• KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00201 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09166 -0.11%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28573 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00201 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09166 -0.11%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28573 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00201 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09166 -0.11%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28573 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00201 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09166 -0.11%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28573 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00201 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09166 -0.11%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28573 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00201 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09166 -0.11%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28573 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00201 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09166 -0.11%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28573 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00201 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09166 -0.11%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28573 -0.14%

Viewing results 7 - 12 of 30

How Central Asia Is Shifting From Russia Towards Turkey

For Turkey, a NATO member and EU hopeful, the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) is an instrument that helps Ankara increase its presence in the strategically important region of Central Asia. For Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, the Turkish-dominated group seems to be a tool that allows them to achieve their economic goals, while also continuing to distance themselves from Russia. Although Moscow still has a relatively strong foothold in Central Asia, it does not seem able to prevent the growing role of the Organization of Turkic States in the post-Soviet space. This entity – whose members are Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey, and Uzbekistan, while Turkmenistan, Hungary, and the self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus hold observer status – has the potential to eventually serve as a counterbalance not only to Russian, but also Chinese influence in the region. Since its foundation in 2009, the OTS has held ten summits of its leaders. Over this period, the intergovernmental organization’s working bodies have also convened dozens of times. On November 5-6 in the Kyrgyz capital Bishkek, the OTS heads of states will meet for the eleventh time to discuss the future of the Turkic world. Although the agenda has yet to be announced, it is believed that the OTS leaders will seek to strengthen economic cooperation between its members. Currently, their major trade partners are nations outside the bloc. For instance, Turkey’s largest trading partner is Germany, Azerbaijan’s is Italy, while China has recently become Kazakhstan’s biggest trade partner with bilateral trade hitting $31.5 billion. For neighboring Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, China and Russia remain the most important economic partners. One of the group’s major problems is the fact that its members, excluding Turkey, are landlocked countries heavily-dependent on Russia and China geographically. Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, as major energy exporters, rely on oil and gas pipelines traversing Russian territory to reach their customers in Europe. It is, therefore, no surprise that the Organization of Turkic States governments’ agreed in September to create a simplified customs corridor, aiming at reducing the number of documents required for customs operations and customs procedures between OTS member states. In other words, they plan to increase trade among themselves. According to Omer Kocaman, OTS Deputy Secretary-General, the Turkic nations are also looking to “continue cooperation to stimulate positive changes in their financial systems.” That is why the organization has recently launched the Turkic Investment Fund – the first joint financial institution for economic integration of the Turkic countries, with an initial capital of $500 million. Kyrgyzstan’s Chamber of Commerce and Industry announced on October 17 that, starting in January 2025, the Turkic Investment Fund will begin financing major joint projects in OTS nations. However, in July, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev said that the current structure of the Organization of Turkic States does not meet its established goals, and that its budget is insufficient for their implementation. In order to change that, on October 19, ministers of economy and trade of the OTS nations met in Bishkek to...

The Ferghana Valley: Navigating Complex Challenges in Central Asia’s Most Volatile Region

The Ferghana Valley is one of Central Asia’s most fertile and densely populated areas, but it is also among the most volatile. Spanning Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, this landlocked region has long been a hotbed of ethnic tension, water disputes, and political instability. These challenges are deeply rooted in the geography, history, and sociopolitical landscape, making the valley a key focal point for understanding broader regional dynamics in Central Asia.   Geographical Importance and Ethnic Diversity Nestled between the towering Tien Shan and Pamir Mountain ranges, the Ferghana Valley covers over 22,000 square kilometers. It is fertile land nourished by the Syr Darya River, making it a critical area for cultivating cotton, fruits, and vegetables. These natural resources have historically drawn diverse populations, creating a vibrant ethnic mosaic. The valley is home to Uzbeks, Kyrgyz, and Tajiks, as well as smaller ethnic groups. While ethnic Uzbeks form the majority, significant Kyrgyz and Tajik minorities inhabit border regions. The ethnic diversity of the Ferghana Valley is both a strength and a source of tension. Soviet-era border policies exacerbated these divisions by creating artificial boundaries that crisscrossed the valley, leaving behind ethnic enclaves — pockets of one nationality surrounded by the territory of another. These enclaves have complicated governance and territorial integrity, making border management a persistent challenge.   The Soviet Legacy and Border Disputes During Soviet rule, the Central Asian republics were organized under Stalin’s divide-and-rule strategy, which deliberately created complex borders to weaken local identities and prevent regional unity. The Ferghana Valley, divided among three Soviet republics, is a prime example of this approach. After the Soviet Union's collapse in 1991, the administrative boundaries became international borders overnight between Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. The lack of clearly defined borders has sparked numerous conflicts over territory, water, and land. A notable clash between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in 2021 resulted in over 40 deaths and the destruction of homes and infrastructure. Many disputes revolve around access to scarce resources like water and arable land. These issues have escalated into violent confrontations, leading to casualties and the displacement of local populations.   Water: A Scarce and Contested Resource Water is the lifeblood of the Ferghana Valley, but disputes over its allocation are a major source of tension. The valley depends heavily on irrigation for its agricultural productivity, and the Syr Darya River, along with its tributaries, plays a crucial role in supplying water to the region. However, the division of the valley among the three countries complicates water management. Uzbekistan, the most populous of the three, relies on the valley’s water resources for its cotton industry, a cornerstone of its economy. Meanwhile, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which control the headwaters of the Syr Darya, often use their upstream position to leverage water access. This dynamic has led to frequent disagreements over water usage. For instance, Kyrgyzstan has at times threatened to withhold water unless it receives compensation, either through payments or electricity.   Ethnic Tensions and Political Instability Ethnic tensions further complicate the Ferghana Valley’s already volatile...

Uzbekistan’s Path to Reform: Navigating the 2024 Elections with a New Electoral System

Uzbekistan’s upcoming parliamentary elections, scheduled for October 27, 2024, mark an important step in the country’s political evolution. These elections will fill 150 seats in the Legislative Chamber, the lower house of the Oliy Majlis, and determine the composition of various regional, district, and city councils. In addition, 65 members of the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Karakalpakstan will also be elected. These elections are notable not only because of their timing — shifting from December to October under a 2021 reform — but also due to the adoption of a mixed electoral system that was introduced in December 2023. This shift represents an important evolution from the previous majority-based system, introducing a balance between majority and proportional representation, which will shape the composition of Uzbekistan’s Legislative Chamber. The new system reflects a broader attempt at political reform and modernization. Of the 150 seats, 75 will be decided through single-mandate districts, where the candidate with the most votes will win, while the remaining 75 will be allocated proportionally based on party results. Uzbekistan’s political landscape, however, remains limited, with only five officially registered parties. In the 2019 elections, the Liberal Democratic Party (UzLiDeP), which is closely linked to the presidency, won the most seats. While this mixed system represents a potential step forward, challenges persist in terms of political pluralism and genuine competition. Uzbekistan, in its journey toward stronger democratic practices, can find inspiration in the electoral processes of other established democracies, particularly India — the world’s largest democracy. India’s electoral system, honed over decades, has become a model for managing elections in a complex and diverse society. The parallels between Uzbekistan’s emerging political landscape and India’s robust democratic traditions offer an opportunity for learning and adaptation.

Azerbaijan Is Bringing Uzbekistan into the Middle Corridor

The Treaty on Allied Relations between Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan, signed last month, formalizes their growing strategic partnership and signals a new phase in their deepening ties. Their relationship has gained momentum particularly as Azerbaijan has been prioritizing the expansion of its networks in the region since 2020. Uzbekistan now plays a significant role in Azerbaijan’s efforts to strengthen the Trans-Caspian International Trade Route (TITR, also known as the Middle Corridor), the key trade and infrastructure link among Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and Turkey.   Uzbekistan and the Middle Corridor Within the last year and a half, many international financial institutions have published comprehensive studies on the implementation of the TITR project. One of the most influential was organized by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) in June 2023, in collaboration with the European Commission. It was an in-depth examination of existing and potential infrastructure and logistical networks across the region. The goal of the report was to determine the “most sustainable option” for efficient transport connections between Central Asia and Europe. This report identified a route that it called the Central Trans-Caspian Network (CTCN), running principally through southern Kazakhstan. This route leverages the already well-established infrastructure and logistical systems there, making it the most viable option for trade and transport in the region. In a separate and complementary report, published in November 2023, the World Bank noted that Uzbekistan’s rail connections with Kazakhstan might be improved, but it did not identify any potential projects. Nevertheless, the Darbaza–Maktaaral project in Kazakhstan, projected for completion in 2025, could be extended first to Kazakhstan’s Syrdarya station, whence a further branch line could run to Zhetysai on the border with Uzbekistan. That project would reduce congestion at the existing Saryagash border crossing, which connects to Keles in Uzbekistan, in the north of the Tashkent conurbation. It could increase transport capacity by as much as 10 million tons per year. Still, the project focuses only on increasing the level of bilateral trade, largely in foodstuffs and agricultural goods, and does not target Uzbekistan’s integration into the Middle Corridor. On the other hand, Azerbaijan has been working actively with Uzbekistan to integrate it into the Middle Corridor, without relying on routes through southern Kazakhstan. Their cooperation includes significant efforts to enhance infrastructure and logistics. Examples include joint ventures in logistics centers and, notably, inter-modal transport links between Samarkand and Baku. Such efforts are designed to offer Uzbekistan direct access to the Caspian Sea and European markets via Azerbaijan, largely bypassing Kazakhstan and building a stronger trade partnership within the trans-Caspian framework.   Uzbekistan’s Relations with Turkey Set the Context While this all started only a few years ago, a look back to 2016 when Uzbekistan’s President Islam Karimov died provides a more complete picture. After Shavkat Mirziyoyev succeeded Karimov, Uzbekistan began to open up from its diplomatic isolation. One of the first interested parties was Turkey. Both nations signaled interest in improving ties, and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan began to take steps...

U.S. Think Tank Calls on American Politicians to Make Uzbekistan a Valued Partner

Daniel Runde, a senior vice-president at the Washington, D.C.-based think tank the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), has called on American politicians to strengthen the U.S.'s relations with Uzbekistan. He believes that Uzbekistan, a key partner for the United States in Central Asia, deserves more attention from the West. With Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and growing competition with China, the U.S. could strengthen ties with Uzbekistan to promote regional stability and counterbalance Russian and Chinese influence. “Uzbekistan seeks more engagement with the United States through bilateral efforts and the “C5+1” (the five Central Asian countries plus the United States) diplomatic platform. We might never become Uzbekistan’s best friend. However, we could become better and more reliable friends. Uzbekistan has five bordering countries, and at one point in the early 2000s, it considered the United States its ‘sixth neighbor,’” Runde mentioned. “When the U.S. government was active in Afghanistan, we supported Uzbekistan’s efforts to develop its economy and invest in its security. With our disengagement from Afghanistan, we need to look at Uzbekistan as the valued partner that it could be and re-engage. We should work towards the day that Uzbekistan considers the United States its ‘sixth neighbor’ again.” According to Runde, there are several goals that the US could assist Uzbekistan in achieving. While some are significantly more difficult to handle, others are relatively straightforward: 1) Uzbekistan wants U.S. support to join the World Trade Organization (WTO), a goal it has pursued for almost 30 years. The U.S. has provided some technical help, and during a recent visit, U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai reaffirmed America’s support. For further progress, Uzbekistan could benefit from greater involvement from U.S. institutions like the Development Finance Corporation (DFC), Export-Import Bank (EXIM), and U.S. Trade and Development Agency (USTDA) to strengthen trade ties with the U.S. 2) Uzbekistan and other Central Asian countries want the U.S. to repeal the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, which restricts regular trade with them. This amendment, initially targeting Soviet-era policies, is now outdated and seen as disrespectful, as it treats these nations as if they are still part of the Soviet Union. Repealing it would show that the U.S. respects their independence and is ready to treat them as equal partners. “Jackson-Vanik now restricts normal trade relations with several existing and former nonmarket economies, including Uzbekistan. For countries like Uzbekistan, Jackson-Vanik is a sign of disrespect that encourages them to take their business to China, Russia, Turkey, or the Gulf,” Runde argues. 3) He notes that many developing countries, including Uzbekistan, would like to see Congress successfully renew the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), a trade preference program. “The GSP benefited many developing countries by providing duty-free treatment for their products. With the absence of this program, trade volumes between Uzbekistan and the United States have not been as impressive as they might have been. Compare U.S. trade with Uzbekistan and Uzbekistan’s trade with China, Russia, or the EU. The lapse of the U.S. GSP has had a real impact on our influence...

SCO and Afghanistan on the Cusp of a New Relationship

The hype surrounding the recent summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Council of Heads of State in Astana has died down, and the expert community has offered differing takeaways, with some experts optimistic and others cautious. Few, however, have considered what new this summit delivered on Afghanistan. In general, what is the role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in resolving the political issues around long-suffering Afghanistan and rebuilding its economy? Despite the SCO’s previous hands-off approach to Afghan affairs, the issue of Taliban-ruled Afghanistan was raised for the first time at the highest level of the SCO in Astana, which gives hope that the organization will expand its role. In their remarks, almost every SCO head of state touched on Afghanistan in essentially the same vein, stating the need for peace, stability and security, while underlining the fact that Afghanistan is an integral part of Central Asia. Indeed, Afghanistan was mentioned in the final declaration of the Astana summit, with Member States “reaffirming their commitment to asserting Afghanistan as an independent, neutral and peaceful state free from terrorism, war, and narcotic drugs [and voicing] their readiness to support the international community’s efforts to facilitate peace and development in that country.” At the same time, there was a clear message to the Taliban that “the establishment of an inclusive government involving multiple representatives of all ethnic and political groups of Afghan society is the only way toward attaining lasting peace and stability in that country.” These statements represent a rather big step, considering that previously the SCO failed to find a consensus on Afghanistan and develop its own mechanisms to interact with Kabul. The creation of the SCO-Afghanistan Contact Group back in 2005 was rather a spontaneous reaction to the US-led coalition's Operation Enduring Freedom in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attack. The SCO itself says the contact group was created because of the "concerns of the SCO countries about the negative development of the situation in Afghanistan and the intention of the SCO to establish a specific consultative dialogue with Kabul." While the contact group included the members’ permanent representatives to the SCO, only a few events were ever held. Indeed, interest in the contact group was only really apparent from the Afghan side, which was looking for SCO assistance in rebuilding the Afghan economy and SCO participation in implementing various energy and transport infrastructure projects and creating favorable conditions for Afghan goods to access the markets of SCO countries. However, none of this was realized. The SCO states preferred, as they still do, to conduct relations with Afghanistan bilaterally, and did not support the efforts of the SCO Secretariat to intensify the work of the contact group. In 2010, Uzbekistan directly indicated its interest in building relations with Afghanistan exclusively on a bilateral basis and stated that it would no longer take part in the contact group. In June 2012, Afghanistan’s application for SCO observer status was granted. Yet this step was more symbolic and failed to...