Russia’s decision to prolong restrictions on gasoline exports has raised concerns in energy markets, but for Central Asia, the immediate fallout appears limited. The true significance lies in what the move reveals about structural dependencies, the role of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), and the region’s long-term push to diversify energy supplies.

Moscow Extends Ban

On September 2, Russian officials confirmed that the government may prolong its gasoline export ban for oil producers into October, extending measures first introduced in late summer. Deputy head of the Federal Antimonopoly Service, Vitaly Korolev, told state media that the authorities were weighing a one-month extension beyond the current deadline of September 30. As reported by Reuters, the aim is to stabilize domestic fuel supplies following refinery outages and a seasonal spike in demand. Ukrainian drone strikes have also damaged key refineries, reducing Russia’s production capacity by an estimated 10–17%.

The ban affects a relatively small share of Russia’s overall fuel output but highlights the state’s readiness to intervene in energy markets. Previous restrictions in 2023 and 2024 temporarily halted shipments to stabilize domestic prices. The latest decision reflects similar concerns: tightening inventories, growing demand from the agricultural sector, and pressure to prevent inflation ahead of winter.

While Moscow insists the measure is temporary, traders and governments across post-Soviet space are watching closely. Russia remains one of the world’s largest fuel exporters, and even marginal policy changes can cause significant ripples.

Fuel Security in Central Asia

For Central Asia, the impact of the ban will be blunted by exemptions. As members of the EAEU, both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan continue to import Russian gasoline without interruption. Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Energy issued a statement stressing that the country is self-sufficient, pointing to its refineries in Pavlodar, Shymkent, and Atyrau. “For countries that have signed the relevant intergovernmental agreement… these restrictions do not apply,” Minister of Energy, Yerlan Akkenzhenov, stated.

Kyrgyzstan is highly dependent on Russian imports. However, according to Kyrgyzstan’s Ministry of Energy, the 1.6 million tons of fuel the country consumes annually, 93% of which is imported from Russia under intergovernmental agreements, will remain unaffected by the export ban. Since mid-summer, gasoline and diesel prices have climbed, driven by rising global oil benchmarks and repair work at several Russian refineries. Talks are already in progress to set revised supply volumes for 2026.

Non-EAEU states face a different challenge. Uzbekistan sources fuel through state-brokered contracts with Russian companies, ensuring stability for now, but smaller private importers outside of these deals have reported difficulties accessing volumes. Late last year, the Chairman of Uzbekistan’s Central Bank warned that the country’s growing reliance on Russian fuel imports could increase vulnerability to supply shocks, which may translate into limited competition and rising prices.

Tajikistan remains heavily dependent on Russian fuel through bilateral import agreements, and its virtually non-existent refining capacity makes it highly susceptible to external price fluctuations, a vulnerability underscored by seasonal diesel shortages and repeated spikes in domestic fuel prices. Turkmenistan, meanwhile, continues subsidizing its energy sector heavily: citizens receive free or deeply discounted electricity, gas, and heat under a policy extending through 2030, even as the authorities explore scaling back subsidies to curb domestic demand and bolster export capacity. As previously reported by The Times of Central Asia, Turkmenistan is also struggling with rampant fuel smuggling as domestic fuel is significantly cheaper than in neighboring states.

EAEU Integration: Shield and Shackle

The EAEU has shielded its members from the immediate effects of Russia’s gasoline ban. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan continue receiving supplies, highlighting the bloc’s role in cushioning shocks. Yet the arrangement underscores a paradox: while integration provides stability, it also locks members into asymmetric dependencies.

Kazakhstan, the region’s largest producer, is steadily upgrading its refining base and aligning production with export markets. Its 2040 energy strategy foresees refined products accounting for a rising share of exports. In 2024, Kazakhstan was the third-largest crude oil supplier to the EU, exporting approximately 1.05 million barrels per day, roughly 11.5% of the bloc’s total. But even Astana acknowledges that Russia’s domestic policies can create disruptions, especially for joint ventures and pipeline flows.

Despite its status as a major oil producer, Kazakhstan continues importing refined products from Russia due to persistent structural constraints and logistical considerations. While Kazakhstan is pursuing a long-term refining strategy to support growing regional energy demand and boost exports, domestic refineries currently remain optimized for heavier or specific crude grades, and demand is unevenly spread, particularly in northern and eastern regions more easily supplied via rail from Russia. This serves to make Russian fuel imports a practical supplement, especially under favorable EAEU terms.

Kyrgyzstan illustrates the opposite end of the spectrum. Despite its EAEU membership, it remains structurally vulnerable because of its near-total dependence on Russian imports. The EAEU guarantees access, but not price stability, leaving Bishkek exposed to shifts in Moscow’s domestic market priorities.

Diversification: From Rhetoric to Imperative

Russia’s export ban has renewed calls for diversification. Kazakhstan is pursuing a multi-vector strategy that includes refining upgrades, supply diversification, and expanded export routes. Projects linked to the Trans‑Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), also known as the Middle Corridor, are designed to connect Kazakh fuel exports westward via the Caspian Sea. Astana is also cultivating Chinese and Indian markets for petroleum and petrochemical products, leveraging its geographic position as a transit hub between Asia and Europe. For instance, Kazakhstan is advancing its oil exports via the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) route, with a 12 % increase in shipments in H1 2025 and discussions underway with Turkey to expand capacity – measures intended to diversify beyond Russian routes. India is also exploring the Middle Corridor – with Kazakhstan as a central hub – as an alternative link to Europe as it seeks greater strategic autonomy beyond China’s Belt and Road infrastructure.

In the near term, Uzbekistan remains structurally dependent on Russian gasoline. When Russia imposed a six-month ban on gasoline exports to safeguard its domestic market in early 2024, Uzbekistan was exempted under intergovernmental agreements, even though it is not a member of the EAEU. Tashkent holds only observer status in the bloc and has stated that it currently has no plans to pursue full membership.

Tajikistan, meanwhile, is betting on hydropower centered on the massive Rogun Dam project to reduce its reliance on fossil fuels. However, without refining capacity or diversified fuel supply contracts, it remains tethered to Russian gasoline. Turkmenistan also continues to face persistent fuel shortages due to domestic pricing subsidies that encourage smuggling.

Why the Ban Matters Symbolically

Russia’s gasoline export ban, while limited in its immediate scope, is a symbolic reminder of Moscow’s leverage. With a relatively minor policy shift, it has demonstrated an ability to disrupt expectations and expose the fragility of regional supply chains. Though the official rationale – domestic stabilization amid refinery outages and seasonal demand – has been emphasized by the Russian authorities, the ban reveals deeper structural vulnerabilities in Central Asia’s energy architecture.

For Kazakhstan, the exemption is a validation of its partial self-sufficiency, but also serves as a reminder that refinery upgrades and export diversification are crucial to insulate against external shocks. Despite being shielded by EAEU mechanisms, Kyrgyzstan is still facing price fluctuations due to its overwhelming reliance on Russian fuel, meaning it effectively has protection without autonomy. Uzbekistan’s exemption via bilateral agreements offers short-term relief, but reinforces its dependence. In Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, where domestic refining is virtually absent or underperforming, reliance on subsidized or imported fuel continues to distort markets and delay reform.

Rethinking Dependency

While no immediate fuel shortages are expected in Central Asia, the episode serves as a stress test. EAEU exemptions, bilateral deals, and domestic production buffers will mitigate short-term risks, but future export bans, refinery outages, or geopolitical shifts could trigger deeper disruptions, especially for states with limited refining capacity or inflexible sourcing strategies. Fuel security is no longer an abstract issue; it is increasingly treated as an element of national sovereignty. Kazakhstan’s and Uzbekistan’s push through the Middle Corridor, therefore, signals a meaningful shift.