Turkmenistan International Affairs - The Times Of Central Asia

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Central Asia-Russia Summit

Russia Seeks to Reassert Role at Central Asia Summit, but Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan Push Their Own Agendas

The second Central Asia-Russia summit, held ahead of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) leaders’ meeting, reaffirmed the Kremlin’s continued intent to assert influence over the region. Russian President Vladimir Putin used the platform not only to signal discontent with the pace of economic integration but also to critique the Central Asian republics for what he portrayed as insufficient engagement in bilateral trade. Despite growing ties between Central Asian states and external partners, exemplified by the “C5+1” dialogue format that includes major powers such as the U.S. and China, Putin made clear that Russia does not view its influence in the region as diminished. Opening the summit, Putin took a veiled swipe at the “C5+1” initiative, which has gained traction in recent years. “I am in constant contact with each of the Central Asian presidents,” he said, before adding, “But I am sure that this multilateral format of communication is also very useful and has its obvious ‘added value’, so to speak.” By “added value,” the Russian leader appeared to suggest that multilateral engagement enables Central Asian states to present a more unified front in foreign negotiations, an approach that complicates Moscow’s ability to exert influence through bilateral channels. Putin also expressed dissatisfaction with the current levels of mutual trade and Russian investment in the region. While acknowledging that trade between Russia and Central Asia had surpassed $45 billion, he pointedly compared this figure to trade with Belarus, which exceeds $50 billion despite its far smaller population. “Our trade turnover with Belarus exceeds $50 billion. Let me remind you that Belarus has a population of 10 million. Uzbekistan already has nearly 40 million, Tajikistan over 10 million, and Kazakhstan more than 20 million. Can you imagine what a colossal resource this is?” Putin said. “This means there are strong prospects for expanding our economic relations.” Putin described Russia’s current $20 billion in regional investments as inadequate and called for increased engagement, but also tempered expectations surrounding major infrastructure and logistics projects championed by Astana and Tashkent, while positioning Russia as a central player in their development. He proposed integrating existing North-South and East-West corridors into a unified Eurasian logistics network supported by digital and transport services. “This will allow us to significantly increase international transport volumes through our common region,” Putin said. Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev responded directly, updating figures presented by Putin and reaffirming Kazakhstan’s commitment to regional integration. He noted that Russia’s total trade with Central Asia exceeded $50 billion in 2024, with $28 billion in trade between Russia and Kazakhstan alone. Tokayev emphasized the strategic importance of transport cooperation with Russia, stating that “Russia is a key gateway for the region’s countries to global markets. Therefore, cooperation in the transport and logistics sector is a matter of heightened strategic importance.” [caption id="attachment_37343" align="aligncenter" width="1600"] Image: Akorda.kz[/caption] Tokayev outlined Kazakhstan’s existing transport infrastructure, eleven international corridors, including five rail and six road routes, that carry about 85% of land freight between Asia and Europe. Over 15 years, Kazakhstan has...

TCA Interviews

From Belt and Road to Backlash: Edward Lemon and Bradley Jardine Discuss China in Central Asia

As China invests billions in Central Asian oilfields, railways, and cities, the region’s response is anything but passive. In Backlash: China’s Struggle for Influence in Central Asia, Bradley Jardine and Edward Lemon document how Central Asians – from government halls to village streets – are responding to Beijing’s expanding footprint. The book provides a nuanced look at China’s engagement in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan over the three decades since these nations gained independence. Drawing on more than a decade of fieldwork, Jardine and Lemon ask a timely question: can Beijing maintain its growing influence in an environment where local voices and interests are increasingly assertive? The Times of Central Asia spoke with the authors. TCA: Central Asia has become an increasingly strategic crossroads, rich in resources, young in demographics, and positioned between major powers. Yet China’s engagement appears far more ambitious than that of Western or regional players. In your view, what accounts for this asymmetry? Is it primarily a matter of geography and financial capacity, or has China been more politically and diplomatically attuned to Central Asia’s priorities than others? J/L: China’s dominance in Central Asia stems from both geography and political attunement. As we note in Backlash, Beijing views the region as an extension of its own security frontier, as both a buffer protecting Xinjiang and a potential source of terrorism. It has built deep ties through consistent, elite-level engagement since the 1990s. Its approach blends vast financial capacity with political instincts that resonate with local elites: prioritizing sovereignty, stability, and non-interference rather than the governance conditionalities that often accompany Western aid and investment. Through the Belt and Road Initiative, which was launched in the region in 2013, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which was established in 2001 with four Central Asian republics as founding members, and newer platforms like the China-Central Asia (C+C5) summit, China offers infrastructure, energy investment, and regime security in ways tailored to the needs of authoritarian partners. Unlike the episodic or values-driven engagement of Western actors, and with Russia’s attention increasingly divided, China’s steady, pragmatic diplomacy, backed by proximity and resources, has allowed it to entrench itself as the region’s indispensable power. TCA: China’s expanding presence across trade, infrastructure, and finance has reshaped Central Asia’s economic landscape. To what extent do these investments remain primarily commercial, and when do they start to carry political or strategic implications? How do local governments manage the risks of dependency or debt while pursuing development gains? J/L: China’s expanding economic footprint in Central Asia may be driven by trade and infrastructure, but the lines between commerce and strategy have become increasingly blurred. As we note in Backlash, Beijing’s investments, roads, pipelines, railways, and energy grids are rarely purely commercial. They create structural dependencies that bind Central Asian economies to China’s markets, finance, and technology. By 2020, roughly 45% of Kyrgyzstan’s external debt and more than half of Tajikistan’s were owed to China, while around 75% of Turkmenistan’s exports flowed to Chinese buyers. These imbalances give Beijing...

Central Asia-Russia Summit

Russia–Central Asia Summit in Dushanbe Tests Putin’s Grip

Russian President Vladimir Putin arrived in Tajikistan on October 8 for a three-day state visit that includes a Russia–Central Asia summit in Dushanbe, and a larger Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) meeting. His arrival comes at a time of geopolitical flux in Central Asia, with Russia seeking to reaffirm its waning influence amid migration tensions, economic pressures, and security challenges on its southern flank. The Visit and Summit: What Has Happened So Far Putin was greeted at Dushanbe airport by Tajik President Emomali Rahmon, who has governed the country since 1992. Upon his arrival, the two leaders conducted a private meeting and later presided over expanded talks with their delegations. In his opening remarks, Putin told Rahmon that Russia and Tajikistan are “reliable allies” and pledged that Moscow would fulfil its obligations to Dushanbe, particularly in terms of security. In the first seven months of 2025, bilateral trade rose by more than 17%, a figure Putin cited to underscore that relations are developing “very positively.” Following the meeting, the two leaders signed a joint statement on “deepening the strategic partnership and alliance” between their countries. Alongside Rahmon, on October 9, Putin met with the presidents of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan as part of the Russia–Central Asia summit. As previously reported by The Times of Central Asia, the summit agenda includes cooperation in trade, transport, energy, security, migration, and environmental policy. A concluding communiqué is expected to lay out joint priorities for 2025–2027 in these fields. Following the Russia–Central Asia gathering, a broader CIS head-of-state meeting is scheduled for October 10. Alongside Russia and the Central Asian states, representatives from Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Belarus will also attend. Draft agendas suggest the adoption of a military-cooperation concept through 2030, counterterrorism and border security strategies, efforts to fight transnational crime, and discussions on a “CIS Plus” format that would allow third-party countries and international organizations to participate in selected CIS events. Russia’s Defense Minister Andrei Belousov held talks in Dushanbe with his Tajik counterparts on October 8, stating that “cooperation between our two military institutions” is key to regional stability. Tajikistan hosts Russia’s largest foreign military base and shares a long, porous border with Afghanistan, which makes the security relationship central to both sides’ calculus. Historical and Geopolitical Context Russia has long viewed Central Asia as its strategic backyard, but since 2022, its dominance has been challenged. Sanctions on Russia due to the war in Ukraine have constrained its economic leverage, while China has expanded its presence via Belt and Road investments. At the same time, the European Union has elevated its engagement with Central Asian states through trade, infrastructure funding, and diplomatic outreach. Central Asian governments have shown increasing boldness in balancing their relations between Moscow, Beijing, and the West. None of the Central Asian governments has openly backed Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Surveys in Kazakhstan show that only 15% of respondents explicitly support Russia, while a larger share leans toward Ukraine or nonalignment. Kazakhstan has refused to recognize the...

CIS

Dushanbe Hosts Central Asia-Russia Summit and CIS Heads of State Meeting

Dushanbe has become the center of Eurasian diplomacy this week as it hosts the “Central Asia-Russia” summit alongside the meeting of the Council of CIS Heads of State. Over two days, leaders from across the region are set to discuss security, economic ties, transport infrastructure, energy cooperation, and new models of regional integration. The inaugural "Central Asia-Russia” meeting took place in Astana in October 2022, focusing on counterterrorism, support for small and medium-sized enterprises, and initiatives in energy, industry, and digitalization. Analysts note that the current summit does not duplicate the functions of existing integration frameworks such as the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) or the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Instead, it complements them by offering a more flexible and pragmatic platform for dialogue. “The Central Asia-Russia format has the potential to become not just a venue for political signaling, but an instrument for the rapid implementation of infrastructure and regulatory solutions,” said Alibek Tazhibaev, Director of the Center for Eurasian Monitoring. He noted that the region has become a natural zone of industrial cooperation and logistics for Russia, with mutual economic interdependence deepening under the pressure of sanctions. Among the key priorities being discussed are the development of North-South and East-West transport corridors, Russian gas transit through Kazakhstan, and the construction of new energy facilities. In 2024, trade turnover between Central Asian countries and Russia totaled $44.7 billion, an increase of 11.3% from the previous year. Tazhibaev also argued that Central Asia could emerge as an independent “Eurasian hub” if it transitions from a simple transport corridor to a region that integrates added value. “Central Asia can offer a ‘door-to-door’ logistics service if it builds digital gateways, assembly warehouses, and unified logistics standards. This would help retain profit margins and manage standards within the region,” Tazhibaev said. CIS: Pragmatism and New Initiatives The second major component of Dushanbe’s diplomatic agenda is the summit of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Despite persistent criticism, the CIS continues to serve as a relevant platform for cooperation. Taisiya Marmontova, Associate Professor at Astana International University and Director of the Institute for Regional Integration Studies, noted that the CIS has “preserved a space for dialogue and joint projects after the collapse of the USSR.” According to the CIS Executive Committee, the combined GDP of member states is growing at an average annual rate of 4.5%, while internal trade has risen by 40% over the past five years. Kazakhstan remains a key player, with trade turnover with CIS countries reaching $37.3 billion in 2024, including $4.3 billion in services. During the summit, leaders are expected to consider several initiatives proposed by Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, including the creation of a “CIS+” dialogue format and the launch of the “Commonwealth Fair” intergovernmental program. The first such fair is scheduled to take place in Taraz in 2026. Member states have also agreed on the Strategy for Transport Corridor Digitalization, the Strategy for Scientific and Technological Development until 2035, and a new Concept for Construction Pricing. “Integration...

Trump Administration

S. Paul Kapur Confirmed as U.S. Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs

The U.S. Senate has confirmed political scientist S. Paul Kapur as Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs to lead the State Department bureau that oversees relations with Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Nepal, Maldives, Bhutan, and the five Central Asian republics. The position carries responsibility for guiding U.S. diplomacy across the region, coordinating security and development strategy, and advising on policy toward regional powers such as China and Russia. Kapur, 56, is an Indian American scholar known for his work on nuclear deterrence and South Asian security. He was born in New Delhi to an Indian father and an American mother, but grew up in the United States. After studying the region in graduate school, he pursued an academic career, earning a doctorate in political science from the University of Chicago and a bachelor’s degree from Amherst College. Kapur taught at Claremont McKenna College and Stanford University before joining the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, where he is a professor of national security affairs and runs U.S.–India strategic dialogues for the Department of Defense. Paul Kapur, a seasoned academic and security specialist, now takes a post that places him at the center of Washington’s engagement with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. His confirmation fills a key regional portfolio in the Trump administration, which may shape how the United States approaches Central Asia within its broader regional strategy. Kapur’s portfolio covers both South and Central Asia, but his confirmation has been closely watched in the five republics that straddle the heart of Eurasia. Central Asian governments and business leaders are eager to see whether the new Assistant Secretary will continue Washington’s traditional emphasis on security partnerships or shift toward deeper economic and investment ties. Kapur brings a distinguished scholarly pedigree and deep expertise in international security. He has written extensively on nuclear deterrence, South Asian security, and great-power competition. While much of his work focuses on India, Pakistan, and U.S. grand strategy, he has also examined how India manages its relationships with larger powers such as the United States and China - an enduring middle-power dynamic. That perspective is particularly relevant to Kazakhstan, an emerging middle power, and to Central Asia acting collectively, which is seeking to balance Russian and Chinese influence. During his confirmation hearing, Kapur emphasized that U.S. engagement in Central Asia will focus on advancing the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the regional states. He noted that, if confirmed, he would leverage the C5+1 framework and bilateral partnerships to pursue cooperation in areas such as energy, critical minerals, counterterrorism, combating transnational crime, and developing physical and digital infrastructure. His remarks reflected a commitment to strengthening regional independence and stability while deepening practical cooperation with the United States. For Central Asian governments, Kapur’s arrival comes at a time of shifting geopolitics. Russia’s war in Ukraine has unsettled long-standing assumptions, while China’s Belt and Road Initiative continues to expand Beijing’s economic influence. The United States has not always prioritized matching these dynamics. However, Kapur’s testimony...

Justice

Turkish Police Detain Teenagers Linked to ISIS, Including Turkmen Citizen

Turkish security forces have detained two teenagers in Istanbul, one identified as a Turkmen national, on suspicion of planning terrorist attacks and communicating with members of the so‑called Islamic State (ISIS), Turkish press reported. The arrests were carried out in two Istanbul districts after police discovered evidence of contact with ISIS operatives on encrypted messaging apps. Authorities say a search of one suspect’s computer turned up files with instructions for making Molotov cocktails and explosives, materials on assembling long‑barreled weapons and shooting training, and a large volume of ISIS‑related propaganda and instructional videos. A court ordered that teenager held in custody. The same reporting says a separate case in July involved a 14‑year‑old Turkmen national, identified by initials D.R., who was detained in the Maltepe district after allegedly being radicalized online. Investigators reportedly found “training materials” on bomb‑making, assassination techniques, videos on using drones and attack vehicles, and other instructions. The court placed that teenager under house arrest. Turkish media cited broader figures showing intensified counter‑terror operations: 3,686 people suspected of links to ISIS have been detained in Turkey over the past nine months, with 784 formally arrested, the reporting states. Earlier cases involving Central Asian nationals have also drawn attention. The Times of Central Asia previously reported that Turkish police had detained a Tajik man (named in reporting as Faziljon A.) and a Kyrgyz woman (named as Zulfiya S.) on suspicion of planning attacks for ISIS; authorities said they found police uniforms, emergency lights, knives and other equipment in the apartment where the suspects were hiding.