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03 Mar 2025

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Tajikistan Announces Preliminary Parliamentary Election Results; OSCE Absent

March 6, 2025
By Vagit Ismailov

Bakhtiyor Khudoyorzoda, the chairman of Tajikistan’s Central Commission for Elections and Referenda (CCER), has announced the preliminary results of the March 2 parliamentary elections to the Assembly of Representatives.

According to Khudoyorzoda, 4.71 million of the 5.52 million registered voters participated in the election, representing an 85.3% turnout.

The election results for party-list voting were as follows:

The People’s Democratic Party of Tajikistan secured the most support, receiving 2,435,541 votes (51.9%).
The Agrarian Party of Tajikistan garnered 986,887 votes (21%).
The Economic Reform Party of Tajikistan received 595,281 votes (12.7%).
The Socialist Party of Tajikistan obtained 248,064 votes (5.3%).
The Democratic Party of Tajikistan received 237,536 votes (5.1%).
The Communist Party of Tajikistan received 89,738 votes (1.9%), failing to meet the 5% threshold required for parliamentary representation.

Additionally, 50,895 voters chose the “against all” option.

As a result of the party-list vote count, the 22 parliamentary seats allocated through the national proportional system were distributed as follows:

People’s Democratic Party of Tajikistan – 12 seats
Agrarian Party of Tajikistan – 5 seats
Economic Reform Party of Tajikistan – 3 seats
Socialist Party of Tajikistan – 1 seat
Democratic Party of Tajikistan – 1 seat

The Communist Party of Tajikistan did not secure any seats.

In total, five of the six registered parties gained representation in the Majlisi Oli, Tajikistan’s parliament. The remaining parliamentary seats were allocated through single-mandate districts.

On February 6, 2025, the OSCE/ODIHR canceled a planned election observer mission, stating that the Tajik authorities’ failure to accredit the observers had “denied the people of Tajikistan an impartial and independent assessment of the elections.” A mission from the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, meanwhile, characterized the election as “transparent, credible and democratic.”

In the latest presidential elections, held in 2020, incumbent Emomali Rahmon won a fifth consecutive term, securing a purported 92.08% of the vote. Rahmon has been president since 1994, having previously led the country as Chairman of the Supreme Assembly from 1992 to 1994. TCA has previously reported on long prison sentences for Tajik opposition figures.

Elections to the National Assembly will be held on March 28, 2025.

03 Mar 2025

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Monument to Kyrgyz Writer Chingiz Aitmatov Unveiled in Rome

March 3, 2025
By Sergey Kwan

A monument honoring Chingiz Aitmatov, the renowned Kyrgyz writer, was unveiled at Villa Grazioli Park in Rome on February 27. Aitmatov (1928-2008) remains the most prominent figure in Kyrgyz literature. A writer, journalist, and diplomat, he gained international recognition for his works, which were written in both Russian and Kyrgyz.

The monument’s unveiling was initiated by the Embassy of the Kyrgyz Republic in Italy as part of ongoing efforts to promote Kyrgyz cultural heritage. This follows the inauguration of Kyrgyzstan Park in Rome during President Sadyr Japarov’s official visit to Italy in October 2024.

The white marble monument, created by Kyrgyz sculptor Alexey Morozov, seeks to capture the philosophical depth of Aitmatov’s literary legacy and his reflections on the fate of humanity.

The opening ceremony was attended by representatives from Italy’s Ministry of Culture and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, officials from the Rome municipality, members of the Italian media, and representatives from the diplomatic, academic, cultural, and business communities. Aitmatov’s family members were also present, along with representatives of Kyrgyz diaspora organizations from across Italy.

During the event, Kyrgyz Ambassador to Italy, Taalai Bazarbayev, expressed hope that the monument would serve as a lasting source of inspiration for future generations of both Kyrgyz and Italians. He emphasized the importance of preserving cultural heritage and the unifying power of art in fostering connections between nations.

03 Mar 2025

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Opinion: Washington Needs a Stronger Policy for the Middle Corridor

March 4, 2025
By Dr. Robert M. Cutler

The inauguration of President Donald Trump marks a new phase in U.S. foreign policy with direct implications for the Middle Corridor, a key trade route linking China to Europe via Central Asia and the South Caucasus. This corridor, also known as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), has been gaining increasing strategic importance as global trade patterns shift and great-power competition intensifies.

During Trump’s first term, U.S. engagement in the region was sporadic and lacked a comprehensive strategy. While some policy initiatives were undertaken to counterbalance Russian and Chinese influence in Eurasia, these efforts remained piecemeal. The Biden administration attempted to address this gap by allocating limited funding for infrastructure development and engaging in regional negotiations aimed at fostering greater connectivity. However, Biden’s approach ultimately fell short of a coherent, long-term policy, allowing Moscow and Beijing to consolidate their positions in the region.

The significance of the Middle Corridor has been underscored by increased international investment. Beyond economic concerns, the Middle Corridor plays a critical role in Europe’s energy security. The corridor facilitates the westward flow of Caspian resources, providing an alternative to Russian energy exports. The development of the Middle Corridor offers a strategic means of achieving this goal, reinforcing the EU’s energy independence while simultaneously strengthening economic ties with the South Caucasus and Central Asia.

Azerbaijan has emerged as a central player in the development of the Middle Corridor. As a crucial transit country, Baku has actively pursued infrastructure investments to bolster the corridor’s efficiency. Azerbaijan’s role is further magnified by its growing energy exports to Europe, solidifying its position as a strategic partner in regional energy security. The Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway, a vital component of the corridor, has received continued investment, underscoring Azerbaijan’s commitment to enhancing trade and transit connectivity.

However, Azerbaijan’s increasing importance also intersects with ongoing geopolitical complexities, particularly its relationship with Armenia. The absence of Armenian participation in the Middle Corridor remains a notable gap, one that is directly tied to the resolution of long-standing territorial disputes. The prospect of an Armenia–Azerbaijan peace treaty has gained traction in recent years, supported by Western diplomatic efforts. U.S. policymakers have recognized that sustainable peace between the two nations would not only stabilize the South Caucasus but also unlock Armenia’s potential role in the corridor.

Armenia’s geopolitical realignment presents both opportunities and challenges. While Yerevan has signaled its interest in deepening ties with the West, it remains economically dependent on Russia, particularly in energy and financial sectors. Increased Armenian exports to Russia, some of which analysts suspect may involve re-exports of sanctioned goods, further complicate efforts to shift its economic orientation.

Recent discussions within U.S. policy circles indicate a growing recognition of the Middle Corridor’s strategic importance. American policymakers have begun exploring ways to expand support for infrastructure development in the region, recognizing that a proactive approach could yield multiple geopolitical and economic benefits. By investing in the Middle Corridor, the U.S. has an opportunity to enhance regional stability, strengthen economic ties with key partners, and counterbalance Russian and Chinese influence in Eurasia.

Furthermore, diplomatic engagement is crucial to ensuring that regional disputes do not obstruct the corridor’s development. The U.S. should leverage its influence to support peace negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan while simultaneously encouraging Yerevan to diversify its economic partnerships beyond Moscow. This could involve increased economic cooperation with the EU, integration into Western financial networks, and participation in broader regional trade agreements.

Another key component of a successful U.S. strategy must be strengthening partnerships with regional partners. Azerbaijan, as a critical transit hub for the Middle Corridor, plays an indispensable role in its success. While U.S.–Azerbaijan relations have been strained in recent years, cooperation on Middle Corridor development presents an opportunity for renewed engagement. Coordinating efforts with Baku could facilitate smoother transit logistics, enhance trade facilitation measures, and promote security along the corridor’s key routes.

Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan also stand to benefit from increased U.S. engagement in the Middle Corridor. Both countries have been actively pursuing policies aimed at reducing their reliance on Russia while expanding trade links with Europe and Asia. The U.S. should support these efforts by deepening economic ties, fostering private-sector investment, and facilitating regional integration initiatives.

At the same time, Washington must remain vigilant against potential disruptions by Russia and China. Moscow has consistently sought to maintain its grip on Eurasian trade routes, and any significant U.S. involvement in the Middle Corridor will likely be met with countermeasures. Similarly, Beijing has been expanding its influence in Central Asia through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), positioning itself as a dominant economic force in the region.

A well-calibrated U.S. approach must account for these dynamics, ensuring that American involvement enhances regional stability rather than exacerbating existing tensions. Ultimately, the Middle Corridor represents a vital yet underutilized avenue for advancing U.S. strategic interests. A proactive American policy — one that combines economic investment, diplomatic engagement, and regional partnership-building — could transform the corridor into a key pillar of stability and prosperity in Eurasia.

02 Mar 2025

Home, Justice, Kazakhstan Justice, Features

Azerbaijan Mulls Praise from Chechnya Two Months After Crash

March 2, 2025
By Times of Central Asia

Two months ago, an Azerbaijan Airlines plane crashed in Kazakhstan after – Azerbaijan says – it was accidentally hit by Russian ground fire in the Russian region of Chechnya. Now Chechnya’s leader says he wants to give an award to the surviving crew members, an announcement that initially angered some people in Azerbaijan, considering the alleged culpability of forces on the ground.

Two of five crewmembers survived the Dec. 25 crash that killed a total of 38 people on the airliner that had been flying from Baku to Grozny, Chechnya’s capital, only to divert across the Caspian Sea and crash near the Kazakh city of Aktau. Twenty-nine people survived. A preliminary report led by Kazakhstan ruled out technical malfunction and said parts of the plane were hit by foreign objects. The report didn’t confirm the objects were missile shrapnel.

On Feb. 27, Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov, an ally of Russian President Vladimir Putin who has sent troops to fight with Russian forces against Ukraine, said surviving Azerbaijan Airlines flight attendants Zulfugar Asadov and Aydan Rahimli had been nominated for the “For Merit to the Chechen Republic” award because of their courage and professionalism.

“In memory of the victims of the air disaster, a memorial plaque will be installed in Grozny,” Kadyrov said on Telegram.

“Flight attendants have always been the first line of support for passengers, ensuring their safety and comfort during flights. In the face of crisis, they acted swiftly and decisively, doing everything they could to assist those on board, said Kadyrov, who expressed condolences to Azerbaijan and its people and spoke of “our shared grief.”

Media in Azerbaijan widely covered Kadyrov’s statement about the flight attendants, which was unlikely to ease Azerbaijani demands that those suspected of shooting at the airliner be turned over for prosecution.

On the contrary, the Caliber.Az media outlet reported that the Chechen leader’s award was initially met with “public outrage” in Azerbaijan. However, another Azerbaijan-based organization, the Trend News Agency, said Azerbaijan had concluded that Kadyrov’s statement was “acceptable” because investigations showed that Russian military personnel, not Chechnya’s leadership, were responsible. Trend cited an unidentified source in Azerbaijan’s government.

Kadyrov is a Putin loyalist with considerable autonomy whose forces have been accused of killings, disappearances and other abuses. Chechen troops, sometimes compared to a private army, are nominally under federal Russian control.

Putin has apologized for the crash, saying Russian air defenses were repelling attacks by Ukrainian drones at the time when the Azerbaijani plane was trying to land. He has not acknowledged that the plane was hit by Russian fire.

01 Mar 2025

Central Asia, Home, Life & Culture, Kazakhstan Life & Culture, Kazakhstan, Features, Kazakhstan Featurees, Kazakhstan Home

Cargo Spacecraft Heads for Space Station in First Baikonur Launch of 2025

March 1, 2025
By Times of Central Asia

Three tons of food, fuel and other supplies are on their way to the International Space Station after a Russian spacecraft lifted off on a Soyuz rocket from the Baikonur Cosmodrome in Kazakhstan. It was the first launch from the space facility this year.

The Roscosmos Progress MS-30 cargo spacecraft, which is unpiloted, was launched early Friday and the trip to the station will take about two days. NASA refers to the space freighter as Progress 91 because it’s the 91st Russian resupply craft to launch in support of the International Space Station since its construction began in 1998.

The Progress spacecraft will deliver equipment for scientific experiments, clothing and hygenic items for the crew, potable water, refueling propellant and nitrogen to replenish the atmosphere aboard the station, Russia’s state news agency Tass reported. It said the spacecraft is also carrying a new spacesuit, the Orlan-ISS No. 6, for the spacewalks of Russian cosmonauts.

“Currently, Russian cosmonauts use Orlan-ISS No. 4 and Orlan-ISS No. 5 spacesuits for extravehicular activity outside the space station,” Tass said.

On the X platform, space journalist Anatoly Zak posted a photograph of what he said was a “rare view” of the Orlan spacesuit being loaded onto the spacecraft before launch.

There are three Russians and four Americans on the space station at this time. NASA and Roscosmos have a “cross-flights” deal involving travel to and from the station for three Russian cosmonauts on the U.S. Crew Dragon spacecraft and three U.S. astronauts on the Russian Soyuz spacecraft. The joint missions have been one of the rare areas of collaboration between Russia and the United States during the Ukraine war.

“Delivery!” NASA declared after the launch on Friday. The U.S. space agency provided launch coverage on various platforms and will do the same for the arrival and docking of the Russian spacecraft at the station. Docking is scheduled at 6:03 p.m. EST on Saturday.

“The Progress 91 spacecraft will remain docked to the space station for approximately six months before departing for re-entry into Earth’s atmosphere to dispose of trash loaded by the crew,” NASA said.

28 Feb 2025

Home, Turkmenistan International Affairs, Turkmenistan, International Affairs, Turkmenistan Features, Features

Strategic Cooperation Between Turkey and Turkmenistan Gains Momentum

April 24, 2025
By Dr. Robert M. Cutler

Turkey and Turkmenistan have accelerated their cooperation in recent years, advancing economic, energy, and diplomatic initiatives that underscore their shared cultural and strategic interests. Their deepening of bilateral ties reflects and expresses both broader regional dynamics and shifts in global energy geopolitics. As The Times of Central Asia reports, the two countries signed a natural gas supply agreement in February 2025 that reinforces Turkey’s ambitions as a regional energy hub while providing Turkmenistan with a new export avenue.

Turkmenistan will begin supplying 1.3 billion cubic meters per year (bcm/y) of natural gas to Turkey on March 1 through a swap agreement. Turkmenistan will send gas to Iran for consumption in the northeast of the country, in return for which Iran will transfer an equivalent amount to Turkey. Various press commentaries and diplomatic declarations touting the “export of Turkmen gas to Turkey” are therefore to be regarded skeptically as political grandstanding, even if such an assessment may be supported from a technical standpoint of how the industry calculates flows.

Trade and investment relations between Turkey and Turkmenistan have recently seen steady growth, underpinned by Turkish business engagement in Turkmenistan’s infrastructure and construction sectors. Over 600 Turkish companies are active in Turkmenistan, and Turkish direct investment has surpassed $500 million. Turkish contractors have executed projects worth over $50 billion in Turkmenistan since its independence.

In this context, the eighth meeting of the bilateral Intergovernmental Commission on Economic Cooperation took place in Ankara on February 25. Following the meeting, a large-scale protocol was signed, including 87 points and covering cooperation over a wide range of issues – areas such as trade and investment, energy, transport and logistics, scientific cooperation, agriculture, and healthcare.

The bilateral trade turnover between the two countries reached $2.2 billion in 2024, and Turkey aims to more than double this level to $5 billion. However, reaching that target hinges on further liberalization of Turkmenistan’s economic policies and the expansion of investment-friendly regulations, both of which could be challenging.

The two sides also discussed how to integrate Turkmenistan into the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR, “Middle Corridor”) as well as possible cooperation in the field of transport and logistics toward that end. Ankara has successfully positioned itself as a strategic economic partner, but Ashgabat’s tightly controlled economy presents structural barriers that may slow the desired growth. Ankara’s engagement with Ashgabat thus reflects its broader efforts to enhance connectivity across Central Asia.

Turkey’s push to integrate Turkmenistan into the TITR aligns with its own ambition to position itself as a logistical bridge between Asia and Europe, complementing its Middle Corridor strategy, which seeks to create an alternative trade route bypassing Russia. However, Turkmenistan’s rigid economic model and cautious foreign policy limit the pace of integration. Practical challenges include regulatory misalignment, infrastructure bottlenecks, and geopolitical sensitivities.

Turkey’s Vice-President, Cevdet Yilmaz, affirmed his country’s intention that Turkmen gas and electricity should reach European markets through Turkey. Turkish state-owned companies such as TPAO and BOTAŞ will also seek to develop hydrocarbon fields in Turkmenistan and make infrastructure investments to transport the resources to western Turkmenistan, where it is easier for them to export to international markets.

Turkey’s deepening engagement with Turkmenistan aligns with its broader geopolitical ambitions within the Organization of Turkic States (OTS). Ankara has consistently sought to consolidate influence among Turkic-speaking nations. Its expanding energy and economic ties with Ashgabat reinforce this strategy. The agreement also positions Turkey as a counterweight to Russian and Chinese dominance in Central Asia’s energy landscape.

Despite its strategic benefits, the gas supply agreement is not without risks. Key uncertainties include vulnerabilities from Iran’s often-changing energy policies and economic challenges, potential shifts in government policies in any of the three countries involved, problems with scalability due to the absence of a direct Turkmenistan–Turkey pipeline, and broader geopolitical volatility that would ignite regional tensions.

Physical obstacles to the expansion of the planned volumes are a further challenge. Turkish officials have suggested increasing Turkmen gas imports to 15 bcm/y within two decades. Negotiations are already underway to extend the current five-year agreement and increase supply volumes over time. However, such an expansion would require significant investment in infrastructure, not to mention regulatory agreements.

The Turkey–Turkmenistan energy partnership is a marker for a broader geopolitical recalibration in Central Asia and the Caspian Sea region. The long-term success of strengthening bilateral ties will depend upon path-dependent context. Broader regional implications concerning Russian and Chinese reactions remain fluid.

Ashgabat is unlikely to antagonize Moscow and Beijing with a full pivot westward, especially given its own “positive neutrality”. Economic interdependence gives Turkey leverage to pull Turkmenistan, which has “observer” status at the OTS, partially into its orbit. Turkey’s success in attracting Turkmenistan could shift Central Asia’s geopolitical balance.

Still, Ankara cannot match Beijing’s investment scale or replace Moscow’s security guarantees. The Turkish economy is strained by inflation and the post-2023 earthquake recovery. Its capacity to compete is, therefore, limited, and there is some risk of overextension. As a consequence, the most likely prospect for developing bilateral relations with Ashgabat is a gradual, pragmatic partnership rather than a transformative geopolitical shift.