• KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00197 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10904 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00197 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10904 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00197 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10904 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00197 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10904 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00197 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10904 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00197 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10904 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00197 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10904 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00197 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10904 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
08 December 2025

Turkish Safi Holding Eyes Sugar Factory Investment in Kazakhstan

Turkish industrial conglomerate Safi Holding has expressed interest in developing a high-tech sugar processing facility in Kazakhstan, according to the country’s Ministry of Agriculture.

The announcement followed a meeting between Agriculture Minister Aidarbek Saparov and Safi Holding CEO Safi Atakan. The two sides discussed the proposed plant’s specifications, which include the capacity to process up to 1 million tons of sugar beets annually and produce approximately 140,000 tons of sugar. The estimated investment ranges from $150 million to $200 million.

Potential sites for the factory are currently under consideration. According to the ministry, the key criteria for site selection include the availability of arable land for beet cultivation and proximity to necessary infrastructure.

Safi Atakan praised Kazakhstan’s agro-industrial potential, particularly in sugar production. “Kazakhstan presents favorable conditions for expanding sugar processing operations,” he noted.

A similar initiative is underway by UAE-based Al Khaleej Sugar, one of the world’s largest sugar producers, which is planning a plant in southern Kazakhstan.

Industry Gaps and Import Dependence

Kazakhstan’s sugar sector is currently under strain due to limited processing capacity. There are four sugar factories in operation: AksuKant (Taldykorgan district), Koksu Sugar Factory (Almaty region), and the Merken and Taraz factories in the Zhambyl region. Of these, three process locally grown sugar beets, while the facility in Taraz handles imported cane sugar.

Despite a record harvest of 1.2 million tons of sugar beets in 2024, only about 700,000 tons were processed, exposing significant inefficiencies in the processing chain.

In 2023, Kazakhstan produced 243,000 tons of sugar, less than half of its domestic demand. The remainder was imported, primarily from Russia. However, reliance on imports has proven volatile. In the summer of 2022, Russia’s temporary export ban led to a spike in domestic sugar prices. In response, the Kazakh government imposed seasonal export restrictions, which have been extended through 2025, to stabilize local markets.

Tajikistan Escalates Deportations of Afghan Refugees Amid Growing Concerns

Afghans who fled to Tajikistan are keeping a low profile lately.

Tajik authorities have started the latest wave of deportations, and this one looks to be bigger than the previous sweeps.

“You Have 15 Days”

At the beginning of July, Afghan refugees and asylum-seekers in Tajikistan received an SMS warning them to leave the country within 15 days or else they would be forcibly deported. Tajikistan’s government has not commented on these messages, but the detention of Afghans started not long after the messages were sent.

So far, the only two places mentioned where Afghans were being apprehended were the Rudaki district outside of Dushanbe and the town of Vahdat, 26 kilometers from Dushanbe. Hundreds of Afghan refugees are known to be living in these two areas.

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s Tajik Service, known locally as Ozodi, reported that journalists who went to the houses of Afghan refugees in Vahdat were stopped and turned away by men in military uniforms outside the homes. Some Afghan refugees in Vahdat spoke with Ozodi under the condition of anonymity and said that on July 15, several vans arrived and took away “dozens” of Afghan men, women, and children.

One said Afghan refugees are staying inside their homes, fearing that if they go out, they will be detained and deported. Police “take the documents from Afghans and set a date for them to leave the country,” the refugee said, “For more than 20 days we have practically not stepped outside at all.”

Local Tajiks confirmed that Afghans were being taken away and that many of those who remained were searching for new places to live to avoid being apprehended.

The Tajik authorities did not say anything about the deportations until July 19, when the state news agency Khovar posted a text from the Press Center of the Border Troops of the State Committee for National Security. The statement said some “foreign citizens” had entered Tajikistan illegally, and a “certain number” of them engaged in illegal activities such as “narcotics trafficking, [spreading] the ideas of extremist movements,” or providing false information or documents to acquire refugee status.

The office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) said that as of the end of 2024, there were 9,902 Afghan refugees registered in Tajikistan. However, Afghans have been fleeing their homeland and coming to Tajikistan for many years, and some estimates for the number of Afghans in Tajikistan run as high as 13,000.

Something else which remains unclear about the Afghan refugees in Tajikistan is how many are ethnic Tajiks. Ostensibly, most of them could be since the ethnic Tajik population of Afghanistan is mainly found in areas adjacent to Tajikistan. Many who came to Tajikistan 10 or 15 years ago have assimilated and are likely not refugees or asylum seekers, but may not have obtained Tajik citizenship.

It is unclear how many Afghan citizens have been detained and deported since the start of July, but they are just the latest to be sent back to Afghanistan in recent years.

Earlier Waves of Deportations

On August 25, 2022, the UNHCR raised “grave concerns over the continued detention and deportations of Afghan refugees in Tajikistan.” The UNHCR said that on August 23, Tajik authorities sent five Afghan families back across the border. By September 6, the number of Afghans deported had reached 85. The UNHCR’s Director of International Protection, Elizabeth Tan, called at the time for Tajikistan to “stop detaining and deporting refugees, an action that clearly puts lives at risk.”

During the first week of December 2024, the Tajik authorities deported at least 56 more Afghans, most from the Rudaki district and Vahdat. The UNHCR again appealed to the Tajik government to halt deportations, noting it was “the third documented incident of forcible returns to Afghanistan since October 2024.”

In January 2025, the UNHCR said that at least 80 Afghans had been deported during the last month of 2024.

Grim Future, Forgotten Past

The UNHCR, rights groups, and others have pointed out that some of those being deported are employees or military personnel from the ousted Afghan government who could face ill-treatment and possibly execution back in Afghanistan.

As the government of former Afghan President Ashraf Ghani was falling in mid-August 2021, as many as 18 Afghan aircraft flew to Tajikistan with government officials, soldiers, and their families aboard. Some later departed Tajikistan for third countries, but many of those who escaped Afghanistan in August 2021 remained in Tajikistan.

Even for those who are not former government employees or soldiers, returning to Afghanistan is a journey into hunger and poverty.

Afghanistan has been unable to feed the people who remained in the country after the change in power. In 2024, the UN Development Programme said that 85% of Afghanistan’s people live on less than a dollar a day. In June 2025, the World Food Program stated that 15 million of Afghanistan’s roughly 40 million people face severe hunger.

In the first six months of 2025, Iran deported some 1.5 million Afghans back to Afghanistan, 410,000 of them since the end of the Israeli-Iran war in June. During the same period, Pakistan deported more than 300,000 Afghans. Every returning citizen places further strain on already insufficient food supplies, and few if any of those being deported are likely to find gainful employment. And Iran and Pakistan have better relations with the Taliban-run government in Afghanistan than Tajikistan does.

The Tajik authorities still view the Taliban as a threat, and Tajikistan is the only immediate neighbor of Afghanistan that has not established a dialogue with the Taliban government. The Afghan embassy in Dushanbe is still staffed by personnel from the ousted regime of Ashraf Ghani. Those being returned from Tajikistan could face a particularly bleak reception back home.

The Tajik border guards’ July 19 statement about deporting Afghans started with the words, “Due to the difficult political and economic situation in the region and the world, there has been an increase in the migration of foreign citizens to our country.”

The bitter irony is that some 30 years ago, the situation was the reverse. During Tajikistan’s civil war from 1992-1997, hundreds of thousands of people from Tajikistan fled the country. The June 1997 Tajik Peace Accord ended the war, and the repatriation of Tajik refugees started.

Russia’s border guards kept watch on the Tajik-Afghan frontier until 2005. They oversaw the return of Tajik refugees from Afghanistan after the civil war ended. By October 1999, the Russian border guards reported that more than 150,000 Tajik refugees had returned from Afghanistan since the peace accord was signed.

With this in mind, the actions of the Tajik government today in returning Afghan refugees and asylum-seekers seem particularly harsh.

Opinion: A Sea of Discord? Intensifying Military Drills Threaten Stability in the Caspian Region

On Monday, Russia and Iran launched joint military exercises in the Caspian Sea under the banner “Together for a Safe and Secure Caspian Sea.” Officially, the drills aim to enhance maritime security and naval cooperation between the two countries and are being coordinated by Iran’s Northern Fleet. While such exercises might once have passed without much notice, their timing and frequency reflect a shifting dynamic: the Caspian region is rapidly emerging as a potential hotspot in global geopolitics.

Just one month prior, the same waters hosted joint military exercises between Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, held in Aktau, western Kazakhstan. These were followed by the “Tarlan-2025” air and tactical drills in Azerbaijan from July 8-10, which focused on enhancing UAV operations and military coordination.

Baku’s strategic alliance with Ankara is a key factor here. Azerbaijan, a close Turkish partner, is now engaged in a more strained relationship with Russia. Moscow’s muted reaction to this cooling suggests an awareness that Ankara is increasingly shaping a Turkic military-political bloc, an emerging force in a region of strategic importance to both Russia and China.

Earlier this month, Turkey launched its annual Anadolu-2025 special forces exercises. Participants included troops from 33 nations, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, and others but notably excluded Russia.

For the first time, in 2024, military exercises were held in the Caspian without Russian involvement. The Birleistik (Unity) 2024 drills were conducted at Kazakhstan’s Oymasha training ground and Cape Tokmak along the Caspian coast. Troops from Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan rehearsed scenarios including conflict zone identification, night maritime operations, and amphibious landings.

Previously, regional military cooperation had been limited to bilateral engagements, such as the 2023 UZAZ exercises (Azerbaijan-Uzbekistan), Kanzhar-2023 (Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan), and Hazri-2023 (Azerbaijan-Kazakhstan).

The spike in joint drills during 2024-2025 underscores growing rivalries between regional and global powers. These operations are not mere formalities but reveal emerging security alignments and geopolitical signals.

Three distinct blocs appear to be coalescing in the Caspian, with implications for Central Asia as well.

The first bloc includes Russia, Iran, and China. These nations have held annual “Maritime Security Belt” exercises since 2019, with the most recent in March 2025 off the Iranian coast.

The second bloc comprises Turkey, Azerbaijan, and members of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS). Defense ties among these countries are becoming a core element of OTS cooperation. At the 10th OTS Summit in Astana in 2023, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev emphasized defense as the main guarantor of member state security, citing ongoing regional conflicts and violations of international law.

The third bloc, more pragmatic and focused, is the Kazakhstan-Azerbaijan partnership. These countries are cooperating on the basis of the 2018 Caspian Convention to secure maritime communications. Azerbaijan contributes military expertise, particularly in UAV and drone warfare developed during the Karabakh conflicts. Kazakhstan brings diplomatic credibility and promotes regional governance and connectivity, offering a stabilizing complement to Azerbaijan’s military strengths.

In sum, the Caspian Sea, once colloquially referred to as “Russia’s lake”, is steadily losing that identity. It is transforming into a contested strategic zone, where three competing security visions intersect. The risk of escalation is real.

Whether the Caspian remains a sea of cooperation or becomes a flashpoint of geopolitical strife may soon depend on decisions made far beyond its shores.

Kazakhstan and China Pilot Driverless Cargo Transport Project

Kazakhstan and China have  launched a pioneering pilot project called “Smart Customs,” which will enable the use of driverless vehicles to transport cargo across their shared border.

The program is currently being tested at the Bakhty (Kazakhstan) and Pokitu (China) border checkpoints. Its main goal is to streamline customs procedures using high-tech solutions, with autonomous trucks as the project’s central feature. These unmanned vehicles are designed to cross the border automatically, removing the need for human drivers.

The initiative was formalized during a working meeting between Zhandos Duisembiev, Chairman of Kazakhstan’s State Revenue Committee, and Zhixianwei, Party Secretary of the Chinese city of Tacheng in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. The two sides signed a cooperation agreement confirming their commitment to harmonize efforts, share expertise, and support digital innovation in logistics.

The Smart Customs system incorporates several advanced technologies:

  • A unified electronic declaration system recognized by both countries
  • Fully digitized documentation and data processing
  • Continuous, unmanned cargo movement across the border
  • Automated navigation and operational control

These innovations are expected to reduce border processing times, lower transportation costs, and improve operational transparency. The project also aims to support the development of logistics infrastructure along the border.

Key objectives of the initiative include:

  • Expanding annual cargo capacity to 10 million tons
  • Establishing logistics hubs to relieve pressure on current infrastructure
  • Creating employment opportunities and attracting investment
  • Increasing exports of Kazakhstani agricultural products, including grain, oilseeds, meat, and processed goods

According to Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Finance, the initiative is intended to strengthen the country’s position as a regional transit hub and to deepen trade relations with China.

Kazakhstan has previously faced criticism over delays in customs inspections. A study by the German Society for International Cooperation (GIZ) in late 2024 found Kazakhstan had the slowest inspection times among Central Asian countries, averaging 2 hours and 26 minutes per cargo inspection. In comparison, Turkmenistan averaged 50 minutes, Uzbekistan 1 hour and 25 minutes, Kyrgyzstan 1 hour and 28 minutes, and Tajikistan 1 hour and 50 minutes.

The rollout of Smart Customs is expected to significantly improve these statistics and help Kazakhstan match the efficiency of regional leaders in border processing.

Autonomous cross-border freight transport has also been explored by Russia and China. Previous plans aimed to launch driverless cargo operations across the new Blagoveshchensk–Heihe Bridge, although that  project has yet to materialize.

New Russian Regulations Halt Kazakhstan’s Black Sea Oil Exports

Kazakhstan has temporarily suspended oil exports via the Black Sea ports of Novorossiysk and Yuzhnaya Ozerovka due to newly enforced Russian regulations. The rules, which took effect on July 21, require foreign vessels entering Russian ports to receive prior approval from the Federal Security Service (FSB) and the port captain.

Strategic Ports, Vulnerable Logistics

According to Reuters, the new clearance procedures have effectively blocked shipments of Kazakh crude transported through the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) system. The disruption could reduce global oil supply by more than 2% (source).

Over 80% of Kazakhstan’s oil exports are shipped through terminals in Novorossiysk and Yuzhnaya Ozerovka. The primary export product is CPC Blend, produced by major Kazakh oil firms, including ventures with significant American corporate participation.

The decree by President Vladimir Putin, issued earlier this month, was introduced amid rising maritime threats. In 2025 alone, five tanker explosions have occurred in the region. One of the most serious incidents involved the tanker Koala, which was damaged in February while docked in the Russian port of Ust-Luga.

Despite suspicions, none of the targeted tankers were carrying Russian crude sold above the G7 price cap. Tracking data revealed that each vessel had visited ports used for Kazakh oil exports, which are not subject to Western sanctions, according to the Financial Times.

The CPC had planned to export 6.5 million tons of CPC Blend in August, maintaining the July level. Of that, 2.2 million tons were shipped via Novorossiysk.

Mounting Risks, Limited Alternatives

The security of Kazakhstan’s energy infrastructure is further threatened by ongoing regional instability. In February, seven Ukrainian drones attacked the CPC’s Krokotinskaya oil pumping station. While there were fears of a 30% drop in throughput, Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Energy denied any disruption, stating that “oil is being received according to schedule”.

Financial analyst Rasul Rysmambetov, writing on his Telegram channel ArtFinanze, urged restraint but acknowledged the seriousness of the situation: “If attacks on infrastructure continue, it will become increasingly difficult to protect the underwater pipeline system.”

He also warned that the involvement of Western firms such as Chevron may not deter further risks: “Contrary to popular belief, the participation of companies such as Chevron will not stop anyone. On the contrary, such infrastructure can be used to put pressure on entire countries”.

Currently, nearly all of Kazakhstan’s oil exports transit Russian territory. The CPC handles 80%, while another 13% flows through the Atyrau-Samara pipeline, connected to Russia’s Transneft system. The remaining 7% is routed via the Kazakhstan, China pipeline, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, and railways.

Even if capacity on the BTC route is expanded to 3 million tons annually, it would barely compensate for the over 60 million tons currently exported through the CPC system.

Despite frequent official calls for diversification since 2022, Kazakhstan’s oil export infrastructure remains acutely vulnerable, highly dependent on transit decisions made by foreign governments.

Kazakhstan Leads Central Asia in Latest Global Passport Rankings

Kazakhstan holds the most powerful passport in Central Asia, according to the latest update of the Henley Passport Index. The index ranks 199 passports by the number of destinations their holders can access without a prior visa. Kazakh citizens can now travel to 79 countries visa-free.

Following Kazakhstan in the regional ranking is Kyrgyzstan, whose passport ranks 73rd globally with access to 63 countries. Uzbekistan is close behind in 74th place, with 62 visa-free destinations. Tajikistan ranks 80th (56 countries), while Turkmenistan trails at 85th, with just 49 destinations accessible without a visa.

The Henley Passport Index calculates scores by awarding one point for each destination where no visa is required, or where travelers can obtain a visa on arrival, a visitor’s permit, or an electronic travel authorization. A score of zero is assigned if a visa is required prior to departure or if government pre-approval is needed for a visa on arrival.

On the global stage, Singapore retains the top spot for the second consecutive year, granting its passport holders visa-free access to 193 countries. Japan and South Korea share second place, each offering visa-free travel to 190 destinations. The top ten is dominated by European countries.

The Times of Central Asia previously reported on last year’s edition of the Henley Passport Index and its implications for mobility in the region.