• KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00192 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10849 0.37%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0.28%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00192 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10849 0.37%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0.28%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00192 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10849 0.37%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0.28%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00192 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10849 0.37%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0.28%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00192 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10849 0.37%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0.28%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00192 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10849 0.37%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0.28%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00192 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10849 0.37%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0.28%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00192 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10849 0.37%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0.28%
11 December 2025

Uzbekistan Aims to Export 10-15 Billion kWh of Electricity to Europe by 2030

Uzbekistan plans to export 10-15 billion kWh of electricity abroad by 2030, according to Deputy Minister of Energy Umid Mamadaminov, who discussed the initiative in an interview on November 6 during the “Days of European Economy in Uzbekistan” forum.

“In 2030, electricity demand is projected to be around 120-125 billion kWh. Our generation capacity will reach approximately 135 billion kWh. Once the necessary infrastructure is ready, we’ll be able to export electricity to Europe,” Mamadaminov explained.

At a meeting in Astana in August, Uzbekistan outlined plans to start exporting surplus electricity to Europe by 2030. Energy Minister Jurabek Mirzamahmudov noted that if the joint project with Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan to lay a cable under the Caspian Sea is successful, Uzbekistan will be able to transmit excess energy to Europe. Mirzamahmudov said that renewable energy capacity would exceed 4 GW by the end of this year and is expected to reach over 20 GW by 2030, with 2-5 GW available for export.

In the summer, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan agreed on a draft strategic partnership to develop and transmit green energy. The agreement includes terms for a preliminary feasibility study, which is being developed by the Italian company CESI.

“We selected CESI to handle the project’s feasibility study,” Mamadaminov stated. “The study will take about a year and a half to complete, with an expected finish date by the end of 2025. Following this, construction will begin based on the study. The project requires around 2,500 km of HVDC (high-voltage direct current) cable, which will be costly—exceeding $2 billion.”

Mamadaminov added that the electricity price will be market-driven but is expected to start at around 4-5 cents per kilowatt.

Kazakhstan Sports Anticipates Influx of Russian and Belarusian Athletes

Kazakhstan’s lower house of parliament, the Mazhilis, has approved in its first reading a bill on physical culture and sports that would ban the funding of foreign athletes (legionnaires) from the state budget and national companies with government stakes. However, even if this bill is enacted, Kazakh sports teams will retain a legal avenue to invite athletes from Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) countries using public funds.

For the first time, Kazakhstan’s national legislature is proposing a provision prohibiting the use of state funds to finance athletes who are not citizens of Kazakhstan, with the goal of prioritizing Kazakh athletes in terms of both sports representation and financial support. Minister of Tourism and Sports Yerbol Myrzabasynov has also suggested setting a cap on state funding for professional sports clubs, which would vary by sport according to national priorities. “The freed funds will be redirected towards children’s and youth sports, including boarding schools, youth sports schools, sports reserves, and facility upgrades,” Myrzabasynov explained. The bill was approved in the first reading.

Currently, government funding for sports clubs in Kazakhstan comes from two main sources. Teams competing internationally, such as the Barys hockey team in the Continental Hockey League, the Astana basketball team in the VTB United League, and the Astana cycling team in the World Tour, receive support from the Samruk-Kazyna fund. Other teams in soccer, hockey, basketball, and volleyball competing in Kazakhstan’s national championships are funded by local budgets, with Astana’s soccer team – which also receives sponsorship from the Samruk-Kazyna fund – being the sole exception. Should the bill pass, these teams will need to rely on Kazakh athletes — or athletes from EAEU countries such as Russia, Belarus, Armenia, and Kyrgyzstan.

The Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union, enacted in January 2015, promotes the free movement of services, goods, capital, and labor across member states, ensuring equal labor rights and remuneration for citizens of EAEU countries. This treaty means that Kazakh clubs cannot restrict funding for athletes from EAEU nations without breaching international commitments. In Kazakh soccer, for instance, EAEU athletes are not counted as foreign players in the Premier League, a policy instituted after the Kazakhstan Football Federation set a limit on foreign players several years ago, capping each team’s roster at eight foreign players per season. Athletes from Russia, Belarus, Armenia, and Kyrgyzstan, however, are treated as domestic players due to Kazakhstan’s international obligations.

This arrangement stems from Kazakhstan’s Law on Legal Acts, which stipulates that ratified international treaties take precedence over national laws. Therefore, if the bill banning foreign athletes’ funding from the state budget is fully enacted, EAEU athletes will remain exempt from this ban. The bill must still pass through a second reading in the Mazhilis, two readings in the Senate, and obtain presidential approval before it becomes law.

Questions remains as to whether Kazakh sports clubs will use this provision to hire athletes from EAEU countries, given potential legal challenges. Local administrations (akimats) who would be affected by any restrictions on funding for Russian or Belarusian athletes could hypothetically encourage clubs to pursue legal action to establish a precedent for continued public funding of EAEU athletes. In Kazakhstan, court rulings carry nationwide legal authority, so a favorable decision would provide akimats with a legal basis to bypass any restrictions.

In Kazakh hockey, Russian players already comprise a significant portion of team rosters, ranging from a third (e.g., Karaganda’s Saryarka) to half (e.g., Petropavlovsk’s Kulager). In soccer, the presence of Russian and Belarusian players has been comparatively modest, though their numbers may rise sharply if this funding ban is enacted.

Alexander Shevchenko, Alexander Bublik, Elena Rybakina and Yulia Putintseva number among a pleyhora of tennis players who have switched nationality from Russia to Kazakhstan, with the latter three all having accepted support from the Kazakh tennis federation as teenagers.

Kyrgyz Politician Irina Karamushkina Detained on Suspicion of Offering Cash for Votes

Irina Karamushkina, a senior member of the Social Democrats party and a former deputy of Kyrgyzstan’s Parliament, the Jogorku Kenesh, has been detained in Bishkek on suspicion of buying votes ahead of local elections on November 17. The Social Democrats are one of about 20 parties whose candidates are registered in the elections.

According to the press service of the city’s police department, on November 13 an audio recording surfaced on social media in Kyrgyzstan, in which the chief of staff of the Social Democrats party, identified as “I.K.”, allegedly discussed vote buying with a person named “D.C.” ahead of Sunday’s elections.

In response, Bishkek police investigators launched a criminal case under Article 196 of the Kyrgyz Criminal Code, addressing election bribery. Later, the police distributed an audio recording allegedly capturing a conversation between Karamushkina and Daniyar Cholponbaev — the party’s candidate for deputy — where they appear to discuss offering bribes for votes.

The investigation found that “T.R.”, a trustee of the Social Democrats, and “I.K.” were involved in voter bribery, offering 1,000 Kyrgyz som ($12) per vote. During a search of the party headquarters, authorities seized lists indicating payments of 15,000 to 30,000 som ($175 to $350) to over 40 individuals, along with 28,300 som ($330) in cash, believed to be intended for offering bribes to voters.

“T.R.” and “I.K.” were detained as suspects and are being held in a temporary detention facility. The investigation is ongoing.
On November 13, police and special forces raided the Social Democrats’ headquarters, evacuating everyone from the premises. Party leader Temirlan Sultanbekov was taken in for questioning, and Karamushkina’s residence was also searched as part of the investigation.

Government Reports Steady Economic Growth in Kyrgyzstan

Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers Akylbek Japarov announced in parliament on November 14 that Kyrgyzstan’s GDP exceeded a historical high of 1.3 trillion KGS in 2023 and is projected to reach 1.5 trillion KGS ($17.35 billion) by the end of the year. Presenting the state budget execution for 2023 and the draft budget for 2025, Japarov reported a 9% real GDP growth rate for 2023, consistent with the growth rate in 2022. For context, Kyrgyzstan’s GDP growth was 7% in 2021.

Japarov offered a conservative forecast for 2024, predicting 9.2% GDP growth. “If we divide GDP per capita, then in 2020, this figure was $1,200, and in 2024, it will exceed $2,500,” he noted. The average monthly wage in Kyrgyzstan has risen steadily from $239 (20,249 KGS) in 2021 to $316 (26,620 KGS) in 2022 and $376 in 2023. By the end of 2024, it is expected to reach $415 (35,791 KGS).

From January to September 2024, Kyrgyzstan’s foreign trade volume was $12.1 billion, an 8.4% increase. Exports grew by 28.2%, totaling $2.8 billion, while imports rose by 3.7%, amounting to $9.3 billion.

Inflation has significantly decreased, dropping from 14.7% in 2022 to 7.3% in 2023, and reaching 4.2% from January to October 2024.
Japarov also highlighted the growth of Kyrgyzstan’s industrial sector, attributing it to investments and government support. By the end of 2024, more than 150 new enterprises are expected to open, with total investment projected at $2.2 billion and an estimated 19,000 jobs created.

Further, for the first time since independence, Kyrgyzstan has started producing cars, standard gold bars, and new types of medicines.
In the energy sector, Japarov reported that small hydroelectric power plants with a combined capacity of 48.3 MW were brought online in 2024. Additionally, solar and wind power projects are underway, alongside the reconstruction of the Toktogul hydroelectric power plant, the country’s largest.

Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Azerbaijan Forge Green Energy Partnership

On November 13, on the sidelines of the COP29 summit in Baku, Azerbaijan, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, Shavkat Mirziyoyev and Ilham Aliyev, the leaders of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan, signed an agreement for a strategic partnership in developing and transporting green energy.

Calling the signing of this agreement a historic event, Aliyev said that “it opens new opportunities for cooperation between the regions of Central Asia and the Caucasus. In fact, the integration processes, the processes related to transportation, energy, and trade between the regions of Central Asia and the Caucasus, allow us to say that these two regions are acting in a synchronized manner in many areas, including in the field of green energy development.”.

The Azeri president added that constructing an electric cable under the Caspian Sea could lead to broader regional collaboration.

Aliyev also highlighted Azerbaijan’s ongoing plans to construct a cable from Azerbaijan along the bottom of the Black Sea to Europe. “The feasibility study for this project is nearing completion, so we will connect Central Asia, the Caucasus, Europe, the Caspian, and the Black Seas with a single energy corridor,” he stated.

In his speech, Tokayev said the trilateral agreement opens new opportunities for integrating the energy systems of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Azerbaijan, as well as for creating reliable corridors to supply environmentally friendly energy to European and other markets. “Kazakhstan plays an extremely important role here as a large transit territory. The practical results of this Agreement will also contribute to developing the Middle Corridor as a ‘green bridge’ connecting our economies. Close cooperation in this key area will intensify the exchange of experience and advanced technologies between the three states and further strengthen our energy security,” Tokayev said.

Mirziyoyev emphasized the environmental significance of this agreement, noting, “The energy that will be transmitted is wind and solar energy, which will help mitigate the impact on the climate. In this way, we support joint efforts to protect the climate within the framework of the Paris Agreement and achieve the Sustainable Development Goals,” he added.

The three presidents also witnessed the signing of an Executive Program on cooperation in green energy development and transmission by the energy ministers of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Saudi Arabia.

After Long Search, Turkmenistan Finally Finds a New Gas Customer – Iraq

Turkmenistan is reconfiguring its natural gas export options. Despite holding the world’s fourth largest gas reserves, Turkmenistan is exporting less of its gas today than it was 16 years ago.

The big gas pipeline projects conceived nearly 30 years ago – a trans-Afghan pipeline to supply gas to Pakistan and India and a trans-Caspian pipeline to send gas to Europe – remain unfeasible for political reasons.

Russia has been a leading customer for Turkmen gas for most of those three decades, but now Russia is competing for some of the same buyers as Turkmenistan.

Stymied in its search for new markets at seemingly every turn, Turkmenistan is now planning on selling gas to Iraq, via a swap arrangement with Iran that includes bring Iranian companies to Turkmenistan to construct a new pipeline.

 

Running Out of Options

Turkmenistan is always looking for new gas customers. Iraq was never a potential gas buyer until recently, and in fact, the defunct Nabucco gas pipeline project of some 15 years ago considered Iraq to be a possible supplier of gas for Europe.

Turkmenistan’s deal with Iraq appears to be the only deal possible at the moment, and it is an interesting arrangement.

The two countries are not connected by any pipelines, so Turkmenistan will ship up to 10 bcm of gas to Iran, and Iran will send 10 bcm of its gas to Iraq.

Turkmenistan signed what was described as a “binding agreement” for gas shipments after Iraq agreed to “an advance payment scheme and tax concessions.”

In recent years, about 40% of Iraq’s gas imports came from Iran. After some 20 years of conflict, Iraq’s gas industry is still recovering, and gas imports are needed to operate the country’s power plants. However, sanctions on Iran made it difficult for Iraq to make payments for that gas.

 

A Rocky Gas History

There are already two gas pipelines connecting Turkmenistan’s gas fields to northern Iran.

At the end of December 1997, the 200-kilometer Korpeje-Kurdkui pipeline with a capacity of some 8 bcm of gas was launched. In January 2010, the Dauletabad-Sarakhs-Khangiran pipeline with a capacity of some 12 bcm started operation.

Turkmenistan was never close to shipping the 20 bcm combined capacity. Exports ranged from 6-8 bcm annually for years.

Iran usually paid for its Turkmen gas in barter, sending a variety of goods, from food to engineering goods and services to Turkmenistan.

In late 2016, a dispute developed between Turkmenistan and Iran over gas. Turkmenistan claimed Iran owed some $2 billion for gas supplies received in the winter of 2007-2008. Iran responded that Turkmenistan was inflating the price.

The winter of 2007-2008 was especially cold causing severe gas shortages in 20 Iranian provinces. One Iranian media outlet reported on December 31, 2016, “Turkmenistan pounced on the occasion to demand a nine-fold hike which yanked the price up to $360 from $40 for every 1,000 cubic meters of gas.”

On January 1, 2017, Turkmenistan halted gas supplies to Iran. The two countries took their cases to international arbitration, which was eventually settled in Turkmenistan’s favor in June 2020.

Since 2017, the two countries have cooperated in a swap agreement with Azerbaijan, but that only called for some 1 bcm of gas.

Turkmen and Iranian officials have been in talks on gas, but after nearly eight years, Turkmen exports to Iran have not resumed.

 

A Rare Contract

To ship 10 bcm of gas from Turkmenistan to Iran requires maintenance and repair on the two largely dormant pipelines connecting the two countries.

Iranian and Turkmen officials met in early July 2024 to sign a contract for the transfer of gas. That agreement called for “Iranian companies [constructing] a new 125-kilometer gas pipeline along with three gas pressure booster stations in Turkmenistan aimed at boosting annual shipments of gas to Iran to 40 bcm.”

The Iranian companies taking part in the project were not identified, but it is an unusual step for Turkmenistan. The only other foreign company to have a contract to build pipelines on Turkmenistan’s territory was the China National Petroleum Corporation for the three gas pipelines to China (Lines A and B – 15 bcm each, and Line C – 25 bcm).

Increasing shipments to Iran to 40 bcm requires construction of a new pipeline with a capacity of 20 bcm of gas, doubling the current combined capacity of the two existing pipelines.

Reports mentioned that increasing Turkmen gas shipments to Iran was a “long term” goal, but provided no timeframe.

Another matter that is unclear is only 10 bcm of that gas is going to Iraq. There was no information about the final destination of the remaining 30 bcm Iran plans to receive.

 

Not Much Choice

Turkmenistan has been trying to sell gas to anyone who would be interested. Among the countries Turkmen officials named just this year as potential customers are Azerbaijan, Turkey, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Kazakhstan, and vaguely, the European Union.

China is currently Turkmenistan’s main gas customer. Turkmenistan exports about 35 bcm to China via three pipelines with a combined capacity of 55 bcm that also run through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.

For nearly 20 years after independence in 1991, Russia was Turkmenistan’s main gas purchaser. Turkmen sold some 45 bcm of gas to Russia in 2008, which represents the zenith of Turkmen gas exports.

Russia drastically scaled back imports of Turkmen gas starting in 2009, and in July 2024 the two countries allowed their biggest contract, for 5.5 bcm, to expire after price negotiations failed.

This was not surprising since Russia has become Turkmenistan’s main competitor for regional customers.

After Russia launched its full-scale war on Ukraine, European countries responded by drastically cutting back on imports of Russian gas. Russia turned to Asian markets and signed deals to supply gas to Turkmenistan’s neighbors Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.

Worse, after several straight winters of power shortages, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are reorienting their gas production for domestic use. Each country has the right to pump up to 10 bcm of its own gas into the pipelines that cross through their territories running from Turkmenistan to China.

Since neither country is currently in a position to export its full allotment, Russia has a deal to take the spare capacity and ship its gas to China via the Turkmenistan-China pipelines, despite Turkmenistan having sufficient gas to replace Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan’s share of pipeline space.

Gas exports to Afghanistan remain improbable due to a lack of foreign investors. Turkey and Azerbaijan are enthusiastic about helping transit Turkmen gas to Europe, but the infrastructure still does not exist to accomplish this.

The 40 bcm referred to in reports about the recent Iran-Turkmen agreement could indicate Iran will be purchasing Turkmen gas again in the future, and in larger quantities than previously.

For now, however, the surest deal Turkmenistan is able to find to increase its gas exports is the agreement with Iraq. Whether this swap arrangement involving Iran can deliver the promised 10 bcm remains to be seen.