• KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00214 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10508 0.48%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00214 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10508 0.48%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00214 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10508 0.48%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00214 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10508 0.48%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00214 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10508 0.48%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00214 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10508 0.48%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00214 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10508 0.48%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00214 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10508 0.48%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%

Opinion: Tajikistan Narrows Online Extremism Liability — Debate Intensifies in Uzbekistan

Tajikistan’s Prosecutor General has reported a decrease in terrorist and extremist crimes. Officials attributed the decrease to the easing of penalties for “likes” and shares on the internet, which came into force in early May 2025, when the authorities stated that “liking” certain types of online materials and sharing them on social networks would no longer, in themselves, constitute a criminal offense.

From 2018 onward, criminal liability was applied to the distribution, storage, or public endorsement of materials deemed extremist or prohibited. According to human rights groups, more than 1,500 Tajiks were imprisoned under the policy. Following recent changes, however, Prosecutor General Habibullo Vohidov said the number of terrorist and extremist crimes had decreased by more than 23%, by 314, compared to 2024.

According to Reuters, the clarification applies to online materials deemed extremist or terrorist in nature; “likes” or shares of such content would no longer automatically trigger criminal liability.

The recent changes implemented in Tajikistan have led to heated discussions among the public in Uzbekistan, where liability for online “likes”, posts, and comments continues. International organizations have for years characterized Uzbekistan’s enforcement of online speech provisions as a form of pressure on freedom of expression.

In Uzbekistan, enforcement previously focused primarily on materials related to extremism and terrorism, but legal changes in 2021 introduced criminal liability for online “discrediting” of the president and state authorities.

Local activist Rasul Kusherbayev wrote the following on his Telegram channel: “This issue is urgent for us, too. Law enforcement agencies, which lack the ‘nerve’ to punish officials who are illegally destroying the property of citizens, are not ashamed to hold citizens liable for a ‘like’”.

Some observers argue that Uzbekistan’s legislation is more regulated compared to that in Tajikistan. While liability for prohibited content had been established in Tajikistan, the exact list of prohibited materials was not consistently disclosed. In Uzbekistan, however, this list has been regularly updated and publicly announced in recent years.

Article 244.1 and the Prohibited List

Draft decisions related to prohibited information have appeared in Uzbek legislation since the 1990s. Documents regarding information policy signed in March 1999 on the Lex.uz website speak about banned information.

However, what was included in this list was not announced in open sources in Uzbekistan for years. The draft law on disclosing the list to the public was signed in 2014. Publicly available information about the evidentiary basis for earlier cases remains limited.

The list of social network accounts and sites prohibited in Uzbekistan was last updated in January 2026. Around 1,600 channels, pages, and materials were included in the list. Specifically, it includes 249 pages and channels on Facebook, 790 on Telegram, 265 on Instagram, 167 on YouTube, 36 on the Odnoklassniki social network, and 53 on TikTok. Materials in audio, video, and text formats on websites and social networks were included.

Although the list is publicly available, questions have arisen regarding its comprehensibility and clarity. Observers argue that the breadth of the list risks encompassing ordinary religious and political expression. Activists emphasize that the breadth of the list, besides creating inconvenience, also makes it nearly impossible to remember all of them.

The May 2025 changes in Tajikistan clarified that criminal liability would apply primarily to the intentional production or dissemination of extremist materials, narrowing the scope for cases based solely on passive or incidental online interaction. According to Article 244.1 of the Criminal Code, for the preparation, storage, distribution, or demonstration of materials that threaten public safety and public order, strict penalties are set, ranging from fines to imprisonment.

In 2023, Jahongir Ulugmurodov was sentenced for distributing a prohibited nashida (an Islamic religious song) on Telegram; his testimony stated that he did not know the nashida was on the “prohibited” list. After public discussions and a series of appeals, the verdict was modified, and the sentence of three years’ imprisonment was changed to three years’ house arrest.

The case prompted online debate and appeals from activists. Most of them condemned the practice of taking the list, which is “difficult to understand,” as a basis for strict criminal liability.

Entrepreneur Zafar Hoshimov expressed his reaction to this situation: “A 21-year-old student reportedly received a three-year prison sentence for a nashida he took from YouTube (an open source) a year ago and sent to his classmates without knowing…  Only after a religious committee reviewed the nashida was it deemed harmful. After all, a young man could have listened to the song on YouTube and not understood these aspects of it.”

The government does not publish comprehensive statistics on how many people have been prosecuted in connection with prohibited materials on the internet. International human rights organizations, including Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, have described the government’s extensive regulation of social networks as a threat to freedom of expression.

These laws remain under criticism by international human rights organizations. Specifically, the CPJ (Committee to Protect Journalists) criticized the law regarding the “discrediting the president” as early as 2021. Article 244.1, which is viewed by the international community as a threat to internet freedom, is still the subject of wide-ranging debates.

Protests against these provisions have also been voiced by local activists. Public opinion appears divided. While some have called on the government to cancel these articles, others continue to support the policy.

Government official Khushnudbek Khudoyberdiyev has emphasized that people must regulate the content they are receiving.

“There is no room for debate regarding the illegality of these actions, because Uzbekistan, as a secular state, has defined in laws exactly what is possible or what is not possible. To put it in simple terms, those guys who distributed prohibited religious materials are not defended by saying ‘they are innocent, they were wrongly accused,’ but it is being said, ‘let’s review the punishment.’ The difference between these two is very large,” he wrote on Telegram.

Other observers have expressed concern that this policy, which the government claims is for “regulation,” causes fear among the population. Activist Komil Jalilov has spoken about how these laws are contrary to the democratic principles viewed as the essence of Uzbek statehood.

“In general, in a democratic state, freedom of speech is seen as a fundamental right and a necessary condition for the development of society. In such a state, people are not tried or held liable simply for a word, for some song (or its link) (even if it is in a religious context), or for hitting ‘like’ … on some materials.”

According to Jalilov, by playing with words or using vague phrases, it is possible to adapt the execution of the law to the situation and interpret it in different ways. This allows for the interpretation of the boundary between restricting freedom of speech and regulating the flow of information.

“As for holding someone liable for concepts not defined in the law (for example, ‘aqidaparastlik’ [dogmatism/extremism]), there can be no talk of this in a democratic (or one that calls itself ‘democratic’) state,” he stated.

 

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the publication, its affiliates, or any other organizations mentioned.

Uzbekistan’s 2026 Reform Program Introduces Life Imprisonment for Pedophilia

President Shavkat Mirziyoyev has approved draft reform programs setting out priority measures for 2026, along with the State Program for implementing the “Uzbekistan-2030” Strategy during what has been declared the “Year of Community and Social Prosperity,” according to the presidential press service.

The documents were presented to the president at a briefing that highlighted a new methodology drawing on advanced international experience. Officials stated that the drafts define the main policy directions and target indicators for the coming year, in line with the President’s Address to the public and the Parliament, the Oliy Majlis, and outline specific implementation mechanisms.

A distinction was drawn between the reform programs and the State Program. The reform programs consolidate initiatives proposed by the president and identify the most urgent reforms for 2026. These include modernizing mahalla infrastructure in line with the concept of a “New Uzbekistan,” shifting the economy toward technology and innovation-driven growth while stimulating domestic demand, upgrading professional training systems and reshaping the labor market, ensuring environmental sustainability and rational water use, strengthening public administration and the judicial system, and reinforcing social cohesion.

Officials emphasized a shift from “document development” to measurable results. Each initiative is accompanied by defined implementation mechanisms and key performance indicators to assess progress by the end of the year. Individual officials have been assigned personal responsibility and coordinating state bodies have been designated.

The State Program structures the implementation of the Uzbekistan-2030 Strategy targets for 2026 and includes 337 specific measures. It included the preparation of 59 key legislative and regulatory drafts across sectors, along with 12 additional drafts related to major strategic reforms.

Public consultation played a significant role in shaping the document. From January 23 to February 1, the draft State Program was published for public discussion. According to official data, more than 5 million users viewed the document online, and over 22,000 comments and proposals were submitted. More than 50 discussions were held at universities and state institutions, involving approximately 10,000 students, faculty members, and civil servants. Nearly 1,000 proposals were incorporated into the final draft.

Among the approved initiatives are stricter penalties for violence against women and children, the introduction of life imprisonment for pedophilia, reforms to mortgage and electric vehicle lending mechanisms, an increase in the share of renewable energy to 30%, strengthened anti-corruption measures, and the introduction of juries in criminal proceedings.

In a related regional context, discussions on criminal justice reform have also intensified elsewhere in Central Asia. In Kazakhstan, the Health Ministry previously proposed tightening procedures related to chemical castration for individuals convicted of sexual crimes against minors, reflecting a broader regional debate on the protection of vulnerable groups.

The Uzbek government plans to allocate 250.5 trillion UZS (more than $20.4 billion) from budgetary sources and attract an additional $50.4 billion to finance the 2026 programs. The Ministry of Justice and the Chamber of Accounts will conduct ongoing monitoring, while the Cabinet of Ministers will review progress quarterly. Reports are to be submitted to the Legislative Chamber every six months and to the president on a monthly basis.

Kazakhstani Skater Denis Ten, Killed in 2018, Is Honored As Nation Celebrates Olympic Gold  

After Olympic figure skater Mikhail Shaidorov won gold for Kazakhstan, he was quick to pay tribute to Denis Ten, a Kazakhstani who got the bronze medal in the same event at the 2014 Winter Olympics and was killed in an attempted robbery in Almaty four years later.

It was a bittersweet moment. Shaidorov, 21, was basking in his extraordinary accomplishment in Milan, Italy last weekend even as he honored an inspiring figure whose violent death in 2018 shocked Kazakhstan, a country that was delighted when Ten made it onto the podium in Sochi, Russia.

“I think my medal would have meant a lot to Denis Ten,” Shaidorov said in comments posted on social media by Kazakhstan’s Olympic team. “He opened the way for us. This path was thorny for him and for me. And I want to express my gratitude to Denis for what he did for our sport.”

A pioneer of the sport in Kazakhstan, Ten skated as a boy at a shopping center rink in Almaty and later trained in Russia. He was a popular figure and had his own skating show called “Denis Ten and Friends.”

Shaidorov followed a similar path, developed early skills in Almaty and, at one point, attending a master class led by Ten. Shaidorov received extensive training in Russia under Olympic champion Alexei Urmanov. While crediting Urmanov for helping him become a world class figure skater, Shaidorov bristles at the idea that he is closer to Russia than the country where he was born.

“I was born, lived, and still live in Almaty, and I spend a lot of time in Kazakhstan, in my beloved city,” he said in an interview with the Russian outlet Sport24 last year. “But I started skating at the Ramstore shopping center, where many figure skaters got their start, including Denis Ten. It had one of the very first rinks in Kazakhstan.”

Ten was fatally stabbed during a robbery attempt in Almaty. Two men were sentenced to long prison terms for his murder. Thousands, many weeping, turned out for Ten’s funeral at a sports venue. The skater was of Korean descent and he was also mourned in South Korea.

Shaidorov, who wears teeth braces, has a disarming quality. He has skated in a bulky panda suit in exhibitions. He performed with assurance at the Olympics as other skaters, particularly the American favorite Ilia Malinin, made missteps. It was the first gold medal for Kazakhstan in any sport at a Winter Olympics since the games in Lillehammer, Norway in 1994.

Shaidorov skated to music performed by Kazakhstani singer Dimash Kudaibergen, who said he would give a car to the Olympian for his achievement.

“You did not let down Denis, the pride of our country, my friend, your brother, whom our nation sadly lost,” the international star said in a video message to Shaidorov. “You fulfilled your duty to him, to the country, and to the people with honor and at the highest level.”

Ten also skated at times to Kudaibergen’s music during his career.

Prosecutor Seeks Life Sentences for Crocus City Hall Attack Defendants

A state prosecutor has asked the Moscow City Court to sentence the alleged perpetrators of the Crocus City Hall attack to life imprisonment in a maximum-security penal colony. The request was made during closing arguments, lawyer Daniil Gauthier, who represents victims in the case, told RBC.

According to the report, Fariduni Shamsiddin, Dalerjon Mirzoev, Muhammadsobir Faizov, and Saidkrom Rachabalizoda are charged with undergoing training for the purpose of carrying out terrorist activities, illegal arms trafficking, participation in the activities of a terrorist organization, and committing a terrorist act under several articles of the Criminal Code.

The state prosecutor also requested life sentences for 11 other defendants whom investigators consider accomplices. For four additional suspects, prosecutors are seeking prison terms ranging from 11 years and 9 months to 22 years and 10 months.

Lawyer Lyudmila Ayvar, representing the victims, said the injured parties are insisting on the harshest possible punishment for both the direct perpetrators and their alleged accomplices. “Responsibility for terrorists must be inevitable, and the punishment must be proportionate to the scale of the grief caused and the public danger of what was committed,” she told RBC. She added that victims are asking the court to satisfy civil claims totaling more than 65 million rubles. “Terrorism is a crime that strikes not only specific individuals but also the very sense of security in the country. Leniency in sentencing would sound like permission to repeat it,” Ayvar said.

The attack took place on March 22, 2024, at the Crocus City Hall concert venue in Krasnogorsk, in the Moscow region. According to investigators, four armed men entered the hall, opened fire on the audience, and set the building on fire. As a result, 149 people were killed and more than 550 were injured. The building was almost completely destroyed by the blaze.

Over 5,700 ISIS Detainees Transferred from Syria to Iraq, Including Central Asians

A total of 5,704 ISIS detainees have been transferred from prisons in northeastern Syria to Iraq, including dozens of citizens from Central Asian countries, according to data from Iraq’s Ministry of Justice shared by journalist and Iraqi Observatory for Human Rights founder Mustafa Saadoun on X.

The figures, issued by the Iraqi Correctional Service under the Ministry of Justice, detail the number of inmates held at Al-Karkh Central Prison by nationality. Among them are 36 citizens of Uzbekistan, 63 of Tajikistan, 42 of Kyrgyzstan, and four of Kazakhstan. The list also includes 165 individuals identified as “Turkestan,” 130 from Russia, and 3,544 Syrians, who make up the largest group.

Saadoun told Shafaq News that the transfer of ISIS detainees from camps and detention centers in northeastern Syria could place “extreme pressure” on Iraq’s already overcrowded prison system. He warned that overcrowding levels could exceed 300% if facilities are not properly equipped to absorb the influx.

“The success of the transfer depends primarily on the prisons’ ability to absorb detainees through modern isolation and classification mechanisms,” Saadoun said. He urged authorities to develop rehabilitation and reform programs that uphold the rule of law and prevent ideological spillover caused by the improper mixing of prisoners.

He also described deteriorating infrastructure inside detention facilities. “Inmates are often forced to sleep in shifts in narrow, poorly ventilated corridors without sunlight,” he said, adding that such conditions create breeding grounds for contagious diseases, including scabies and tuberculosis.

Last month, United States Central Command announced it had begun a “safe and systematic” transfer of around 7,000 ISIS detainees from northeastern Syria to what it described as secure facilities in Iraq, in coordination with Iraqi authorities. However, Reuters later reported that fewer than 500 detainees had been transferred in the initial phase after Baghdad requested a slowdown to negotiate with foreign governments over the repatriation of their nationals and to prepare additional detention capacity.

Iraqi officials have cautioned that accepting the full number of detainees could overwhelm the judicial system, particularly as many foreign fighters may face the death penalty under Iraqi law.

Central Asian governments have previously faced challenges repatriating their citizens from conflict zones in Syria and Iraq, conducting special operations in recent years to return women and children, while cases involving male detainees have remained more complex.

Turkmenistan Effectively Bans Passengers from Taking Food Abroad

Since February, passengers departing from Turkmenistan’s capital Ashgabat have effectively been prohibited from taking food products out of the country. The restrictions reportedly apply to meat and fish products, canned goods and even bread. No official explanation has been provided.

According to turkmen.news, a ban on the export of most food items was introduced at Ashgabat International Airport in February. The measures affect passengers flying to Turkey, the United Arab Emirates and other destinations.

Controls are reportedly carried out before the main customs inspection, in the oversized baggage area. Only after this additional screening are travelers allowed to proceed to standard border control procedures. However, few passengers reportedly pass the initial check without issue.

Eyewitnesses cited by the outlet say that many passengers are found carrying canned kaurma (meat preserved in fat), as well as sausages, smoked and salted fish, canned meat and fish, condensed milk, homemade preserves, vinegar and bread.

Confiscated products must be left behind. Passengers accompanied by relatives are reportedly allowed to hand over the food to them. Those traveling alone are said to ask taxi drivers to return the items to their homes, while some leave bags on airport benches.

There has been no official statement clarifying the situation. The Customs Service of Turkmenistan has not published any formal ban on the export of food products, except for sturgeon. Food items are also not listed among prohibited exports on the website of Turkmenistan Airlines.

Sources cited by turkmen.news suggest that the tightened controls may be linked to cases in which Turkmen food products were confiscated at foreign airports, particularly in Istanbul and the Russian city of Kazan. In early February, more than 10 kilograms of honey and over 53 kilograms of meat were reportedly seized from Turkmen citizens in Kazan.

A year earlier, turkmen.news reported increased scrutiny of passengers carrying food. At that time, checks were described as less systematic and, according to sources, were often accompanied by alleged demands for bribes rather than consistent enforcement of formal regulations.

For many Turkmen students studying abroad, food brought from home is not only a matter of preference but also an economic necessity. Preserved products such as canned goods and kaurma can be stored for extended periods and significantly reduce living expenses. Turkmen food products are generally cheaper than comparable goods in Turkey, Russia or the United Arab Emirates.