• KGS/USD = 0.01149 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00191 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09173 -0.11%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01149 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00191 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09173 -0.11%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01149 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00191 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09173 -0.11%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01149 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00191 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09173 -0.11%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01149 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00191 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09173 -0.11%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01149 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00191 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09173 -0.11%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01149 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00191 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09173 -0.11%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01149 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00191 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09173 -0.11%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
02 January 2025

Viewing results 7 - 12 of 28

Uzbekistan’s Path to Reform: Navigating the 2024 Elections with a New Electoral System

Uzbekistan’s upcoming parliamentary elections, scheduled for October 27, 2024, mark an important step in the country’s political evolution. These elections will fill 150 seats in the Legislative Chamber, the lower house of the Oliy Majlis, and determine the composition of various regional, district, and city councils. In addition, 65 members of the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Karakalpakstan will also be elected. These elections are notable not only because of their timing — shifting from December to October under a 2021 reform — but also due to the adoption of a mixed electoral system that was introduced in December 2023. This shift represents an important evolution from the previous majority-based system, introducing a balance between majority and proportional representation, which will shape the composition of Uzbekistan’s Legislative Chamber. The new system reflects a broader attempt at political reform and modernization. Of the 150 seats, 75 will be decided through single-mandate districts, where the candidate with the most votes will win, while the remaining 75 will be allocated proportionally based on party results. Uzbekistan’s political landscape, however, remains limited, with only five officially registered parties. In the 2019 elections, the Liberal Democratic Party (UzLiDeP), which is closely linked to the presidency, won the most seats. While this mixed system represents a potential step forward, challenges persist in terms of political pluralism and genuine competition. Uzbekistan, in its journey toward stronger democratic practices, can find inspiration in the electoral processes of other established democracies, particularly India — the world’s largest democracy. India’s electoral system, honed over decades, has become a model for managing elections in a complex and diverse society. The parallels between Uzbekistan’s emerging political landscape and India’s robust democratic traditions offer an opportunity for learning and adaptation.

Azerbaijan Is Bringing Uzbekistan into the Middle Corridor

The Treaty on Allied Relations between Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan, signed last month, formalizes their growing strategic partnership and signals a new phase in their deepening ties. Their relationship has gained momentum particularly as Azerbaijan has been prioritizing the expansion of its networks in the region since 2020. Uzbekistan now plays a significant role in Azerbaijan’s efforts to strengthen the Trans-Caspian International Trade Route (TITR, also known as the Middle Corridor), the key trade and infrastructure link among Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and Turkey.   Uzbekistan and the Middle Corridor Within the last year and a half, many international financial institutions have published comprehensive studies on the implementation of the TITR project. One of the most influential was organized by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) in June 2023, in collaboration with the European Commission. It was an in-depth examination of existing and potential infrastructure and logistical networks across the region. The goal of the report was to determine the “most sustainable option” for efficient transport connections between Central Asia and Europe. This report identified a route that it called the Central Trans-Caspian Network (CTCN), running principally through southern Kazakhstan. This route leverages the already well-established infrastructure and logistical systems there, making it the most viable option for trade and transport in the region. In a separate and complementary report, published in November 2023, the World Bank noted that Uzbekistan’s rail connections with Kazakhstan might be improved, but it did not identify any potential projects. Nevertheless, the Darbaza–Maktaaral project in Kazakhstan, projected for completion in 2025, could be extended first to Kazakhstan’s Syrdarya station, whence a further branch line could run to Zhetysai on the border with Uzbekistan. That project would reduce congestion at the existing Saryagash border crossing, which connects to Keles in Uzbekistan, in the north of the Tashkent conurbation. It could increase transport capacity by as much as 10 million tons per year. Still, the project focuses only on increasing the level of bilateral trade, largely in foodstuffs and agricultural goods, and does not target Uzbekistan’s integration into the Middle Corridor. On the other hand, Azerbaijan has been working actively with Uzbekistan to integrate it into the Middle Corridor, without relying on routes through southern Kazakhstan. Their cooperation includes significant efforts to enhance infrastructure and logistics. Examples include joint ventures in logistics centers and, notably, inter-modal transport links between Samarkand and Baku. Such efforts are designed to offer Uzbekistan direct access to the Caspian Sea and European markets via Azerbaijan, largely bypassing Kazakhstan and building a stronger trade partnership within the trans-Caspian framework.   Uzbekistan’s Relations with Turkey Set the Context While this all started only a few years ago, a look back to 2016 when Uzbekistan’s President Islam Karimov died provides a more complete picture. After Shavkat Mirziyoyev succeeded Karimov, Uzbekistan began to open up from its diplomatic isolation. One of the first interested parties was Turkey. Both nations signaled interest in improving ties, and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan began to take steps...

U.S. Think Tank Calls on American Politicians to Make Uzbekistan a Valued Partner

Daniel Runde, a senior vice-president at the Washington, D.C.-based think tank the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), has called on American politicians to strengthen the U.S.'s relations with Uzbekistan. He believes that Uzbekistan, a key partner for the United States in Central Asia, deserves more attention from the West. With Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and growing competition with China, the U.S. could strengthen ties with Uzbekistan to promote regional stability and counterbalance Russian and Chinese influence. “Uzbekistan seeks more engagement with the United States through bilateral efforts and the “C5+1” (the five Central Asian countries plus the United States) diplomatic platform. We might never become Uzbekistan’s best friend. However, we could become better and more reliable friends. Uzbekistan has five bordering countries, and at one point in the early 2000s, it considered the United States its ‘sixth neighbor,’” Runde mentioned. “When the U.S. government was active in Afghanistan, we supported Uzbekistan’s efforts to develop its economy and invest in its security. With our disengagement from Afghanistan, we need to look at Uzbekistan as the valued partner that it could be and re-engage. We should work towards the day that Uzbekistan considers the United States its ‘sixth neighbor’ again.” According to Runde, there are several goals that the US could assist Uzbekistan in achieving. While some are significantly more difficult to handle, others are relatively straightforward: 1) Uzbekistan wants U.S. support to join the World Trade Organization (WTO), a goal it has pursued for almost 30 years. The U.S. has provided some technical help, and during a recent visit, U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai reaffirmed America’s support. For further progress, Uzbekistan could benefit from greater involvement from U.S. institutions like the Development Finance Corporation (DFC), Export-Import Bank (EXIM), and U.S. Trade and Development Agency (USTDA) to strengthen trade ties with the U.S. 2) Uzbekistan and other Central Asian countries want the U.S. to repeal the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, which restricts regular trade with them. This amendment, initially targeting Soviet-era policies, is now outdated and seen as disrespectful, as it treats these nations as if they are still part of the Soviet Union. Repealing it would show that the U.S. respects their independence and is ready to treat them as equal partners. “Jackson-Vanik now restricts normal trade relations with several existing and former nonmarket economies, including Uzbekistan. For countries like Uzbekistan, Jackson-Vanik is a sign of disrespect that encourages them to take their business to China, Russia, Turkey, or the Gulf,” Runde argues. 3) He notes that many developing countries, including Uzbekistan, would like to see Congress successfully renew the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), a trade preference program. “The GSP benefited many developing countries by providing duty-free treatment for their products. With the absence of this program, trade volumes between Uzbekistan and the United States have not been as impressive as they might have been. Compare U.S. trade with Uzbekistan and Uzbekistan’s trade with China, Russia, or the EU. The lapse of the U.S. GSP has had a real impact on our influence...

SCO and Afghanistan on the Cusp of a New Relationship

The hype surrounding the recent summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Council of Heads of State in Astana has died down, and the expert community has offered differing takeaways, with some experts optimistic and others cautious. Few, however, have considered what new this summit delivered on Afghanistan. In general, what is the role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in resolving the political issues around long-suffering Afghanistan and rebuilding its economy? Despite the SCO’s previous hands-off approach to Afghan affairs, the issue of Taliban-ruled Afghanistan was raised for the first time at the highest level of the SCO in Astana, which gives hope that the organization will expand its role. In their remarks, almost every SCO head of state touched on Afghanistan in essentially the same vein, stating the need for peace, stability and security, while underlining the fact that Afghanistan is an integral part of Central Asia. Indeed, Afghanistan was mentioned in the final declaration of the Astana summit, with Member States “reaffirming their commitment to asserting Afghanistan as an independent, neutral and peaceful state free from terrorism, war, and narcotic drugs [and voicing] their readiness to support the international community’s efforts to facilitate peace and development in that country.” At the same time, there was a clear message to the Taliban that “the establishment of an inclusive government involving multiple representatives of all ethnic and political groups of Afghan society is the only way toward attaining lasting peace and stability in that country.” These statements represent a rather big step, considering that previously the SCO failed to find a consensus on Afghanistan and develop its own mechanisms to interact with Kabul. The creation of the SCO-Afghanistan Contact Group back in 2005 was rather a spontaneous reaction to the US-led coalition's Operation Enduring Freedom in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attack. The SCO itself says the contact group was created because of the "concerns of the SCO countries about the negative development of the situation in Afghanistan and the intention of the SCO to establish a specific consultative dialogue with Kabul." While the contact group included the members’ permanent representatives to the SCO, only a few events were ever held. Indeed, interest in the contact group was only really apparent from the Afghan side, which was looking for SCO assistance in rebuilding the Afghan economy and SCO participation in implementing various energy and transport infrastructure projects and creating favorable conditions for Afghan goods to access the markets of SCO countries. However, none of this was realized. The SCO states preferred, as they still do, to conduct relations with Afghanistan bilaterally, and did not support the efforts of the SCO Secretariat to intensify the work of the contact group. In 2010, Uzbekistan directly indicated its interest in building relations with Afghanistan exclusively on a bilateral basis and stated that it would no longer take part in the contact group. In June 2012, Afghanistan’s application for SCO observer status was granted. Yet this step was more symbolic and failed to...

Samarkand: The City that Forged a Country’s Nationhood

The city of Samarkand holds great significance in the history of Central Asia. The etymology of the name “Samarkand” has multiple possible origins. One train of thought is that it is derived from Sanskrit and Old Persian words, with “Samar” meaning “war” and “kand,” a “square” or “place.” Another roots it in the ancient Sogdian language with “Samar” interpreted as “stone” or “rock,” and “kand,” as “fort” or “town.” Some foreign toponymists claim the name originated in the Sanskrit word “Samaria,” signifying a gathering or meeting, whilst according to certain historical accounts, it evolved from the name of its king, Samar, and “kand,” the Turkish word for city. Yet another theory involves Shamar, a Yemen royal, who after seizing the town from the Sogdians, reconstructed and renamed it Samarkand. Today’s Samarkand, one of Central Asia’s oldest cities, is a testament to its enduring resilience and indomitable spirit against centuries of numerous conquests. According to the Encyclopaedia Britannica, the city then known as Maracanda, was the capital of Sogdiana prior to its conquest by Alexander the Great in the 4th century BC. It was subsequently ruled by various groups, including Central Asian Turks, Arabs, the Samanids of Iran, various Turkic peoples, and the Khwārezm-Shāh dynasty, before being ravaged by Genghis Khan in 1220. After a successful revolt against Mongol rulers in 1365, Samarkand rose to the fore as Central Asia’s economic and cultural capital under the reign of Timur (Tamerlane). In 1550, the city was conquered by Uzbeks and integrated into the Khanate of Bukhara. By the 18th century, the city had fallen into serious decline and remained uninhabited from the 1720s to the 1770s, but once again rose from the ashes when in 1887, it became a provincial capital of the Russian Empire and a railroad center. The city then served as the capital of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic from 1924 to 1936. Samarkand is a city of two parts; the first dating back to medieval times, and the second after the Russian conquest in the 19th century. Despite large-scale destruction by the Russians, the old city’s walls, erected in the 11th century and spanning five miles, remain true to their original plan with the streets running from six gates towards the center housing some of the most magnificent monuments of Central Asian architecture. Constructed between the 14th and 20th centuries, these include the Bībī-Khānom Mosque (1399–1404), commissioned by Timur’s favorite Chinese wife, Timur’s tomb, the Gūr-e Amīr Mausoleum, built around 1405, and the late 15th century Ak Saray tomb with its superb interior fresco. The madrasahs (Islamic schools) of Timur’s grandson, the astronomer Ulūgh Beg (1417–20), and those of Shirdar (1619–1635/36) and Tilakari (mid-17th century) flanking the central Registan Square are but the finest of Samarkand’s many historic mausoleums, madrasahs, and mosques. Famously adorned with magnificent portals, vast colored domes, and remarkable exterior decorations in majolica, mosaic, marble, and gold, the city’s awe-inspiring architecture resulted in Samarkand’s recognition as a UNESCO World Heritage site in 2001. The newer...

Saudi Islamic Development Bank Increasing Its Presence in Central Asia

The Saudi-based Islamic Development Bank (IDB) has been particularly active in Central Asia so far in 2024. The growing IDB role is part of Central Asian region’s foreign policy shift toward the Arab world as financial backers to replace Russia, which is devoting huge attention and resources to its war in Ukraine, and China, which is increasingly reluctant to spend large sums of money in Central Asia after pouring in tens of billions of dollars there during the last 25 years. Some of the Central Asian governments owe China substantial amounts of money that they are unlikely to be able to pay for possibly decades. The Central Asian states have been members of the IDB for many years. Kyrgyzstan was first, joining in 1993, followed by Turkmenistan in 1994, Kazakhstan in 1995, Tajikistan in 1996, and Uzbekistan in 2003. One of the IDB’s three regional offices is in Almaty, Kazakhstan (the other two are in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia and Rabat, Morocco).  The IDB has been dealing individually with the five Central Asian countries on a wide range of projects and programs in recent months. Energy Resources In February, Tajik Minister of Economic Development and Trade Zavqi Zavqizoda announced a deal was reached for the IDB to provide $250 million to Tajikistan. Zavqizoda said $150 million of that would go toward construction of the Rogun hydropower plant (HPP).  The Rogun HPP was a Soviet-era project. Construction started in 1976 but was discontinued shortly after the Soviet Union collapsed. Tajikistan restarted work on the HPP in 2008. Tajik President Emomali Rahmon has repeatedly said that building the HPP with a planned 3600 MW capacity will make the country energy independent and even allow Tajikistan to bring in extra revenue exporting electricity to neighboring countries.  In its 28 years as an IDB member, Tajikistan had received some $620 million from the IDB, so the $250 million announced in February 2024 represents a significant jump in IDB financial help. Not surprisingly, when IDB President Muhammad Al-Jasser visited Kyrgyzstan in June, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov sought IDB investment in the Kambar-Ata-1 HPP, another decades-old project with a multi-billion-dollar price tag that has barely made any progress in being realized during the 33 years Kyrgyzstan has been independent. Al-Jasser did not commit to IDB financing for the Kyrgyz HPP. However, less than a week after Al-Jasser was in Kyrgyzstan, the IDB was one of several international financial organizations that signed on at a conference in Vienna to be a members of a coordination donors’ committee for the Kambar-Ata-1 projects. At a meeting in Istanbul in February, the IDB reaffirmed its support for the Central Asia-South Asia-1000 (CASA-1000) project that aims to export electricity from HPPs in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Kyrgyz Energy Minister Taalaybek Ibrayev met with Al-Jasser in June during the latter’s visit to Kyrgyzstan to discuss funding for Kyrgyzstan’s section of CASA-1000. Not Only Energy In June, the IDB pledged up to $2 billion in funding for improvements to water management...