• KZT/USD = 0.00221
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00221
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00221
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00221
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00221
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00221
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00221
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00221
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
24 October 2026

Viewing results 13 - 18 of 771

Central Asia Agrees New Water Limits, but National Quotas Remain Unclear

Water has repeatedly caused friction between Central Asian governments. Uncoordinated releases have flooded communities downstream, while disputes over access have contributed to deadly fighting along contested borders. On October 7, the region's countries agreed on water withdrawals from the Amu Darya and Syr Darya for fall and winter 2026–2027, though published results do not reveal how much water each country will receive. The agreements were reached at the 95th meeting of the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination (ICWC) in Avaza, on Turkmenistan's Caspian coast near Turkmenbashi. Participants agreed on national water withdrawal limits and projected reservoir operating schedules, but the figures remain in unpublished annexes to the meeting protocol. Regional cooperation has grown in recent years. In June, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan agreed on water releases and electricity supplies for the 2026 irrigation season, continuing efforts to coordinate reservoir operations across borders. Despite this progress, longstanding tensions remain. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan need water in the winter to generate electricity, while Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan need it in the summer for irrigation. Bishkek has revived proposals for its neighbors to share the costs of maintaining reservoirs, while Afghanistan's Qosh Tepa Canal could put further pressure on the Amu Darya. Countries are also trying to resolve discrepancies in river-flow measurements. [caption id="attachment_58085" align="aligncenter" width="1774"] Officials from Central Asian countries attend talks on cross-border cooperation and sustainable development in the Amu Darya basin in Turkmenistan. Image: State News Agency of Turkmenistan[/caption] From Flooded Villages to Border Clashes The competing demands of electricity generation and agriculture are particularly evident in the Syr Darya basin. Kyrgyzstan's Toktogul Reservoir sits on the Naryn River, the Syr Darya's main tributary. In winter, Kyrgyzstan releases water to generate electricity, months before downstream farmers need it for irrigation. When these releases exceed the capacity of reservoirs and canals, the excess water can cause flooding. In February 2004, residents of Kazakhstan's Kyzylorda region experienced the consequences of uncoordinated water releases. The Syr Darya overflowed its banks, forcing the evacuation of at least 200 families. Ice had already restricted the river's flow, worsening the flooding. According to NASA, Kyrgyzstan was releasing more water from its hydropower system than the agreements allowed, with the excess flow entering the Shardara Reservoir. Uzbekistan agreed to divert some of the water into the Arnasay lake system, but it was not possible to divert the entire volume needed. As a result, the river flooded areas farther downstream. In the Amu Darya basin, disagreements developed differently. In 2012, then-Uzbek President Islam Karimov warned that disputes over water resources could lead to war. The source of tension was the construction of the Rogun Hydropower Plant in Tajikistan. Tashkent feared that a large dam on the Vakhsh River, a tributary of the Amu Darya, would allow Dushanbe to influence the volume of water reaching Uzbekistan's agricultural regions. The confrontation was accompanied by interruptions in gas supplies to Tajikistan, transport restrictions, and mutual accusations. Dushanbe linked Tashkent's actions to pressure over the Rogun project, although the Uzbek side disputed that...

Farewell to Russia: An Interview with Joe Luc Barnes on Central Asia’s Changing Role

In Moscow, before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Joe Luc Barnes met residents who distrusted their government but believed its assurances that war was not coming. The shock that followed opens his book, Farewell to Russia: A Journey Through the Former USSR. Barnes, a journalist, editor and contributor to The Times of Central Asia, has visited all 15 former Soviet republics since February 2022. His book explores how people have built their lives since independence, and how deeply Russia remains woven into them. Speaking to TCA, Barnes recalls meeting rural residents in Central Asia who were more supportive of Russia than their urban, Russian-speaking counterparts. He also reflects on why Russia remains a destination for young people seeking opportunities, despite the discrimination many face there. TCA: At the start of the book, you describe Muscovites’ conviction that Russia would not invade Ukraine. What sustained that certainty, and how did people respond when events shattered it? Joe Luc Barnes: I think it was mainly down to people not wanting to believe it. The amazing thing is that Muscovites (and Russians at large, in my experience) are fully aware that their government is full of crooks whom they wouldn’t trust with anything, but simultaneously most of them are in lockstep with the Kremlin’s foreign policy position. The war started just as Russia was trying to get the country vaccinated against Covid. In the end, the government struggled to persuade even 50% of people to have a single dose of the vaccine, but meanwhile those same people were sure the Kremlin was telling the truth when it said that its soldiers were massing on Ukraine’s borders as part of “routine exercises”. When the war did begin and that illusion collapsed, the main reaction was shock. For the first few days, there was a kind of numbness over the city. Many people had friends or relatives in Ukraine; others were stunned that something they had been denying had actually come to pass. Many in their 20s or 30s were disgusted with their government and began to look for a way out of the country. But people were generally focused on looking after themselves – worrying about things like finances, getting money out of their bank accounts, things like that. I think there was also a belief among many that it would be a short war. When I left Russia in March 2022, I don’t think I, or anyone around me, expected the war to still be raging four and a half years later. [caption id="attachment_58058" align="aligncenter" width="1774"] Lenin still stands in Bishkek, though not on his original plinth. Image: Joe Luc Barnes[/caption] TCA: Your title suggests a departure from Russia. Where in Central Asia did that feel most real, and where did everyday life complicate the idea? Joe Luc Barnes: I think in urban Central Asia, you can often feel like you’re in a Russian city. People speak Russian, you get around using Yandex Taxi, your mobile provider is Beeline, and architecturally you still...

Kyrgyzstan Court Jails Kadyr Atambayev and Temirlan Sultanbekov

A court in Kyrgyzstan has sentenced Kadyr Atambayev, the son of former President Almazbek Atambayev, to four years in prison and opposition Social Democrats leader Temirlan Sultanbekov to seven years over an alleged plot to seize power following last year's parliamentary elections. The defendants denied the allegations, and Sultanbekov described the prosecution as politically motivated shortly before the October 8 verdict. The trial at Bishkek’s Pervomaisky District Court was held behind closed doors despite defense lawyers’ requests for public hearings, preventing independent scrutiny of much of the evidence. Kadyr Atambayev entered politics in 2021, when he was elected to Bishkek's city council as a Social Democrats representative. His father served as Kyrgyzstan's president from 2011 to 2017 but fell into conflict with his successor, Sooronbay Jeenbekov, and subsequently faced several criminal prosecutions. Sultanbekov leads the Social Democrats, a party closely associated with the former president's political circle. He is also a vice president of the Socialist International, an international association of socialist and social democratic parties. He was previously convicted in a separate case involving allegations of vote buying during the November 2024 local elections. His new seven-year prison term takes into account the earlier sentence. The latest case began on November 22, 2025, eight days before Kyrgyzstan's early parliamentary elections. Police detained ten people, including Social Democrats members, former lawmakers, and associates of Almazbek Atambayev. Investigators alleged that the group was preparing to organize unrest after the vote. Atambayev and Sultanbekov were among those charged with preparing a forcible seizure of power. Defense lawyers challenged the prosecution's evidence. Lawyer Asel Argymbaeva questioned a recording used in the case, alleging that it was made before investigators obtained judicial authorization for surveillance and that expert examinations found no calls for violence. The court acquitted former lawmaker Kubanychbek Kadyrov, while some other defendants received lesser penalties or were released from custody. Those convicted have the right to appeal. The verdicts come less than four months before Kyrgyzstan's presidential election on January 27, 2027, in which incumbent President Sadyr Japarov intends to seek a second term. Since Japarov came to power in 2020, Kyrgyzstan has adopted a presidential system that concentrates greater authority in the head of state. The presidential election is taking place amid criminal prosecutions of several prominent political figures and restrictions on rallies in central Bishkek.

They Went to Russia for Work and Ended Up at War: How Central Asians Enter the Russian Military

Twenty-year-old Ainabek Keldibek went to Russia expecting to work as a security guard. Relatives of other young Kazakh men say they had taken jobs at a sausage factory and a poultry farm. But according to reports aired in early October on Kazakhstan’s KTK television channel, the men later ended up in or near the combat zone in Ukraine. Some appeared in videos wearing Russian military uniforms and asked Kazakhstan to help bring them home. On October 7, relatives of Kazakh citizens who had reportedly ended up in Russia’s military visited the Foreign Ministry in Astana to seek help bringing them home. Lawyer Meirman Shekeyev, who accompanied the families, said his list had grown from eight to 21 people as more relatives contacted him. The same day, ministry spokesperson Zhanbolat Ussenov said officials were checking appeals and would send Russia a list of citizens after verification. Negotiations over their return were underway, he said. Exactly how the men ended up in the Russian military remains unclear. One family said their relative had already been wounded, while KTK reported that the circumstances surrounding the signing of the military contracts have not been independently established. For now, much of what is known comes from the men themselves and their relatives. Their stories raise a broader question that neither Moscow nor the capitals of Central Asia have fully answered: how many people from the region have ended up in the Russian military, and under what circumstances did they get there? Nearly 13,000, According to a Ukrainian Database Russia does not publish comprehensive statistics on foreign contract soldiers. Central Asian governments have only fragmented data from criminal cases, consular appeals, and reports from relatives. The most detailed country-by-country breakdown comes from the Ukrainian government project I Want to Live. By May 2026, the project said it had identified 12,919 citizens of the five Central Asian states who had signed contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense: 4,955 citizens of Uzbekistan, 3,489 of Tajikistan, 2,420 of Kazakhstan, 1,474 of Kyrgyzstan, and 581 of Turkmenistan. These figures cannot be regarded as complete or independently verified. I Want to Live operates within Ukraine’s Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War, and Ukraine is a party to the war. In addition, 12,919 is a cumulative figure, not the number of Central Asians currently at the front. Some may have been killed or captured, completed their service, returned home, or obtained Russian citizenship. Another major estimate comes from the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), Truth Hounds, and the Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and Rule of Law. Their report estimates that Russia recruited at least 27,000 foreign nationals from more than 130 countries after February 2022. More than 10,000 of them, according to the study, came from Central Asia. The study is based on open sources, consultations with Ukrainian authorities and experts, and interviews with 16 prisoners of war and former Russian servicemen. There are no comparable publicly available Russian statistics, meaning it is impossible to...

Kyrgyzstan Presidential Election: What Has Changed Since 2020?

Kyrgyzstan’s presidential election is scheduled for January 27, 2027, with candidate nominations already open. Sadyr Japarov intends to run for a second term, but the political landscape bears little resemblance to the situation six years ago, when he came to power following the protests of October 2020. Since then, Kyrgyzstan has shifted from a parliamentary to a presidential model, rewritten its election rules, and changed its media legislation. Japarov’s political alliance with Kamchybek Tashiyev, the former chief of the State Committee for National Security (GKNB), has collapsed. Tashiyev, until recently considered a possible successor to the president, has been convicted and remains under three years of probation supervision. Several other prominent politicians are facing criminal cases, while rallies in central Bishkek have been restricted. The Jogorku Kenesh, the national parliament, has scheduled the vote for a Wednesday rather than the traditional Sunday. The election law was changed twice: first, the vote was moved from autumn 2026 to January 2027, and then election day was moved from the fourth Sunday to the fourth Wednesday of January. “I intend to run for another term and continue my work,” Japarov said in an August 13 interview with investigative journalist Ali Toktakunov. Japarov’s right to run again required a separate interpretation by the Constitutional Court. In 2021, he won under the previous Constitution, which provided for a single six-year presidential term. A few months later, a new Constitution shortened the term to five years but allowed a president to hold office twice. In February, the Constitutional Court preserved the original six-year duration of Japarov’s current term, while ruling that he would continue exercising his powers under the 2021 Constitution. It also held that his current six-year mandate counts as his first term under the new two-term limit, allowing Japarov to run again. From Successor to Defendant A year ago, any discussion of the election inevitably led to Tashiyev. Japarov’s longtime ally headed the GKNB and was the country’s second center of political influence. Japarov later said that he had originally planned to step down after his first term and support Tashiyev. “Kamchy would become president, and I would retire. That was my plan,” he said in the interview with Toktakunov. That scenario collapsed after a group of 75 former officials, politicians, and public figures published an open letter on February 9 calling for an early presidential election. The following day, Japarov dismissed Tashiyev as head of the GKNB. A criminal case and trial followed. In July, Tashiyev and seven other defendants were found guilty of preparing to seize power by force. In September, the Bishkek City Court removed that charge and reclassified the case as obstruction of electoral rights. Under the current election law, people with a criminal conviction, including one that has later been expunged, are barred from being elected president. Tashiyev therefore cannot take part unless his conviction is overturned. Among other contenders, former acting Interior Minister and Batken regional governor Omurbek Suvanaliev has announced his intention to run. He has spoken...

Reports of Suspected Plague in Russia Prompt Central Asian Health Checks

Reports surrounding the death of an employee at an anti-plague research institute in Russia’s Irkutsk region have prompted health authorities across Central Asia to tighten sanitary controls and review preparedness measures. Russian officials have not confirmed that the employee contracted plague or that a laboratory accident occurred. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan have nevertheless announced additional checks or heightened readiness in response. Officials across the region say there is no cause for alarm, but the response reflects the sensitivity that remains around cross-border infectious disease threats after the COVID-19 pandemic. What Is Known Russian authorities have released few details, but reports say an employee at the anti-plague institute in Shelekhov, near Irkutsk, accidentally broke a test tube containing live bacteria. That employee, a female aged 27 or 28, was hospitalized on September 29, but she died on October 2. The hospital where she was treated was reportedly placed under quarantine, and nearly 200 people who might have come into contact with her are under medical observation. There are also reports that four more hospitals are under quarantine, with some 100 people hospitalized as a precaution. Russian officials deny these reports and say health specialists are on the ground in the area investigating and have urged the public to wait for an official assessment of the situation and not spread rumors. The Response in Central Asia Kazakhstan shares a 7,800-kilometer border with Russia; the distance from far northeastern Kazakhstan to Irkutsk is more than 1,500 kilometers. While that is comforting, the distance from Kazakhstan to Wuhan, China, is some 3,600 kilometers, and the coronavirus that originated in Wuhan in 2019 eventually reached Kazakhstan and everywhere else in the world. On October 5, Kazakhstan’s Health Ministry said it was aware of the reports from Irkutsk, was following the situation closely, and had ordered closer checks at border crossings and other entry points. “Sanitary and quarantine controls are being conducted at state border crossing points,” a Health Ministry statement said, “No individuals with elevated temperatures, signs of illness, or suspected highly dangerous infections have been detected across any mode of transport.” The Health Ministry said the chances of plague, or “pneumonia of undetermined etiology” crossing Kazakhstan’s borders were low. Kyrgyzstan’s Health Ministry also said it had ordered close checks of people entering the country in response to reports about the situation in Irkutsk. “Specialists monitor individuals, vehicles, and cargo crossing the border to prevent the importation and spread of infectious diseases, including highly dangerous infections,” the Health Ministry said. The same measures are being implemented in Tajikistan. Said Davlatzoda, the head of the Health Ministry’s Department of Sanitary-Epidemiological Safety, Emergency Situations and Emergency Medical Care, said orders went out that every person crossing into Tajikistan must have their body temperature measured. Workers from the department have been instructed to ask people arriving whether they are experiencing symptoms such as nausea and vomiting, headache, weakness, and muscle and joint pain. Personnel from the Sanitary-Epidemiological Safety Department have also been told to wear disposable hazmat...