As Russia remains preoccupied with the war in Ukraine and the United States is focused on the ongoing Israel-Iran conflict, China is seeking to increase its presence in Central Asia. In the current circumstances, the European Union and Beijing appear to be the most active players in the strategically important region; but who is in a better position?
Central Asia has become a region where various foreign powers are competing for influence. On June 5, New Delhi hosted the 4th India-Central Asia Dialogue, during which the foreign ministers of the regional nations, along with their Indian counterpart, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, discussed anti-terrorism cooperation amid rising regional extremism. Earlier, on April 3–4, the European Union sought to expand its ties with the region through the EU–Central Asia Summit format.
Given China’s extensive economic cooperation with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan, it is unsurprising that Beijing is seeking to strengthen its strategic influence in the region. The 2nd China-Central Asia Summit, taking in Astana on June 16-17, is yet another opportunity for Beijing to demonstrate that it has the capacity to position itself as an alternative to the growing European presence in the region.
According to Dr. Habib Al-Badawi, Professor of International Relations at the Lebanese University, China is also aiming to limit the influence of other powers in the region – especially the United States, and to a lesser extent, Russia.
“Moscow appears to accept China’s growing economic dominance while trying to maintain its traditional security role. However, Beijing’s expanding presence represents a long-term challenge to Russia’s historical sphere of influence in the region,” Dr. Al-Badawi told The Times of Central Asia, emphasizing that Moscow and Beijing are more inclined to cooperate rather than compete in the region.
Mark N. V. Temnycky, a Nonresident Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, believes that Moscow is showing a high degree of tolerance toward Beijing’s increased economic, energy, and security presence in Central Asia. Both countries, in his view, share similar objectives in the region, where they act as major trading partners and energy suppliers.
The European Union seems to be their major rival in the Central Asia. In Dr. Al-Badawi’s view, unlike the EU that is “solely pursuing the region’s critical minerals,” China appears focused on broader economic integration through infrastructure development and trade partnerships. Dr. Tugrul Keskin, Professor at Cappadocia University and Moderator of Global China Academic Network, seems to share this view.
“Beijing’s objectives in Central Asia are driven by a blend of strategic, economic, and security imperatives. While access to critical minerals – including rare earth elements vital for green technologies – is an emerging interest, it is not the primary driver. Unlike the European Union, whose recent engagement has focused heavily on securing raw materials, China’s approach is more comprehensive. It aims to shape the region’s long-term political alignments and economic structures in ways that favor Chinese leadership and diminish Western influence,” Dr. Keskin told The Times of Central Asia.
At the same time, Beijing is actively increasing its soft power in the region, particularly at Russia’s expense. According to Dr. Al-Badawi, China has expanded cultural and educational exchanges, language programs, and economic partnerships that enhance its regional appeal. Yet, for Keskin, these efforts have yielded mixed results.
“In terms of soft power, China has indeed made notable efforts – establishing Confucius Institutes, offering scholarships, fostering media ties, and expanding cultural diplomacy. However, skepticism persists in parts of Central Asia, particularly in societies with strong cultural ties to Russia or where public concern over China’s treatment of Turkic Muslims remains high,” he stressed, pointing out that the geopolitical balance in Central Asia, long shaped by Russian hegemony, is gradually but unmistakably tilting toward Beijing.
Meanwhile, Dr. Andrey Gubin, Associate Professor in the Department of International Relations at the Eastern Institute of Russia’s Far Eastern Federal University in Vladivostok, argues that Beijing and Moscow have managed to “divide their competences” and have built a complementary model of cooperation in Central Asia.
“Russia remains more engaged in political dialogue and defense ties, while China leans heavily toward economic and infrastructure-driven initiatives. However, nearly all official actions by the two powers appear to be coordinated in advance. Notably, China has increased its share of military exports to Central Asia in areas where Russia continues to lag – a development that is seen as both positive and motivating,” Dr. Gubin told The Times of Central Asia, adding that Beijing requires a more stable and secure environment to revive its temporarily stalled Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in the region.
In Al-Badawi’s view, the BRI is one of the crucial drivers of China’s Central Asia strategy. He believes that Beijing is seeking to make Central Asia a crucial hub for its Belt and Road Initiative, with major infrastructure projects like the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Railway scheduled to break ground in July 2025, which will shorten transit times, reduce logistics costs, and enhance regional economic integration.
“China’s engagement in Central Asia is also driven by a comprehensive set of objectives aimed at establishing a Sinocentric sphere of influence, particularly in the context of global economic shifts. To put it simply, Beijing seeks to promote its economic interests in Central Asia and enhance energy security,” Al-Badawi concluded.
Keskin, however, believes that Beijing’s engagement in the region is not purely economic.
“Politically and strategically, the emergence of radical Islamist movements in Central Asia – many of which have impacted China’s Xinjiang region – has introduced serious security concerns for Beijing. In his influential 2010 essay Advance Toward the West, General Liu Yazhou argued that China’s future lies in consolidating its western frontier – particularly Xinjiang and Central Asia – rather than focusing solely on maritime ambitions,” Keskin stated.
Although Temnycky believes that China hopes to establish itself as a guarantor of regional stability and security – which would lead to Central Asia relying more heavily on Beijing – he sees energy as an important aspect of the People’s Republic’s strategy in the region.
“If China gains access to Central Asia’s rare earth elements, this would enable the world’s second-largest economy to strengthen its global dominance in critical minerals. It would also make Central Asian states even more dependent on China, both economically and politically,” Temnycky concluded.
One thing is certain: most, if not all, Central Asian nations will seek to strike a delicate balance between the interests of major powers in the region. Still, geography plays an important role, which means that China, due to its proximity, will almost certainly continue to strengthen its economic and strategic positions in Central Asia.
