In recent years, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have embarked on distinct yet complementary paths to enhance their connectivity with Pakistan. Kazakhstan has embedded itself within such institutionalized frameworks as the Middle Corridor (also known as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, or TITR). In this context, it has also sought to align with trans-Eurasian logistics designed to integrate South Asian trade routes into established infrastructural regimes.

Uzbekistan, by contrast, marginalized from World Bank-backed corridors, has adopted a more adaptive and tactical approach by advancing alternative linkages such as the Termez–Karachi transport corridor and the Trans-Afghan Railway. Both strategies reflect the imperative to reduce dependence on Russian-controlled northern routes while leveraging Pakistan’s maritime infrastructure to reposition Central Asia within the matrix of regional and global trade.

Thus, a few days ago, at a meeting with Uzbekistan’s Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Pakistan, the prospect of developing the Termez–Karachi transport corridor was discussed. Termez is on Uzbekistan’s border with Afghanistan; the goods would travel via Kabul and Kandahar to Quetta, then to the Karachi port. The possibility of establishing an advanced logistics terminus in Termez with the assistance of Pakistan’s National Logistics Corporation was explored. The two sides noted the need to create a permanent platform for business communications between them, such as an Entrepreneurs’ Council coordinated by their respective Chambers of Commerce.

This road route should not be confused with the Trans-Afghan Corridor (TAC, also called the Trans-Afghan Railway Project or the Uzbekistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan Railway Project), a $4.8 billion project to connect the three countries via 573 kilometers of rail. This rail route would run from Termez through Mazar-e-Sharif and Logar in Afghanistan, reaching Pakistan at the Kharlachi border crossing and extending to Kohat District, where a rail link southward already exists.

In August 2024, the governments of Kazakhstan and Pakistan agreed to extend the TAC’s route into northeast Kazakhstan to create the Trans-Afghan Multimodal Transport Corridor: multimodal because goods would arrive from Kazakhstan at Uzbekistan’s Termez terminus by truck, for transshipment by rail to Pakistani ports. From there, they can reach a broad range of countries from Southeast Asia to South Asia to the Middle East.

Kazakhstan, pursuing its goal to diversify its export pathways and reduce dependence on traditional northern routes, has explored several connectivity projects that have either direct or indirect implications for trade routes to Pakistan. Of these, the three most significant are the Trans-Afghan Multimodal Transport Corridor (TMTC), the Middle Corridor, and the Quadrilateral Traffic in Transit Agreement (QTTA).

The Middle Corridor is the best-known of the three. Seeking to connect China to Europe via the Caspian region, it is not directly pertinent for Pakistan, but it would offer the potential to integrate with Pakistani trade routes, offering an alternative pathway for goods.

The QTTA includes China, Kyrgyzstan, and Pakistan along with Kazakhstan. This transit deal aims to facilitate Kazakhstan’s foreign trade by providing it with access to Pakistani ports via the Karakoram Highway, which connects Pakistan and China, thereby bypassing Afghanistan. It was agreed in 2017 and is related to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Pakistan. Indeed, the Karakoram Highway, a major segment of the QTTA, is a crucial component of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

The CPEC, however, has itself encountered significant problems and has lost a great deal of momentum since the late 2010s. Various earthquakes — not to mention the social and economic effects of the state-imposed lockdowns in the early 2020s — have directly affected progress on the renovation of the Karakoram Highway and its integration into a reinvigorated CPEC corridor. Therefore, the QTTA must today be judged as being aspirational. This assessment does not even take into account significant security and financial constraints.

The emergent connectivity architectures that Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are pursuing manifest structural transformations in Eurasian economic corridors. These transformations will condition the evolution not only of the regional international system but also of the general international system, as global political chaos deepens over the next two decades. Uzbekistan’s pivot toward road and rail corridors through Afghanistan is an adaptive maneuver responding to its marginalization from formally sponsored transcontinental and intercontinental transit corridors.

By prioritizing pragmatic, country-to-country agreements, Uzbekistan is seeking to circumvent bureaucratic and financial obstacles posed by large institutional frameworks. Trying to increase its agility, it is instead relying on targeted investment and partnerships to carve out independent transit routes linking it to global markets.

Kazakhstan’s strategy, by contrast, consists of embedding itself within multilateral transport agreements that have international support. This strategy aligns with China’s BRI, which prioritizes trans-Eurasian corridors, while simultaneously reducing reliance on Russian-controlled infrastructure. Moscow, wary of losing influence, has sought to maintain leverage through alternative connectivity agreements.

The long-term success of initiatives such as the Middle Corridor and the QTTA will depend not only on material infrastructure investments but also on the resilience of their underlying geopolitical foundations. Here, Pakistan’s policy recalibrations and security conditions in Afghanistan are key.

As an overall restructuring of the international system is projected for the years around mid-century, the fate of these corridors will shape and constrain Central Asia’s broader and longer-term strategic realignment. Much like the dissolution of Soviet-era transit dependencies and the post–Cold War realignment of regional economies, these emerging corridors signify not just infrastructural projects, but the ongoing reconfiguration of geoeconomic power in Eurasia.