U.S. sanctions on Iran’s Chabahar Port on the Gulf of Oman have been on again/off again since 2013, when the U.S. Congress passed the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act (IFCA) to curb Iran’s regional influence and strategic capabilities through targeted economic pressure, aka sanctions.
In the decade following IFCA’s passage, Washington’s sanctions on Chabahar had a negative impact on Central Asia, largely by complicating its efforts to deepen economic ties with South Asia and the Gulf. But geopolitics are shifting. Washington is increasing its involvement in Central Asia and India, and is doing the same in Afghanistan. These factors may well induce the U.S. Department of State to keep the waiver in place.
Washington first waived its sanctions on Chabahar in 2018—a strategic move to support India’s role in Afghanistan’s post-war development and to provide a crucial trade route for that landlocked country. Six years later, India’s Indian Ports Global Limited secured a 10-year deal with Iran to manage Chabahar port, in part, to offset Pakistan’s Gwadar port at the end of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, a mere 100 miles from Chabahar. For all the fanfare, Central Asia held little real priority in Washington in those years.
Seven years later, the U.S. changed course. It announced on September 16, 2025, much to Central Asia’s surprise and concern, that “the State Department has revoked the sanctions exception issued in 2018 under the IFCA”, making individuals involved in Iran’s Chabahar port operations subject to penalties, resulting in another snag in Central Asia’s desire for a southern breakout route.
And then, in a swift reversal, the U.S. restored India’s sanctions waiver some six weeks later, on October 30.
Whatever might explain the sudden change, Central Asia breathed a sigh of relief, and, by all accounts, now feels confident that the waiver will be evergreened. Time will tell if this confidence is justified.
The U.S. waiver enables India to work to enhance Chabahar’s infrastructure and functionality, offering Central Asian exporters a more direct and profitable trade route than those via China, Russia, or the Middle Corridor, which stretches from East Asia to Europe via Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Türkiye. As a result, goods like minerals, cotton, and energy products can reach regional and global markets faster.
Central Asian capitals are quietly reveling in Washington’s flexible realpolitik in the face of convulsive U.S.-Iranian relations and heated Indo-Pakistan tensions. Without fear of punitive measures, India can now continue its work at Chabahar. To be sure, the waiver affirms India’s rising global presence and accelerates New Delhi’s drive into Central Asia, including Afghanistan.
Washington’s decision signaled to traders, investors, and think tankers that it has no intention of spoiling India’s export ambitions and Central Asia’s desire for north-south economic integration. The waiver shows Washington’s pragmatism—and is welcomed by those who have little or no use for Washington’s penchant for foreign policy moralism.
Chabahar Port complements not only the Trans-Caspian corridor—a multimodal trade route connecting Asia and Europe by linking China to Europe through Central Asia, the Caspian Sea, and the Caucasus—but also existing trade routes with Russia, China, and Pakistan.
Eldor Aripov, Director of the Institute for Strategic and Regional Studies under the President of Uzbekistan, told The Times of Central Asia that “the waiver removes a major bottleneck to reliable access to the Indian Ocean, giving Uzbekistan and our neighbors one more route for our exports and imports. Diversification—which does not mean exclusivity—strengthens Central Asia’s strategic autonomy.”
Afghanistan and Central Asia
The waiver comes at a time when Central Asian nations are looking for new trade opportunities with regional partners across South Asia. As trade between Afghanistan and Pakistan sputters, Kabul is looking for alternative routes for its commerce via Iran and India. Central Asia welcomes this.
On November 20, 2025, Afghan minister Alhaj Nooruddin Azizi and India’s External Affairs Minister Jaishankar met in New Delhi to deepen commercial cooperation and explore Chabahar’s potential to lessen Kabul’s dependence on Pakistan. In Doha, Ambassador Yerkin Tokumov, Kazakhstan’s Special Representative for Afghanistan, met with Ambassador Faisal bin Abdullah Al Hanzab of Qatar to discuss shared political, security, and humanitarian issues, including trade issues and further economic connectivity.
The U.S. sanctions waiver also invigorates the development of various other transport corridors, including the much-ballyhooed Lapis Lazuli transport route (Afghanistan-Turkmenistan-Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey) and the Five Nations Railway Corridor (China-Afghanistan-Tajikistan-Kyrgyzstan-Iran).
The waiver has also given impetus to the 2016 Ashgabat Agreement, a multimodal transport pact between Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Iran, India, Pakistan, and Oman to develop transit connectivity, despite geopolitical challenges, and link Central Asia, via Chabahar, to the Persian Gulf. As noted by India’s Embassy in Ashgabat in its “Unclassified Brief on India-Turkmenistan Relations” (Nov. 26), trade dominates the agenda of the agreement’s signatories— and Chabahar plays a role in broader connectivity efforts, though the brief does not describe it as the agreement’s central element.
The opening of a direct maritime gateway via Chabahar for landlocked Central Asian nations makes them less reliant on Pakistan and enhances their strategic room for maneuver. It lowers political exposure while expanding their economic autonomy. In doing so, it strengthens a cooperative geoeconomic vision built on mutual benefit and shared opportunity.
It would seem that the Chabahar sanctions waiver is a fresh tailwind for Central Asia’s future economic development and Eurasian integration. That is good news for Central Asia.
