On August 26, special representatives on Afghanistan from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan met for the first time in Tashkent. The meeting resulted in the creation of a permanent regional platform: the Contact Group on Afghanistan.

This gathering was not only a continuation of commitments outlined in the joint statement from the most recent Consultative Summit of Central Asian heads of state, but also a step toward preparing for the next high-level format, scheduled for November in Tashkent.

Formally, Turkmenistan was absent. Available information suggests the reasons were purely technical. Ashgabat was ready to join and expressed support for the results through its foreign ministry channels.

The key outcome is that Central Asian states have, for the first time, shown their readiness to speak with one voice on an issue long shaped by competing external interests. This is not the start of forming a common position; that had already developed de facto in recent years. All Central Asian countries have supported trade and transit with Afghanistan, continued supplying electricity and food, and maintained working contacts with the Taliban, while avoiding extremes. The Tashkent meeting institutionalized this approach: parallel tracks have now shifted, cautiously, toward coordination. Informal unity has been formalized into a tool.

Unlike external players, who often cloak interests in grand rhetoric, Central Asia acts openly and pragmatically. The logic is simple: whatever is done for Afghanistan is, in fact, done for oneself. That is the distinctive feature of the regional approach – no ideological cover, no attempts to reshape Afghanistan.

Examples are straightforward. Electricity continues to flow even when payments are delayed – not as charity, but as an investment in security. A blackout in Afghanistan could trigger refugee flows and threats heading north. Exports of flour and fuel sustain Afghan markets but also expand outlets for Central Asian producers. Participation in trans-Afghan corridors is not a gift to Kabul but an opportunity for Central Asia to anchor itself in southern logistics routes.

Ultimately, every step “for Afghanistan” is primarily for the region itself. If Kabul ignores basic rules, cooperation will simply stop. In politics, there are no eternal friends, only eternal interests.

The new format does not yet imply collective pressure on the Taliban. Rather, it creates conditions for each country to conduct more substantive bilateral dialogue, but grounded in a shared position. Until now, Central Asia has mainly spoken to the Taliban about trade, transit, and infrastructure. The Contact Group now makes it possible to add another dimension: clarifying boundaries of what is acceptable on issues like extremism, border escalation, or water pressure. For now, “red lines” are unlikely, since the Taliban have not crossed them. The situation remains manageable, leaving room for constructive dialogue.

Equally important, the Contact Group is not a threat or ultimatum. Coordination is meant to expand opportunities for dialogue, not limit them. In the long run, this could evolve into a sustainable C5+A format. Afghanistan would then be integrated into regional frameworks not as a problem to be managed, but as a partner engaged in discussions on water, security, logistics, and the environment.

The issue for Central Asia is not who governs Kabul, but whether Afghanistan can function as a competent economic and political actor. What matters is adherence to accepted economic standards and integration into regional formats. For this reason, the C5+1 could become the backbone of future cooperation, regardless of regime.

The recent SCO summit in Tianjin illustrates this pragmatic approach. Its final declaration stated that Afghanistan should become an independent, neutral, and peaceful state, free of terrorism, war, and drugs, and that “the formation of an inclusive government with broad participation of representatives of all ethno-political groups of Afghan society is the only way to achieve lasting peace and stability in this country.” Central Asia, through the Contact Group, is advancing the same principle: cooperation is possible, but some issues are non-negotiable.

This regional subjectivity is also evident within multilateral organizations, particularly the SCO. The 2024 Astana Declaration enshrined Central Asia as the “core of the organization.” President Tokayev’s proposals – specialized SCO centers to tackle security threats, new infrastructure and humanitarian initiatives, and engagement with UN resources – demonstrate that the region is moving beyond declarations to building institutional mechanisms that could also involve Afghanistan.

Attempts to create broad international formats on Afghanistan have consistently stalled under the weight of competing interests. The Tashkent format is different: it is an intra-regional conversation, without outside players. Of course, disagreements remain within Central Asia itself. But the fact that states have created a permanent platform on an issue vital to them is already progress. It strengthens their international standing and tests their ability to overcome differences for a shared purpose.

Cautious optimism is warranted, though it is too early to judge effectiveness. Yet the need for such a platform has long been obvious. It allows the region to set its own agenda instead of waiting for outside decisions.

The new format is not altruism, but calculation: by helping Afghanistan, Central Asia strengthens its own stability. If the Contact Group enhances their ability to negotiate and act together, it will prove an important investment in the region’s future.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the publication, its affiliates, or any other organizations mentioned.