• KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00193 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10811 -0.28%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00193 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10811 -0.28%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00193 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10811 -0.28%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00193 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10811 -0.28%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00193 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10811 -0.28%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00193 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10811 -0.28%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00193 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10811 -0.28%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00193 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10811 -0.28%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
10 December 2025

Kazakhstan to Develop Rare Earth Metals Deposit in Karaganda Region

Kazakhstan’s national mining company, Tau-Ken Samruk, is preparing to develop the Kuirektykol rare earth metals deposit in the Karkaraly district of the Karaganda region, located in central Kazakhstan.

Initial exploration of the Kuirektykol site began in 2022 and concluded in November 2024. Surveyors discovered commercially viable concentrations of rare earth elements, including cerium and lanthanides, across a 64.2 square kilometer area. Four promising zones were identified, with total resources estimated at 935,400 tons and confirmed reserves of 795,800 tons. Preliminary data suggests that reserves could potentially double with further exploration​.

On Monday, it was announced that Tau-Ken Samruk will lead the next phase of development, which includes pre-investment preparations such as additional geological studies, technology selection, and feasibility assessments. The company may proceed either independently or in partnership with private investors.

“This approach has already been applied to pilot projects at the Karatas (copper), Zhosabai (gold), North Katpar, and Upper Kayrakty (tungsten) deposits,” the Cabinet of Ministers noted. “The Kuirektykol site, with its significant rare-earth reserves used in semiconductors and high-powered magnets, is the next in line for development”​.

Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov highlighted the growth of private investment in the sector. Over the past six years, private capital in solid mineral exploration has tripled, reaching 100 billion tenge (approximately $198.6 million) in 2024. However, Bektenov also emphasized that state funding for geological exploration remains insufficient. In total, 38 promising areas with solid mineral deposits were identified across Kazakhstan in 2024.

Earlier this year, Azat Peruashev, head of the Ak Zhol parliamentary faction, called on authorities to investigate subsoil users amid concerns over the alleged uncontrolled export of rare earth metals​.

Three Uzbeks Sentenced to Death in UAE for Murder of Israeli-Moldovan Rabbi

A court in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has sentenced three Uzbek nationals to death for the murder of Rabbi Zvi Kogan, a dual citizen of Israel and Moldova. The verdict, issued on March 30, has not yet been publicly confirmed by UAE authorities, according to The Times of Israel.

Reports of the sentencing began circulating on social media, including an audio recording purportedly featuring one of the convicted men informing his family of the court’s decision. In the recording, the man urges his mother and sister to trust in Allah, ask for forgiveness on their behalf, and remain patient. The recording’s authenticity has not been independently verified.

Israeli diplomatic sources, however, have confirmed that the UAE has indeed imposed the death penalty. The three convicts, Olympi Tohirovich, 28; Makhmodjon Abdulraheem, 28; and Azizbek Kamilovich, 33, were arrested in Turkey shortly after the crime and later extradited to the UAE.

Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has acknowledged the sentencing but noted that the legal process is still underway. “This is not yet the final verdict. In the UAE, the death penalty is automatically appealed and sent to the Criminal Chamber of the Federal Supreme Court,” ministry spokesperson Ahror Burhonov told Kun.uz. The government of Uzbekistan has not publicly commented on the case’s merits or the broader diplomatic implications.

Rabbi Kogan, 28, was a member of the Chabad-Lubavitch movement and had been living in the UAE for several years. He was reported missing in Dubai in November 2024, and his body was later found in Al Ain, near the Omani border.

According to The Wall Street Journal, the suspects attempted to kidnap Kogan and transport him to Oman. Some of the perpetrators reportedly fled to Turkey following the incident. The Israeli government has denounced the killing as an “anti-Semitic terrorist attack.”

Rabbi Kogan had played a key role in fostering Jewish life in the UAE following the 2020 Abraham Accords, which normalized relations between Israel and several Arab states. He was instrumental in establishing kosher food services and founding the country’s first Jewish education center.

Exposing the Cracks: Asem Tokayeva on the Decline of RFE/RL and Central Asia’s Media Future

Speaking to The Times of Central Asia, Asem Tokayeva, a seasoned journalist with years of experience at Radio Azattyq – Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, offers a compelling critique of RFE/RL’s challenges, from internal corruption allegations to its declining relevance in Central Asia’s evolving media landscape.

Tokayeva started her career with Express K and other publications in Astana before joining Radio Azattyq as a freelancer in 2004 and contributing to the groundbreaking Russian-language program, Паровоз (“locomotive”). In 2008, she played a pivotal role in launching Radio Azattyq’s Russian-language website, a platform recognized for tackling sensitive issues and fostering free discussion. Her work contributed to the site’s recognition by the Online News Association in 2009 for “Protecting Citizens’ Rights to Information.”

After nearly 14 years at Azattyq, including over seven at its Prague office, Tokayeva left in late 2017 to further her academic pursuits, earning a Master’s degree from Charles University in Prague, where her dissertation focused on Media Framing: Transformation of Nursultan Nazarbayev’s Image in the U.S. Media.

TCA: How do you feel about the funding cuts to the U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM), which oversees projects like RFE/RL and Voice of America?

I have always advocated for the reform of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, and now the new U.S. administration has simply cut its funding in one fell swoop. However, I don’t see this as just Trump’s whim. The work of this media outlet had long been criticized in Washington, and not only during his tenure. During Barack Obama’s and Joe Biden’s presidencies, American media published investigations into abuses, including the infiltration of pro-Kremlin agents, within international broadcasting corporations funded through USAGM.

When Hillary Clinton was Secretary of State, she called the entire U.S. international broadcasting structure, which includes Radio Azattyq, practically defunct.” Even during Bill Clinton’s presidency, there were serious discussions in Washington about shutting down these radio stations, as they were considered outdated following the collapse of the USSR and the end of the Cold War. By the 1990s, it was already difficult to claim that Radio Liberty was the sole source of alternative information. During the August 1991 coup in Moscow, other radio stations provided more timely and comprehensive field reports. For instance, Echo of Moscow became one of the most listened-to stations at the time.

Today’s media landscape has different challenges, such as media literacy and combating fake news, rather than a shortage of news organizations. While the mission and goals of Radio Liberty have renewed significance, given the persistence of authoritarianism in many former Soviet countries, the U.S. administration no longer sees value in its international broadcasting system. They simply decided to shut down another bloated bureaucratic structure, one that had also been plagued by corruption. For example, its parent agency had been overpaying exorbitant amounts for office space in downtown Washington D.C. for 15 years.

Radio Azattyq destroyed its uniqueness when it completely shut down shortwave broadcasting in 2012 at the insistence of its then-editor, Yedige Magauin. Yet, in 2011, during the protests in the oil town of Zhanaozen, Azattyq was one of the few alternative sources of information. However, if we analyze Azattyq’s content over the past decade, it’s ceased to be an important or exclusive source of information. [There are multiple examples of] topics, especially those sensitive to the Kazakh authorities, that have either been ignored by Azattyq or are covered in the same way as most other media outlets in Kazakhstan.

TCA: You have consistently criticized the management of RFE/RL, including Radio Azattyq, for nepotism, corruption, labor rights violations, and more. In your opinion, how have these issues affected the core mission of the organization?

Corruption, nepotism, and censorship within Azattyq have effectively destroyed its mission to provide independent and objective information to people in authoritarian countries. Journalism has turned into a mere imitation when top managers are more concerned with keeping their positions and inflating their salaries and benefits rather than ensuring the quality of their content.

In an attempt to regain its audience, Azattyq’s Kazakh-language website even published sexualized videos and fostered sexism and chauvinism under the guise of promoting aitys, a traditional Kazakh poetic duel. As for its supposed mission of promoting democratic values, the same website actively facilitated smear campaigns against opposition leaders and distorted reports on the deaths of civil activists.

As a result of these developments, RFE/RL’s Central Asian services have steadily lost the trust of their audience and have ultimately alienated their most loyal listeners and readers. Internal editorial problems played a major role in weakening the outlets’ influence and significance in the region.

Thus, the reduction of government grants was a consequence of a prolonged crisis in the management of USAGM and its affiliated media outlets. When an organization’s top management disregards its own mission to disseminate uncensored information in countries where the press is suppressed and instead becomes mired in corruption and nepotism, it’s hardly surprising that the U.S. administration not only questioned the rationale for continued funding but ultimately decided to terminate grants to this corporation, which has repeatedly been exposed for mismanagement, infiltration, spreading disinformation, and even promoting authoritarian propaganda.

TCA: How did U.S. legislative and executive officials react to your 2019 testimony about violations in the RFE’RL’s Central Asian services during the USAGM hearing in Washington?

Some participants expressed concern that the Central Asian services of RFE/RL were effectively operating in coordination with authoritarian regimes. I noticed how the top managers of USAGM and RFE/RL became visibly uneasy. Key figures like RFE/RL Vice President Nenad Pejic and Central Asia Regional Director Abbas Djavadi, both responsible for the crisis, were quietly forced into retirement or resigned. However, there was no real investigation, and they were given generous severance packages, which, incidentally, was one of the Trump administration’s criticisms of USAGM.

The organization has long had an opaque management system and a culture of mutual protection. Real control over the content and personnel decisions rests with mid-level managers, vice presidents, and regional directors, who actively resist reforms. The leadership shields its own from accountability, allowing the system to remain unchanged. As a result, their successors continued the same practices, particularly in Central Asian services, where nepotism, favoritism, and political bias thrive, a fact repeatedly pointed out by civil society representatives in these countries. It is therefore unsurprising that the directors of these services were caught hiring their wives, stepdaughters, or mistresses. The fact that nearly an entire newsroom could be staffed by people from just one region or a single Islamic community has become a routine occurrence.

TCA: Are you aware of the current situation at Radio Azattyq? What will happen to the editorial staff if the closure of the outlet is upheld? Will they receive compensation, and will they be protected from potential persecution by the authorities?

I sympathize with my colleagues, the ordinary journalists who worked honestly and professionally. They face losing not only their jobs but also, in many ways, their sense of purpose, their ideals, and their values. I cannot say what kind of compensation they could receive or whether they will receive any at all; much depends on USAGM’s decisions. However, given the stark inequalities within RFE/RL, it is likely that many rank-and-file employees, especially those outside the Prague office, will be left without protection or support.

The income gap and levels of job security at the outlets are enormous. The six-figure salaries of the president and other top executives have consistently increased year after year. I wouldn’t be surprised if it turns out that the leadership raised their salaries ahead of the upcoming layoffs. Washington has a well-developed accountability system that allows NGOs to track government spending with relative transparency. According to the nonprofit ProPublica, Jamie Fly’s salary as the head of RFE/RL rose from $141,722 in 2020 to $308,491 in 2023.

Meanwhile, freelancers risking their freedom in places like Iran or Afghanistan receive meager fees, with rates that have remained stagnant for years. When I started as a freelancer in Astana, the rate for reporting was $7.50 per minute. It has probably increased since then, but I doubt it has increased by much, considering how reluctant management is to raise salaries. And even when they do, they are selective — loyalists and sycophants receive annual raises and bonuses, while honest but inconvenient employees are kept in the doghouse and subjected to internal harassment.

TCA:  Will the shutdown of RFE/RL projects in Central Asia affect freedom of speech in the region?

In my view, the loss of RFE/RL as an important source of information occurred long ago, when it voluntarily ceased broadcasting on shortwave, except in a few countries where the media situation is dire, such as Turkmenistan. The current content on the websites of the Central Asian services cannot compete with local media or even independent bloggers, who operate with far smaller budgets but are free from internal censorship and bureaucratic constraints. Under the leadership of Torokul Doorov, the RFE/RL Kazakh service has seen a decline in website traffic. That’s why I don’t think most news consumers will notice its absence. Had RFE/RL maintained high journalistic standards and true independence, its closure would have been a much bigger blow.

Clearly, a time of major change has arrived. This could open doors for new independent media initiatives. In the digital era, large traditional media organizations are no longer the sole providers of information. Perhaps the shutdown of RFE/RL in the region will push independent journalists and civil society to develop alternative platforms for delivering objective news.

Explore our Special Coverage section to dive deeper into the shifting priorities of U.S. funding for media in Central Asia.

Kazakhstan to Curb SIM Card Issuance Amid Rising Digital Fraud

Kazakhstan is considering new restrictions on the number of SIM cards individuals and legal entities can possess, in a bid to combat growing digital fraud. The proposal was announced by First Deputy Prosecutor General Timur Tashimbayev during a parliamentary session where the corresponding bill is under discussion.

Targeting Scams Through Regulation

The draft legislation proposes a cap, either five or ten SIM cards per individual, as well as the introduction of video verification during registration, mirroring procedures used in the financial sector.

“Unfortunately, anyone can currently purchase SIM cards with virtually no oversight. They’re sold in stores, handed out during promotions, and it’s nearly impossible to track who is using them and for what purpose,” Tashimbayev said.

In collaboration with mobile operators, the Prosecutor General’s Office has also developed methods to detect so-called SIM boxes, devices used to mask international internet calls as local traffic. In the past year, law enforcement seized 78 such devices and over 50,000 SIM cards connected to illegal operations.

Data and Legislative Developments

Since 2019, Kazakhstan has mandated registration of mobile devices through a combination of IMEI number, SIM card, and the subscriber’s Individual Identification Number (IIN), creating a digital footprint for each user. Despite this, new forms of fraud continue to emerge.

In 2023, discussions began around biometric identification for remote telecom services. The plan would require users to provide facial recognition data when registering SIM cards, a move aimed at deterring the use of fake identities.

Reclaiming the Numbering Plan

In October 2024, Vice Minister of Digital Development Askhat Orazbek announced plans to return control over the country’s numbering plan to the state. Under the proposal, new numbers would be issued via the eGov portal and its mobile app.

The initiative also includes differentiating SIM cards by purpose. While private users will face strict limits, legal entities will be required to justify the need for each card issued.

“We will cap the number of SIM cards per person. Legal entities issuing them on a large scale must provide documentation justifying their use,” Orazbek stated.

Universal SIM Cards on the Horizon

Alongside restrictions, Kazakhstan is considering the rollout of universal SIM cards. Enabled by a draft law on virtual telecom operators, these cards would be compatible with the nearest base stations of any network provider, thanks to shared infrastructure access.

Adapting to New Digital Threats

With cyber fraud becoming increasingly sophisticated, Kazakhstan is taking a multi-pronged approach to enhance digital security. The proposed limits on SIM card ownership, enhanced registration protocols, and the development of virtual operators are central to this evolving strategy to combat telecom-related crime.

Forced and Child Labor Persist in Turkmen Cotton Harvest, UN Experts Say

The International Labour Organization (ILO), a United Nations agency focused on labor rights, has confirmed cases of forced labor involving public sector employees and children during Turkmenistan’s 2024 cotton harvest, despite a formal government ban introduced in July of that year.

Public Sector Employees and Children Sent to the Fields

According to the ILO’s findings, employees of state institutions, including kindergartens, schools, and hospitals, were mobilized for cotton picking alongside children. These violations occurred even after the official prohibition on such practices was enacted​.

During a visit to Turkmenistan in autumn 2024, ILO experts found that around 20% of surveyed farmers admitted to employing public sector workers. This included both technical staff, such as cleaners, and professionals like nurses, doctors, and educators.

Over one-third of public sector employees reported facing pressure from management to participate in the harvest, with threats of wage cuts or dismissal. The ILO categorized these practices as a form of “psychological coercion.”

Minors in the Fields, Women Dominate the Labor Force

Despite the legal ban on child labor, 14% of surveyed government workers and 11% of farmers confirmed the involvement of minors in cotton picking. The report links this to poor socio-economic conditions in rural areas, low-income levels, unemployment, and prevailing cultural expectations.

Women accounted for over 90% of all cotton pickers in 2024. The average working day lasted 8.5 hours, often extending beyond that. Approximately 80% of pickers had no written employment contracts, exposing them to potential exploitation. Many reported being forced to accept whatever terms their employers offered.

While in 2023 only 12% of pickers earned more than one Turkmen manat per kilogram of cotton, this figure rose to over 70% in 2024. Nevertheless, experts noted that pay remained unstable, with widespread delays and opaque compensation practices.

Obstacles for Observers, Risk of Sanctions

The ILO conducted monitoring at 472 cotton plantations across Turkmenistan, interviewing 1,762 pickers, 472 farmers, and 2,500 public officials. However, the report notes that in some instances, officials and farmers attempted to obstruct monitoring efforts, interfering with observers and misrepresenting facts.

While the ILO acknowledged government efforts to ban child labor and reduce coercion, it warned that the absence of effective oversight mechanisms continues to enable violations.

“Risks remain, especially when there are threats of dismissal or fines for refusing to go into the field,” the report states.

International Repercussions Loom

Under newly adopted European Union regulations banning imports of goods produced using forced labor, Turkmen cotton exports could face restrictions. In November 2024, EU officials discussed a potential ban on imports of Turkmen cotton for this reason.

The ILO report underscores that sustainable reform is only achievable through transparent oversight, full respect for human rights, and the complete elimination of coercive labor practices for both adults and children.

Inside the EU’s New Power Play in Eurasia

Kaja Kallas’s late-March 2025 tour of Central Asia, in her role as the European Union’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, was a high-signal intervention in structural terms. It indicates a major re-evaluation of the EU’s posture toward a region historically treated as a far-flung, liminal borderland. As the inaugural EU–Central Asia Summit in Samarkand on April 3–4 approaches, her visible diplomatic activity was less about spectacle than about configuring a new field of co-adaptive engagement. Not only the European Union but also, separately, the United Kingdom are both seeking new regional footholds for building durable alignments.

Central Asia, for decades considered through a lens of post-Soviet dependency or one of Chinese infrastructural absorption, is now increasingly recognized as a network node of emergent geopolitical agency. No longer just a space “between” other spaces, it is becoming a strategic space in its own right. Kallas’s mission and the UK’s parallel outreach signify a turn toward a negotiated interdependence that does not dissolve classical interest-based diplomacy but rather “complexifies” it by embedding it in a landscape of developmental trajectories and overlapping power centers.

The arc of Kallas’s visit traced a deliberate sequence: Ashgabat, Tashkent, Almaty, Bishkek. In Ashgabat, she chaired the 20th EU–Central Asia Ministerial Meeting, a session nominally bureaucratic but substantively strategic. Discussions reaffirmed the 2023 EU–Central Asia Roadmap and activated the Global Gateway as an organizing frame for infrastructural, digital, and energy cooperation. Bilateral exchanges with officials in Turkmenistan brought the sensitive issue of sanctions circumvention into the open: Turkmenistan, though nominally neutral, remains enmeshed in logistics corridors proximate to Russian interest.

From there, Kallas moved to Uzbekistan, where preparations for the April 3–4 Samarkand summit took clearer shape. Talks with President Shavkat Mirziyoyev and Foreign Minister Bakhtiyor Saidov in Tashkent widened the terrain of diplomatic discourse to include the energy transition, educational exchange, and regional transport integration. By hosting summits and fostering cooperation, Uzbekistan is seeking to establish for itself a profile as a key facilitator in Eurasian affairs. In Kazakhstan, her final significant stop, the meetings with President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and Foreign Minister Murat Nurtleu emphasized macroeconomic diversification and critical raw material supply chains. These are areas in which the EU is not merely a partner but a principal stakeholder.

And yet, it is not only the EU that has begun this strategic deepening. The United Kingdom, post-Brexit and still actively reconfiguring its global engagements, has moved in parallel. April 2025 marked the first anniversary of the UK–Kazakhstan Strategic Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. Foreign Office Minister Stephen Doughty’s recent hosting of the Kazakhstan–UK Strategic Dialogue marked 33 years of formal relations. These diplomatic celebrations, beyond their performativity, represent the UK’s recognition that Kazakhstan, and Central Asia more broadly, is a region where its strategic, commercial, and normative interests intersect.

In this broader convergence, Kazakhstan plays a central structural role of a balancing nature. It shares long borders with both Russia and China; it hosts a significant Russian-speaking population; and it has maintained a political posture of calibrated neutrality during a period of sharply escalated geopolitical tensions. For both the EU and the UK, Kazakhstan’s independence and stability transcend bilateral issues; they have become, indeed, system-stabilizing. With Russia’s unabated aggression in Ukraine and China’s unceasing infrastructure diplomacy across the region, Kazakhstan’s capacity to maintain equidistance becomes a geopolitical asset in itself, even for outsiders like the EU and the UK.

The material vectors of this engagement are principally energy and infrastructure. Kazakhstan remains central to Europe’s energy diversification strategy. For the UK, the logic is even more direct: Kazakhstan supplies approximately 20% of British crude oil imports. British companies such as BP and Shell maintain longstanding investments in the Tengiz and Kashagan fields. The pragmatism of maintaining hydrocarbon fuel flows during the “energy transition” coexists with investment in green energy and renewables, supported through mechanisms like the EU’s Global Gateway and private-sector coordination.

The institutional layer is also to be noted. The Astana International Financial Centre (AIFC), which operates under English common law, offers a familiar regulatory ecosystem for UK-based investors. It also acts as a vector for Kazakhstan’s economic diversification. This policy aspires to curb rentier dependence and to stimulate innovation in finance, technology, and professional services. The EU has historically emphasized regulatory alignment as a strategic vector, so Kazakhstan’s legal and financial modernization presents an attractive pathway to long-term structural alignment.

Beyond finance and energy lie the questions of corridors, logistics, and flows. Kazakhstan’s promotion of the Trans-Caspian International Trade Route (TITR), also called the Middle Corridor, is no longer a boutique project. As trade through Russian territory becomes politically and economically volatile, the corridor has already taken on significant strategic importance. Both Brussels and London have recognized this. The EU backs multimodal infrastructure investment across Central Asia through Global Gateway, while the UK has sought project-specific partnerships aligning with its goals of trade facilitation.

Such convergence, however, takes place within a competitive field. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) still has life in Central Asia, where governments do not see engagement with Europe or the UK as a replacement for Chinese partnership but as a diversification of their own strategic portfolios. What differentiates European and British engagement is not their magnitude but their method of introducing conditionality frameworks, legal transparency, and sustainability metrics. Their models of partnership offer what might be called “predictive credibility” that provides higher informational clarity and so also lower volatility.

The Samarkand summit on April 3–4 will formalize these trajectories. It is expected to produce memoranda and initiatives across digital infrastructure, educational exchange, logistics coordination, and green energy. The summit crystallizes how Europe is shifting its engagement with the region. Central Asia is no longer a periphery but rather a partner, no longer a mere object of policy but a co-agent in system evolution.

Kallas’s mission demonstrates, and UK engagement reinforces, that the architecture of Eurasian engagement is no longer founded on dominance or dependency. It is increasingly shaped by distributed agency, managed asymmetry, and negotiated interdependence. This increased compatibility among the partners enables efficient differentiation and mutual adaptation. This convergence does not ensure broader geopolitical stability, but it does enhance the number of degrees of freedom available to any emergent equilibrium.