• KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00210 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10523 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00210 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10523 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00210 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10523 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00210 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10523 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00210 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10523 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00210 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10523 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00210 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10523 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00210 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10523 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%

Deadly Clashes and Gold Mines Fuel Tensions on the Tajik-Afghan Border

Along a short strip of the Tajik-Afghan border, there has been a lot of activity in recent months, including the most serious incidents of cross-border violence in decades. Most of this activity has involved Tajikistan’s Shamsiddin Shohin district, a sparsely inhabited area where the population ekes out a living farming and herding in the foothills of the Pamir Mountains. Why the situation changed so suddenly is not entirely clear, but it is clear that the district is now the hot spot along the Tajik-Afghan frontier.

A Dubious Post-Independence Reputation

The Shamsiddin Shohin district is in Tajikistan’s southwestern Khatlon region. The district is located near the place where Afghan territory starts to make its northern-most protrusion. The elevation across most of the district is between 1,500-2,000 meters.

The district is about 2,300 square kilometers and has a population of some 60,000. Shuroobad, population roughly 11,000, is the district capital, and the entire district was once called Shuroobad. It was renamed Shamsiddin Shohin in 2016 to honor the Tajik poet and satirist of the late 19th century, who was born in the area.

Tajikistan and Afghanistan are divided by the Pyanj River, which further downstream merges with other rivers to become the Amu Darya, known to the Greeks as the Oxus, one of Central Asia’s two great rivers.

The road to Shuroobad; image: TCA, Stephen M. Bland

The Tajik-Afghan frontier is about 1,360 kilometers. Some 70 kilometers is the southern border of the Shamsiddin Shohin district, but it is the first area, traveling downstream, where the current of the Pyanj River slows significantly.

In the first years after the Bolshevik Revolution broke out, many Tajiks fled through what is now the Shamsiddin Shohin district into Afghanistan. Some seventy years later, thousands of Tajiks again fled through the district into Afghanistan when the newly independent state of Tajikistan was engulfed by civil war.

The United Tajik Opposition (UTO), the group fighting against the Tajik government during the 1992-1997 civil war, made frequent use of the Shamsiddin Shohin area to bring weapons from Afghanistan. UTO fighters had safe havens in Afghanistan, and they often made their way through this district, retreating south of the border and returning via the district once they were rested and resupplied.

There are only a few roads in the Shamsiddin Shohi district. The European Union funded the construction of the Friendship Bridge, which was completed in 2017, and connects the district to Afghanistan. It has often been closed by the Tajik authorities due to security concerns emanating from the Afghan side of the border.

Anyone crossing illegally from Afghanistan into the Shamsiddin Shohin district could easily hide in the rugged hills and abundance of caves in the area, making it ideal for smugglers and other intruders. Aside from a few small villages along the banks, there are no settlements for 20 to 30 kilometers north of the river.

Border posts were built during the time Tajikistan was a Soviet republic. Russian border guards remained in Tajikistan after the collapse of the USSR, and fortified these outposts as they increasingly came under attack from smugglers and UTO fighters crossing from Afghanistan.

Foreign governments funded the construction of new border guard posts along the Afghan frontier after the last Russian border guards departed in 2005. China, for example, financed the construction of the Gulhan border guard post in the Shamsiddin Shohin district in 2016.

A burnt-out bus in the Pyanj River between Tajikistan and Afghanistan; image: TCA, Stephen M. Bland

New People, New Business

Illegal narcotics, weapons, precious and semi-precious stones, and a variety of contraband goods have been regularly smuggled from Afghanistan through Tajikistan since not long after Tajikistan became independent. It didn’t matter who the government in Afghanistan was. The Shamsiddin Shohin district is one of the more popular places along the Tajik-Afghan border for smugglers.

However, almost all of the recent violence along the Tajik-Afghan frontier is happening in the Shamsiddin Shohin district and Afghan territory on the other side of the river, and smuggling does not seem to be the main reason.

Not long after the Taliban returned to power in August 2021, agreements were signed with Chinese companies to develop Afghan gas and oil fields, and mineral deposits, notably gold. About three years ago, Chinese and Afghans started working at several sites in Afghanistan’s northern Badakhshan Province that borders Tajikistan.

In February 2023, the Tajik-Chinese company Zarafshan announced the discovery of new gold deposits, one of the most promising of which was in the Shamsiddin Shohin district. Zarafshan subsidiary Shohin SM started work shortly after that announcement.

In November 2024, armed men from Afghanistan crossed into Tajikistan and attacked the Shohin SM gold-mining camp, killing one Chinese worker and wounding at least four other workers, three of whom were also Chinese (the fourth was Tajik). The Tajik authorities blamed the attack on drug smugglers who wandered too close to the gold-mining camp and were seen by camp security guards.

In May 2025, the Tajik authorities apprehended a group of Chinese and Afghans who had crossed from Afghanistan on excavators into the Shamsiddin Shohin district. Tajik officials alleged the group intended to launder money, though the head of the district, Zafar Gulzoda, said the group was searching for gold scrap on the Tajik side of the Pyanj River.

Then in August 2025, Tajik border guards stationed in Shamsiddin Shohin exchanged fire with Taliban fighters on the other side of the river.  The Tajik border guards did not suffer any casualties, but one Taliban fighter was killed and four others wounded. The head of the local Tajik border guards led a small detachment of troops across the border into Afghanistan for talks with local Taliban officials and the head of the local mining operation.

In late October, there were reports that Tajik border guards and the Taliban were again involved in a firefight in the same area as the shooting in August. A report from an Afghan media outlet said there were casualties on both sides, but Tajik and Taliban officials never commented on the incident.

The reason for the second exchange of fire was reportedly construction work at a Chinese-Afghan gold mining site that had altered the course of the Pyanj River and sent more water to the Tajik bank, sparking concerns about flooding in the Shamsiddin Shohin district. The Tajik authorities have complained about this several times.

Then, on November 26, three Chinese workers at the Shohin SM gold mining camp were killed and two wounded in an attack that combined gunfire and the use of a drone armed with a grenade. On the last day of November, two Chinese roadworkers were shot dead and three wounded in Tajikistan’s Darvaz district, the next district east of Shamsiddin Shohin. The shots came from the Afghan side of the river.

On December 24, Tajik border guards in Shamsiddin Shohin were again involved in a shootout, this time with an armed group that came across the river from Afghanistan. Two Tajik border guards and three of the attackers were killed in the clash. The Tajik authorities said the armed group were terrorists who attacked the Tajik border guard post in the area.

No other place along the Tajik-Afghan border has seen the sort of violence that is becoming routine in the Shamsiddin Shohin district. The alleged “smuggler” attack on the gold mining camp in November 2024, and then a series of attacks and exchanges of fire since late August 2025.

Chinese gold mining, smuggling, and terrorists are combining to make the Shamsiddin Shohin district the hot spot of Tajikistan’s border with Afghanistan.

Tajikistan Plans $6.5 Billion Investment in Energy Sector

Tajikistan will require approximately $6.5 billion to implement its 2026-2030 Energy Sector Development Program, with funding expected from a combination of external and internal sources, including international partners and the state budget.

Planned funding sources include:

  • Development partners: $3.94 billion
  • Private investment: $2.56 billion
  • The state budget, primarily to finance the ongoing construction of the Rogun Hydropower Plant (HPP), which is supported annually through a dedicated budget line.

In 2025 alone, more than $970 million was allocated from the state budget to the Rogun project, accounting for roughly 20% of all approved treasury expenditures.

Support for Tajikistan’s fuel and energy complex remains one of the top budgetary priorities. The draft state budget for 2026 earmarks $1.61 billion for the sector, equivalent to 22.4% of total planned expenditures.

The program will primarily focus on large-scale hydropower development. In parallel, the government aims to expand renewable energy capacity. Solar power plants with a combined capacity of 1.5 GW are planned for construction in the Sughd and Khatlon regions. Authorities also plan to explore the potential for wind energy.

Another key objective is increasing electricity exports and contributing to frequency regulation within Central Asia’s regional power networks. Achieving this will require infrastructure upgrades, including construction of the Rogun-Saihun 500 kV transmission line and the modernization of existing substations.

Domestically, the program calls for the replacement of outdated equipment, renovation of distribution networks, and the installation of smart meters to enhance energy reliability and efficiency.

Kazakhstan Accelerates Shift Away from Cash Payments

Kazakhstan is rapidly embracing cashless payments, with the share of cash withdrawals in card transactions continuing to decline each year, according to data from the National Bank. While the country has not yet reached the levels seen in leading digital economies, recent trends suggest Kazakhstan is closing the gap.

A recent study by analysts at Finprom.kz compares Kazakhstan’s transition to cashless payments with global trends. It highlights the persistent divide between countries where cash is nearly obsolete and those where it remains dominant.

The global variation is illustrated by the Cash Index, compiled by FOREX.se, which ranks 122 countries based on the share of daily transactions made with cash. Using data from Statista, Numbeo, central banks, and other global sources, the index offers an average estimate of cash usage across the world.

According to the Cash Index, countries with the lowest rates of cash use, just 10%, include South Korea, Norway, China, Iceland, and Australia. Similarly low figures are reported for Scotland, England, and Denmark (12% each). Analysts attribute this to strong fintech ecosystems, widespread broadband internet, high smartphone penetration, and robust consumer protection frameworks.

In contrast, cash remains dominant in countries where poverty, limited banking access, and weak infrastructure prevail. In Myanmar, daily cash transactions account for 98% of all payments, followed by Ethiopia and Gambia at 95%. Other high-cash-use countries include Albania, Cambodia, Laos, Lebanon, Nepal, and Pakistan, all averaging around 90%.

While Kazakhstan is not included in the Cash Index due to its tourism orientation, National Bank statistics provide insight into local trends. From January to October 2025, cash withdrawals via Kazakhstani and foreign payment cards totaled $44.37 billion, an 8.6% increase compared to the same period in 2024.

Yet the overall trend favors non-cash transactions. The share of cash withdrawals in total card turnover fell from 13.5% to 12.9% over the year, comparable to figures seen in developed economies. By contrast, in 2019, cash accounted for more than half of card-based transactions. This dropped to 34.1% in 2020 and has continued its steady decline.

Regional data reveal that the shift to cashless payments is uneven across the country. In January-October 2025, the share of cash withdrawals in total card transactions ranged from 8.3% to 27.4%, depending on the region.

The lowest shares were recorded in the Almaty region (8.3%), Almaty city (9%), and the Turkestan region (9.4%). Astana and the Atyrau region followed with 14.4% and 14.8%, respectively. The North Kazakhstan region reported the highest share of cash withdrawals.

Alcohol and Tobacco Lead Kyrgyzstan’s Excise Tax Revenues

Alcohol and tobacco products continue to be the primary sources of excise tax revenue for Kyrgyzstan’s state budget, according to the Ministry of Finance’s final report on budget revenues for the first 11 months of 2025.

The report highlights excise taxes as one of the most stable and predictable sources of state income. From January through November 2025, total excise tax revenues exceeded $222 million.

Alcohol producers remain the top contributors. During the reporting period, they transferred $38 million to the budget. Vodka producers accounted for the largest share at $25.5 million, while breweries contributed approximately $9.4 million. Producers of brandy, wine, and other alcoholic beverages paid significantly less. As a result, the alcohol sector continues to lead all industries in excise tax contributions.

Despite reduced domestic production, tobacco companies dominate excise revenues from imports. In the same period, excise taxes on tobacco products imported from Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) countries brought in $101 million, with an additional $4.4 million from imports originating outside the EAEU.

Revenue is no longer limited to traditional cigarettes. The report notes contributions from heated tobacco products and electronic cigarettes. While their current share remains modest, steady annual growth in excise payments for these categories points to shifting consumer habits.

Kyrgyz authorities consider excise taxes on alcohol and tobacco not only a fiscal mechanism, but also a tool of social policy. Gradual increases in tax rates are intended to simultaneously boost revenue and, according to government projections, reduce consumption of harmful products.

The state’s role in the alcohol sector warrants particular attention. In early 2023, the country’s largest alcohol producer, Ayu, along with its distilleries and vodka factories, was voluntarily transferred to state ownership. Since then, smaller industry players have voiced concern that the government may incrementally tighten its grip on the sector and effectively establish a monopoly.

Overall, the data confirm that so-called “harmful” goods, alcohol and tobacco, remain the most lucrative sources of excise tax revenue for the Kyrgyz budget.

Beshbarmak, Pilaf, and Olivier Salad: What Will Be Served on New Year’s Eve Tables in Central Asia

New Year remains one of the most significant holidays in Central Asia. While its scale and prominence have gradually declined due to rising religiosity, many residents still regard it as the foremost secular and ideology-free celebration of the year. Across the region, households prepare their most beloved dishes to ring in the occasion.

No New Year Without Olivier Salad

For many families, traditional fare is an essential part of New Year’s Eve. Olivier salad has long been a staple of the holiday table. Originally created in the 1860s by a French chef in Russia, the dish once featured ingredients such as hazel grouse and seafood. Over time, particularly during the Soviet era of shortages, the recipe evolved.

Today, Olivier salad typically includes beef, chicken (or boiled sausage), potatoes, green peas, pickled cucumbers, and mayonnaise. It is usually prepared in large batches to ensure there is enough for all guests.

Other popular salads include herring under a fur coat, vinaigrette, and “Tenderness”, hearty dishes that can leave guests too full for main courses. Even in modest households, red caviar often finds its way to the table, adding a touch of festivity and indulgence.

Kazakhstan: Beshbarmak with a Twist

In Kazakhstan, beshbarmak remains the centerpiece of the New Year’s feast, as it is for most major celebrations. Traditionally, the dish combines three cuts of horse meat, kazy, karta, and zhay, served with flat noodles and onions. However, some families are adapting their menus in line with the Chinese zodiac. As the Year of the Red Horse approaches, online advice has suggested avoiding horse meat out of respect for the symbolic animal. A vegan version of beshbarmak, featuring mushrooms and pumpkin, is gaining traction.

Baked koktal fish is another showpiece dish, while kuydak (lamb with potatoes and onions) and khan syrbaz (a rich stew of lamb, vegetables, barley, and broth) are popular additions. Desserts often include traditional fermented milk products such as zhent, katyk, and irimshik, and the table is rarely without kumys, a fermented mare’s milk beverage.

Uzbekistan: Pilaf Reigns Supreme

In Uzbekistan, New Year is celebrated with great enthusiasm. According to folklore, Korbobo, a local version of Santa Claus, arrives on a donkey with his granddaughter Korgyz to distribute gifts to well-behaved children.

Pilaf, or plov, is the dominant holiday dish. Made with rice, carrots, onions, meat, and spices, regional variations might include raisins or quince for added sweetness. Each area boasts its own version of the national favorite.

Samsas, meat-filled pastries baked in a tandoor, are also served, as are manti, large, steamed dumplings filled with lamb, beef, or pumpkin. Other popular dishes include kazan-kabob (fried meat and potatoes). For dessert, chak-chak (fried dough with honey) and halva (made from sesame, semolina, or nuts) are perennial favorites.

Kyrgyzstan: Boorsoki and Beshbarmak

In Kyrgyzstan, beshbarmak, prepared with either horse meat or lamb, is also a central dish. Families commonly serve manti, baked chicken, and boorsoki (known in Kazakhstan as baursaki), fried dough balls that are a holiday staple.

Other meat-based specialties such as kabyrga (lamb rolls), asip (lamb sausages), chuchuk (horse meat sausages), and offal dishes like karta and karyn are also featured. Preparations often take place communally, with Soviet-era films playing in the background.

In Tajikistan, pilaf, referred to in its festive form as Oshi Milli, is also the dish of choice. While Olivier salad, herring under a fur coat, and holodets (jellied meat) remain popular, appetizers are often led by Shakarob, a fresh salad of greens, tomatoes, and cucumbers.

Turkmenistan also upholds culinary traditions, with Olivier salad offering a cultural link to its Soviet past. Pilaf dominates the table, prepared with meat, rice, vegetable oil, onions, and carrots. Elengi rice, prized for its size and juiciness, is typically used for festive meals. In many households, the New Year’s table is set directly on the carpet, on a large tablecloth, around which families gather. As in years past, children write letters to Santa Claus with their holiday wishes.

Turkmen Scientists Develop Plan to Extinguish the Darvaza Gas Crater

Scientists from the Scientific Research Institute of Natural Gas, under the state concern Turkmengaz, have proposed a method to extinguish the Darvaza gas crater, an uncontrolled fire that has been burning for decades in Turkmenistan’s Karakum Desert. The development was reported by Nebit-Gaz.

The proposed solution involves drilling a new well to divert natural gas away from the crater. Researchers believe this strategy could significantly reduce, and eventually halt, the gas flow fueling the fire. If successful, the plan would allow Turkmenistan to mitigate environmental damage and conserve valuable energy resources.

Turkmen officials have increasingly framed the Darvaza fire as both an environmental liability and an economic loss. Burning methane contributes to greenhouse gas emissions, while the continuous flare represents wasted natural gas in a country heavily dependent on energy exports for revenue.

Located roughly 270 kilometers north of Ashgabat, the crater, officially named the “Glow of the Karakum”, sits atop the Chaljulba structure of the Zeagli-Darvaza group of gas fields. It measures approximately 60 meters in diameter and is 20 meters deep. The formation resulted from the collapse of an exploratory gas well. To prevent methane from harming local populations and wildlife, scientists ignited the gas, expecting the fire to burn out within days.

However, the blaze has continued uninterrupted. Gas has been burning at the site since 1971, making the crater one of Central Asia’s most unusual natural and industrial spectacles. Researchers at the institute have conducted in-depth studies of the region’s geological structure, identifying a complex network of thin gas-bearing layers between 200 and 950 meters underground. These layers are interspersed with water-bearing and dense rock formations and are often hydrodynamically connected, enabling gas migration between them.

Experts caution that extinguishing the fire has never been straightforward. The crater is fed not by a single reservoir but by multiple interconnected gas pockets, complicating efforts to isolate and shut off the fuel source.

This interconnectivity explains why the fire persists despite the initial reservoir being relatively modest. Previous attempts to extinguish the fire included examining the crater floor to locate the original wellbore.

Turkmengaz safety teams descended into the crater in hopes of installing flow-control equipment, but gas was found to be leaking from multiple surface outlets, rendering those efforts ineffective.

Engineers found that sealing individual outlets risked increasing pressure elsewhere in the field, raising concerns that poorly planned interventions could trigger new leaks rather than resolve the problem.

Now, using updated geological and production data, scientists have proposed drilling an operational and appraisal well in the Chaljulba field. By intensively extracting gas from the most productive reservoir, they aim to alter subsurface pressure conditions and redirect the gas away from the crater. According to Nebit-Gaz, this scientifically grounded approach offers a realistic path toward halting the fire and minimizing its environmental impact.

If successful, the strategy could also allow some of the diverted gas to be captured for industrial use, potentially turning a long-standing liability into a limited economic resource.

The Darvaza fire has drawn global attention for decades. The site became infamous after Soviet scientists ignited escaping methane in an effort to prevent contamination, inadvertently creating a long-burning blaze and a potent symbol of resource loss.

Often dubbed the “Gate to Hell,” the crater has featured prominently in documentaries and social media, increasing international scrutiny of Turkmenistan’s handling of methane emissions and industrial legacies.

In January 2022, then-President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov ordered renewed efforts to extinguish the fire, citing environmental concerns and economic waste. Despite multiple attempts over the years, the fire has proven resilient. Despite official optimism, experts note that success will depend on precise geological modeling and careful execution. Until drilling begins and pressure changes can be measured, the fate of the Darvaza crater remains uncertain — as it has for more than half a century.