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Killing of Russian General Kirillov: Arrest of Uzbek Suspect Raises Fears Among Central Asians

In the early hours of Tuesday, December 17, an explosion occurred at the entrance of an apartment building in a modest Moscow district, killing two people: Lieutenant General Igor Kirillov and his assistant. Kirillov was the head of the Radiation, Chemical, and Biological Defense (RCBD) troops of the Russian Armed Forces. A briefing by him had reportedly been scheduled for later that day. The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) announced the arrest of a suspect: a 1995-born citizen of Uzbekistan. According to the FSB, the suspect was identified and detained through joint operations with Russia’s Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Investigative Committee. According to investigators, the explosive device had been attached to an electric scooter parked near the building's entrance. Surveillance was allegedly conducted via a video camera placed inside a carshare vehicle parked nearby for several days. While the Ukrainian side has not officially claimed responsibility for the attack, some sources linked to Ukraine’s Security Service have reportedly done so. Russian officials quickly blamed Ukraine. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated, “The Kiev regime does not shy away from such methods,” without providing evidence. Soon after, Investigative Committee spokesperson Svetlana Petrenko claimed that the suspect had confessed to being recruited by Ukrainian special services, who allegedly promised him an EU passport and $100,000. However, a video of the confession released by the FSB raises doubts. The suspect, who appears to struggle with Russian, delivers statements that suggest he may not fully understand what he is saying. While the confession's credibility is unclear, the nationality of the suspect - another migrant from Central Asia - is what resonates most in the short term. The incident follows a previous terrorist attack at Moscow’s Crocus City Hall, after which migrants from Central Asia faced intensified scrutiny. Over the past six months, many Central Asian workers living in Russia have felt treated not as second-class but as third-class citizens. Document checks, lengthy detentions, and increasingly restrictive rules for entry and residency in Russia have become commonplace. In August, Russia’s Interior Ministry reported that almost 92,800 foreign citizens were expelled in the first half of 2024 - a 53.2% increase compared to the same period in 2023. In response to the attack, nationalist groups and patriotic public figures are once again urging the Russian government to introduce a visa regime for Central Asian countries, particularly Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Similar measures have been observed in Turkey after the Crocus incident involving Tajik citizens, and in the UAE following a high-profile crime involving Uzbek nationals. It is highly likely that anti-migrant sentiment in Russia will intensify in the coming months. Coupled with increased security operations, this trend could escalate into new forms of repression targeting migrants. Such measures are likely to strain Russia's relations with Central Asian republics, where the treatment of migrant workers remains a sensitive issue.

Central Asia’s Role in Europe’s Energy Future: Insights from Samuel Doveri Vesterbye

The Times of Central Asia sat down with Samuel Doveri Vesterbye, Director of European Neighbourhood Council, a research organization funded by the EU and by Member States, to discuss prospects for the further development of the EU's relations with Central Asia. TCA: How significant is Central Asia for Europe's energy diversification strategy, especially in light of the need to reduce dependency on Russian gas? Europe needs energy. Since the revolution in shale gas production and liquefied natural gas (LNG) transport, it’s clear that European energy has become more diversified, particularly since Russia’s war against Ukraine. Reliance on Russia has decreased, while importation of U.S., African and Asian LNG has increased. Pipeline gas from Azerbaijan and renewable energy are both important and rising sources of diversification. The problem is that Europe doesn’t only need energy; it needs inexpensive energy, preferably in terms of pipeline gas. This is why the Caspian region, home to some of the world’s largest natural gas reserves, is important. That’s one significant reason for Europe’s renewed interest in the region. TCA: What are the key energy projects connecting Central Asia to Europe, and what obstacles do they face in becoming viable alternatives? In 2022–2023, the EU and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) financed and conducted the biggest connectivity study about Central Asia to date. This study outlined the full capacity, potential, and challenges of trans-Caspian infrastructure and regulatory connectivity. It has become a key roadmap for all governments involved, as well as for the private sector and international investors in renewables, gas, transport, and other types of logistical infrastructure. In January and February 2024, the EU, together with international financial institutions, provided over €10 billion in low-interest loans and grants for the construction of energy and transport infrastructure cross-regionally. This amount represents over 50% of the investment needs estimated and outlined in the EBRD study. It is a strong indication of Europe’s political and financial dedication towards the region. TCA: How can Central Asian economies benefit from closer economic ties with Europe, particularly through energy trade? Central Asia has significantly increased its economic engagement with the European Union. In less than a decade, the EU has become Kazakhstan’s biggest trade partner in the world, ahead of China, Russia and the United States. Uzbekistan is taking a similar direction to Kazakhstan, and is about to sign an Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (EPCA) with Brussels covering energy, politics, security, trade, and natural resources among many other issue-areas. For Central Asia, its new relationship with the EU is strategically intelligent, as the region ceases to be only a part of so-called “Chinese transit trade”. TCA: What economic reforms are necessary in Central Asia to align with European standards and attract more investment in energy sectors? The relationship with the EU allows Central Asia to increase its trade and gain new technology as it also benefits from industrialization. Both Europe and Central Asia are full of small and medium-sized nations who are often under pressure from great...

Uzbekistan Welcomes 6.5 Million Tourists in 10 Months of 2024, With China Leading Growth Outside CIS

Uzbekistan’s tourism industry is thriving, with 6.5 million foreign visitors from January to October 2024, fueled by a 17.2% year-on-year increase, or 951,300 more visitors compared to the same period last year. Among these tourists, 57,700 were from China, marking a 63.1% rise and making China the leading source of visitors outside the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). China's interest in landlocked Uzbekistan comes as no surprise. Rich in natural resources and brimming with untapped potential, Uzbekistan stands as a promising opportunity for growth and prosperity when strategic investments are managed effectively. For instance, China continues to dominate Uzbekistan’s trade scene, accounting for 18.8% of the country's total foreign trade turnover as of October 2024. Bilateral trade between the two nations reached $10.2bn, with Uzbekistan exporting $1.7bn worth of goods to China and importing $8.5bn in return. While this was a slight dip from the $10.8bn in 2023, China has maintained its position as Uzbekistan’s largest trade partner since 2020, thanks in part to strategic agreements like the Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) and the Agreement on Avoidance of Double Taxation (DTA). Additionally, China’s investment footprint in Uzbekistan is hard to miss. By the end of 2022, China had invested a total of $4.5bn, with over 2,000 Chinese enterprises operating in the country as of January 1, 2024. These businesses span a wide range of sectors, from oil and gas exploration to infrastructure development, automotive assembly, agriculture, and textiles. Projects include the Pengsheng Industrial Park, which focuses on construction materials and modern agriculture with a $129mn investment, and the Anjiyan Textile Park, which specializes in textile production, backed by more than $64mn. The Luoyang-Bukhara Agricultural Cooperation Zone takes this partnership to the next level, blending agricultural cultivation with industrial activities for a dynamic collaboration. Agriculture has blossomed as a key area of collaboration between Uzbekistan and China in recent years. Uzbek exports, such as cherries, apricots, and dried fruits are hitting the sweet spot in China, while Chinese investments in agri-tech are giving Uzbekistan’s productivity and export game a major boost. When it comes to green energy, Uzbekistan’s renewable ambitions are getting a powerful push from Chinese know-how. A standout project, a 1 GW solar power plant under the Belt and Road Initiative, is a shining example of both nations’ dedication to a greener, more sustainable future. In addition, on December 5, Uzbekistan's Uzatom and China National Nuclear Corporation Overseas (CNOS) signed a cooperation agreement, setting the stage for small nuclear power plants and improved uranium processing in Uzbekistan. This follows earlier talks about tapping into China's expertise to enhance the country’s nuclear energy capabilities. The digital transformation of Uzbekistan is another exciting frontier of opportunity. With plans to expand its digital infrastructure, Chinese companies are stepping in with cutting-edge technologies like 5G networks and e-commerce platforms. These innovations are set to supercharge Uzbekistan’s digital economy, making it more efficient and connected than ever before. It’s a win-win that promises to drive growth and elevate the country’s technological landscape. Two major...

Uzbekistan Energizes Growth with $7 Billion in New Energy Projects

On December 13, Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev inaugurated operations for 18 new energy facilities and launched the construction of six additional projects. Together, the 24 initiatives represent an investment of over $7 billion. The ceremony marked a significant milestone for Uzbekistan’s energy sector, connecting the national power grid to five solar and wind power plants with a combined capacity of approximately 2,300 megawatts. Additionally, five high-voltage substations were commissioned in the Bukhara, Navoi, Namangan, and Tashkent regions. The country’s first energy storage system, with a capacity of 300 megawatts, began operations in the Andijan and Fergana regions. New power facilities launched include a 400-megawatt plant in Kashkadarya, a modern cogeneration plant in Tashkent, and four small hydroelectric power plants in Andijan, Surkhandarya, and Tashkent regions. Mirziyoyev also initiated construction on six power-generating facilities with a total capacity of 2.5 gigawatts in the Fergana, Samarkand, Navoi, and Tashkent regions, as well as in the city of Tashkent. These projects will collectively produce an additional 9.5 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity, sufficient to power more than 4 million households. They are also expected to save 2.5 billion cubic meters of natural gas and reduce emissions by 4.6 million tons annually. Foreign Investment Fuels Energy Transformation Mirziyoyev highlighted the pivotal role of foreign investment in these initiatives. Companies from the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, China, and Germany are leading the projects, supported by international financial institutions such as the Asian Development Bank, the Islamic Development Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the World Bank. Uzbekistan aims to produce 84 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity in 2025—an increase of 25 billion kilowatt-hours compared to 2016. Over the past five years, the energy sector has attracted $20 billion in foreign direct investment. Solar and wind power plants with a total capacity of 3,500 megawatts have already been launched, producing 10 billion kilowatt-hours annually and raising the share of "green" energy to 16% of the total energy mix. The country’s GDP reached a historic $100 billion last year, and plans are underway to double this to $200 billion by 2030. Such economic growth will drive a 1.5-fold increase in electricity demand over the next five years. Key Priorities for Uzbekistan’s Energy Sector Mirziyoyev outlined three strategic priorities for the energy sector: Expansion of Renewable Energy By 2030, Uzbekistan plans to add 19,000 megawatts of renewable energy capacity, increasing the share of "green" energy to 54%. In 2025, the country will commission 18 solar and wind power plants with a combined capacity of 3,400 megawatts, along with energy storage systems totaling 1,800 megawatts. This is expected to boost "green" energy production to 12 billion kilowatt-hours annually. Liberalization of the Electricity Market Uzbekistan will continue to liberalize its electricity market, with plans to establish a competitive wholesale electricity market by the end of 2025. Public-private partnerships will be introduced in energy distribution, and $4 billion will be invested to modernize power grids across the country. Expanding International Cooperation The government will enhance international collaboration in...

U.S. Sanctions on Gazprombank Put Uzbekistan’s $4.8 Billion Copper Ambitions at Risk

Uzbekistan faces a significant economic challenge as U.S. sanctions on Russia’s Gazprombank disrupt the $4.8 billion Yoshlik mine expansion project. The project, managed by state-owned Almalyk Mining and Metallurgical Combine (MMC), is critical to Uzbekistan’s plan to nearly double its copper production by 2026, according to The Diplomat. However, with Gazprombank now excluded from the international payments system, the project’s financing is at risk. The Russian Government directly owns 36.44% of Gazprombank's capital. Financing Challenges The Yoshlik mine expansion aims to increase copper output by 78% and gold production by 50%, making it a cornerstone of Uzbekistan’s economic development strategy. However, Almalyk MMC’s reliance on Gazprombank leaves it vulnerable to delays and potential secondary sanctions. This situation exacerbated earlier difficulties after U.S. and EU sanctions in 2022 suspended an $800 million tranche from Russian development bank VEB.RF, another key financial backer. Almalyk MMC must now urgently secure alternative financing to keep the project on track. Russia’s Role in Uzbekistan’s Economy Russia remains Uzbekistan’s largest trading partner, and remittances from Uzbek workers in Russia account for 18% of Uzbekistan’s GDP. Russia’s involvement in the Yoshlik project began in 2021 when Gazprombank and VEB.RF pledged $2 billion to finance mining equipment purchases. Impact on European and British Partners The Yoshlik project also involves significant participation from European and British firms: Germany: Engineering firms such as Thyssenkrupp have supplied critical equipment. Germany’s KfW IPEX-Bank recently arranged $2.55 billion in financing for the project. However, U.S. sanctions on Gazprombank could create legal and logistical hurdles, putting pressure on Germany’s government to reassess its support for exports to Uzbekistan. United Kingdom: The UK has taken a complex position. While it sanctioned Gazprombank in 2014, British firms, including Weir Group, remain involved in the project. In 2024, the U.K.’s export credit agency guaranteed a refinancing deal through Spain’s Santander Bank, reflecting the mine’s importance to British exporters. As reported by TCA, earlier this week, the UK Export Finance (UKEF) guaranteed a €12.6 million ($13.25 million) loan to the Almalyk Mining and Metallurgical Complex to refinance the purchase of fully automated vehicles. Urgency for Alternative Financing For Uzbekistan, securing alternative sources of funding is critical. Almalyk MMC must navigate a challenging sanctions landscape while keeping the Yoshlik project on schedule. Failure to do so could not only isolate the company but also hinder Uzbekistan’s broader economic goals, particularly its ambitions to expand its mining sector and boost foreign investment.

More Than Half of Uzbeks View Nepotism as a Corruption Problem

According to the United Nations, corruption costs developing countries approximately $1.26 trillion annually. Since 2016, Uzbekistan has undertaken significant reforms to combat corruption, including the establishment of the Anti-Corruption Agency, the simplification of public services, and the full digitalization of public procurement systems. A recent study conducted by Uzbekistan's Anti-Corruption Agency, the United Nations Development Programme, and the Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission of the Republic of Korea sheds light on public attitudes toward corruption. The study used surveys, focus groups, and expert interviews, covering all 14 regions of Uzbekistan and gathering responses from 503 participants. Key Findings The study revealed that public understanding of corruption in Uzbekistan often focuses on bribery and nepotism. Over half of respondents identified abuse of office and nepotism as corrupt practices. However, less than 40% considered valuable gifts a form of corruption, with many viewings them as gestures of gratitude rather than bribes. While bribery is widely condemned - 88.4% of respondents disapproved of it - attitudes toward small gifts for good service were more lenient. Sectors Most Affected The study highlighted the sectors most susceptible to corruption: Healthcare and Education: Particularly in higher education. Local Governance: Frequent opportunities for misuse of authority. Traffic Safety Services, Internal Affairs, Roads, and Construction: Identified as high-risk areas, with rural residents particularly concerned about corruption in road construction. Reporting Corruption Despite witnessing corrupt practices, few respondents report such behavior to authorities. Among respondents: Men: 79.2% were slightly more willing to report corruption than women (70.4%). Women: Showed greater interest in using mobile applications or online portals for reporting (85.2% versus 79.2% of men). Persons with Disabilities: Reported corruption less frequently, but expressed a high willingness to use online tools if made accessible. Trust in Anti-Corruption Institutions Trust in anti-corruption institutions varied significantly: Urban Residents: Trusted the media (20.3%) and bloggers (17.3%) more than rural residents. Rural Residents: Had higher trust in the Anti-Corruption Agency (21.4%). Persons with Disabilities: Showed trust in the Anti-Corruption Agency, media, and bloggers. General Public: Less than 5% said they trust no one to address corruption. Moving Forward The findings suggest that while public awareness of corruption is growing, attitudes toward certain practices, such as gift-giving, remain complex. Efforts to increase transparency, provide accessible reporting tools, and build trust in anti-corruption institutions are critical to further reducing corruption in Uzbekistan.