After the Taliban returned to power in August 2021, the question of recognizing the new Afghan regime became one of the key issues in regional and global politics. Although no country has granted de jure recognition to the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA), international engagement with the de facto authorities is becoming increasingly institutionalized.

This article attempts to systematize and provisionally classify countries based on their stance toward the IEA. This is not a formal legal typology but rather an analytical tool meant to identify “stable patterns of behavior” in the context of interactions with the de facto authorities in Kabul. This approach does not aim for exhaustive academic precision but provides a basis for further discussion and analysis.

To begin, we must clarify some basic principles, first and foremost, the institution of recognition. In international legal doctrine, the recognition of a new state or government is a unilateral act by a state and does not require the approval of international organizations. The UN, including the Security Council, does not formally conduct acts of recognition, but its approval is required for admitting authorities to the UN General Assembly, which constitutes formal recognition of international legitimacy and a willingness by the global community to work with them.

The key mechanism here is the UN Credentials Committee. This is a special committee of the UN General Assembly consisting of nine member states, which change on a rotating basis. It annually reviews the lists of delegations accredited to participate in UN General Assembly sessions. Between 2021 and 2024, the committee decided to reject the recognition of seats for the Taliban government. In effect, this constitutes a denial of international recognition at the UN level.

While the decision of the Credentials Committee has no formal legal significance as an act of recognition or non-recognition, politically it sends a strong signal to other states: the UN still does not regard the IEA as the legitimate government of Afghanistan. In other words, the Credentials Committee acts as a kind of beacon: until it is “lit,” a wave of de jure recognition from other states is highly unlikely. Many countries, especially those following a policy of collective decision-making, will take their cue from the UN. For now, the signal remains unchanged: the international community maintains a cautious distance from legitimizing the Taliban regime.

As is well known, there are two types of recognition: de jure recognition, which is complete and official and involves the establishment of diplomatic relations, and de facto recognition, which is limited and does not imply full legitimization of the regime.

Removing the Taliban from national terrorist lists (as Kazakhstan and Russia have done) does not constitute legal recognition, even though some may portray it as such.

The UN itself uses the term “de facto authorities” to describe the Taliban. At the same time, the UN Security Council sanctions regime on Afghanistan (under Resolution 2255) provides for the application of sanctions on an individual basis, without qualifying the regime as a terrorist regime.

The Taliban are officially recognized as “terrorists” at the national level only in Canada, according to the Criminal Code of Canada, and in Tajikistan by decision of the Supreme Court.

Many countries, like the US, EU member states, the UK, Japan, and Australia, have adopted a sanction-based approach akin to the UN’s, rather than labeling the Taliban as a terrorist group.

Another common misconception involves the presence of diplomatic missions in Kabul. In international practice, a diplomatic mission is a communication channel, not an act of recognition. This is explained by the need to maintain consular and humanitarian work, protect national interests, and coordinate work on various issues. Diplomats often say that diplomacy is the art of maintaining contact “even when bridges are burning.”

How does de jure recognition work in practice?

De jure recognition is an official confirmation of the legitimacy of a foreign government or state by another sovereign state. International law lacks a single document codifying the procedure of de jure recognition. Instead, it is one of those institutions that is governed by doctrines, precedents, and diplomatic practice.

The 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations does not regulate recognition. In international practice, the dispatch of an ambassador and the accreditation of a diplomatic mission usually occur in the context of at least de facto diplomatic relations. The Convention does not require states to formally recognize each other, only that they agree to establish diplomatic channels (Article 2). Thus, diplomatic interaction can exist without de jure recognition, as demonstrated by many historical examples.

In the “classic” model, recognition is achieved through the following steps. However, these elements are considered signs rather than legally binding stages.

1) A statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (or the head of state/government) recognizing the new entity or government.
2) Presentation of letters of credence, which is an important but symbolic act.
3) Opening or reopening of an embassy with the accreditation of an ambassador to the new government.
4) Establishment of contractual relations, including the signing of intergovernmental agreements with the new regime.
5) Protocol behavior – participation in official events, state visits, congratulations on national holidays, etc.

De jure recognition does not require the consent of the UN or international organizations – it is the sovereign right of each state. However, it entails political and legal consequences, including obligations under international law, the legitimization of treaties, and immunities.

Typology of States in Relation to the IEA

De facto recognition, demonstrated through contacts and rhetoric, has been extended by countries such as China, Uzbekistan, the UAE, and Turkey, all of which have accepted IEA ambassadors.

Economic engagement without political legitimacy characterizes the approach of Kazakhstan, Iran, and Russia. Moscow, however, holds a unique position and, given its recent diplomatic actions, could arguably be placed in the category of de facto recognizers.

The conditions and criteria under which these countries might formally recognize the Taliban government de jure remain difficult to determine.

Maintaining a “technical” presence (“pragmatists”): Japan and India, along with the EU, which maintains a mission in Kabul. Italy also operates a representative office for its special services in the city and can therefore be included in this category.

Islamic mediators: Qatar and Saudi Arabia.

Passive observers: Malaysia and Indonesia. These states are characterized by an absence of a clear political stance, minimal contact with the IEA, cautious statements on women’s rights, and non-participation in regional forums attended by the Taliban.

States that categorically do not recognize the IEA: Canada, France, Australia, and Tajikistan maintain firm positions, demanding significant changes in human rights, inclusivity, and legitimacy as prerequisites for recognition. While they participate in humanitarian programs, they reject diplomatic engagement and support political alternatives to the IEA.

We would like to highlight a distinct category: “Recognition through economics” or “pragmatism in action.” These are states that actively cooperate with the IEA in trade, logistics, and investment, while withholding formal political recognition. This form of engagement, sometimes described as paradiplomacy, reflects a pragmatic balance between geopolitical realism and diplomatic constraints.

Countries in this category include Iran, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkey, Qatar, and Turkmenistan, all of which are involved in infrastructure, energy, and transport projects in Afghanistan.

There are currently 18 diplomatic missions operating in Afghanistan, including the embassies of Azerbaijan, the European Union, Indonesia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Qatar, China, Kyrgyzstan, the UAE, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Turkey, Uzbekistan, and Japan. We have also included India’s technical group in this list.

Additionally, regional consulates exist in:
● Herat: Iran, Turkey, Turkmenistan
● Nangarhar: Pakistan
● Balkh: Iran, Pakistan, Russia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan

However, as noted above, the presence of a permanent mission signifies dialogue with the Taliban rather than formal recognition. It is more accurate to focus on the countries whose ambassadors have officially presented their credentials to the IEA authorities. According to confirmed information, only two countries have done so: China and Uzbekistan.

In September 2023, the new ambassador of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) presented his credentials to the Prime Minister of the IEA, Hassan Akhund. A year later, in October 2024, Uzbekistan’s new ambassador to Afghanistan, Oybek Usmanov, followed suit.

Other ambassadors were accredited under the former republican regime, while current embassies are led by interim chargés d’affaires. According to unofficial information from Afghan diplomats, the Taliban themselves informally believe that the Islamic Emirate is de facto recognized by four countries: China, Uzbekistan, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). First of all, this is justified by the fact that Taliban ambassadors have been accepted in these countries. However, there is a question mark over Turkey since there is no confirmed information about the appointment of an ambassador to Turkey, only that the embassy in Ankara was transferred to Taliban control in February 2025.

Legal Positioning

● “Taliban = terrorists”: Only Canada and Tajikistan
● “Sanctions regime”: US, UK, EU, Germany, France, Japan, India (aligns with Taliban opponents)
● “Only UN sanctions”: These states follow UN Security Council resolutions but do not classify the Taliban as terrorists in national law, including most Afghan neighbors and the Arab world.

It is very important to clarify here that the UN Security Council’s 1988 Committee monitors the implementation of sanctions imposed by the Security Council. There are only three such measures: asset freezing, travel bans, and an arms embargo. These measures apply to individuals and organizations included in the relevant list, which includes 135 individuals and five legal entities. The list was last updated on January 30, 2019, before the Taliban came to power. At the same time, according to UN documents, they are not recognized as terrorists and are included in the list in the context of “creating a threat to the peace, stability, and security of Afghanistan.” Even this reflects the assessment of the Taliban as a political force. According to estimates for 2024, 61 of the 135 individuals subject to sanctions hold various positions within the IEA.

The legal assessment of the Taliban movement in international practice remains extremely fragmented. Only two countries officially classify it as a terrorist organization. The remaining states rely either on UN Security Council sanctions or their political approaches to engagement. At the same time, most countries in the Middle East and Southeast Asia avoid direct legal classification, leaving room for diplomatic maneuvering.

UN Voting as an Additional Indicator

Although recognition of the IEA is a sovereign decision of each state, international votes, especially within the UN General Assembly, reveal trends in the positions of countries that do not openly state their attitude toward the Taliban regime but make their position clear by approving or rejecting condemnatory resolutions.

Thus, voting on key resolutions serves as an indicator of political orientation, at least temporarily, and sometimes strategically.

For our analysis, we use as a reference the vote on the United Nations General Assembly resolution of November 10, 2022, titled “The Situation in Afghanistan” (A/RES/77/10). The resolution condemned violations of the rights of women and girls, the exclusion of inclusive governance, and the dismantling of civil society institutions in Afghanistan.

The voting results were as follows: 116 countries voted in favor, 10 against, and 17 abstained.

The countries that voted against the resolution—effectively defending the IEA—were: Russia, China, Belarus, Ethiopia, North Korea, Nicaragua, Syria, Zimbabwe, Eritrea, and Burundi.

Those that abstained—often referred to as “soft sympathizers”—included: Iran, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, India, Indonesia, Vietnam, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE.

Notably, most of the abstaining states are the same ones that maintain active engagement with the de facto authorities in Afghanistan across economic, humanitarian, and infrastructure sectors.

These results can be seen as an additional indicator of who is ready to publicly condemn the Taliban and who prefers to take a “neutral” but cooperative position. While this is not recognition per se, it shows political trends useful for deeper classification.

“Contact Diplomacy Contact”:

Some researchers take a quantitative approach, focusing on who, where, and how many. This method offers a different but equally valuable perspective. One such example is the work of Aaron Y. Zelin, a senior fellow at The Washington Institute, whose data covers the three years from August 2021 to August 2024.

According to Zelin, the practice of “contact diplomacy” by the Islamic Emirate unfolded as follows: from August 2021 to August 2023, representatives of the IEA held 944 diplomatic meetings with officials from 72 different countries.

The top five countries by number of meetings were:

1. Turkey – 150
2. Iran – 141
3. Qatar – 99
4. Pakistan – 92
5. Uzbekistan – 58

Other active participants include Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Russia, China, the EU, Japan, the US, and Norway (6 meetings), despite the absence of an embassy in Kabul.

Out of these meetings, 471 were in Kabul, 146 were in Doha, with a lesser number being held in Islamabad, Tehran, Ankara, Moscow, and others.

The peak of activity occurred in the second half of 2022, with spikes in August and November. The formats included bilateral and multilateral meetings, participation in conferences, visits to capitals, and behind-the-scenes consultations. In addition to the country breakdown, these figures demonstrate that despite the lack of official international recognition, the Taliban’s diplomatic activity is very systematic and large-scale. The Emirate uses it as a tool to build parallel legitimacy, especially with countries in the region.

Where is Pakistan?

Here we encounter a complexity. Pakistan holds a unique position: there is neither de jure nor official de facto recognition of the Islamic Emirate, yet the country maintains active diplomatic and infrastructural ties that enable a practical relationship bordering on de facto recognition. Domestic political sensitivity, border security, and international pressure prevent Pakistan from making a formal move, yet by many indicators, Islamabad is one of the most deeply engaged partners of Afghanistan’s de facto authorities. Overall, Pakistan’s position can be described as one of “borderline realism.”

Conclusions

Recognition is not a one-dimensional act, but a complex set of signals: from letters of credence and sanctions to economic dialogue and behavior at the UN. The IEA remains unrecognized but actively engages with the outside world. Overall, it appears that today’s Afghanistan is setting a new precedent, whereby recognition is not a declaration. It is a network of projects, connections, and interests that will one day make the question of recognition a formality.

If we attempt to distill this multi-layered system into a kind of “ranking,” the clear leaders, based on a combination of factors, are as follows:

1st Place: China

China stands as the undisputed leader. It was the first country to receive an IEA envoy and the first to present ambassadorial credentials to the Taliban government, thereby setting a precedent. Its engagement includes active diplomatic contacts, consistent media signaling, and involvement in major infrastructure projects.

2nd Place: Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan (shared)

These two Central Asian nations lead in terms of partnership without rivalry. Each plays a prominent role in shaping regional policy toward Afghanistan, with different emphases but no sign of competition.

• Uzbekistan was the first in the region to formally accredit Afghan ambassadors, reflecting its pragmatic approach to diplomacy driven by geographic proximity and national interest. Afghanistan is among its top foreign policy priorities.

• Kazakhstan, despite lacking a shared border, has actively engaged with the IEA, from voting patterns at the UN to expressing readiness for major investments in logistics, mineral resources, and geological exploration. Notably, Kazakhstan was the first in the region to remove the Taliban from its list of banned organizations and to accredit IEA diplomats. Its approach is not about political alignment, but building a long-term economic framework.

Together, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan demonstrate that Central Asia is capable of shaping its strategic approach to Afghanistan, one based not on competition but on cooperation and shared security. For this reason, they share a well-deserved second place.

3rd Place: United Arab Emirates (UAE)

The UAE was among the first countries to reopen its embassy in Kabul and to accept an IEA ambassador. It plays an active role in humanitarian aid, aviation logistics, and efforts to support regional stability, all while officially maintaining a policy of non-interference.

Special nominations include:

“Strategic Mediator”: Qatar has served as the main negotiating hub for the Taliban since 2013. Key rounds of negotiations between the Taliban, the United States, and other international actors took place in Doha. Qatar remains the most important channel for dialogue between the IEA and the outside world, combining humanitarian support with an active role in political mediation.

“Legal Maximalist”: Canada is the only Western country where the Taliban is officially classified as a terrorist organization.

“Borderline Realist”: Pakistan maintains maximum practical engagement, ranging from diplomacy and transit to security, despite ongoing accusations from both sides. Islamabad is balancing the need to engage with the Taliban against concerns over growing TTP activity, border instability, and domestic political risks.

“Engagement Without Slogans”: Turkmenistan maintains official neutrality while demonstrating deep economic engagement in Afghanistan. It avoids public political statements on the IEA but is implementing large-scale infrastructure projects that form North-South and East-West links. In this context, neutrality without action amounts to silence, while neutrality backed by projects becomes a form of influence.

“Geopolitical Flexibility”: Russia, after removing the Taliban from its list of terrorist organizations, is preparing to take another symbolic step by raising the status of Afghanistan’s diplomatic presence in Moscow to that of an ambassador. At the same time, there are no signs of formal recognition, and the relationship remains flexible and subject to revision. Russia is building strategic cooperation with the Emirate in logistics, trade, and regional security, while demonstrating to the West that its influence in Afghanistan is more than rhetoric. This reflects a strategic flexibility typical of a global actor.

“Geopolitical Intrigue”: The United States does not recognize the IEA and maintains sanctions, yet it keeps technical communication channels open and holds sway over key frameworks of international legitimacy. The behavior of many other states is influenced by Washington’s position. The U.S. acts as the architect of non-recognition while staying in the background, still capable of changing the rules of the game.

This article does not claim to be an exhaustive analysis or a universal typology. It reflects a view from Central Asia, from within a region that cannot afford to distance itself from the reality of Afghanistan.

Our goal is not to pass judgment but to share observations, structure the complex positions of various countries, and, as much as possible, speak objectively and respectfully about our neighbor, Afghanistan, whose fate plays a central role in the stability of the entire Central Asian region.