/caption] He was neither a colonial administrator nor a military officer; rather, he traveled as an independent observer. His writings reflect the curiosity of an educated European shaped by the intellectual currents of his era, including Orientalism and the growing interest in ethnography. Like many travelers of his time, Karutz sought to document ways of life he believed were on the verge of transformation under imperial modernization. Across the Steppe and Desert In Among Kirghiz and Turkimans, Karutz traveled among communities then commonly referred to in Russian and European sources as “Kirghiz”, a historical term often applied to Kazakhs, as well as Turkmen tribes. His route took him across vast grasslands, caravan routes, and oasis settlements shaped by pastoral migration, tribal organization, and Islamic traditions. Rather than producing an official report or military survey, Karutz wrote in a personal and descriptive style typical of travel literature. His narrative often reads as impressionistic reflection rather than systematic analysis. He documents everyday life, including nomadic encampments and felt yurts, equestrian culture and elaborate codes of hospitality, tribal leadership and clan loyalty, as well as desert trade routes and caravan movement. Mangyshlak, a peninsula on the eastern coast of the Caspian Sea in present-day Kazakhstan, features prominently in his descriptions. Significant mineral deposits were later discovered there, leading to its designation as a “peninsula of treasures.” Mangyshlak is characterized by stark desert landscapes and was once described as a barren land consisting largely of sand and stone. In the Middle Ages, it served as a gateway for trade between East and West. The region also played a role in the early history of Turkmen communities. Karutz’s writing attempts to capture both the hardship and the quiet grandeur of steppe existence. Depicting Nomadic Society A central strength of the book lies in its attention to social organization. Karutz was particularly struck by the mobility of Kazakh life, seasonal migrations, a livestock-based economy, and...

Water Scarcity

Central Asia and the Global Water Crisis: A Test of Governance and Cooperation

Water scarcity is rapidly transforming from a regional environmental concern into one of the defining global security challenges of the 21st century. UN-linked assessments estimate that around four billion people experience severe water scarcity for at least one month each year, and nearly three-quarters of the global population lives in countries facing water insecurity. Against this backdrop, Central Asia is not an exception but rather a concentrated example of global dynamics: climate pressure, population growth, and inefficient resource management. Regional initiatives, including proposals put forward by Kazakhstan, therefore have the potential to contribute not only to stability in Central Asia but to the development of a more coherent global water governance architecture. The Water Crisis as a Global Reality Water is increasingly regarded as a strategic resource on par with energy and food. Climate change is intensifying droughts, floods, and the degradation of aquatic ecosystems across all regions, from Africa and the Middle East to South Asia, Europe, and North America. Recent mapping and analysis by investigative groups and international media indicate that half of the world’s 100 largest cities experience high levels of water stress, with dozens classified as facing extremely high levels. Major urban centers, including Beijing, New York, Los Angeles, Rio de Janeiro, and Delhi, are among those under acute pressure, while cities such as London, Bangkok, and Jakarta are also categorized as highly stressed. In this context, Central Asia is not an outlier. It is confronting today what may soon become the global norm. Central Asia: Where Global Trends Converge A defining feature of the current environmental situation is that factors beyond natural ones drive the water crisis. Experts increasingly stress that shortages are often less about absolute physical scarcity and more about outdated management systems, infrastructure losses, and inefficient consumption patterns. In this respect, Central Asia can be seen as a testing ground for global water challenges, where multiple stress factors converge. The region, with mountain peaks exceeding 7,000 meters, contains some of the largest ice reserves outside the polar regions. The Pamir and Hindu Kush ranges, together with the Tibetan Plateau, the Himalayas, and the Tien Shan, form part of what is sometimes referred to as the “Third Pole,” the largest concentration of ice after the Arctic and Antarctic. [caption id="attachment_13410" align="aligncenter" width="2560"] The White Horse Pass, Tajikistan; image: TCA, Stephen M. Bland[/caption] However, the pace of change is alarming. By 2030-2040, water scarcity in Central Asia risks becoming chronic. Glaciers in the Western Tien Shan, for example, have reportedly shrunk by roughly 27% over the past two decades and continue to retreat, posing a direct threat to the flow of the Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers. These rivers increasingly fail to reach the Aral Sea in sufficient volume, while the exposed seabed has become a major source of salt and dust storms. [caption id="attachment_21928" align="aligncenter" width="2560"] Moynaq, Karakalpakstan; image: TCA, Stephen M. Bland[/caption] Infrastructure inefficiencies compound the problem. Estimates suggest that in some systems, 40-50% of water can be lost in deteriorating...

Politics of Language

The Language Nobody Wants to Speak About: Russian’s Uneasy Place in Central Asia’s Cultural Conversation

Rhetoric in segments of the Russian media has sharpened debates over sovereignty and influence across Central Asia, pushing these concerns beyond policy circles and into everyday conversations. The region is reassessing not only pipelines and alliances, but language itself. In politics, this shift is visible and symbolic. In culture, it is more difficult to discern. The Russian language still shapes how Central Asian art is funded, circulated, and institutionally processed, even as institutions distance themselves from Moscow’s influence. This contradiction sits at the heart of contemporary cultural life in the region. Artists produce work rooted in Kazakh, Uzbek, Kyrgyz, Tajik, or Turkmen histories. They title exhibitions in local languages. They speak passionately about decolonial futures and cultural sovereignty. But when the catalogue is written, the grant application submitted, or the curatorial text sent abroad, the language quietly shifts. First to Russian, sometimes to English, and only occasionally does it remain in the local language. This is not nostalgia, but a structural inheritance. Russian remains the shared professional language of much of the urban cultural sector. Edward Lemon, President of the Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, argues that the language’s endurance reflects both ideology and pragmatism. “While local languages have become much more widespread as the Central Asian republics have strengthened their nationhood and as there has been an increase in anti-Russian sentiments since the invasion of Ukraine, Russian language use remains widespread,” Lemon told TCA. “Despite the ideological imperative to reduce reliance on Russian, there are some pragmatic reasons why it remains prominent. High levels of migration to Russia, particularly from Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan, mean that a basic competence in the language is essential to survival for many Central Asians. Russian remains a language of interethnic communication, particularly in Kazakhstan, where ethnic Russians, for the most part, are reluctant to speak Kazakh. While English has become more widespread and some of the Central Asian languages are mutually intelligible, Russian retains a status as a diplomatic, business, and civil society language for those working in multiple countries. Russia also remains a language of education. Over 200,000 Central Asians study in Russia, by far the largest destination in the world. Russian-language schools remain prominent at every level in Central Asia, from kindergarten to graduate schools. In short, while the usage of Russian is in slow decline, its position is relatively entrenched.” For cultural institutions, this reality means that distancing from Moscow politically does not automatically sever the linguistic infrastructure through which grants are written, exhibitions travel, and contracts are signed. Naima Morelli, an arts writer focused on contemporary art across Asia-Pacific and the Middle East, argues that the issue is less about elimination than coexistence. “For me, it makes sense that Russian continues to function as a practical operating language across Central Asia’s cultural infrastructure, as an inherited connective tissue of sorts. In the hypothesis of getting rid of it, the most obvious alternative for a shared language for exchanges across countries in Central Asia is English, which the global...

Afghanistan

From Security Threat to Economic Partner: Central Asia’s New ‘View’ of Afghanistan

Afghanistan is quickly becoming more important to Central Asia, and the third week of February was filled with meetings that underscored the changing relationship. There was an “extraordinary” meeting of the Regional Contact Group of Special Representatives of Central Asian countries on Afghanistan in the Kazakh capital Astana. Also, a delegation from Uzbekistan’s Syrdarya Province visited Kabul, and separately, Uzbekistan’s Chamber of Commerce organized a business forum in the northern Afghan city of Mazar-i-Sharif. A Peaceful and Stable Future for Afghanistan The meeting in Astana brought together the special representatives of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan for Afghanistan. The group was formed in August 2025. There was no explanation for why the fifth Central Asian country, Turkmenistan, chose not to participate. The purpose of the Astana meeting was to coordinate a regional approach to Afghanistan. Comments made by the representatives showed Central Asia’s changing assessment of its southern neighbor. Kazakhstan’s special representative, Yerkin Tokumov, said, “In the past [Kazakhstan] viewed Afghanistan solely through the lens of security threats… Today,” Tokumov added, “we also see economic opportunities.” Business is the basis of Central Asia’s relationship with the Taliban authorities. Representatives noted several times that none of the Central Asian states officially recognizes the Taliban government (only Russia officially recognizes that government). But that has not stopped Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, in particular, from finding a new market for their exports in Afghanistan. Uzbekistan’s special representative, Ismatulla Ergashev, pointed out that his country’s trade with Afghanistan in 2025 amounted to nearly $1.7 billion. Figures for Kazakh-Afghan trade for all of 2025 have not been released, but during the first eight months of that year, trade totaled some $335.9 million, and in 2024, amounted to $545.2 million. In 2022, Kazakh-Afghan trade reached nearly $1 billion ($987.9 million). About 90% of trade with Afghanistan is exports from Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. For example, Kazakhstan is the major supplier of wheat and other grains to Afghanistan, and Uzbekistan is the biggest exporter of electricity to Afghanistan. Kyrgyzstan’s trade with Afghanistan is significantly less, but from March 2024 to March 2025, it came to some $66 million. To put that into perspective, as a bloc, the Central Asian states are now Afghanistan’s leading trade partner, with more volume than Pakistan, India, or China. Kazakhstan’s representative, Tokumov, highlighted Afghanistan’s strategic value as a transit corridor that could open trade routes between Central Asia and the Indian Ocean. Kyrgyzstan’s representative, Turdakun Sydykov, said the trade, economic, and transport projects the Central Asian countries are implementing or planning are a “key condition for a peaceful and stable future for Afghanistan and the region as a whole.” The group also discussed humanitarian aid for Afghanistan. All four of these Central Asian states have provided humanitarian aid to their neighbor since the Taliban returned to power in August 2021. Regional security was also included on the agenda in Astana, but reports offered little information about these discussions. A few days before the opening of the meeting in Astana, Russian Ambassador to Kyrgyzstan Sergei...

China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Railway

China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan Railway: What It Means for Central Asia

The China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway (CKU railway), also known as the Kashgar–Andijan railway line, is more than an infrastructure project. It represents a geopolitical initiative that could significantly shape the future of Central Asia. In June 2024, Beijing, Bishkek, and Tashkent signed the intergovernmental agreement to move the project forward. The project’s financing—estimated at $4.7 billion—was finalized in December 2025, sparking optimism in all three nations about regional connectivity, trade, and economic growth. Once completed, the railway is expected to become a vital strategic asset in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). From China’s perspective, the CKU project is a strategic line that diversifies its trade channels and strengthens overland access to Central Asia and beyond. Construction was ceremonially launched on 27 December 2024 in Kyrgyzstan, with major works progressing through 2025, including key tunnel works. For Uzbekistan, the railway could serve as a key link for commerce and transit. Tashkent aims to integrate the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan line with existing international transport networks, including connections through Iran and Turkey. But how important is the project for Kyrgyzstan, through which, according to recent reporting, 304 km of the line will pass? According to Nurbek Satarov, Presidential Envoy in the Naryn Region, the project is vital for Kyrgyzstan’s most mountainous region, as roughly 90% of the route through the country will run through Naryn. As he told The Times of Central Asia, construction is in full swing, and the railway is expected to be completed between 2028 and 2030, despite the challenging terrain and technical difficulties. The project includes the construction of 50 bridges and 29 tunnels, underscoring the significant engineering complexities involved. But while regional and national authorities anticipate direct economic benefits from the project, critics argue that Kyrgyzstan may end up serving primarily as a transit country, with limited gains for the local economy. They also question the financial sustainability of the project, noting that it is backed by a long-term loan package of approximately $2.3 billion from Chinese banks. The financing, structured over 35 years and to be repaid by the joint venture company implementing the railway, increases Kyrgyzstan’s exposure to China-linked debt and has raised concerns about future repayment obligations. [caption id="attachment_44216" align="aligncenter" width="1536"] Site visit at the road construction project in the Naryn Oblast; image: TCA, Nikola Mikovic[/caption] However, Edil Baisalov, Kyrgyzstan’s Deputy Prime Minister, claims that the CKU will have a positive impact on the country’s economic development. “This railroad will virtually transform Kyrgyzstan – and not just Kyrgyzstan, but the whole of Central Asia,” he told The Times of Central Asia. Baisalov believes that the CKU railway, once completed, will be part of a larger transcontinental railroad that will cut transit times by at least seven days compared to the northern routes of the Trans-Siberian Railway and maritime transport. The CKU line could indeed bypass the usual northern rail routes through Russia and Kazakhstan, taking a significant share of freight from those countries and reducing their transit revenue. Kyrgyzstan, on the other hand, hopes to see direct gains...