The most closely watched development in Kazakhstan this June is the decision over which foreign company will be awarded the contract to build the country’s first nuclear power plant. According to earlier announcements, the Kazakh Atomic Energy Agency is expected to make its decision by the end of the month. Bidders from South Korea, France, Russia, and China remain in contention, although recent expert commentary suggests that earlier assumptions favoring Russia’s Rosatom may no longer hold.
Competing Interests Beneath the Surface
In Kazakhstan, there appears to be an internal struggle between two strategic camps with opposing visions for the project’s future. Each faction has its own backers, deeply embedded in the country’s nuclear ambitions.
One group, primarily composed of financial officials and economic policymakers, is advocating for the least expensive option. Their preferred bidder is China’s China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC), which is offering the lowest project cost, backed by Chinese bank financing. This group is influenced not only by CNNC’s competitive pricing but also by China’s broader economic leverage over Kazakhstan.
The second group consists of nuclear professionals, scientists, engineers, and technicians, who prioritize reliability and operational familiarity. Their preference leans toward Rosatom, given Russia’s historical involvement and established presence in Kazakhstan’s nuclear sector. This technical camp is widely viewed as a de facto ally of the Kremlin, as Rosatom’s participation would extend Moscow’s long-term strategic influence in Central Asia. Given the 50-60-year operational lifespan of such reactors, this influence would be enduring.
Though this tension remains speculative, patterns observed over the past decade suggest a real and ongoing tug-of-war.
No Thermal Power, No Nuclear Power?
At the end of May, media in Kazakhstan reported that Russia might not fulfill its commitments under a 2023 memorandum signed during President Vladimir Putin’s visit to Astana. The agreement with President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev concerned the construction of three coal-fired thermal power plants (TPPs) in Kokshetau, Semey, and Ust-Kamenogorsk, with Russian energy giant Inter RAO designated as the turnkey builder. The total cost was estimated at $2.8 billion.
However, in April 2024, First Deputy Prime Minister Roman Sklyar acknowledged financial hurdles. While design and preliminary work continue, difficulties remain in subsidizing equipment interest rates. Sklyar noted that a change in investor may be considered, and the situation could be resolved within a month.
Oil and gas expert Olzhas Baidildinov has speculated that the nuclear power plant project may be bundled with the thermal plants as a “social burden”, a condition that CNNC might accept more readily than Rosatom. “If CNNC is chosen to build the nuclear power plant, the thermal plants could follow as part of the package,” Baidildinov suggested via his Telegram channel.
Sergey Agafonov, head of the Kazakhstan Association of Energy Supply Organizations, also sees the nuclear and thermal plant projects as interconnected, particularly with regard to financing.
Debunking the Price Myth
The technical community has responded swiftly to growing narratives about CNNC’s supposedly unbeatable offer to construct the nuclear plant for $5.5 billion, a claim spread via Chinese sources.
Nuclear physicist Sayabek Sakhiev, Director General of the Institute of Nuclear Physics, called these figures implausible. Citing global construction costs, he estimated a realistic price range of $10-15 billion for such a facility. He noted that even a Chinese-built plant in Pakistan, completed in 2013, cost $9.1 billion, equivalent to $12.5 billion today after adjusting for inflation.
“Announcing that China can build 2.4 GW of nuclear capacity in Kazakhstan for $5.5 billion is simply untrue,” Sakhiev emphasized.
A Decision Rooted in Financing Power
Ultimately, the decision may not hinge on technical reliability or long-term geopolitical considerations, but on which bidder can shoulder the heaviest financial burden. If Kazakhstan has indeed conditioned the nuclear plant contract on the simultaneous construction of three coal-fired TPPs, a deeply unfashionable investment globally, then the financially stronger Chinese side is likely to emerge victorious.
In the end, the race for Kazakhstan’s nuclear future may be decided not by reactors, but by balance sheets.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the publication, its affiliates, or any other organizations mentioned.
