Uzbekistan Features - The Times Of Central Asia

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Qosh Tepa Canal

Opinion – Qosh Tepa Canal: Transboundary Impacts Without a Transboundary Mechanism

In recent months, media attention has increasingly focused on infrastructure projects underway in Afghanistan. Chief among them is the Qosh Tepa Canal, widely seen not only as an irrigation initiative but as a development with significant transboundary implications for the Amu Darya River basin. The canal draws water from one of Central Asia’s most critical transboundary rivers. For downstream countries, primarily Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, the Amu Darya is a vital water source, directly linked to agricultural output and the sustainability of rural communities. As such, the conversation surrounding Qosh Tepa extends well beyond Afghanistan’s domestic agenda. Concerns voiced by experts and analysts stem from both the scale of the project and the absence of an inclusive, basin-wide mechanism that includes Afghanistan, which is not a party to the main post-Soviet Amu Darya allocation frameworks. As a result, discussions regarding the canal’s potential impacts are taking place largely outside formal multilateral frameworks. One positive development is the increasing presentation of Qosh Tepa within a broader context, where water flow management is recognized as a factor shaping regional political and economic relations. However, these assessments often highlight not the canal’s stated purpose, but rather the absence of a sustainable mechanism for coordinating discussion of its cross-border effects. [caption id="attachment_43173" align="aligncenter" width="1280"] Image: TCATCA[/caption] A recurring concern among experts is the lack of a structured multilateral platform that enables early-stage evaluation of such projects before they are perceived as risks. Infrastructure development in the region frequently outpaces the establishment of mechanisms for joint impact assessment and management. In this light, Kazakhstan’s initiative to establish a specialized structure within the UN system, the International Water Organization, acquires particular relevance. This proposal is not about building a theoretical global agenda but about addressing a specific institutional gap: the lack of a neutral forum for technical and expert discussion of transboundary water projects at an early stage. The Qosh Tepa Canal, currently a unilateral infrastructure undertaking rather than the result of an international agreement, could serve as a test case for such a preventive mandate. While the project is already underway and its transboundary implications are actively being discussed among experts, it has not yet escalated into a regional dispute. This creates an opportunity for professional dialogue, without entanglement in political or status-related debates. The present situation can be summarized as one of “transboundary implications without a transboundary mechanism.” The project, while entirely within Afghan territory, objectively affects the interests of downstream states, yet it remains disconnected from any multilateral framework for consultation or agreement. Is it in Afghanistan’s interest to engage in multilateral formats? Though the question is often left unanswered, the answer is a clear “yes.” Such engagement would help dispel suspicion not only among Central Asian states, but also in Iran and Pakistan, both of which have voiced concerns over shared water resources. First, it would reduce negative external rhetoric. Currently, Qosh Tepa is largely discussed via external media with alarmist scenarios and with little to no Afghan participation. This reinforces the image...

Russian Media

Rhetoric, Disinformation, and Regional Responses: Central Asia Reacts to Debates in the Russian Media Space

In recent months, a series of sharp and at times openly threatening statements circulating within the Russian media space have drawn growing attention in Central Asia. As previously reported by The Times of Central Asia, rhetoric targeting several Central Asian states has become increasingly frequent on Russian television and social platforms, raising concern among analysts and the public over issues of sovereignty, coercive tactics, and broader regional security. Russian officials have repeatedly stressed that commentary aired on television talk shows or circulated on social media does not necessarily reflect official state policy. Moscow has, on several occasions, distanced itself from provocative remarks made by media personalities, emphasizing that Russia’s foreign policy is articulated only through formal government channels. Analysts note that such episodes unfold within a highly polarized information environment, where sensational or confrontational statements can spread rapidly online, often detached from their original context or intent. Even when later denied or debunked, these narratives can contribute to heightened tensions by reinforcing existing anxieties and testing political and societal reactions in neighboring states. One recent and widely discussed episode involved a video that went viral on social media, allegedly showing Russian State Duma deputy and former heavyweight boxing champion Nikolai Valuev calling for a shift in Russia’s approach toward former Soviet republics from “carrots” to “sticks”, while also hinting at the possibility of a “special operation” in Central Asia. The footage sparked an immediate backlash and skepticism, particularly in Uzbekistan. According to RIA Novosti, Valuev later publicly denied the authenticity of the video, asserting that it was a deepfake. The Russian news agency quoted him as saying the video “has nothing to do with me” and had been produced using AI. “I’m glad that technologies are developing so fast, but this was done with artificial intelligence,” he said, noting that he often discusses AI and deepfakes and that “apparently, AI has taken offense at me.” Doubts about the video’s authenticity emerged almost immediately. Among those questioning it was Ruslan Chagaev, the former world boxing champion from Uzbekistan and one of Valuev’s former opponents, who publicly expressed his disbelief that the statements reflected Valuev’s actual views. Nonetheless, the incident fueled broader discussions in Central Asia about information manipulation, the role of deepfakes, and how aggressive narratives can gain traction, even when later debunked. These concerns were echoed at a recent session of the analytical forum “Fikrat,” held in Tashkent under the theme National Interest and Global Pressure. The gathering brought together political scientists, economists, and historians to assess the growing volume of inflammatory rhetoric emerging from Russia and its implications for Central Asia. Participants stressed that, even when such narratives do not reflect or translate directly into policy, they can shape public perception and test societal and governmental responses. [caption id="attachment_43140" align="aligncenter" width="1598"] The Firkat Forum in Tashkent; image: TCA, Sadokat Jalolova.[/caption] Economist Abdulla Abdukadirov, First Deputy Director General of Uzbekistan’s Agency for Strategic Reforms under the President, addressed the ideological underpinnings of these narratives, identifying Russian nationalist figure Alexander Dugin...

Ministerial Dismissals

Uzbekistan Fires Counter-Narcotics Chief as Drug Trade Surges

In late January, Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev sacked a series of high-ranking officials in the Interior Ministry, National Guard, and the Emergency Situations Ministry. Their dismissals for corruption overshadowed the firing of the director of the Agency for Control of Narcotics and Illegal Firearms, who was let go for failing badly to combat illegal trafficking and use of drugs. Poor Results Ravshan Mamatov was appointed director of the National Center for Narcotics Control in August 2024. In July 2025, a presidential decree transformed the center into the Agency for Control of Narcotics and Illegal Firearms. On January 27, President Mirziyoyev criticized the work of the Narcotics Control Agency and warned Mamatov to engage in more than simply “analytical work and international cooperation.” Mirziyoyev dismissed Mamatov the next day, and it was not a surprise. Exactly two weeks earlier, Bahodir Kurbanov, the head of Uzbekistan’s State Security Service (SGB), spoke at a session of the country’s Security Council, chaired by President Mirziyoyev. Kurbanov detailed security measures along Uzbekistan’s borders, including the use of military surveillance drones. The security chief also spoke about illegal narcotics, noting the amount of drugs seized in 2024 was some 1,700 kilograms and that figure more than doubled to 3,600 kilograms in 2025. Kurbanov noted the 2025 figure included more than 180 kilograms of synthetic drugs and more than one million doses of psychotropic drugs. Additionally, the number of people arrested for illegal narcotics went from some 2,600 in 2024 to some 4,500 in 2025. In his January 27 comments, President Mirziyoyev said that during the last three months, the authorities in the capital Tashkent, had detained members from approximately 50 major narcotics trafficking groups and seized some 500 kilograms of illegal drugs. “Last year, more than 1,500 drug users were officially registered in the capital,” Mirziyoyev said, noting, “The saddest part is that the number of drug addicts living in the shadows is even higher.” The Uzbek president added that most were young people and that “in their quest to raise money, drug addicts naturally resort to crime.” Mirziyoyev also criticized the penal system, remarking that a significant number of people convicted for illegal narcotics were released from jail before serving even half their sentences. Mirziyoyev said that this has led to a 25% increase in the number of repeat offenders. Mamatov addressed Uzbekistan’s parliament on December 17, admitting the amount of synthetic drugs being seized had increased phenomenally during the last five years and that the number of crimes involving illegal narcotics had doubled during that time. Mamatov claimed that in a number of cases, “drug trafficking was being facilitated by officials,” though he did not name any specific officials. A Regional Problem The other Central Asian countries are facing the same problems as Uzbekistan. The amounts of drugs seized and people arrested have been growing in the last few years and continue to increase. Part of the problem is that the region’s counter-narcotics agencies are facing a new situation in combating the illegal drug...

Jackson-Vanik Amendment

Jackson-Vanik Repeal Gains Momentum as U.S. Courts Central Asia

For many years, U.S. relations with Central Asia were primarily political in nature, while economic ties developed slowly. However, in the past year, engagement has intensified significantly, with recent agreements suggesting the U.S. is poised to strengthen its economic presence in the region. A recent statement by U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio reinforces this outlook. Calls to repeal the outdated Jackson-Vanik trade restrictions have been framed by U.S. officials as a way to facilitate trade with Central Asia and strengthen U.S. energy security. The Jackson-Vanik Amendment The Jackson-Vanik Amendment, enacted in 1974, restricts trade with countries that limit their citizens’ right to emigrate. At the time of its passage, Central Asia was still part of the Soviet Union. The amendment prohibits granting most-favored-nation (MFN) status, government loans, and credit guarantees to countries that violate their citizens’ right to emigrate, and allows for discriminatory tariffs and fees on imports from non-market economies. The amendment was repealed for Ukraine in 2006, and for Russia and Moldova in 2012. However, it remains in effect for several countries, including Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, which continue to receive only temporary normal trade relations. In May 2023, a bill proposing the establishment of permanent trade relations with Kazakhstan, which included repealing the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, was introduced in the U.S. Congress. A follow-up bill with similar provisions was submitted in February 2025. Then-nominee and now Secretary of State Marco Rubio previously noted that some policymakers viewed the amendment as a tool to extract concessions on human rights or to push Central Asian states toward the U.S. and away from Russia. However, he characterized such thinking as outdated, stating that, “In some cases, it is an absurd relic of the past.” Rubio has consistently supported expanding U.S. ties with Central Asia. Expanding Cooperation In 2025, relations between the U.S. and Central Asia deepened significantly, particularly with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, which are seen by analysts as the primary beneficiaries of this cooperation. In late October 2025, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau and U.S. Special Representative for South and Central Asia Sergio Gor visited Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. One of the year’s major events was the Central Asia-U.S. (C5+1) summit held in Washington on November 6. Leaders of the five Central Asian states met with President Donald Trump and members of the U.S. business community. Uzbekistani President Shavkat Mirziyoyev also met with U.S. Senator Steve Daines, co-chair of the Senate Central Asia Caucus, with both sides focusing heavily on economic cooperation. At the summit, Uzbekistan finalized major commercial agreements with U.S. companies, including aircraft orders by Uzbekistan Airways and deals spanning aviation, energy, and industrial cooperation. Kazakhstan signed agreements worth $17 billion with U.S. companies in sectors including aviation, mineral resources, and digital technologies. This included a deal granting American company Cove Kaz Capital Group a 70% stake in a joint venture to develop one of Kazakhstan’s largest tungsten deposits, an agreement valued at $1.1 billion. Further agreements were signed on critical minerals exploration. Kazakhstan and the...

Corruption

Uzbekistan Uncovers Large-Scale Corruption, Files Charges Against Senior Interior Officials

Uzbekistan has launched criminal proceedings against senior officials in the Ministry of Internal Affairs as part of a sweeping anti-corruption campaign that has exposed extensive financial violations across the country. At a government meeting on January 27, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev announced that investigations had uncovered 53 trillion Uzbekistani som ($4.38 billion) in financial irregularities and misappropriated funds. Of that, damage linked directly to corruption schemes totaled 4.2 trillion som ($347.3 million), according to a statement from the president’s press secretary. Authorities reported that 1.3 trillion som ($107.5 million) in damages has already been recovered, and 55 individuals have been arrested nationwide in connection with corruption-related activities. Among the highest-profile cases is one involving the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Criminal proceedings have been initiated against Deputy Interior Minister Bekmurod Abdullayev and Rustam Tursunov, head of the ministry’s Penitentiary Department. Investigators allege that 186 billion som ($15.38 million) in budget funds were embezzled through fraudulent state procurement schemes within the ministry. “Every single som of state money will be placed under strict and effective control. Responsibility is inevitable, and punishment will be severe,” Mirziyoyev said during the meeting. In addition to budget-related losses, audits also identified more than $8 billion in debt associated with foreign trade operations. Mirziyoyev described the findings as alarming and announced the introduction of internal compliance and anti-corruption systems across government bodies and state enterprises. He also addressed personnel management within law enforcement. Despite mandatory retirement ages, 55 for colonels and 60 for generals, over 300 officers exceeding these limits are reportedly still in leadership roles. By contrast, all top officials in the Ministry of Emergency Situations are currently under 50 years old. Mirziyoyev underscored the need to promote a new generation of professional and accountable young leaders while also harnessing the expertise of retired or soon-to-retire officers through mentorship and youth engagement programs. The meeting concluded with directives to conduct a critical review of officials responsible for oversight and security in state institutions. The initiative is part of a broader effort to strengthen financial discipline and governance throughout the public sector.

Russia

Russian TV Comments on Central Asia Trigger Strong Reaction from Uzbek Analysts

A recent broadcast on Russia’s state television channel Russia-1 has sparked strong backlash in Central Asia after inflammatory remarks aired on the political talk show Evening with Vladimir Solovyov questioned the independence and foreign policy choices of post-Soviet countries in Central Asia and the South Caucasus. The controversy began when political analyst Sergey Mikheyev, who served as a representative for President Vladimir Putin during Russia’s 2024 election campaign, criticized Moscow’s approach toward former Soviet republics, calling it “ineffective” and overly generous. “Our policy toward the post-Soviet space was not very effective,” Mikheyev said. “The situation where Russia owes everyone and no one owes Russia anything is a dead end. We solve many of their problems, labor migration, assistance, many other things and yet we are always the ones who must give.” He added, “We spoiled them. We spoiled them too much. We will not tolerate this anymore.” Program host Solovyov supported the tone of Mikheyev’s remarks, adding: “If I am forced to speak about you like this, then think about what you are doing wrong.” The broadcast quickly spread across social media platforms in Central Asia, prompting swift reactions from regional analysts, particularly in Uzbekistan, who criticized the rhetoric as imperial and patronizing. Uzbek political scientist and university professor Sherzodkhon Qudratkhodja called the discussion an emotional outburst rooted in nostalgia for a lost empire. “They spoke like sentinels, bitterly offended by the entire former Soviet Union,” he wrote on social media. He added that Mikheyev’s phrase “we spoiled them” infantilized independent states, framing them as unruly children rather than equal partners. “The logic is simple: if you don’t obey, you’re ‘nervous.’ If you want independence, you’re ‘spoiled.’ Their favorite phrase is that others ‘must know their place,’” Qudratkhodja wrote. He also rejected the idea that Central Asian countries are exploiting Russia or living at its expense. “No one is blackmailing anyone. No one owes us anything, and we owe no one anything,” he stated, emphasizing Uzbekistan’s commitment to “equal rights and mutual respect in international relations.” Another Uzbek analyst, G‘ayratxo‘ja Saydaliyev, argued that Mikheyev’s comments reflect a broader worldview within segments of the Russian political elite. “This is an open expression of a geopolitical mindset where Central Asia is not seen as a partner, but as a subordinate,” he wrote. “Independent foreign policy is treated not only as ingratitude but as illegitimate.” Saydaliyev noted Mikheyev’s additional remarks on Iran and Turkey, interpreting them as evidence of growing Russian anxiety over shifting alliances. He argued that Moscow views Iran as a counterbalance to the U.S. and Turkey, and fears that losing influence over Tehran could further weaken Russia’s position, potentially prompting it to exert more pressure on post-Soviet neighbors. Turkey’s rising role in Central Asia and the concept of a “Turkic world” were also framed by Mikheyev as a geopolitical threat. Saydaliyev concluded that deeper regional ties with Ankara are being viewed in Moscow not as legitimate foreign policy, but as a challenge to Russian dominance. “The biggest challenge for Central...