Uzbekistan Features - The Times Of Central Asia

Viewing results 7 - 12 of 741

Trans-Afghan Railway

Icy Relations Between Pakistan and Afghanistan Threaten Central Asian Trade Plans

On November 25, the Afghan authorities accused Pakistan of a new round of airstrikes in eastern Afghanistan. The bombing killed nine children and a woman, injuring several others. The attacks are the latest escalation in rapidly worsening tensions between Islamabad and the Taliban-led government in Kabul, with key border crossings currently closed, and Afghan refugees being expelled from Pakistan. At the heart of the crisis is Pakistan’s claim that Kabul is providing support to the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (Pakistani Taliban, or TPP), a militant group seeking to topple Pakistan’s government and impose its strict interpretation of Islamic law. The fallout may ripple beyond bilateral relations, with significant consequences for Central Asian trade, particularly the Pakistan-Afghanistan-Uzbekistan plan for a Trans-Afghan railway. The planned 647-kilometer line is set to connect the northern Afghan city of Mazar-e-Sharif with Peshawar in Pakistan. When combined with existing infrastructure, this will mean that trains can travel from southern Uzbekistan all the way to the Pakistani ports of Gwadar and Karachi, granting landlocked Uzbekistan and Afghanistan a long-sought gateway to the Indian Ocean. But mounting instability, along with Islamabad’s willingness to shut borders as leverage, may now place the project in serious jeopardy. “The moment a state weaponizes geography, every financier in Tashkent, Moscow, or Beijing prices in risk, delays commitments, and quietly explores alternative alignments,” Anant Mishra, Marie Skłodowska-Curie Research Fellow at the International Centre for Policing and Security at the University of South Wales, told The Times of Central Asia. So, what are the prospects for salvaging the Trans-Afghan railway? How can Pakistan and Afghanistan de-escalate? And what does this turmoil mean for Central Asia’s wider economic ambitions? A sudden frost On July 17, Uzbekistan’s Transport Minister Ilkhom Makhkamov, Pakistan’s Railway Minister Muhammad Hanif Abbasi, and Afghanistan’s acting Public Works Minister Mohammad Esa Thani signed an agreement to conduct a feasibility study for the proposed railway. Many hoped the railway would presage a new era of fraternal relations between Central and South Asia. “Civil society, the intelligentsia, media, and business community of Pakistan have been loudly calling for intimate trade relations with the Central Asian Republics,” Khadim Hussain, Research Director at the Centre for Regional Policy and Dialogue (CRPD), Islamabad, told TCA. For Uzbekistan, which has aggressively pursued diversification of trade routes to reduce reliance on transit through Iran and Kazakhstan, the project promised a cheaper, faster corridor to global markets. According to Nargiza Umarova, Head of the Center for Strategic Connectivity at the Institute for Advanced International Studies, University of World Economy and Diplomacy in Tashkent, the trans-Afghan is one of two high-priority transport projects, along with the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway – work on which began in April 2025. But the ink had barely dried on the July accord when tensions between Afghanistan’s Taliban government and Islamabad began escalating, throwing the ambitious railway into doubt. [caption id="attachment_40211" align="aligncenter" width="1600"] Uzbek passenger and freight trains parked in Andijan; image: TCA, Joe Luc Barnes[/caption] In early October, Pakistan launched an airstrike in Kabul targeting the leader of the...

Wildlife Conservation

Samarkand’s CoP20 Opens with High-Stakes Debates on Wildlife Trade and Species Protection

The world’s largest conference on wildlife trade opened last week in Samarkand, drawing nearly 3,000 delegates to Uzbekistan for two weeks of critical negotiations that could reshape global conservation policy. The 20th meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES CoP20) is being held in Central Asia for the first time, a region increasingly impacted by transcontinental wildlife trafficking routes connecting Africa and Asia. Hosted by Uzbekistan’s National Committee on Ecology and Climate Change, CoP20 carries the theme “CITES at 50 in Samarkand: Bridging Nature and People,” commemorating five decades of global conservation under the Convention and echoing the city’s legacy as a historic crossroads of commerce and ideas. One of the central issues dominating this year’s meeting is a series of proposals concerning African megafauna, particularly elephants, rhinos, and giraffes. These proposals, submitted by several African range states, challenge the extent to which legal trade in vulnerable species should be permitted, given decades of poaching and habitat degradation. Audrey Delsink, Senior Director at Humane World for Animals, warned of the dangers these proposals pose. “All the species proposals concerning African megafauna are highly concerning because of the impact they will have on the respective species and the repercussions on illegal trade should the proposals be accepted,” she told The Times of Central Asia. Among the most controversial is a joint proposal by Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe to remove most southern African giraffe populations from CITES Appendix II. Delsink cautioned that this would create a fragmented regulatory regime, complicating enforcement. “It is very difficult to differentiate bones and pelts of the different species and subspecies, making it easy to launder endangered giraffe species through the system,” she said. With wild giraffe populations estimated at fewer than 120,000, any weakening of controls could prove disastrous. Similar concerns surround Namibia’s proposal to sell ivory from registered government stockpiles. Delsink warned that the legal ivory trade has historically masked illicit flows and could trigger renewed poaching. “Legal trade provides a cover for illegal ivory and fuels illegal trade, poaching, and consumer demand,” she said, noting that CITES members have rejected such proposals for nearly two decades. Central Asian countries, increasingly used as transit corridors for high-value wildlife contraband, are becoming key players in enforcement. Smuggling networks exploit Eurasian air, rail, and road links to move products such as ivory, rhino horn, and exotic animals. Delsink highlighted the “Samarkand Declaration and Action Plan (2025-2032),” signed this week by Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, as a major step toward regional coordination. The agreement commits signatories to harmonize laws and improve intelligence-sharing mechanisms. [caption id="attachment_40166" align="aligncenter" width="2560"] Image: National Committee on Ecology of Uzbekistan[/caption] “Intelligence-led operations and rapid information exchange between agencies can disrupt organized crime networks that exploit porous borders,” Delsink said. She also underscored the need for customs modernization and officer training, supported by organizations such as TRAFFIC and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime. Beyond...

U.S. Sanctions

U.S. Waiver of Sanctions on Iran’s Chabahar Port is Good News for Central Asia

U.S. sanctions on Iran’s Chabahar Port on the Gulf of Oman have been on again/off again since 2013, when the U.S. Congress passed the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act (IFCA) to curb Iran’s regional influence and strategic capabilities through targeted economic pressure, aka sanctions. In the decade following IFCA’s passage, Washington’s sanctions on Chabahar had a negative impact on Central Asia, largely by complicating its efforts to deepen economic ties with South Asia and the Gulf. But geopolitics are shifting. Washington is increasing its involvement in Central Asia and India, and is doing the same in Afghanistan. These factors may well induce the U.S. Department of State to keep the waiver in place. Washington first waived its sanctions on Chabahar in 2018—a strategic move to support India's role in Afghanistan's post-war development and to provide a crucial trade route for that landlocked country. Six years later, India's Indian Ports Global Limited secured a 10-year deal with Iran to manage Chabahar port, in part, to offset Pakistan’s Gwadar port at the end of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, a mere 100 miles from Chabahar. For all the fanfare, Central Asia held little real priority in Washington in those years. Seven years later, the U.S. changed course. It announced on September 16, 2025, much to Central Asia’s surprise and concern, that “the State Department has revoked the sanctions exception issued in 2018 under the IFCA”, making individuals involved in Iran’s Chabahar port operations subject to penalties, resulting in another snag in Central Asia’s desire for a southern breakout route. And then, in a swift reversal, the U.S. restored India’s sanctions waiver some six weeks later, on October 30. Whatever might explain the sudden change, Central Asia breathed a sigh of relief, and, by all accounts, now feels confident that the waiver will be evergreened. Time will tell if this confidence is justified. The U.S. waiver enables India to work to enhance Chabahar’s infrastructure and functionality, offering Central Asian exporters a more direct and profitable trade route than those via China, Russia, or the Middle Corridor, which stretches from East Asia to Europe via Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Türkiye. As a result, goods like minerals, cotton, and energy products can reach regional and global markets faster. Central Asian capitals are quietly reveling in Washington’s flexible realpolitik in the face of convulsive U.S.-Iranian relations and heated Indo-Pakistan tensions. Without fear of punitive measures, India can now continue its work at Chabahar. To be sure, the waiver affirms India’s rising global presence and accelerates New Delhi’s drive into Central Asia, including Afghanistan. Washington’s decision signaled to traders, investors, and think tankers that it has no intention of spoiling India’s export ambitions and Central Asia’s desire for north-south economic integration. The waiver shows Washington’s pragmatism—and is welcomed by those who have little or no use for Washington’s penchant for foreign policy moralism. Chabahar Port complements not only the Trans-Caspian corridor—a multimodal trade route connecting Asia and Europe by linking China to Europe through Central...

ASEAN

Uzbekistan Gains ASEAN Approval to Join Cooperation Treaty

Uzbekistan’s efforts to strengthen its ties with Southeast Asia advanced significantly this week after all member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) approved Tashkent’s application to join the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC). The decision was made during a meeting of ASEAN foreign ministers chaired by Malaysia in Kuala Lumpur, according to the Dunyo news agency. Signed in Bali in 1976, the TAC outlines core principles for regional cooperation, including peaceful dispute resolution, non-interference, renunciation of force, and respect for sovereignty. ASEAN now comprises 11 countries with a combined population nearing 700 million, forming one of the world’s most dynamic economic regions. Uzbekistan’s accession to the TAC is expected to enhance its political and economic presence in Southeast Asia, facilitate state-to-state cooperation, boost trade and investment, and increase confidence among international companies operating in or considering expansion into Central Asia. Political analyst Jahongir Akramov described the approval as a significant diplomatic achievement for Uzbekistan. Speaking to The Times of Central Asia, he said the move aligns closely with Uzbekistan’s foreign policy principles: “Uzbekistan’s joining this treaty can be seen as a very significant diplomatic success. One of the key reasons is that the core principles of the TAC fully match the principles set out in Article 17 of Uzbekistan’s Constitution, non-use of force, resolving conflicts peacefully, negotiating disputes, and respecting the sovereignty of states.” Akramov noted that since 2016, Uzbekistan’s foreign policy has evolved along three strategic vectors, all of which are reinforced by the TAC: “First, Uzbekistan adopted a multi-vector foreign policy. Second, the country has taken major steps to develop economic diplomacy. Third, we have been deepening regional integration. All three of these trends are fully consistent with joining the TAC.” He emphasized that the timing is especially relevant amid growing geopolitical strains: “Geopolitical tensions have intensified, particularly among the United States, China, and Russia. In this situation, participating in platforms such as ASEAN can help reduce pressure and maintain diplomatic balance.” Akramov also positioned Uzbekistan’s move as part of a broader Global South cooperation trend. “Central Asian and ASEAN countries are both part of the Global South. Building closer relations ensures our interests are better represented in shaping new international norms.” Economically, Akramov pointed to ASEAN’s size and diversity as highly advantageous. “ASEAN includes Indonesia, the world’s most populous Muslim-majority country, Singapore, a global innovation hub, Malaysia, an advanced and diversified economy, and Thailand, a leading tourism destination. Closer ties with these states could expand tourism, improve Uzbekistan’s international image, and boost the competitiveness of Uzbek products.” He added that ASEAN’s extensive experience with regional integration offers a model for Central Asia. “As one of the first Central Asian countries to join the TAC, Uzbekistan could take a leading role in fostering ASEAN-Central Asia cooperation. A regional office or cooperation structure based in Tashkent or Samarkand would be a major diplomatic achievement.” However, Akramov cautioned that the partnership would require careful navigation. “Southeast Asia has its own geopolitical tensions, such...

Air Pollution

Tashkent Launches Emergency Measures as Air Pollution Worsens

Tashkent is experiencing a significant decline in air quality, prompting President Shavkat Mirziyoyev to sign a decree on November 25 implementing urgent environmental measures. According to the presidential press service, the decree establishes a special commission to take immediate steps to stabilize the situation. The decision follows a high-level meeting on November 24 chaired by Saida Mirziyoyeva, head of the Presidential Administration, to discuss “urgent measures to improve the ecological situation in Tashkent.” Experts at the meeting presented a series of short, medium, and long-term proposals, ranging from immediate restrictions to structural reforms aimed at preventing future pollution spikes. The new plan includes enhanced environmental monitoring, stricter controls on major polluters, tighter regulations for construction sites, and citywide greening initiatives. Authorities also intend to develop a modern air quality assessment system supported by new scientific infrastructure. A key component of the initiative is the establishment of a specialized laboratory under the State Committee for Ecology to analyze sources of PM2.5 pollution, one of the primary contributors to the current smog. To expedite the process, the decree exempts a broad range of imported equipment from customs duties. These exemptions apply to automated monitoring stations, dust-gas filtration systems, localized water-treatment devices, and thousands of quartz filters required for sampling. The measure also extends to household air purifiers brought into the country by individuals and businesses, as demand for such devices has surged. In response to the prolonged dry conditions, the Muslim Board of Uzbekistan announced the performance of istisqo, a traditional Islamic prayer for rain, to be held on November 28 following Friday prayers in mosques nationwide. “In Islamic history, istisqo has been performed during periods of drought, and its benefits have been noted in hadith literature,” the Board stated. Teachers and students from Islamic institutions will also recite the entire Sahih of Imam al-Bukhari before the prayer. This call for collective prayer comes as climate change continues to intensify environmental stress in Uzbekistan. According to a newly released Atlas of Environmental Change by the UN Environment Programme (UNEP), Uzbekistan’s average annual temperature has risen by 1.6°C over the past 60 years, nearly three times the global average of 0.6°C. In the Aral Sea region, warming has reached 1.8 to 2.5°C, contributing to more frequent droughts, particularly in summer and autumn, and placing further strain on already limited water resources. UNEP describes Uzbekistan’s water resources as “among the country’s most valuable and vulnerable,” noting that they depend almost entirely on sources located outside its borders. The atlas highlights the increasing importance of integrated water-resource management and cross-border cooperation, which officials say have already helped address local water-security issues. The agency also points to the adoption of water-saving technologies such as drip irrigation, which are critical to sustaining the country’s irrigated agricultural sector, the backbone of many rural economies. Despite demographic and environmental pressures, the report finds that Uzbekistan has achieved near self-sufficiency in food production. Reforestation is also a national priority. UNEP praises the Yashil Makon (Green Space) initiative, launched in 2021...

CSTO

CSTO Summit in Bishkek: Armenia’s Boycott, Russia’s Agenda, and a New Secretary General

On November 27, Kyrgyzstan will host the annual summit of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in Bishkek, bringing together foreign ministers, defense ministers, and security council secretaries from member states. While often portrayed in Russian media as an Eurasian analogue to NATO, the CSTO remains an organization heavily dependent on Russian military power. Should Moscow withdraw or reduce its support, the Organization’s relevance would likely collapse. A stark illustration of this fragility is Armenia, whose Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan will boycott the summit entirely. Russian Presidential Aide Yuri Ushakov confirmed that Armenia will not attend the session of the Collective Security Council, the CSTO’s highest governing body, though it does not object to the adoption of bloc-wide documents. According to the CSTO press service, the Council is expected to adopt a declaration outlining member states’ joint positions on current security challenges. Also on the agenda is the formal appointment of the next Secretary General for the 2026-2029 term, and the unveiling of Russia’s priorities for its upcoming presidency in 2026. President Vladimir Putin’s speech on these priorities is expected to dominate the summit. Armenia’s withdrawal highlights the CSTO’s waning cohesion, maintained largely by members' reliance on Russian security assistance, a dynamic in place since the Treaty’s inception in Tashkent on May 15, 1992. The original signatories included Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, with Azerbaijan, Belarus, and Georgia joining in 1993. The treaty entered into force in 1994. Its central provision, Article 4, mandates collective defense: an attack on one member is considered an attack on all, obligating military and other forms of assistance in line with Article 51 of the UN Charter. In 1999, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan signed a protocol extending the treaty, establishing an automatic renewal every five years. The formal CSTO was created in 2002; its charter was registered with the UN the following year, and it has held observer status at the UN General Assembly since 2004. For Armenia, the CSTO’s relevance has waned dramatically since the bloc declined to intervene during the final phase of the Nagorno-Karabakh crisis. Yerevan’s disenchantment, however, predates 2023 and stretches back to the 2021–2022 border clashes, when it also felt the organization had failed to provide meaningful support. Kazakhstan, by contrast, remains a key beneficiary: the rapid CSTO deployment in January 2022 played a central role in stabilizing the country during a period of acute domestic unrest. As the current Secretary General, Imangali Tasmagambetov - an influential figure from the “Old Kazakhstan” elite - completes his term, the position is scheduled to rotate to Taalatbek Masadykov of Kyrgyzstan. Ushakov confirmed that Tasmagambetov will deliver a final report on the Organization’s activities and security concerns before officially stepping down on January 1. Masadykov, currently Deputy Secretary General, is expected to assume the role seamlessly. While Masadykov brings diplomatic gravitas, the question remains whether he can restrain Moscow and Minsk from pushing CSTO allies toward confrontation with NATO. Tasmagambetov leaves behind a significant legacy and an...