Page 68 – The Times Of Central Asia

10 Feb 2026

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Kazakhstan to Establish International Computing Hub in Pavlodar Region

February 10, 2026
By Dmitry Pokidaev

Kazakhstan plans to develop an international computing hub centered in the Pavlodar region, based on the emerging “data center valley” in Ekibastuz, one of the country’s key energy production zones. The announcement was made by Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Artificial Intelligence and Digital Development Zhaslan Madiev during an expanded government meeting.

The government had earlier unveiled plans to establish a cluster of high-performance data centers in Ekibastuz, a city that hosts extensive coal-fired power generation and robust energy infrastructure. Madiev now says the project will evolve beyond a national cluster into a full-fledged international computing hub.

According to Madiev, two critical enablers for the project are affordable electricity and cross-border telecommunications infrastructure. A land plot has already been designated for development, and 300 megawatts of power capacity have been reserved at Ekibastuz GRES-1. Negotiations are ongoing with international investors.

AI Center to Anchor Digital Expansion

The hub’s anchor facility will be a 50 MW AI-focused data processing center currently under construction by national telecom provider Kazakhtelecom. Scheduled for commissioning in mid-2027, the new facility is expected to be ten times more powerful than Kazakhstan’s recently launched state supercomputer facility.

Astana is already home to Central Asia’s most powerful supercomputer, unveiled earlier this year, marking a significant step in the country’s digital infrastructure ambitions. Officials envision this computing expansion as the foundation for a new economic model driven by artificial intelligence and big data.

Concerns Over Domestic AI Model Usage

At the same government session, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev expressed dissatisfaction with the uptake of the national large language model, KazLLM. He noted that public interest remains limited, with many users favoring international platforms such as ChatGPT.

Madiev acknowledged that while KazLLM is used by approximately 600,000 people, about 3% of the population, foreign AI tools enjoy far broader adoption. He emphasized the importance of ongoing training and updates to local AI models, aligning with global best practices.

In addition to KazLLM, a second model, Alem LLM, is also under development. Both systems have already been integrated into numerous digital platforms, including search engines and services targeted at students and IT enterprises.

10 Feb 2026

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Ukrainian Ambassador to Kazakhstan: “The War Will End This Year. I Truly Believe In That.”

February 12, 2026
By Askar Alimzhanov

As the war between Russia and Ukraine approaches its fifth year, diplomatic efforts to reshape trade routes, energy flows, and regional partnerships are intensifying far beyond the battlefield. For Ukraine, Central Asia has emerged as an increasingly important economic and logistical partner, particularly as Kyiv seeks alternatives to disrupted transport corridors and supply chains.

The Times of Central Asia spoke with Viсtor Mayko, Ukraine’s Ambassador to Kazakhstan, about the prospects for deeper economic cooperation with Central Asia, the role of the Middle Corridor, energy transit challenges in the Caspian region, Kyiv’s expectations for international support, and a possible path toward ending the war.

Trade and Economic Prospects in Central Asia

TCA: Mr. Ambassador, what are the prospects for deepening trade and economic partnerships between Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and wider Central Asia? Which sectors offer the greatest potential for cooperation?

Ambassador Mayko: Deepening trade and economic ties between Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and other Central Asian countries is not merely a prospect; it is a necessity dictated by global economic trends.

Kazakhstan leads the region economically, with a GDP exceeding $300 billion. It is on a trajectory to join the G20 within 5 to 10 years. The United States, recognizing this potential, has invited Kazakhstan to the upcoming G20 meeting in the U.S., demonstrating Kazakhstan’s rising global significance.

Ukraine and Kazakhstan’s economies are complementary. Ukraine brings experience in agricultural technology, mechanical engineering, IT, and processing, while Kazakhstan contributes resource strength, industrial capacity, and logistics. Promising areas for cooperation include agro-industrial development, from crop production to digitalized processing; industrial cooperation through equipment supply and joint production; logistics and infrastructure aimed at strengthening transport corridors; and energy and IT projects focused on efficiency and network modernization.

We are already transitioning from theory to action. A major business delegation from Ukraine will visit Kazakhstan this year. We also anticipate another meeting of the Joint Ukrainian-Kazakh Intergovernmental Commission on Economic Cooperation, which is crucial for removing barriers and initiating new projects.

Ukraine’s presence in Kazakhstan’s economy has historically been significant. If not for the war and resulting transport disruptions, I believe our mutual trade could have reached $10 billion. Ukrainian machinery still accounts for a substantial portion of Kazakhstan’s industrial base, especially in regions such as Karaganda, Aktau, and Pavlodar, though much of this equipment now requires modernization.

Another promising area is mineral resource development. Ukraine has the scientific and practical base to contribute meaningfully to this sector.

Turkmenistan’s earlier collaboration with Ukrainian firms in revitalizing depleted wells illustrates our potential. Wells deemed exhausted by older technologies yielded hundreds of thousands of tons of oil under Ukrainian management. This successful model can be applied in Kazakhstan, one of the EU’s top three oil suppliers.

Transport Infrastructure and the Middle Corridor

TCA: How is cooperation in the transport sector developing, especially regarding the Middle Corridor? Are there any potential plans for joint infrastructure projects?

Ambassador Mayko: Russia’s full-scale aggression disrupted Ukraine’s previous logistics routes. Today, we prioritize alternatives like the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, the “Middle Corridor”, as a strategic interest.

Our current multimodal route passes through Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey, Georgia, and Azerbaijan before crossing the Caspian Sea. However, delivery remains costly and time-consuming. A 20-ton shipment to Almaty, for example, costs $11,000-$15,000 and takes around a month, largely due to ferry bottlenecks across the Caspian.

We see strong potential in joint Ukrainian-Kazakh railway and maritime projects to reduce costs and improve reliability. A key goal is to integrate Ukraine’s Black Sea ports into the Middle Corridor. Recent port-level agreements, including those involving the Belgorod-Dnestrovsky Sea Trade Port, aim to establish formal cooperation with Kazakh counterparts.

Ukrzaliznytsia JSC is actively engaging with railway administrations in Central Asia and the South Caucasus to implement a bilateral agreement focused on practical logistics solutions. Additionally, we support establishing a container hub in Aktau’s SEZ to enhance the corridor’s overall capacity.

The Middle Corridor is a vital instrument for boosting trade and reinforcing Kazakhstan’s role as a regional transit leader.

Energy Sector Cooperation and Route Diversification

TCA: How does Ukraine view its energy cooperation with Kazakhstan and other Central Asian countries? Are there plans to diversify supply routes?

Ambassador Mayko: Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are vital energy partners for Ukraine, both for oil and gas. Our cooperation continues at an enterprise level, with Ukrainian manufacturers providing equipment for Kazakh energy companies.

Despite wartime challenges, Ukrainian companies have resumed direct engagement with partners in the Mangystau region. Ukrainian expertise is helping modernize critical systems without reliance on intermediaries or counterfeit parts.

Energy exports are another area of focus. Kazakhstan has emerged as a top-three oil supplier to the EU, accounting for 11.5% of EU imports in 2024, and demand is growing. Ukraine also seeks Kazakh oil, provided transportation avoids the Russian Federation.

Practical steps are underway in Aktau and Kuryk to improve tanker capacity and rail links. Promising routes include Aktau-Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and Baku-Supsa, as well as the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline.

We invite Kazakh participation in rebuilding and constructing oil refineries in Ukraine, with the goal of refining Kazakh oil domestically for local use and EU export.

Deep drilling is a shared priority. Ukraine has drilled 24 wells beyond 6 km depth in the Poltava region, a model that may interest Kazakhstan. We are open to partnerships between JSC NC KazMunayGas and JSC Ukrgazvydobuvannya to jointly explore and develop hydrocarbon reserves.

Ukraine also offers strong potential in shipbuilding. Collaboration between Kazmortransflot and Ukrainian firms like the Nikolaev Shipyard and Smart Maritime Group could boost fleet repair and construction capacity. Ukrainian companies such as NPIK Neftegazstroizolyatsiya and Neftegazhim Service LLC can also assist in oil pipeline modernization across the Caspian region.

On Security and Attacks on Oil Infrastructure

TCA: How do you respond to reports of attacks on tankers transporting Kazakh oil and oil linked to Western companies, including U.S. firms? Have these events impacted bilateral relations?

Ambassador Mayko: Ukraine has never targeted Kazakhstan’s economy or infrastructure. We value Kazakhstan’s consistent support for our sovereignty and territorial integrity and aim to ensure secure energy supplies via the Black Sea.

Ukrainian strikes are strictly directed at Russian military-linked targets. For example, we target refineries supplying fuel to the Russian military, not civilian infrastructure. Ukraine never considered Kazakh facilities as legitimate targets.

The recent incident involving Greek tankers chartered by KazMunayGas illustrates this. These vessels, with active transponders and transparent routes, were not damaged. Simultaneously, two Russian “shadow fleet” tankers near Novorossiysk were severely hit by long-range Ukrainian drones. In contrast, the Greek tankers were reportedly attacked by short-range FPV drones, suggesting the launch did not originate from Ukraine but from waters near Novorossiysk.

Following discussions with Ukrainian military officials, I can confirm: Kazakhstan is not, and will not be, a target for Ukrainian strikes. This is the unified position of Ukraine’s political and military leadership.

International Support and the Path to Peace

TCA: How do you assess current relations with the U.S. and the EU? How are internal political dynamics affecting support for Ukraine?

Ambassador Mayko: Ukraine continues to receive strong support from the United States, the European Union, the United Kingdom, Canada, Japan, Turkey, and others. This support, military, financial, and humanitarian, is essential to our resistance.

During this winter’s attacks on our energy infrastructure, assistance has remained steady. We are receiving equipment, satellite communications, intelligence, and humanitarian aid. Starlink disconnections for Russian forces are a notable development.

New sanctions, including the EU’s 20th package, target Russia’s shadow fleet and financial system. Given these developments, concerns about waning support are unfounded.

The U.S. and Europe have been steadfast allies throughout the war. Without their backing, Ukraine’s situation would be significantly worse. We remain engaged in negotiations with Russia, supported by our European partners.

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has signaled a willingness to make compromises, but not unilaterally. Security guarantees must be reciprocal. Russia continues shifting its terms, especially around post-war military presence.

Ukraine will not voluntarily cede its territory. These lands are home to citizens who do not wish to live under occupation. They include key industrial assets and mineral resources.

While Russian civil society remains largely passive, even the Kremlin must recognize its domestic limits. I believe those limits are fast approaching. That’s why I remain convinced: the war will end this year. I truly believe in that.

10 Feb 2026

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Is Kyrgyzstan About to Have a Snap President Election?

February 12, 2026
By Bruce Pannier

Kyrgyzstan held early parliamentary elections at the end of November 2025 that were moved forward by a year so that they would not overlap with the campaign for the presidential election scheduled for January 2027.

On February 9, a group of 75 former officials and notable figures from various spheres of society publicly submitted a letter to the president and speaker of parliament calling on them to “immediately initiate a new election for president.”

While there has yet to be any official response, such a proposal is likely to be accepted, leaving anyone who planned on running against incumbent President Sadyr Japarov with little time to organize a campaign.

Early Parliamentary Elections

In June 2025, amendments were introduced to the electoral system. The split system of using single-mandate districts and party lists to elect parliamentary deputies was changed to only single-mandate districts, and electoral districts were redivided.

This sparked discussions that perhaps early parliamentary elections were needed to fill the 90 seats with deputies elected under the newly-approved system.

The argument that tilted the debate toward early elections was that parliamentary elections were scheduled for late November 2026 and the presidential election for January 2027. The general opinion was that having the two elections so close together would make voters weary and unable to fully focus on the presidential campaign. Also, if the vote count was delayed in some districts or there were legal challenges, these processes would be ongoing as campaigning for the presidency got underway.

The solution was to move parliamentary elections forward by a year. In September 2025, parliament voted to dissolve itself, and November 30 was named as the date for early elections.

The Letter

The petition addressed to President Japarov and Speaker of Parliament Nurlanbek Turgunbek uulu was signed by former deputies, nine former governors, four former prime ministers, several high-ranking members of the military, academics, artists, and even an Olympic Games medal-winner.

The letter praised the current administration for establishing stability in Kyrgyzstan, strengthening the country’s armed forces, resolving long-standing border issues with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, successfully battling corruption, and eliminating organized crime in the country.

The letter also mentioned remaining problems such as the growing national debt, poverty, and the outflow of “especially young people” unable to find employment and going to other countries to work.

A key point in the appeal for an early presidential election was that it would clear up an ambiguity in President Japarov’s term. Japarov came to power in the wake of the October 2020 revolution that was sparked by parliamentary elections riddled with irregularities. He was elected in January 2021 to a six-year term in office, but in April that year, a national referendum approved a new constitution with a five-year presidential term. Therefore, holding the presidential election this year would bring Japarov closer into line with the new constitution.

Additionally, the previous constitution, which had a six-year presidential term, also limited a president to one term in office. The new constitution allows for two five-year terms.

Who Wrote the Letter?

The 75 signatories are listed at the end of the letter. However, independent outlet Kaktus Media contacted some of them to confirm whether they signed the letter or not. Olympic medal winner, Kanybek Osmonaliyev (who won his gold in weightlifting as part of the USSR team in 1980), said he had not signed the letter. “I’m not a politician; no one approached me,” he stated.

Others, like former Prime Minister Tursunbek Chyngyshev, confirmed they had signed the appeal.

What no one who spoke with Kaktus seemed to know, or at least would say, was where the letter originated from. It is unclear who the author or authors of this petition are.

Kaktus Media reported at the beginning of February that there were already rumors of an early presidential election. Whoever initiated this letter, it seems clear that it was a pre-planned effort.

Now that the proposal has been made, backers of the snap poll can gauge public reaction. It is likely many of the recently elected parliamentary deputies, most of whom support the president, already knew and are ready to move on the petition as soon as the president gives the signal.

Japarov is legitimately popular in Kyrgyzstan, and it would be difficult for a challenger to defeat him in an election.

That being the case, there seems to be no need to have an early election. However, if he waits until his six-year term approaches its end, that could be fuel for opponents to claim he is then subject to the one-term limit.

Even if this appeal is rejected, there will probably be more, making an early presidential election this year likely.

10 Feb 2026

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Up to 300 Tajik Women and Children Remain in Syria and Iraq

February 10, 2026
By Vagit Ismailov

An estimated 250 to 300 Tajik women and children remain in Syria and Iraq, according to Suhaili Kodiri Abduhafizzoda, Head of the Department for State Protection of Children’s Rights at the Office of the Human Rights Commissioner of Tajikistan.

Abduhafizzoda stated that the repatriation process, previously overseen by a dedicated Tajik working group, has stalled since the change of government in Syria. At its peak, approximately 800 Tajik nationals, mainly women and children, were believed to be in the two countries. While more than half have returned home, hundreds remain stranded.

Four Repatriation Waves Since 2019

Tajikistan has conducted four formal repatriation missions since 2019, resulting in the return of 382 individuals. These included:

2019: 84 children repatriated
2022: 144 women and children
2023: 104 individuals
2024: 47 women and children

In addition, roughly 90 Tajik citizens returned independently, although their exact routes and methods of escape from conflict zones have not been officially disclosed.

Final Stage Falls Short

Officials had hoped the 2024 operation would mark the final stage of the repatriation effort. However, Abduhafizzoda confirmed that not all remaining women and children agreed to return.

“We planned to return all remaining women and children, but this was not possible, primarily because they themselves refused,” he explained.

Fear of legal consequences was the most commonly cited reason. Many of the women expressed concern that they would face criminal prosecution upon returning to Tajikistan.

However, authorities insist these fears are largely unfounded. According to the ombudsman’s office, none of the women previously repatriated have been charged or prosecuted. Instead, they were reportedly met with state support and reintegration programs.

“Some of the women who had already returned had similar fears. But once they came back, they saw that no criminal cases were initiated, and they were all forgiven,” Abduhafizzoda noted.

Children Reunited With Families

Officials report that all repatriated children have been reunited with relatives and received assistance in resuming their education and adjusting to civilian life.

Nonetheless, the fate of those still in Syria and Iraq remains unclear.

Legacy of the Islamic State

According to official figures, more than 2,500 Tajik citizens joined the Islamic State group after 2013. Many men took their families with them to Syria and Iraq. By 2017, most of the men were reported killed or missing, and some women and children are also believed to have died during the conflict.

With no current framework for further repatriation, the future of the remaining Tajik women and children in the region remains uncertain.

10 Feb 2026

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Tokayev to Personally Oversee Probe Into Medical Insurance Fund Embezzlement

February 10, 2026
By Dmitry Pokidaev

President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has pledged to personally oversee the investigation into large-scale embezzlement from Kazakhstan’s Social Medical Insurance Fund (SMIF) and has instructed the government to accelerate the rollout of a unified national healthcare information system.

The move follows a series of alarming revelations about systemic fraud in the medical insurance system. In January, Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov ordered that control of the SMIF be transferred to the Ministry of Finance to bring financial flows under tighter oversight.

Subsequent audits uncovered widespread violations, including the registration of fictitious patients, the billing of unnecessary medical services, duplicate financing of procedures, and even the provision of treatments to deceased citizens. The findings have been submitted to law enforcement agencies for investigation.

Addressing an expanded government meeting, Tokayev stated that fraudulent activity in the social sector had reached “unprecedented proportions,” and emphasized that the Prosecutor General’s Office and other relevant bodies must investigate all instances of wrongdoing, regardless of the statute of limitations or the individuals involved.

“I will personally oversee the investigation process,” the president declared.

Tokayev attributed much of the abuse to the absence of a unified digital infrastructure in Kazakhstan’s healthcare system. More than 30 separate and unintegrated information systems are currently in use, creating serious gaps in oversight and traceability.

In response, the president has ordered the government to finalize the development of a single, centralized state medical information system by December 1. The new platform is expected to provide full traceability of services and financial transactions, and to digitize all SMIF operations.

Tokayev emphasized that digitization is essential for ensuring transparency and the proper use of public funds.

As The Times of Central Asia previously reported, earlier this year, the government also announced it would cover health insurance contributions for more than one million unemployed citizens.

10 Feb 2026

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Kyrgyz MP Questions Why Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan Don’t Pay for Irrigation Water

February 11, 2026
By Sadokat Jalolova

A long-standing debate over Kyrgyzstan’s water resources resurfaced this week after a member of parliament questioned why Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan do not compensate Kyrgyzstan for irrigation water sourced from its reservoirs, according to a report by Kaktus Media.

Speaking at a February 9 meeting of the parliamentary committee on agrarian policy, water resources, ecology, and subsoil use, MP Umbetaly Kydyraliev raised concerns about growing water shortages caused by climate change and the lack of economic return from water exports to neighboring countries.

“About 80% of the water in our reservoirs goes to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan,” said Kydyraliev. “How are we resolving this issue with them?”

Regional Cooperation vs. Compensation

In response, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Water Resources, Agriculture, and Processing Industry Bakyt Torobaev explained that while Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are not making direct payments for water, they are contributing to major regional infrastructure projects, most notably, the Kambar-Ata-1 hydropower plant.

Torobaev emphasized that cooperation is based on mutual benefit rather than transactional agreements. He noted that both countries have expressed strong interest in ensuring reliable access to water and have supported the hydropower initiative accordingly.

Kambar-Ata-1: Strategic Investment

Kambar-Ata-1, originally launched during the Soviet era and later shelved, is poised to become one of Central Asia’s largest hydropower plants. Once completed, it is expected to surpass the output of the Toktogul hydropower station, currently Kyrgyzstan’s main source of electricity. The plant’s projected cost is around $3.6 billion.

Who Should Pay for Upkeep?

Kydyraliev also cited other key reservoirs, including Kempir-Abad (jointly managed with Uzbekistan), Kirov, and Orto-Tokoy, which remain under Kyrgyzstan’s jurisdiction. Annual intergovernmental commissions determine how much water is released from these facilities, yet no financial compensation is received.

“Does this mean Kyrgyzstan gains no economic benefit from maintaining these hydropower facilities?” he asked. “We have to repair them, stabilize water levels, and inspect dams. These are real costs. Other countries pay for water under international law.”

Official Position: No Demands for Payment

Deputy Energy Minister Nasipbek Kerimov noted that the issue is being jointly studied by energy and water specialists. Torobaev added that details of these discussions are confidential but confirmed that President Sadyr Japarov has instructed officials not to demand payments from neighboring states for infrastructure maintenance.

Instead, Kyrgyzstan will shoulder those costs itself, with any external assistance remaining voluntary.